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Spaces, Places and States of Mind: a pragmatic ethnography of liminal critique. 
 
Eric Paul Weissman PhD.   
Concordia University, 2013. 
 
 Intentional homeless communities, such as tent camps and shantytowns are 
increasingly entering political and academic debates about how to solve homelessness. 
Dignity Village Oregon, the first city licensed, homeless-built democratically self-
governed, non-profit transitional housing community in US history, was the result of 
activists fighting for their rights to housing. It is central to debates about the role of 
homeless camps in various cities’ housing strategies.  The village has been criticized 
from within and by conventionally housed Oregonians for lack of sustainability, a series 
of impeachments of leadership, failure to transition people into conventional roles and for 
the drug epidemic that has much of the membership in its grip.  Theorized here as a by-
product of the intrinsic logical contradictions of democracy and the exigencies of poverty, 
villagers’ liminality; their suspension between marginal and conventional statuses has an 
implicit function in the poverty management strategies of the city by keeping them off the 
streets and preventing them from organizing further.  
 Liminal space and the critical potential of homeless populations are under-theorized.  
Employing an interdisciplinary approach open to critical diversity called pragmatic 
ethnography of critique (PEOC), this dissertation uses video, participant observation and 









how residents of such communities establish critical commitments to one another and 
housing activism.  
 Dignity’s twelve-years of struggle are praised by housing activists as evidence of a 
noble fight for the rights of the poor but critics present it as a lawless, drug infested 
failure that should be closed. Villagers fear eviction.  A solution is difficult to imagine. It 
is concluded that the village model is less satisfactory than conventional housing 
programs, but can have a temporary role in stemming homelessness. The village must 
engage in housing activism in order to empower itself in city politics.  A hybridized form 
of self-governing in which village leadership, homeless advocates and city planners 
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Fig. 1. Cover page of the Village Plan- and Excerpt of Mission Statement 2001. 
“…The Village will integrate itself within the city so as to be a contribution to the 
life of Portland, presenting a public face that will invigorate the life of adjoining 
streetscapes and public areas. Consistent with the structure of Dignity thus far, the 
Villagers will actively participate in the design and will literally build the phases of 
the Village through their own sweat-equity. The Public spaces will be designated, 
path and roadway infrastructure laid out, and the tent pods will be sited in 









Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
In this section, I introduce the general context of the research, discuss my thesis and 
develop my central debates, and then I discuss my methods and the periods of research 
covered by this dissertation. 
 
1.2 The General Context of Dignity Village 
 Each week, close to 146 million Americans have difficulty paying for at least one of 
the following: rent, food, clothing, medicine and transportation.1 In a country ranked 
seventh in per capita wealth by Forbes Magazine for 2012, 47 million people out of these 
146 million are considered by the US Government to live below the poverty line (NAEH 
2011; HUD 20012). Approximately 3 million of these people suffer from some form of 
homelessness, which might be temporary, episodic or chronic; the majority is urban, of 
ethnic minorities and male.2  Chronic homelessness, that is homelessness experienced 
multiple times or over extended periods, confounds housing authorities as a pervasive 
and historically troubling urban problem. Currently the United States federal government 
supports a Housing First and Rapid Re-housing approach to deal with the homeless 
problem. The former places homeless persons directly in apartments or other housing, 
sometimes with supports, before addressing issues of addiction or mental health that are 
frequently associated with the perpetual nature of this homelessness – housing first, 









because of lack of rent or loss of jobs by offering temporary rent relief and family 
assistance. Such preventive programs currently constitute the backbone of Ten-Year 
Plans to End Homelessness, a widely implemented national strategy initiated by the Bush 
Administration in 2003 and embraced by Obama’s “Opening Doors” program, and by 
now well established in the long term strategies most major cities pitch to federal funders 
for housing monies. Neither is currently effective at ending even sporadic homelessness. 
Chronic and literal homelessness, meaning that people have no shelter whatsoever, 
continue to baffle planners. 
  Very often, the chronically homeless have no choice but to pitch a tent, or to 
otherwise illegally inhabit empty urban spaces.   An historic tension between so called 
street-engaged homeless people and city governance places them at the mercy of police 
who arrest and jail homeless people for urinating in laneways, or for sleeping on 
sidewalks, leaving only the scant shelter offerings of charitable organizations and poorly 
run shelters that offer a finite number of beds and services. At times, out of sheer 
necessity, street engaged homeless people group together and occupy bridge underpasses, 
abandoned buildings or parks in order to “squat” and establish places to sleep and 
congregate3.  In most cities, police and municipal workers sweep such camps within 72 
hours of posted warnings of trespass (DePastino 2003; Mitchell 2003; National Law 
Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2007, 2012; Mosher 2010).  One can argue then 
that American cities have not been kind to squatters and homeless tent camps except 









such camps were seen as temporary, secondary alternatives to “proper” or conventional 
housing (DePastino 2003). 
  At the national level, due in large part to rapacious foreclosure actions in the U.S. 
in recent years that continue to spike the numbers of persons entering homelessness for 
the first time4, a growing number of municipal governments have had to learn how to 
incorporate tent camps and large-scale homeless squats into their homeless management 
strategies 5  but outside of ten-year planning language. Since my last participant 
observation fieldwork for this dissertation in the emergency transitional housing camp 
Dignity Village, Portland in 2011, the cities of Seattle, Washington, Eugene and Ashland, 
Oregon, San Francisco and Sacramento, California have formed alliances with housing 
activists and homeless people to explore the possibility of building transitional housing 
camps or for extending the rights of those camps and shelters already in the midst of 
critical displacements, that is, in the midst of establishing themselves through protest, 
direct action and court battles within local strategic emergency housing policies. 
Communities specifically built around an organizational goal are called intentional 
communities; in this case, the organizing categories are emergency and transitional 
housing. Homeless tent camps, shantytowns and tent cities are all intentional 
communities. 
 This trend towards negotiation and consideration is neither predictable nor 
consistent. Political shifts on city councils, bad press from camps, and failed action by 









in actually incorporated homeless communities or merely extend the debate that has been 
going on for many decades. In cases, and as recently as June 2013, the city of Seattle has 
decided to abandon some of its currently “tolerated” temporary camp models such as the 
infamous “Nickelsville” (discussed later) in favor of conventional housing projects while 
Eugene, Oregon has just christened its first city sanctioned camp, “Opportunity Village,” 
which is expected to start hosting residents in August of 2013. That the debate exists is 
evidence that the numbers of people who need help transitioning from homelessness into 
stable roles in society, understood here as a liminal transition is a major social problem.  
 Liminal is a descriptive concept brought into the social sciences in 1908 by 
Arnold Van Gennep.  Liminal describes the transitional stage in the life of individuals 
when they are removed from antecedent social contexts and roles on the way to 
achieving new ones. He called these “rites of passage.” In recent years, some attention 
has been paid to the liminal nature of homelessness, and to homeless people as liminal 
personae, Victor Turner’s (1969) name for members occupying spaces of liminality like 
festivals or ritual processes (Turner 1969, 1985; Baumhol 1996; Hopper and Baumhol 
2004; Leginski 2007; Weissman 2012). Understood as “liminality,” the quality of being 
liminal has common usage in the social sciences, a use which extends beyond 
anthropology into many areas of social and cultural analysis (Myerhoff 1982; St. John 
2001; Harper and Baumhol 2004; Topinka 2010). Liminal mental and physical spaces are 
dark and suspicious, ambiguous and feared.  People stuck in liminal phases or going 









successful because their transition to expected roles and status is not complete. Turner 
suggested that inverting and experimenting with roles and statuses was vital to social 
structural stability, and he envisioned a ludic and experimental space for this called 
“communitas” (1967).  Communitas however is a temporary space like those found in 
festivals or performances, and does not bear the mantle of responsibility for transiting 
people from ludic to real statuses.  Homelessness is rarely ludic, and increasingly 
permanent.  In the West, liminality amongst the homeless is under-theorized6 but we 
know that length of homelessness is associated with the severity of addictions, mental 
illness, physical disabilities and high mortality rates (NCH 2011; NAEH 2012; HUD 
2012).  Since few examples have been established, our knowledge of how the struggle 
for intentional homeless communities helps people transcend liminality is weak.  As 
spaces designed to facilitate transition from marginal to conventional statuses, such 
communities are liminal spaces, and so in order to theorize their role in the world of 
homeless strategies, we must confront ambiguity and diversity as the basis for 
meaningful social critique. This is no mean task.   
 Dignity Village is the primary site of this research. Established on the outskirts of 
Portland in 2001, it resulted from the collective critical action of housing activists who 
rallied together, exploited a loophole in state law, and won the right to a democratically 
self-governed emergency campground. The village’s mission is to house homeless 
people, help them get a footing back into conventional roles and to continue to fight for 









shacks, on two acres of swept off composting tarmac, next to an airport, a prison and a 
shipping depot.  As the first and longest running city sanctioned, legally contracted 
emergency homeless camp in the US, the village is part of the ongoing debate about the 
place of intentional communities in the housing strategies of American cities.  The 
continuum of debate over Dignity Village has always viewed the site as a lawless 
community of reckless and incapable junkies at one end, and as noble homeless activists 
fighting for the rights of the homeless at the other.  In the past, the latter perspective has 
been the one that those of us interested in housing as a matter of social justice, wanted to 
see. We have observed how empowering social struggle is, even for the poorest amongst 
us, and how community building helps people transcend feelings of despair and 
disconnect (Weissman 2005; Biswas-Diener and Diener 2006; Mosher 2010; Weissman 
2012).  In 2010, when I began my fieldwork in Dignity Village, I had wanted to see how 
it was that community helped marginalized and homeless people reclaim their lives. I had 
theorized that political participation in the activist critique of the village helped people to 
overcome the limbo that homelessness had imposed on them. What I found was a 
community where any noble actioning of needs had long since faded away, a village 
where people spent more time fighting with one another than the political and economic 
system that produced their poverty, and where they had all but forgotten their historic ties 
to housing activism in the Oregon area.  It was a disappointment to me. It was not the 
case that villagers were incapable or unwilling to express critical attitudes. They were all 









fact, they have been so busy fighting with themselves that they have let the community 
slide in important ways.  They do not live up to the reporting or fiduciary requirements 
laid out in their contract with the city; they have an ineffective government; they 
transition people from the village, but usually back into homelessness and they have been 
in the grips of a drug epidemic for the last four years.  These various problems, and there 
are others, give weight to critics of the village model, despite what we want to see, and 
contribute to what I call the crisis of community at Dignity Village, one that is 
characterized by a deep and enduring state of perpetual liminality.   In the last year, the 
city of Portland has begun to pressure the village to perform according to the contract 
and other codes it signed in 2001, and which were ratified in the official agreement in 
2007.  News of the drug epidemic has reached the police, the city housing bureau and the 
press.  The village wants now to know what it can do to empower itself.  The answer 
seems quite simple: struggle, resist and make claims about the village’s collective rights.  
But the potential for this to happen is complicated and constitutes the conundrum that 
undergirds my thesis. 
 
1.3 A Thesis 
 My goal is to establish an ethnographic mode of social critique that I call 
pragmatic ethnography of critique (PEOC), which considers elements of macro and 
micro critical approaches in order to explain the potential for critical action produced in 









another, villagers feel they have no need to engage in broader debates because they have 
until very recently been content to view the village as a self-contained world where they 
had a certain tenure. Furthermore, as a democratically structured corporation, the village 
forces people to align with others over matters of a political nature, so that their political 
horizon is extremely limited.  As village citizens, they are so busy navigating the 
precariousness of their tenure in the village social structure that broader issues of social 
justice that used to guide the community as a whole, no longer exist for them.  Based on 
the Foucauldian proposition that “critical discourses do not merely function as an 
ideological glaze on top of a fixated power differential, but rather they can function as 
the tactical instrument to enable a critical alternative to become a new form of power” 
(Larsen, 2011:43), a second goal of this dissertation is to consider what exactly happens 
to social critique when homeless communities win the right to legally occupy city space? 
Legal occupation suggests that whatever action was taken has been reformulated by 
authorities of the state into some entity that is rational within its own strategies of 
housing governance, and this makes me question what happens to justice-driven social 
critiques when the powers of state and claimants collide, and resistance, which happens 
on each side, is transformed into a compromise.  
 For Dignity Village Oregon, this has meant adopting codes and regulations on the 
spatial and social aspects of the village that are hard to live up to, and so the village is 
always on the verge of failure in the eyes of its critics.  Rather than striving for its 









regulatory pressure to live within the guidelines of a transitional housing camp, which 
was the compromise served to them by the city, questions just how alternative is the 
community, and how reachable are its goals.  It has come to be a between-world, a 
marginalized space for people stuck between the streets and conventional lives.  I ask the 
reader to consider that the rise of Dignity Village Oregon, has not been emancipating but 
constraining in important ways for those who have come to live there because democracy 
limits freedom to a certain way of achieving it that requires the domination of others, is 
not radical, not activist, and certainly not a threat to critics of the village. But the most 
threatening aspect of this liminality to the villager is its perpetual nature, a state of limbo 
they rarely transcend.  In a small utterly poor world, roughly 2 acres in size and out on 
the outskirts of a major city, if this democracy fails, and the city shuts it down, then 
people will have no choice but to return to the streets. The stakes are higher here than 
most people imagine.  The final point I want to argue is that the only way for the village 
to surpass its liminality and to become powerful in this debate, is to reclaim its active 
role in the social critique of housing and to fight for the land, resources and services that 
can make it a functioning community once more.  Community ties with conventional and 
activist groups, as types of social relations, are the roots of power. PEOC contributes to 
the building of this power, and to villagers’ critical capacity, by helping villagers bring 
diverse ways of seeing the village and the alternatives available to it into a strategy of 
empowerment.  









1.4 Portland and Dignity Village – Conditions of Possibility 
 Recently and since the economic crisis of 2007-2008, what some homeless 
activists and critics describe as the Great Recession7, leniency towards grassroots 
responses to homelessness like tent camps and shantytowns has been only slightly 
warmer, but warmer still, especially in Oregon, where there is a tradition of grassroots 
communitarian responses to poverty.8 Oregon’s longstanding resource economy and vast 
wild territories fostered a legendary hobo and migrant worker economy spanning much 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries; for labor, camping and travelling to seasonal work 
was common, and historically high and fluctuating unemployment rates have over time 
merged into a common value system or symbolic imaginary9, a concept borrowed from 
Jacques Lacan ([1971] 2002), by Castoriadis (1987) and Wright (1997); a symbolically 
shared system of (urban) identities and attitudes towards the use of space that in this case, 
understands rough sleeping and impoverished shelter communities as part of Oregon 
lore.10  
 Portland, Oregon is a city of 598,000 people. As the largest urban centre in the 
state, it has borne the brunt of demands for social services in a period of economic 
recession and rising poverty rates not seen there since the early 1960’s when Johnson’s 
National War on Poverty was declared.  In Oregon, since the last recession of 2008, 
120,000 people crossed into poverty bringing the total to 596,000, slightly smaller than 
the population of Portland, and nearly double the population of Oregon’s next two largest 









close to 47 million people. Oregon’s poverty rate sits above the national average, at close 
to 15.8%.  Those living in deep poverty, that is for example, a family of three, earning 
less than 8687.00 a year is almost 7.2 percent of Oregonians.  Poverty is worse in Oregon, 
as it is in most places, if you are non-white.  White, non-Hispanic poverty sits at about 
13.1%, while for persons of colour, it skyrockets to 23.1% for Native Americans, 28.8 % 
for Latinos, and 39.0 % for Blacks. The number of children in poverty increased to 1 in 5 
by 2010 or from 16.9% to 21.6% (Oregon Center for Public Policy, Fact Sheet 2011).  
With such a widespread distribution of poverty, it is not too hard to imagine that the 
problem of homelessness is difficult to define or to measure in static or uniform terms, in 
Oregon generally, and Portland, especially.12  
 Portland in particular has a strong grass roots environmental and communitarian 
tradition and has enjoyed a creative artistic urban imaginary that includes community 
based alternative cooperatives like City Repair and the Village Building Convergence 
that have been questioning the monopoly of urban space by the wealthy for over twenty 
years.13  These groups periodically occupy abandoned lots and build communal gardens, 
take control of neighborhood streets, transforming them into parkettes and communal tea 
stations, and are champions of the emerging “tiny house movement.”14 Historically faced 
with high numbers of homeless residents, camping and squatting in the Portland area 
have not been uncommon. In June 2013, Dignity Village celebrated 12 years as an avatar 
of the emotional and protracted debate about the place of emergency intentional 









every time the city announces proposals to extending the village’s contract, or when the 
village is up for Fire Department and other city led inspections. Contract negotiations are 
lengthy and pit different internal factions and visions of the village against one another.  
As recently as August 12, 2013, a local and militant activist15 in the Portland area has 
decided to expose the village’s ongoing epidemic drug problems to the city and the press 
because she thinks it will make them “get on track.”  As I try to conclude this dissertation, 
I am receiving emails, phone calls and Facebook chats imploring me to advise various 
people associated with the village about how to deal with the scrutiny and critique the 
village is going to face as a result.   This is something I deal with in my conclusions, but 
I think it is very important to recognize the kind of relationship this suggests exists 
between the villagers and me. This research is part of their struggle as much as an 
indictment of their village in many ways. It is also important because if the village closes, 
as they fear, 56 people are back on already congested and troubled streets where based on 
single night street counts, as many as 2000 people per night seek shelter (June 14 2013, 
Portland Mercury Newspaper).  
 Between 2010 and 2012, the period in which my fieldwork was done, the number of 
people identified by the Portland Housing Bureau’s various street counts, as “literally 
homeless” increased by 7% or from 2,542 to 2, 727 or .45%.  This number created by the 
US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) refers to people living 
unsheltered, or in hostels or vouchered in motels and, because it is difficult to measure, is 









herein as a collection of empty urban spaces, temporary shelters and impermanent 
housing that I discuss in the following chapters.  At the time of this writing, the number 
is estimated to be as high as double that amount.   By the broadest definition employed 
by other government agencies including the US Department of Education, the number 
increased from 14, 451 to 15, 563, figures that include people couch surfing or doubling 
up on housing due to economic hardship. This larger figure is more difficult to accept for 
those concerned with the general well being of people.  It is a high number, about 2.62% 
and more than twice the national average of people without housing, although once again, 
such numbers are hard to pin down, and are presumed to be much higher.  Still, Portland, 
a city with one of the highest per capita poverty rates in the US, and this long history of 
“seeing” homeless persons camped out, struggles with this ever-increasing presence. 
 A recent column in the Oregonian Newspaper, a popular news entity, which is often 
critical of the Village, stated that Portland is over run by homeless people not because 
local folks are losing their jobs, but because Portland has become a symbolic magnet for 
transient homeless people from across the state and the nation (Pindyck, E., September 1, 
2012).16 He states,  
It’s not because of the temperate weather, or local demands for housing, but the problem 
it seems, has more to do with our collective attitudes than anything else (ibid).  
 
 Echoing the sentiments of some of Portland’s conservative housed citizens, the 
columnist’s position is that this permissive idealism exists as a mode of thinking that 
needs to be reconfigured in order to control and stem the rise in the population of 









programs and jails, and for them, it is acceptable if not inevitable to see worst-off cases 
on the streets, if only to roust them from bench to bench: the problem is attitudes, not 
numbers.  
 On the other extreme of opinion are activist websites like the Portland Occupier17 
and grassroots magazines like Street Roots18 that fight for the rights of the poor and 
homeless.  Their argument is that permissiveness is actually a kind of recognition of 
human rights and basic needs for the poor, and that communities and the state have a 
responsibility to help them.  This imaginary questions the privy status of the wealthy in 
urban spaces. Furthermore, “guardians” of this permissiveness, argue that the homeless 
have the right to help themselves by occupying city space and building camps because 
the American Constitution grants them the right to shelter, and because the help they 
deserve is not forthcoming.  This position echoes the popular position espoused in 
current state “Homeless Bill[s] of Rights” which seek to table and establish legislative 
sanctions in favor of the poor such as, repealing anti-loitering laws, outlawing 
discriminatory zoning and rental practices that exclude the homeless and their 
organizations and other practices that violate the rights of the poor.19 These Bills of 
Rights currently exist as law only in Rhode Island and Connecticut, but are being 
explored in various states, including Oregon and California, as a means to ensuring the 
rights of the homeless to use city space and services. Even though such “Bills” have not 
proven completely successful yet, lawmakers are being asked to recognize that there is 









   I use the term “imaginaries” often, or variations of it, such as “urban imaginaries.” 
Castoriadis (1987) and Wright (1997) each invoke a Marxian lens in crafting imaginaries 
in which the material value of space and of social behaviour in spaces, or one might say, 
lived experiences, varies widely between urban and other locations. Wright in particular 
demonstrates that current attitudes towards the use of urban space are the results of 
mediations over time between competing views on acceptable reality and spatial values 
under late neoliberal capitalism (1992, 1997, 2000). This is not to say that spatializations 
of poverty such as homeless camps are widely accepted as legitimate (that is, legally and 
politically acceptable) forms by members of conventional imaginaries, even in Oregon. It 
is more apt to suggest that they are understandable in the symbolic and imaginary 
concepts Oregonians use to organize their feelings and ideas about poverty, constitutional 
rights and community uses of space, because that use, this “permissiveness,” has 
historical roots that people understand, even if they disagree with it on moral or other 
grounds.  
 This goes for homeless Oregonians as well. Since Dignity Village emerged, urban 
developers and others for whom city space is a matter of capital investment have 
increasingly questioned the validity of this use of space for housing the poor in non-
profit organizations, of which Dignity Village is one example.  It is a tension between 
these views on space - for profit as investment versus for people as a basic right - that 
provides a central critical dynamic to debates about intentional communities for the 









where space is a commodity (Castells 1983; Harvey 2008). Most critics of the village 
would be delighted if it managed to live up to its mandate as a transitional community 
with a moral duty and legal mission to help wayward souls back into the fold.  Villagers 
would be deserving of the space, that is, if they earned it, by doing something positive for 
society, instead of being lazy and doing drugs, which is the common perception of the 
village amongst conservative critics like the writer mentioned earlier. 
 Under neoliberalism, deserving subjectivities are very much interpreted in terms of 
economic before other roles.20 Conservative imaginaries want the village to live up to its 
transitional promise and return homeless people to self-governed lifestyles. This has been 
a common criticism regardless of the city setting of the spaces set up for the homeless; 
shelters, transitional housing, rehabs, and other “workfare” projects.  Hence Fairbanks Jr. 
(2004) has established the appeal of using Foucault’s (1991) governmentality critique for 
understanding tolerance for spatializations of service for the poor.  Governmentality, 
understood here as the range of techniques employed by government to produce self-
regulating subjects, is a critical anchoring point for my research for many reasons, but at 
this juncture, I point out only that Foucault argued that suitable self-conduct, that is the 
government of one’s self, was a basic requirement of neoliberal citizenship, as a certain 
expression of freedom. In Dignity’s case, there are critics who reject it as a failure 










 I will discuss a union between pragmatic, critical and reflexive ethnographic field 
methods as the core of the PEOC.  Culling some useful ideas from Critical Theory, 
Critical Sociology and Critical Realism, I will show why choosing a single approach is 
difficult and unwise in looking at liminal spaces and experiences. I end up at a theoretical 
model that unites these elements in the gaps left open by pragmatic sociology of critique 
and Foucault’s governmentality critique, before suggesting a spatial-temporal critical 
model open to diversity and permutation, because it seems to me after all, that successful 
social critiques have unpredictable and dynamic results and that they inhere qualities we 
often don’t recognize by trying to slot them into narrow critical frames. Since the claim 
we are examining here emplaces ideas about freedom and democracy in a spatial 
argument - for land, I see some sense, here at least, to enter a sort of hybridized spatial 
critique. After looking at the historical conditions that afforded the critical displacement 
by Dignity activists, I conclude by examining what the village might look like if different 
critical positions get their ways, and how the process of doing this research has impacted 
the critical capacity of the village. 
 Currently, as of August 12, 2013, the city of Portland has issued an ultimatum to the 
village based on its failure to meet eleven points of its contract.  The morale of the 
village is at an all time low and the leadership is seriously considering the number of 
days that the village might have left.  As the village struggles to identify solutions to this 









identify critical courses of action out of liminality and into more powerful places in the 
broader community. 
 
1.5 Method and Periods of Study 
 My interest is interdisciplinary. In my research oriented, work, I use archival film 
and video footage, archival photographs and documents, video interviews, field notes, 
drawings, photography, email, chat rooms, blogs, web archives, and Skype interviews as 
ways of collecting and sharing ideas in the field and while away.  My primary method is 
to watch the video I shot in the field, to listen to the recorded conversations I have had 
over the net or on the phone, and to transcribe parts of these and my many pages of field 
notes that speak to the issues I raise in this dissertation.  
 There were four periods stretched out over 12 years that contribute to this work. I 
began studying Dignity Village in 2001 when I was working on my film series Subtext 
(2003, 2005, 2008) about Toronto’s shantytown, Tent City.  At that time I was sent video 
recordings made by Kwamba Productions, an Oregon documentary team who were 
chronicling the rise of the village. Their video archives, our conversations and 
correspondences, and hearsay from nomadic homeless activists, who I met in Toronto, 
over the next seven years, provided me with my only knowledge of the village.  By 2009, 
however, the village websites, numerous articles and media reports of the village had 
appeared and so I digested those.  As I crafted various cuts of my own documentary 









Dignity Village became more remarkable as an enduring historical form of intentional 
housing. This period constitutes the first of four periods. 
 The second period was my two-week non-participant observation in June to July 
of 2010 when I visited Portland and the village as a way to understand what might be 
gained by embedding there in the following year for long-term participant observation. In 
that first visit I shot 20 hours of video, took notes and made vital connections with the 
village leadership.   In the interim, I read the bulk of studies and literature that are 
reviewed in later chapters.  I also made frequent calls and shared many emails with the 
leadership as a way to stay in touch and to understand the political climate before I 
reentered. 
 The third period was my 6 - week participant observation during June and July of 
2011 during which time I lived in a small shack in the village.  It was the first time any 
researcher of the village had done so. I had anticipated staying up to three months, but 
after five weeks, I felt the village was mentally and physically unsafe for me.  I address 
this in due course, later.  I shot over 70 hours of footage wrote many field notes and 
collected samples of writing and art produced by villagers. I did not use surveys, 
questionnaires or formal interviews of any kind. Villagers were leery of such practices. I 
did not form focus groups or reenact any acts or performances associated with life at the 
village.  I did film everything I could, including daily routines, personal unstructured 
interviews, business and membership meetings, excursions to other activist meetings and 









requirement and in addition to paying for a few needed village resources such as propane, 
I was asked to help with contracts, political strategies and filming testimonies that might 
be used as a village promotional video (the video was not produced21). In addition to the 
villagers, I filmed the participation of many supporters and did interviews with them.  I 
collected samples of the documents that encode the village including the contract, 
mission statement and other plans and regulations that are meaningful to villagers. They 
are included in part in this text. At every opportunity we discussed the nature of living in 
the village, reviewed footage together and worked closely together when (Nigel Dickson 
came down to take photos of the village for our collaborative book, Dignity in Exile – 
Stories of Struggle and Hope from a Modern American Shantytown (2012).  In that book, 
I discuss the basic themes that I was imagining en route to this dissertation, and present 
transcriptions of filmed conversations and interactions I had with villagers. Some of 
those appear in an abridged form in this dissertation, as do some of Nigel’s photos. 
Nigel’s photos of the people and the place offer a character driven image record of the 
village, just as my approach to the book, and to my fieldwork is sometimes described as  
 Conversational ethnography (go to  - http://tinyurl.com/BooktrailerEricWeissman). 
 I want to make a clarification here, an important one.  Mosher (Kwamba) identifies 
her work in the village as a community psychology informed public ethnography 
(Dissertation Support DV 1: Kwamba: intro Henceforth: DS DISC 1, part 1).  According 
to Gans (2010),  
Since ethnography is arguably the kind of sociology of most appeal to the lay public, 









of public sociology. Public ethnography differs from academic ethnography when its 
sites and subjects are relevant to what the lay public wants and needs to know, and when 
it is written in non technical English.” 
 
 Public ethnographies use various combinations of art, film, digital media, visual and 
audioscapes; in short whatever works to capture the diversity of unique, but always, field 
oriented experience. I try to make my work open to a variety of disciplines and accessible 
to most readers.  The debate between public ethnography/anthropology and applied 
schools of anthropology/sociology seems to hinge on the former being more open to 
other disciplines and to a broader public audience. Both these applied and public forms 
try to link study with practice aiming to resolve concrete and practical issues that have 
implications for persons, and the public as a concern for just social change (McGranahan 
2006; Borofsky 200422).  
 In applied anthropology, the specialization of the anthropologist tints the lens by 
which their public oriented work is discussed. A debate of the two forms would be a 
thesis in itself.   I mention it here because I have been asked to define my work by many 
scholars, students and other readers of my work or audiences of my films. While I 
recognize the discomfort ambiguity suggests, I have a hard time explaining to them what 
being a social scientist means. It’s “kind of the MacGyver” of the academic world, 
someone once said. I wrote Dignity in Exile with a broader readership in mind, but the 
manner in which data and the conversations were arrived at is the same for this 
dissertation.  Both use the same video as a record of the fieldwork, and in support, so 









videos that show the things to which I speak. Still, Dignity in Exile, with its simpler 
language, emphasis on stories and storytelling and photography, its broader appeal to 
non-academic audiences, and its critique of housing policies, if one accepts a public 
ethnographic or anthropological form, is that kind of ethnography.  
 In this dissertation, I interrogate the deep structure of ideas, philosophies, critique 
and methods as well as the world I was studying and informing in much greater detail.  
Borofsky (2007) has said that public anthropology not only preaches holism, it seeks to 
understand how anthropology can be made more holistic. Furthermore he says 
anthropologists need to transcend their specialties, speak to broader and cooperative 
attachments with other disciplines, and that the truth lies in what people say. To me, this 
seems like another reconstruction of post-structural anti-foundationalism, which is a 
good thing, a sort of social scientism au courant, but not unlike the model you will read 
in chapter three, and which I call pragmatic ethnography of critique.  That is not to say 
that the ideals he and other public anthropologists express are not valid; solving social 
justice problems though the informed lens of the actor herself is a good thing, but I am 
lost quite frankly, in how an anthropologist does that differently than any concerned 
social scientist whose interest is social justice, and who uses participant observation or 
fieldwork.  It’s what I am trying to do here. He finally argues that a definition of public 
anthropology will be vague, and the goal is to foster conversation about what it might 
ideally mean. I am presenting PEOC as part of this larger conversation. Though the field 









to slot my work in that or other categories.  My hope is to open our disciplines to see 
diversity rather than simplicity, and to that end I imagine there will be overlaps with 
most disciplines.   Chapter three identifies my work with critical and reflexive modes of 
fieldwork, and ethnography, video and ethical storytelling, and I will leave the debate 
over what kind they might be to others.   
 This is an interdisciplinary approach that bridges oral history with (at least) 
participant observation, ethnographic film and video, cultural geography, 
communications, media studies, anthropology, sociology and social theory. As a 
pragmatic approach, PEOC is a highly subjective mode of inquiry, which elaborates on 
the way villagers understand their history, current circumstances and views about the 
future.  This is also a very personal form of ethnography - our conversations are frank, 
and not always easy, and I do not hide my personal ethical commitment to some of the 
participants or their issues. The way I transcribe and re-present field moments is strongly 
linked to the oral history tradition. Steven High has written,   
We therefore try to see the past through the eyes of someone else – coming to an 
understanding of “their truths.” This development represents a fundamental shift in 
perspective. Instead of mining for data, oral historians now approach the interview as a 
life story narrative. We have learned that there can be a great deal of meaning in the form 
and structure of oral narratives, as well as in the information provided (March 2011, 
accessed online August 4, 2013). 
 
 I don’t mine the stories or code them looking for patterns of semantic or rhetorical 
structures, so my observations and analysis are in a way, yet another story being told on 
top others. The main source data for this storytelling are the 90 or so hours of audio and 









these other “official” visualizations of the rational systems of the village. Analyzed 
together, they provide a good sense of how the irrational and the rational compete in the 
messy context of a liminal space.  This is not a neatly packaged dissertation.  As I said, it 
is interdisciplinary and this takes on a somewhat organic form in the way I write about 
the village.  This research raises more questions than it answers and nudges students of 
homeless camps to look at their own critical attitudes as much as those they study. 
 The fourth part of this research has been the dozens of hours of phone and video 
conferencing between the villagers and me.  Sometimes these were one-on-one private 
conversations, and other times, group calls. The material collected in this virtual 
participant observation was preserved on digital audio recordings.  During this period I 
sent a camera and tapes to the village and asked villagers to film what they thought 
would be important (e.g. www.youtube.com/watch?v=tRrUJdmnJZw). This period was 
an important part of the ethnographic process because after writing Dignity in Exile… I 
repatriated several copies to the village hoping for commentary. I received numerous 
responses and the book had the effect of shifting some of the villagers’ self-perceptions, 
which they felt needed to be included in this dissertation. Furthermore, partly because of 
the stir caused by the book (and especially the moving photos taken by Nigel Dickson) 
and spurred by a series of subsequent city-village contract negotiations, the village has 
used me as a resource and an advisor and these interactions have been recorded as well.  
 In ways, these last two years since the fieldwork have been more pivotal for the 









spent in situ. I have reimagined my entire project to accommodate the pragmatic 
dimensions of the ethnography as a result of these later interactions.  As of this writing, 
the village and its supporters, including me as an advisor, are engaged in a process of 
deep and troubling critical examination that confronts the question of how to heal the 
community en masse of its addictions.  This healing is required because the village will 
be entering yet another series of contract negotiations where this collective health 
problem is expected to be used as a means to end the village experiment. As much as I 
wanted to step out of the role of a participant and write this work from a position of 
detachment and reflection, events that tie my work to the village’s ongoing process of 
critique prevent this exteriority. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
 In chapter two, I introduce the concepts and arguments that undergird this 
research and I flesh out my argument in more detail.  I discuss the classic confrontation 
between capital and the homeless as a question of the willingness of Portland’s city 
leadership to listen to the people on the streets, or to the business districts that are 
threatened by them. Then I use a conversation I had with one of the ex-founders of the 
village to discuss the implications of self-run democratic governance in a place where 
people don’t know how to govern. Democracy sounds like a noble organizing principle 
but in the village’s case, it has led to powerful factions and a complete incapacity to 









critical action that led to the village was based on a less radical critique than other 
activists at the time had wanted, and so the village from the very beginning has 
represented a co-option or compromise of the social critique that spurred it on. I discuss 
liminality in more detail. I also suggest that critique need to be understood for its 
temporal qualities as it shifts and morphs over time.  In a sense then, when we talk of 
critique we are also looking at the liminal or transitional experience of subjects becoming 
political. In this light, the stagnation of the village right now might only mean that 
critique is stalled, and if this is so, the village might have another chance, if the people 
can become politically motivated.  I make the suggestion that the mundane critiques that 
occur between villagers are in part anticipated by the city as an indirect form of creating 
this liminal space, one which is more easily controlled than a thriving activist community.  
That means that the city understood how difficult it would be just to survive under the 
conditions they gave the community, and as some of the discussions you will read 
suggest, the city is just sitting back and waiting for the village to fail. So I suggest a 
PEOC as a means to understanding what the villagers want from their community 
experience and establishing means to achieving such ends. 
 In chapter three, I examine how reflexive and critical forms of ethnography unite 
with pragmatism in a PEOC. I theorize ethnographic fieldwork as an act in the 
Bakhtinian sense, and also as a type of critique.  By correlating the critical and 
ethnographic elements of my work with a certain pragmatic vision, I suggest ways that 









the process of doing analysis with participants. As much as we are looking to understand 
how critical attitudes happen in the village, we are also exploring how this research has 
been part of the creation of those attitudes. While Dignity Village is the primary site, my 
research today is attached to 12 years spent doing research on the streets of Toronto, two 
of those at the failed shantytown, Tent City.  I find it impossible to separate that 
fieldwork, and my prior battle with addictions and homelessness from this current 
enterprise.  It was those two events that led to my critical position towards intentional 
homeless communities and my interests in ethnographic storytelling. 
 In keeping with the reflexive and autoethnographic elements of my model, in chapter 
four, I discuss how my early fieldwork on the streets of Toronto and relevant literature 
has informed my current research questions and my understanding of critical 
spatializations by homeless people. I discuss the currently debated idea of the 
ethnographer as a resource in his own work.  And I then give a fairly detailed and 
personal account of how my own struggle with addictions in a rehab and homelessness 
have shaped the moral call and weight of this research, and also how my experience 
afforded me particular insights into this community. I offer up a fairly tight and detailed 
account of how my early documentary studies, experience at Tent City between 2000-
2002 and events going on in the field of housing between 2002 until now, led me to ask 
certain questions. I look at issues of misrepresentation and how the ethical and moral 
position I now take is related to the failures of others in the past to meet these demands. I 









homelessness find expression and rejection.  I discuss how my first encounter with 
community organizers led me to try and understand locality-based ethnography as a type 
of ethnographic community organizing. 
 A review of early literature and observations from my fieldwork show that power 
emerges as a central concept in understanding the claims made by homeless people, and 
in the claims made by the activist founders of Dignity Village especially. I reject the idea 
of a powerless easily dominated homeless identity, and I offer up a method for 
illuminating how power manifests for those who are without home. In trying to 
overcome the blandness of community studies, the hopelessness of culture of poverty 
legacies and the unbalanced storytelling by radical and conservative movements, I 
suggest uniting these positions historically in a frame that unites them with shifts in 
attitudes about deserving and undeserving poverty.  Importantly, I discuss Isin and 
Nielsen’s Acts of Citizenship (2008) and raise questions about structure and agency that 
force me to interrogate the limits of various critical approaches, especially Foucault’s 
critique of governmentality in the next chapters. 
 In chapter five, I first address Latour’s (2004) critique of critique. I explain how 
the PEOC is a way of making critique relevant again. Then I offer a very quick 
discussion of the philosophical roots of critique in critical dogmatism, transcendental 
critique and deconstructionism, offering simple examples of how homeless camps and 
people might be framed in these lenses.  Ultimately I see PEOC as oriented towards a 









dogmatic and transcendent forms of critique in everyday matters that really get in the 
way of community building. I then discuss five main branches of sociological critique 
that impact my work and help PEOC understand the perspectives of villagers. Critical 
Theory (Frankfurt School), Critical Sociology (Bourdieu) and Critical Realism (CR) 
(Bhaskar/Archer) are one group; Genealogical Critique (Foucault) and Pragmatic 
Sociology of Critique (Boltanski et al), another. Understood as a classic confrontation 
between structure and agency, critical approaches tend to be distinguished by where the 
power to be critical originates.  In the first group, critique attaches truths generated by or 
about an objective reality in order to motivate and empower critical actors. In the latter, 
power is truth, and the actor is inherently more in charge of her critical capacity.  I find 
them all informative for understanding the ambiguous and therefore undetermined 
critical potential of liminal spaces, but suggest uniting elements of Foucault and 
Boltanski in my own measure of a liminal space-world, based on what the villagers say 
and do.  A liminal between-world in this sense is for lack of a better word, a fairly self-
contained intentional and transitional community that sits between conventional and 
marginalized modes of living but rarely transits actors into desirable conventional 
statuses. Make no mistake, homelessness is a conventional status, just not the one we 
would hope for people, and certainly one that in great numbers, threatens the possibility 
of a conventional world. I am not trying to prove the existence of between-worlds, but I 
am suggesting that the Dignity Villager wrapped up in liminality comes to understand 









wholeness that constitutes a type of world that is forever suspended between the way 
they want to experience the world, and the unlikelihood of that occurring.  
 In chapter six, I offer a fairly rigorous historical account of laws, policies and 
conventional attitudes about deserving and undeserving poor since the first US colonies. 
This chapter shows how attitudes towards deserving and undeserving poor shift 
concomitantly with massive shifts in the economy and social structure. I reveal this 
debate over deserving and undeserving poor as it has been constructed on a legacy of 
laws and attitudes that use freedom and autonomy to underscore proper modes of living 
at different times in history. Under neoliberal regimes, urban symbolic imaginaries judge 
poor individuals as deserving or undeserving on these terms as part of the rationalization 
of devolution. In this case, the poor have always been represented by a normative 
boundary between deserving poor who might be old or disabled, and those undeserving, 
cut off from state and community support because of idleness or personal defects of 
character, such as addiction.  Out-casting the undeserving to the streets and to shelters 
has opened up a sanctioned and profitable housing and supports industry for the 
homeless. Leginski (2007), Caton (1990) and others offer periodizations of homelessness 
and policy that are not completely infallible but which do provide good general guides 
for understanding how periods of massive liminality, understood as unfulfilled 
transitional life experiences, have impacted laws and attitudes towards homeless 









 Using Dean’s (2010) analytics of government as a means to rejoin the critique of 
governmentality, I show how the codification of the village in contracts, assessments, by-
laws, articles of incorporation and other “forms” has set the measuring stick for the 
village and is an attempt by power to stem the tactical displacement that the original 
claim represented.  Where pragmatic sociology of critique had showed that governance 
has the ability to incorporate critique into its management strategies, these forms and 
contracts establish the city’s sovereignty rather than reflecting the realistic capacity of the 
villagers to govern. Because of how rules and codes of conduct delineate the acceptable 
action of villagers, and how codes and laws govern the use of the space, I re-engage the 
question, “what happens when critique displaces power?” and speak briefly to the limits 
of governmentality in an actual research setting. While the rules and regulations of the 
community suggest a stable and well-organized community, the reality is very different. 
PEOC helps to explain the space opened up by the divergence between intended and 
actual conduct, and the seemingly endless experimentation with critical attitudes in 
liminal spaces. I often have wanted to think of the chaos I witnessed at the village as an 
attempt or an expression of intentional resistance, but in the end I can’t argue that it is so.  
 In chapter seven, I try to gather the many approaches and concepts we have read into 
a neater bundle. By way of a summation, I ask, “What does the history we just read tell 
us about the critical capacity of the village?” I re-enter the discussion of the right of the 
city and the classic opposition of capital and other users of space, because over history, 









capital and the economy. Tolerance and deserving are terms based on essentially 
economic terms. At least that’s what chapter six shows us. I talk briefly about Lefebvre 
and his ideas about socially created space. In some ways what we read confirms his 
observations. He too struggles with the idea of liminal or ambiguous space, and so I use a 
few examples from my fieldwork to give a qualitative taste of what that space feels like. I 
recharge this chapter with Soja’s (1996) notion of “Thirdspace” in order to establish the 
limits of Lefebvre’s socially constructed space, Turner’s (1967), communitas, and 
Foucault’s (1984) heterotopias and the usefulness of identifying a new kind of liminal 
space, open to the challenge of creating collective action out of seemingly endless 
amounts of conflict and diversity.   I argue for the diversity that spaces present, and for 
critique to find ways for uniting diverse experiences of the same place into a critical 
framework for solving the crisis of community. The historical conditions that made 
Dignity possible also made a certain kind of concentrated liminality the norm there.  
Looking at the village as a liminal world then, means that many different possibilities 
exist because liminality in itself can go in many directions depending on where actors 
take it.  They are vulnerable to organized external critiques and this must be addressed if 
they are to fight for the community. So I ask actors in my conclusions where and how to 
take it. 
 In my concluding chapter 8, I introduce transcripts of recent conversations I have 
had during the last two years when two significant regime changes led to shifts in the 









and powerful in Oregon’s housing activist movement, the village failed to do so because 
of the age-old problem of factional impotence. While the village entered a renewed phase 
of decline and low morale, other sites have become empowered through critical 
displacements.  Their ties to Dignity Village suggest that they are in fact, the crests of the 
wave that Dignity started back in 2001 and that it does take time to understand the 
implications of successful social critique. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Endnotes  - Introduction: Pages 1 – 33. 
 
1  As discussed on Bill Maher, HBO, February 22 2013. 
 
2  Based on various statistics from, HUD 2012; State of Oregon, EHAC 2011; 
NAEH 2011.  The difficulty being that the use of such numbers is almost a dysphemism 
when one understands the larger number 146 million, is almost half the country, meaning 
that a huge number of Americans are within a paycheck or two of homelessness. 
 
3  See Don Mitchell, The Right to the City (2003) Jim Ward, The Street is their 
Home, the hobo’s manifesto (1979), David Wagner, Checkerboard Square (1993). 
 
4  The documentary. Hard Times, Lost on Long Island (2011) suggests that over 
5,000,000 personal bankruptcies and 8,000,000 home foreclosures took place in the 2.5 
years since the 2008 bust and the making of the film. The majority of these were middle 
class employed persons who had lost one or both sources of employment. 
 
5  Eugene Oregon is using that language when constructing the terms of 
Opportunity Village.  In so much as Leginski (2007) defines the housing services sector 
in the US as de facto sector, composed of many indirectly linked parts, there is reason to 
argue that sanctioned tent camps are of this de facto system. 
 
6  In recent years, the topic of liminality as critique is gaining more interest in 
anthropology and beyond. Boland (2013a and 2013b) manages a deep and critical 
analysis of crises driven liminality and the critique it produces as a sort of permanent 
liminality for modernity, which he gets to, by a reading of Szakolczai (2000).  In future, I 
imagine linking his discussion of ritual and process into my imagining of liminal space. 
 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
8  These are explored in detail in chapter four and six. 
 
9  Lacan had argued that ideas have both symbolic and imaginary dimensions to the 
degree that popular illusions through speech acts become fixed in symbolic imaginaries; 
in this autonomous realm where the ego comes to understand itself as a reflection (the 
mirror stage) of the Imaginary order; such popularized ideas appeal to the narcissistic and 
autonomous needs of the individual to comprehend reality (Lacan 1955:  Seminar Three: 
The Psychoses – also 197, Ecrits.). Castoriadis (1987) builds a model of larger scale 
“symbolic imaginaries” upon this foundation, arguing that under capitalism, simple or 
magico-religious foundations of common belief are replaced by ever increasing scientific 
and managerial, even moral symbolic representations of acceptable social and political 
order often contained in laws and expectations for normal economic behavior. Boltanski 
and Thévenot’s The New Spirit of Capitalism (1999) explores similar themes. As such, 
urban symbolic imaginaries under neoliberal capitalism tend to replicate visions of 
themselves through various cultural practices, organizational principles and ideas about 
public and private domains, uses of urban space and so some scholars such as Wright, 
(1993; 2000) make important connections between attitudes towards deserving and 
undeserving poor, the spaces in which they are tolerated, and the proper conduct of the 
well off vis a vis the poor in terms of the imaginary moral foundations of capitalist 
societies and cities. 
 
10  http://www.ohs.org/education/oregonhistory/ 
 
11  These figures oscillate monthly if not yearly. CNN recently announced a national 
rate of 15.7% while another news source stated 14.1%. The figures I offer are from 
nationally recognized sources, HUD, NAEH, NCH and others. 
 
12  The reader is cautioned that the figures presented in this section are impossible to 
verify and differed pending on the sources cited.  I have chosen my figures from three 
sources: the EHAC Ten-Year Plan yearly reports for 2009 and 2010, The Portland Ten 
Year Plan report, for 2010, and US Census Bureau or HUD sources.  The implication of 
this is that the economy or other structural factors are shedding people into homelessness 
much faster than the state can produce Housing First. 
Also go to http://www.oregon.gov/ohcs/isd/ra/docs/2010_oregon_poverty_report.pdf for 
some good figures. 
 
13  http://vbc.cityrepair.org -- City Repair and its festive Village Building 
Convergence, won early battles with city government resulting in ordinances for 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2012/12/10/tiny-house-happy-life/ 
 
15  Mary Jo Pullen-Hughes: http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_03_25/The-US-
Government-sent-an-assassin-for- me-interview-333/ 
 
16   http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/09/index_3.html 
 
17  http://www.portlandoccupier.org/?s=dignity+village 
 
18  http://streetroots.org 
 
19  Connecticut and Rhode Island are the first two states to pass such laws, but 
Oregon and California are currently very close to signing theirs. 
 
20  See Burchell (1991), Gordon, (1991),  in chapter five notes. 
 
21  For precisely the same reasons that Mosher had had problems and are discussed 
in my chapter on ethnography: essentially an unwillingness amongst villagers to say 
anything that might be taking the wrong way by the public, or to publicize their demise.  




Chapter Two: Concepts, Contradictions and Controversies 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I accomplish many things. First I discuss in detail how the contest of 
over space pitches business and the homeless against one another, and is oddly enough, 
empowering for both despite the tendency for business to win most of the time.  The 
contest has asked urban imaginaries to consider different uses for city space. I introduce 
Soja’s (1996) Thirdspace as an example of this diversified take on space and experience.  
Then I introduce community studies not just because of the way they emplace experience, 
but also because villagers refer to the village as a community, and one villager, Dave 
Samson, even suggests that community is the essence of dignity and self-worth.  Another 
villager says that their community hinges on the structure it gives to people, so I address 
structure and agency as mutually constitutive aspects of community building.  The 
village relies on its reputation as a democratically self-run community. I look at the 
important testimony of one of the village founders as evidence of the inherent conflicts 
that De Tocqueville ([1841] 1961) and Derrida (2005) attribute to the contradictory 
logics of freedom and democracy.  The village’s current crisis of community is very 
much the result of a tendency towards Michel’s (1915) oligarchy, which I discuss briefly. 
Because I am constantly looking to know how villagers perceive their world, rather than 
merely just observing, I then introduce pragmatism as an organizing influence in my 
research.  Beyond this address to ideas, I also discuss the need to look at historical 
records as a way to discern critical flows over time, and to texts, codes and contracts as 
evidence of how the powers that govern, would govern.  These codes and contracts, the 
very idea of democracy; all these notions – they don’t work so well, in a group of 
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homeless folks.  So I present the crisis of community as a form of endemic liminality.  
This does not have to be fatal. If one recognizes how critique has a temporal quality, then 
it is possible to intervene in the direction(s) it takes. 
 
2.2 Portland’s Conflict Over Urban Space – Contestation is Power 
 The cleansing of urban cores has been happening for decades, with conventional 
urban planners and housing providers confounded by the pervasiveness of abject 
homelessness on city streets.  The battle has been especially difficult in cities where 
Business Improvement Districts (BIDS) have been implanted as a means of organizing 
capital against the street homeless (WRAP 2008).  Polarization over the spatial rights of 
the homeless increasingly is defined by the objections of capital though BIDS, and the 
claims of activists, communitarian movements, and non-profits in the name of their 
homeless members.  While the presence of wealthy, powerful BIDS suggests a classic 
Marxian conflict between capital and the exploited classes, the fact that some of these 
intentional camps have been recognized by the state as legitimate, if not temporary 
responses, suggests that one must abandon strict conflict based perspectives in order to 
understand how homeless activism gives power to the very poor in order to politically 
defeat capital.  
 In Portland, BIDS, Economic Improvement Districts (EID) and since 2010, 
Ecodistricts, tend to spearhead the debate over how to develop the city core and improve 
its standing as a vibrant and sustainable community.1  While debates at city council are 
over how to make the city richer and better to live in, homeless people continue to queue 
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for shelter beds and food, or sneak into the night to sleep in laneways and abandoned lots. 
Housing activists contest the use of this privy city space too.   
 It is absolutely required to deal with the concept of space in my research.  I spend 
considerable time doing this in chapters five, six and seven.  Space is literally the 
substance that the Dignity claim was after. They wanted an address and a certain amount 
of space to house people.  The ensuing compromises over the claim came to be centered 
on how much land, how many buildings, how close or how far they should be, how far 
from the center of town would the village be, maximum occupation laws and so on, all 
measures of what Soja (1996) referred to as “firstspace.” Such firstspace is the physical 
vector of space, that which is counted, measured and commoditized.  “Secondspace,” is 
the mental vector of space; what we imagine to go on in certain spaces.  Soja argues that 
the classic antagonism between space and time in social theorizing, and other sciences 
has to do with the traditional bicameralism of space into these two vectors.   In his model 
of Thirdspace, Soja unites Lefebvre’s (1974) representational space (that part of social 
space where ideas and critique abound), with Foucault’s (1984) heterotopias (temporary 
sites of counter conduct or resistance), with the notion of abstract space (or physical) and 
then tears it wide open to any number of ways to be interpreted; emotional, historical, 
light, dark, safe, tangible, imaginative, and so on, in order to recognize the diverse 
critiques that space represents rather than a simple binary construction.   
 I will discuss this in much greater detail, in chapter seven, because perceptions of the 
village as a space of different values are very much what I am interested in understanding.  
When I tell people it is a democratic member run village, they look at the photos of the 
poverty and the broken things, and wonder how that would be possible.   Democracy 
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doesn’t look like that or operate in space that way, does it?  Thirding opens up the village 
to diversity as a means to understanding critical capacity.  And it seems to me that a 
diverse range of perceptions is a completely normal state of affairs regarding the village.  
A range, and a fluid or temporally shifting nature to these perceptions is what we find.  
The idea of community is important to villagers but not restricted to a singularity. 
 
Fig. 2. The Village Main Gate. June 2011. (E. Weissman). 
 
 
2.3 Who Deserves Community? 
 Community studies engage what Casey (1996) had argued was the key factor in 
ethnographic research finding its relevance since the upheavals associated with the 
critical turn of the 1980’s.2 Framing such writing as it happened as part of the community 
dynamic, that is emplacing ethnography as part of the community it discusses, helps to 
reveal how knowledge is constructed in real situations. For Casey, place after all denotes 
a setting, a context and a sense of lived experience and is the basic component of 
ethnographic understanding.3 My understanding of place is as a way of uniting human 
action and lived performances in temporal and spatial terms. Casey says, “Places are not 
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added to sensations any more than they are imposed on spaces. Both sensations and 
spaces are themselves emplaced from the very first moment, and at every subsequent 
moment as well” (1996:19).  I discuss alternative views of spatial concepts shortly.  
 One of the important insights gained from community ethnographies has been to 
recognize that local communities can no longer be understood outside of or free from 
power relations and struggles with other communities or levels of government (Brunt 
2004:84). Dignity Village created its own space within an extant regime of powerful 
governance of poverty through critical action and protest, and invited encapsulation 
rather than being encapsulated by an encroaching powerful regime.4  Dignity Village 
asserted itself into a pre-existing political, economic, social and moral context by 
framing its claim as a democratic and constitutional right, agreeing to specific terms of 
encapsulation, as a transitional housing camp, in a lease with the city.  In this sense, we 
are still talking about a community, but the encapsulating power dynamic is best 
understood as tactical agreement between the state and the protesters, where the 
spatialization was conditioned by the encoding of the activist community’s function as an 
alternative path to reproducing self-governing individuals; it won the right to be an 
alternative part of a strategy for containing homeless people on the grounds that they 
would be self governing according to the law as expressed in a formal agreement and 
later, in a contract with the city. The prerequisite codes of construction of the village 
reflects the extension of control by the city over the space and people who reside there, 
while placing the village on the outskirts of town in 2002 was a sort of statement that in 
terms of the city symbolic imaginary, this spatialization had no proper place, except as 
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far away as possible.5  They wanted the village to be unclear and to reside outside of the 
common debates on poverty; to symbolize as little as possible. 
 In so much as the village’s claim to land was presented to city governance as a 
self-governed space where homeless people could work on recovering their lives, and 
then transition back into mainstream communities, Dignity, similarly to drug rehabs, 
treatment programs and other self-help programs for the poor appeals to but is not 
limited to critiques of governmentality (Foucault 1991; Tsemberis 1992; Mitchell 2003). 
Foucault (2007) had argued that being critical is an inherent feature of self-governance, 
in the sense, that conduct of conduct, or governing one’s self, requires citizens to make 
choices and is at a basic level a critical activity.  Social critique then resides in the 
deliberations made by people who are said to share a capacity to self-govern.  Foucault 
was not interested in power per se.  Foucault’s main intent was to elaborate how subjects 
were created by the way power had manifest in ideas, “social languages and epistemes” 
over time and across cultures (Bevir 1999:65).  In his later work, we saw that he more 
clearly discusses how power creates certain types of subjects as a matter of population 
management within spatial territories and so as Bevir reminds us, we must look at the 
individual as “an effect of power” (ibid: 63; Foucault 1977: 98).6 
 One might assume that size of the community expresses a certain structural 
complexity, of which the village might be a simpler type. This idea we know from Van 
Gennep7 and Turner, suggests that “simpler” societies present less complicated critiques 
of identity by more effectively moderating and regulating rites of passage, which are 
ways of establishing identity.8  And so, it has been common in my field experience of 
Toronto’s Tent City and Dignity Village, to hear villagers referred to as “them” or 
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“villagers” as if they represent an essentially homogeneous and undifferentiated critical 
identity.  In small communities like the village, where people with similar histories and 
experiencing a similar common problem: poverty and homelessness, and who willingly 
participate in a local government, it might seem logical to assume that at some level the 
effect of power has been to produce a similar subjectivity amongst them, and also then, 
potentially similar critical actors.  
 So, how does one reconcile the divergent critical actions of residents at Dignity 
Village given that they are subjects of the same shifting political and social structures 
within and outside of the village?  That is; if they are subject to the same art of 
government, how does a truly activist moment come to be?   If governmentality is 
everywhere under neoliberal governance as Foucault might argue, how are these diverse 
and often disintegrating village identities to be reconciled?   In this light, the sustained 
critical action of the few remaining Dignity housing activists who go out and protest, 
who occupy land and are sometimes prosecuted, but who at the same time are cast to the 
margins of the village as “shit disturbers,” set upon by factions and often blamed for 
creating negative “press,” must be understood in relation to how shifts in the critique of 
housing policy by neoliberal regimes produce shifting expectations and self-knowledge 
over a range of villager-types. There is a basic analytical tension between 
governmentality that suggests governing takes precedence over inspiration, and other 
positions like Latour’s practical metaphysics (2005) that suggest looking at the world 
from the actor outward.  The point behind the PEOC is that these and many other 
positions are relevant, depending on what we are interested in knowing, or what changes 
we are interested in bringing about.  The key is to locate the nature of the critique that 
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villagers as the key actors express, and then to see how they make sense in these other 
frames.  What does the actual critique say about critique? 
 A number of such scripts exist because to some, the village is a permanent 
residence; to others a temporary space en route to housing or back into homelessness; to 
activist members, it is a secret place in which to plan protests and experiment with social 
economy; for others including me when I was there, the place was ambiguous and 
uncertain.  Critics of the village cling to this latter position, and therefore the village 
comes to be feared and rejected.  These observations suggest to me that experience is 
often understood in terms of mental and physical dimensions - that they are often 
understood as distinct from one another. If Firstspace is the physical and built urban 
environment and Secondspace, the expectations we hold of those structures, then the 
continuum of debate I have mentioned is largely to be understood in terms of 
disagreements about how the latter should be carried out in the former.  Understood as a 
“Firstspace-Secondspace bicameral confinement” (Soja 1996:3; Anderson 2002:301), 
such a perspective restricts critique to one or the other category of experience, or argues 
for the normalcy of certain experiences in certain spaces, and misses the myriad ways 
time and space are imbricated and experienced by actors.  The notion of community 
transcends this bicameralism, but is ambiguous, and so one might want to know what 
members of a community understand it to be. 
 On my first day in the village in June of 2010, Brad Powell, then CEO took me 
on a tour. He shared,  
 I’ve only been here for a little over three years. I was homeless, camping out on 
the [Columbia] river a little ways, on one of the sloughs, and one day, the city came in 
with one of their crews from the jail and took our whole camp… took everything, 
straightened the blades of grass out… I had nothing except for the backpack on my 
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back… I had gone to a day-labor place to work and when I went home there was nothing 
there, and I had a friend who had lived out here and he told me about it. And I shared the 




Fig. 3. John Boy Hawkes and Brad Powell, June 2010. (E. Weissman). 
 
 
 For Brad, the amazement refers to a psychic shift resulting from actual experience 
of the village.  Very few people in Portland had even heard about the village.  In the days 
before I entered I had toured around and talked to shop owners and tourists and if they 
had heard of Dignity Village, it was a long time ago in a news story. Few people had any 
idea it was still there. Brad was very insistent that daily routines and social structure were 
important (not to be confused with structure or structures, the terms they also use to refer 
to their shacks). 
 “It saved me. Saved him too,” Brad said.  
“What exactly?” I asked.  
“Structure. Order, I mean rules, not being afraid of rules. I mean we make the rules here 
so it’s better for us here than out there.” 
 
 While villagers believe they make the rules there, that is simply a 
misunderstanding resulting from an unsophisticated understanding of how rules are made.  
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I show repeatedly that they confuse choosing from a range of city-sanctioned codes of 
conduct, with making rules. Still villagers tend to understand their community space as 
separated from the outside by the gate and the fence and they also experience this sense 
as a type of isolation – watching cars go by, planes lifting off and buses for which they 
don’t have the fare.  A city-bus stops in front of the village to service the prison next 
door, but rarely can villagers afford the bus. People en route to visit convicts pass by the 
village and cannot make sense of the camp.  Two people whom I had met in a parking lot 
referred to them as Hobos and it, as a Hobo camp.  If one reads Anderson (1923, 1975) 
or DePastino (2003), one will understand that this comprehension is testimony to the 
mental aspect of space that shapes how we think about space, regardless of its other 
possibilities.  None of the Dignity Villagers were Hobos in the classic senses described 
above (and in detail in chapter 6) a few had ridden trains, one in particular, Rocky had 
spent time as a teenager with men calling themselves Hobos in a camp outside of Peoria.  
Regardless, ideas of space are very much a matter of perception not matched with lived 
reality.  
 This excerpt from Dignity in Exile is important for the kinds of complex 
ethnographic moments I am trying to relate to readers. At the same time Brad is speaking 
about mundane and practical information about the place, information of an entirely 
different range emerges.  Observing the “objective” or material with these emotional 
points of contact with life history illustrates how closely together these two realms of 
experience ride, and the equal weight of their agency. 
Brad and I walked the village a bit and he showed me his structure. But we did not go in 
because he motioned to a brightly painted structure in the far corner. One of many to 
have murals on them. Some are painted by residents, and others by local artists. On this 
one house, however, there was an unusual mural – a royal blue basecoat, 
 46 
impressionistically painted animals two by two, and an ark. Brad stopped dead in his 
tracks. He looked around. His eyes teared up. I sensed he was on the verge of an 
emotional outburst and that he was trying to suppress something he might have needed to 
get out. I had to “out” myself. “Look, Brad, just so you know, and it’s not a big secret, 
but I do this kind of work because, well, you know, I was pretty fucked up for a good 
chunk of my life.” He hung his head and nodded. “So I get this. I get some of the stuff I 
mean. I was pretty much homeless at the end, sleeping in a coma pretty much. All the 
time. When I went to rehab…”  
 Brad pointed to my camera. Then he nodded to me with a faint smile. His lip was 
trembling. I wondered if I should turn the camera on. But he insisted, flogging his hand 
at me, encouragingly, so I did. This structure, or rather the painting of the arc on it, held 
special value to him. As I was to find out, all the paintings have special meaning to the 
folks who live in their structures. Without missing a stroke, he went on. “And I have 
post-traumatic stress syndrome, from being homeless, well, just from life. And I have a 
hard time talking about ‘Noah’s Ark’… because it’s a kid’s…”  
 I put an arm around his shoulder and tried to comfort him. So many times in my 
work with the guys from Tent City or other street folks, moments like this had arisen 
where interview became confessional, and all my training as an anthropologist and all my 
sociological imagination were completely useless, and all that was left was a moment 
defined by its existence. I had to just be a person, no role but be present and decent to 
someone I hardly knew, who was opening up to me. Moments like this confirmed for me 
that the only ethical moment was the one that arises from the interpenetration of two 
unique souls in the event of being. There is no such thing as universal pain. For each 
person, pain manifests uniquely.  
 As a researcher in the field, confronting the pain and suffering of others has been 
doubly problematic for me. Was my line of inquiry causing Brad pain or harm, or was 
this leading to some necessary point of understanding?  
 Brad caught his breath and forced through a sob, “You know, it’s the guy’s last 
painting.” The young artist who had donated his time to the village to paint the ark was 
in the middle of his last-shot chemo treatment somewhere in Portland.  
 “I’ve contacted most of the past chairmen and especially Jack Tafari, who started all 
this, and I thanked him for the chance to change the world,” Brad somehow managed to 
say. He was fighting through heavy tears. I tried to console him. “There’s a lot of pain, a 
lot of pain,” I said. “But I can see that now,” he replied. “And I have a chance here to 
show the world a different way to do things, and lot of people here don’t even see that” 
(Dignity in Exile 2012:17). 
 
 Even more striking about this passage is his clear and emotional attachment to the 
message he thinks he is carrying to the world.  He is all about what the village represents 
to the critique of homelessness.  After that meeting, so was I.   I really wanted it to be 
that same place, with that vibe, and for Brad to be that same activist hero when I returned 
in 2011. The village can be a utopic opportunity to change the world or a dismal prison 
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filled with darkness and despair. In 2011 when I returned to the village, Brad had been 
replaced as Chairman. His drug use had become heavier following a car accident, but he 
had been using pretty heavily even when we interviewed in 2010.  He just didn’t feel it 
was time to tell me until I had returned, because he didn’t want me having “the wrong 
idea about the village.” He stayed inside getting high, everyday.  It is now July of 2013 
and he has not come out of that addiction. A chance to change the world is now a slow 
death mitigated by moments of meth-induced exhilaration, a rush, and then oblivion.  
There is the physical part of space that tells one how to geo-locate communities or people, 
or buildings. There is mental space, that tells us what kinds of attitude predominates a 
certain place, a prison, a corporate boardroom, a state of mind, like happiness. The space 
of critique adjoins these in a difficult to ascertain and highly unstable place, the actor.  
Space is what we make it as an outcome of critical deliberations with reality.  The last 
part of the transcript explains the way other powerful agencies in the housing game think 
about villagers gives Brad and others pause to critically examine their place in this world. 
 
Fig. 4. Brad in 2011, laid up in his shack.  Bedpans and Urine filled bottles. 
Dirt and festering plates of old food. (N. Dickson). 
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 “Later that day, I showed the residents an early version of my film, Subtext. It was a 
way for them to get to know me and to understand how I saw things, and to decide 
whether they wanted me to come stay there. The response was surprising. Most notably, 
villagers felt they had seen mirror images of themselves in the squatters in Toronto’s 
defunct Tent City. They were equally angry at the way Tent City was demolished, and 
several remarked that Tent City probably would have had a chance at it if only they had 
had more structure and were able to negotiate a lease with the city.  
 After the viewing, Brad remarked that he was even more grateful to have his shack. 
He, like most people in the village, dreamt about having a home or a subsidized 
apartment, but the odds against actually finding mainstream housing were high in Oregon, 
as they were in most of the U.S. And as Brad suggested, “I can see all kinds of possible 
drawbacks to having housing that I never imagined before, and it makes me think.” 
 At dusk, after the village had quieted down, Brad and I concluded our first interview, 
though, looking back at it literally in digital form, it does not feel like an interview. If 
there was such a thing as conversational anthropology, this surely was it. I was fairly 
certain that these folks at the village were homeless, but that the painted shacks, the 
gardens, the flags flying and the smell of meals being cooked on various barbeques were 
all symptomatic of a housed community. Brad didn’t agree.  
 “I’m still homeless.” 
 “But why, you have a house?” 
 “Technically, I’m homeless.” 
 “According to whom?” 
 “The city, the state, the federal government.” 
 “But what about in your state of mind?”  
 “Homelessness is a state of mind. Home is where your heart is, so you are never 
without a home” (ibid). 
 
 It has been instructive to recognize that the street nature of extreme poverty is 
carried over to conventional critiques of the camps. Villagers are vulnerable and exposed.  
Despite any sense of who they think they are, housed, citizen or patriot, as examples, there 
is always a next level of power ready to tell them who they are not and how they are 
failing.  It does not have to be this way. Liminality makes it hard to push back. This is 
partly because of the poverty, partly because the people who arrive there from the streets 
are traumatized and have been brainwashed through years of institutionalization to believe 
what they are told by authorities.   Often it is because non-villagers understand the village, 
the camps as an extension of the streets, and, therefore, the conventional urban imaginary 
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sees the camps in this dark and ambiguous light and its residents as temporary guests of 
their progressive and good will.  Without sustained critical action from within, and this the 
founders’ knew, the villagers themselves will impart this debilitating view on themselves 
and see it reinforced by the actions of the city. It is against this external critique of whom 
they are that the collective energy of the village must now turn. Still, it is hard to come up 
with a clear strategy for doing this from within the grip of liminality. 
 As the “basic component of ethnographic understanding” (a community) Dignity 
Village, and intentional communities in general, are perhaps the best if not the last 
manifestation of the ideal community model in the sense that they are literally, 
intentionally demarcated by measures of space, such as fence lines and gateways, 
thresholds and passage ways encoded and enshrined in planning documents, building 
codes, site maps, rules of conduct and the actual spatialization of structures on sites; each 
of which is type of physical measurement for defining the zone of action for the 
community as a Firstspace: the place,  Dignity Village is at 9401 NE Sunderland, in 
Portland. It is populated by members who come to know and recognize each other, and 
who, within the governance of that community, are compelled to follow rules of conduct 
that unite people across a range of possible behaviors whose important ethnographic 
measure is understood as everyday experience, as time spent in Secondspace. 
 If nothing else, villagers agree that community implies or is in fact, a sense of 
belonging to a group and of that group to be grounded in a place.  Set off to the margins 
of the city, and to the margins of capital, inclusive identities: member, community, friend, 
and villager, become meaningful at a level most of us in conventionally understood 
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housing take for granted.  Rocky, a resident of Dignity Village, and one of the few 
homeless women veterans I met, once said:   
“We’re a family out here. We look out for each other. And nobody judges no one, cause 
we all been there. Even if we had a ‘beef’ back there (on the streets). I mean no one 
understands homelessness until they get here. God forbid. That’s what makes this 
community different than normal (laughs) ones.  We might be a bunch of fuck ups, but 
we all know we belong here, together. Hell, who else is ‘gonna’ let us live like this 
together.  You tell me where?” (Phone chat, December 2012).  
 
 This statement as simple as it is, suggests that there is some value in understanding 
the fence, the gate, the sign and the property that contains Dignity Village as delineating 
a particularly unique kind of community space.  Even though a villager’s social relations 
may not be wholly bounded by that geography, for those who live in that space, the 
integration of conventional and homeless social and symbolic imaginaries yields social 
relations of particular import to the community that mirror the conventional, but would 
largely be rejected by it, if they happened anywhere else (Stacey 1975 in Brunt 2004:89; 
Mosher 2010; Weissman 2012).  
 If one does not understand the importance of a systematic interrogation of space to 
my research that likely is because they have always had a space to call home, or a 
community of which they were a part.   We are not concerned with space and time here 
because they are important to me, or to you the reader. We are addressing them in these 
ways because these are two parameters of life that poverty and homelessness completely 
skews. Dignity Village is called Dignity Village on purpose, as Ibrahim Mubarak an ex-
founder says. “We called it a village because it is a community first, and most important.” 
In 2012, I had an instructive conversation with Dave Samson, then security head of the 
village: 
 “Where do you want to be in a year, David?” 
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 “You mean, aside from save the whole planet in general and myself?”  
 “How long will you be in the village?” 
 “I am thinking a year. And then a bunch of us are trying to build a new intentional 
community. I don’t want to live in Rome anymore. Our civilization is Rome and it’s 
gonna fall. But to carry the message, first you have to build it, not just building it, living 
it. My carbon footprint is small. I don’t want to contribute to the garbage and 
consumerism culture. I want to contribute to healthy, positive, sane, sober living. Sane 
behavior. People treating each other with dignity and respect. Human beings and animals 
are not trash, they are not disposable items.”  
 “Okay, okay. So beyond the rhetoric, which I don’t disagree with, what can the 
village do for people in the short term?” 
 “Relieve survival anxieties.” 
  “And in the long term? Maybe some of them get jobs, some might get housing, and 
some will go back to the streets?”  
 “Yeah. I hate to say it,” Dave concedes, “but some of them can’t be saved. But as 
long as we offer safe communities for people, a great number more can be saved than the 
current system model offers.” 
 “David, let’s end this right now. What is dignity?” 
 “Well... having or getting the sense returned to you that you are a human being, you 
are worthy of time and place and community.” 
 “Okay. Leave it on that, Dave” (Dignity in Exile 2012:132). 
 
 




 Time and space are not merely targets for philosophical debate. They are 
fundamental concepts to all individuals and basic to pragmatic attitudes that contribute to 
our senses of self-worth and dignity.  David says, ‘deserving of time and place and 
community.” The conflicts that threaten Dignity Village are about how to govern one’s 
self and others in a community where time is ticking, because their use of that space, 
their conduct in it, is constantly under review and subject to many interpretations.  There 
is reason to critique various kinds of space in this one example, so when we look at the 
critiques of the village, it will be interesting to know how they mentally construct the 
space, and the criteria by which to judge what goes on there. The place to start with this 
is to understand the political critique embedded into the village’s mission 12 years ago.  
A certain democratic disposition towards freedom and democracy was the moral call to 
action, while the pragmatic concern was over how to shelter people.  
 Very recently, Charlie Hayles, the new Mayor of Portland was interviewed by Street 
Roots about his views on Right 2 Dream Too (R2DTOO), a recently staked homeless tent 
camp (2011) in downtown Portland that has been fighting fines, code inspections and 
criticism from the downtown business community since it “occupied” a parking lot at the 
gates to Portland’s Chinatown in the Autumn of 2011. One of the founders of R2DTOO, 
Ibrahim Mubarak, had co-founded Dignity Village, 11 years earlier. 
(Israel Bayer – Editor of Street Roots) I.B.: What’s the answer for Right 2 Dream Too? 
 (Charlie Hayles) C.H.: I think the answer is a different site that is a good place to 
live that doesn’t have the friction that that site has. I was on the council when we 
approved the creation of Dignity Village. It is clearly a success. 
 It seems to me that Right 2 Dream Too is on the way to being that kind of 
sustainable, self-managed community. It’s not in the right location on the corner of 
Fourth and Burnside. I think there are partnership possibilities between organizers and 
residents of Right 2 Dream, property owners, other non-profits and public agencies that 
will lead to positive outcomes. 
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 I went out to Dignity Village last fall. I am impressed. I’ve been to Right 2 Dream 
a couple of times. You see people really doing a great job, managing that enterprise for 
themselves. I’ve got a lot of confidence in the capacity of those folks to make this work. 
It’s up to the larger community, me included, to try to find a place for the camp to land 
that makes sense. 
(By Street Roots Staff | 28 Feb 2013) 
 
 
 There is no way to predict if the mayor’s position will translate into ordinances that 
legally legitimize this claim, but such places have entered the knowledge processes by 
which cities are rationalizing their other housing strategies, and by which homeless 
activists are using critique to displace established practices, because of the example laid 
out by Dignity Village. Discussions of the intentional community movement cannot take 
place in isolation from discussions about broader power and knowledge structures and 
the contest for urban space. Some of the comments on the Street Roots’ Facebook page 
express the range of critique amongst more sympathetic Portlanders. 
“Dignity village is great because the inhabitants make it so, but jebus [sic] the place is 
between an empty prison and a giant manure pile. I'm sorry Portland, YOU CANNOT 
JUST MAKE THE HOUSELESS DISAPPEAR LIKE SO MUCH GARBAGE.” (A. 
Davis) 
 
“Reading between the lines, I think our new mayor is saying we need to get the houseless 
community out of sight. The city does not have the will to provide a solution to the 
homeless problem. Until they do, R2 needs to be replicated to serve greater numbers, not 
moved away from the services that low income folks need access to.” (G. Margolis) 
 
“There are many positives in this statement, a testimony to the incredible work of 
R2DTOO. But I agree with others, Hales wants us out of there. And he wants the "larger 
community" to decide where we go. This is what we need to address. That the people 
who are affected get to say where we go. Let's take initiative and start looking and 
proposing places. We have leverage.” (A. LaFleur) 
 
 Each of these remarks underscores important themes in this dissertation.   Most 
importantly, there is the recognition that homeless camps like Dignity Village and 
R2DTOO are seen as legitimate democratic opposition9 to the goals of city governance, 
opposition in the sense that they critique and interfere with the plans of capital or other 
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elites in the management of the city’s poor and the city’s space, understood as a 
commodity with monetary value, and that they do this by invoking laws and codes of 
conduct that are generally framed as a matter of constitutional, and therefore, American, 
rights. This position suggests that the activists, who fight for space, must struggle with 
and resist the interest of other powerful groups, but that their position relative to other 
power claims is not that of being completely dominated while the action is in play.  Until 
the final decision is made in a court, or by an act of legislation at some level of 
government, the action has power and merit.  “We have leverage,” one respondent says, 
“Let’s take initiative…” These are fainter, yet parallel calls to those made by the Housing 
Liberation Front in 2000, in its fight for Dignity Village.10 
  Currently, Dignity Village is at a crossroad.  Entrenched and comfortable in their 
“homes,” some members see the village as a permanent solution to their homelessness; 
they have no interest in moving beyond the poverty of the village or have little faith that 
the state will provide for their housing needs. They are unwilling to provoke the ire of the 
city and the public by being “radicals.” At the same time, a handful of villagers cling to 
the mission of the founders to carry the housing message to the community in general by 
establishing more camps as a matter of social justice. They understand the village to be a 
symbolic community with an obligation to live up to the legacy of the founders. Others 
see it as a safe haven in which to get their lives together, establish work and other 
conventional relationships, and overcome the anxieties and trauma of street life.  They 




2.4 Structure and Agency, Active and Activist Citizens 
 This range of responses raises questions about how structural conditions can produce 
diverse experience for homeless actors who occupy a fairly closed and similar discursive 
and actual space.  Clearly I am making an assumption that structure is real to actors but 
that does not make it universally the same.  There are many reasons to do this, especially 
as it pertains to homelessness.  In 2010 on my first visit to the village, then CEO, Brad 
Powell, told me,  
“Well, it’s just my theory, but I believe that when you become homeless, you have no 
rules. So you have no structure. You’re not used to being told you have to do this or you 
have to do that. When people come here to live, the only requirement used to be that you 
were homeless, and now the city has required us to pay a liability insurance and so, on 
top of the ten hours of work toward the upkeep of the village, now you’re required to pay 
20 a month for the insurance on the property… and the city has agreed to leave us alone 
and pretty much let us run the place as long as we do it in an appropriate manner, and I 
think after ten years we have shown that we can do that.”  
 Brad was very insistent that daily routines and social structure were important (not to 
be confused with structure or structures, the terms they also use to refer to their shacks). 
Jon Boy, who had stood by this whole time and had nodded or shaken his head, had to 
leave to take a call, but he suggested we meet in his place later. I agreed. “It saved me. 
Saved him too,” Brad said. “What exactly?” I asked. “Structure. Order, I mean rules, not 
being afraid of rules. I mean we make the rules here so it’s better for us here than out 
there” (From Dignity in Exile 2012: 8). 
 
 I examine this in greater detail in subsequent chapters because I debate that they 
had successfully proven their ability to govern. Let us start with the following: 
homelessness is a concept that generally defines the worst off poor in terms of 
marginality or distance from an imaginary center, which is a structural perception: 
programs for the homeless and this includes aspects of Dignity Village are structured 
with rules, obligations, and codes for acceptable participation in them: the fact that 
structures exist does not require that all actors experience them the same way, and so 
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critique is likely to have many faces and many expressions, even amongst people who 
are said to be part of the same structural community.  
 Living in the village requires homeless people to at least consider the debates that 
produced the village, its history and failed traditions, and the current debates about where 
the village can go as an experiment with a ticking clock.  As of the writing of this 
dissertation, they have 1.5 years left on a contract that many feel will be the last.  
Villagers debate how to resolve their poor public image and the administrative incapacity 
of the village. Out of the knowledge produced in these debates homeless actors come to 
understand themselves as deserving or underserving “selves,” and this impacts the 
choices they make towards critical action.  Taking agency to mean the ability of the 
individual to make her own choices, structure is often counter-positioned to this, as that 
institutional part of society, which imposes the values and means by which individuals 
are directed to exercise this agency if at all (Bourdieu 1972; Foucault 1975; Giddens 
1976; Bakhtin 1993, 1982; De Certeau 1986; Latour 2005; Isin 2008; Nielsen 2008).
 One must address this debate over agency and structure because in advanced liberal 
society defined as strategies for governing autonomous individuals though their freedom, 
according to Rose (1999:84), citizenship implicates the subject into an idealized world of 
action organized around customs and methods for facilitating his participation in 
practices of decision making with others. Isin (2008) distinguishes between an activist 
citizen whose act is an inversion or break with habitus, and an active citizen, whose 
engages in these other practices of freedom that we confuse with acts. An act of 
citizenship then is unusual and questions these practices in search of social justice. I will 
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test these distinctions as we go along because of the way these two identities tend to 
divide villagers in their critical orientation to housing justice.  
 Critique of housing is also part of governance.  Resistance to the critical action by 
homeless groups will vary depending on how the critique is perceived by those in a 
position to reject it, such as the city council.  PEOC then looks at the critical action 
between villagers as actors in a tentative democracy, and also between the village and 
broader systems of democratic governance that are powerful too – how do they perceive 
the claim? What made the claim for better housing, or for a piece of land on which to 
build a camp, deserving of consideration not only for homeless people, but those in a 
potentially powerful position to have rejected it, such as city councils or business 
groups?  Perhaps most importantly, what do villagers understand as the means to keep 
this critically powerful place in the discourse on housing?  
  Beyond the village, critics look at the village as an unjust occupation of public land 
by undeserving squatters, and as a failed transitional housing experience. Supporters 
prefer to see it as a bold and laudable housing action by deserving citizens. In the former 
the villager is imagined as a lawless drug infested den of iniquity, in the latter, a self-
governed tribute to democracy in the making. Hence, it is not easy to define the village in 
terms of what kind of place, or community it is.  It is more apt to understand the diversity 
it represents, because understanding how different actors comprehend the village from 
within and without as a space with infinite possibilities and meanings, speaks to the 
lengths they are willing to go as actors in pursuit of critical action.  The question is vital 
to me because when I was there, I did not see much collective critical action, and those 
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few activists I did meet at the village were afraid of powerful factions who threatened to 
kick them out. This had me wondering what exactly does democracy mean then?  
 
Fig. 6. Ibrahim Mubarek 2012 (R2DTOO Website Photo) 
(www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWwBPs4XmRs  
 
2.5 Liminal Democracy:  A Conversation with 
Ibrahim Mubarek, Co-founder of Dignity Village, founder of R2DTOO (July 13 2011) 
 
 Well into my stay at Dignity Village in July 2011 my perspective on intentional 
housing camps had changed drastically as a result of the horror stories I had heard from 
visitors to other tent camps, like Seattle’s Tent City 3 and 4. My greatest source of 
anxiety was the absolute reversal of the community spirit I had witnessed a year earlier. 
Witnessing day after day the negativity and lack of motivation within Dignity Village, I 
very seriously questioned the validity of such communities.  I had been told that I should 
talk to some of the founders who were in the Portland area. I tried to speak with one in 
particular for weeks, but he was always out on activist business, engaged in an action or a 
meeting or a protest - busy with various housing actions, one of which included the 
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planning stages of a well-thought out occupation of a piece of prime downtown Portland.  
It would come to fruition some months later as “Right To Dream Too,” a tent camp 
supporting up to 50 street folks with emergency sleep, showers and food on a non-
resident basis – emergency camping that is (R2DTOO - September 2011).  Finally on 
July 16, we met and I went for a walk though downtown Portland with Ibrahim Mubarak.  
“Ib” had been a co-founder of Dignity Village from 2000-2004. He had left the village 
once it was up and running shortly after that and moved in and out of homelessness but 
kept himself engaged in homeless activism in the city.  
 When I met him in 2011, he lived in a house with a few other members of his 
activist network. A couple was camped in his backyard and another couple slept in their 
mini van on his driveway.  It was a modest house, the gardens lush and full as were most 
in the damp Portland climate. Ibrahim, like most of the activist community in Portland 
had stopped visiting Dignity Village.  Ibrahim had said something, which echoed clearly 
the sentiment of what most housing activists and the street homeless themselves had said 
to me in my jaunts downtown; he said:  
“When they gave up fighting for the rights of homeless people, we had to start fighting 
for us, not them living up there – they got themselves housing.  We’re down here dying 
on the streets. They just don’t know how much they need us too.  We need each other.”   
 
I respected Ibrahim’s use of the collective “we.” In the last decade he had gone from 
being homeless, to help in the fight for and the construction of Dignity Village, and had 
made his way into a nice home, but had never lost his sense of connection to the struggle 
of the thousands of Portland’s men and women who lived on the streets.11  
 I finally managed to get him to meet me and do some interviews because I told him 
on the phone one day, that the village was on the verge of a collapse.   I was astonished 
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that it had turned so disappointedly downward since only a year earlier when I had done 
my first fieldwork.  “You need to come out here man.   You need to show them they still 
have ties.  This place is so lost…” I was quite frankly experiencing a collapse of a sort.  
It was partly emotional, and partly intellectual, this sudden sense of desperation. On the 
one hand, I was struggling to observe the daily fighting and mismanagement of the 
village. On the other, this great idea of a noble act of citizenship that I had theorized the 
village to be when I started my PhD. was turning out to be a fallacy, and I was hard 
pressed to conceptualize how to discuss the village.   I imagine when I called him that he 
understood that the village and I were each in a desperate place. So we met the next day.   
Ptery who lived in the village and was one of only two active activists, agreed to bring 
me to meet Ibrahim. They were friends. Ibrahim was tutoring Ptery and another villager, 













Fig. 7. Ptery in July 2011. (N. Dickson). 
 
Dignity in Exile 2012: 83-87 
For Ptery, Dignity Village was the discursive site of debates that go beyond mere 
housing or social structure: it was the site of discourses that embody a complete 
restructuring of the way we as humans conducted ourselves with this planet. Ptery had 
come to visit Dignity Village in August of 2010, a few weeks after my first visit. Ptery 
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had been living in Seattle’s well-known Tent City #4 (TC4). Life in Seattle was hard. 
Tent City 4 is still a temporary campground for about 100 homeless folks. They slept in 
tents and temporary huts formed from materials they scrounged up in the nearby city 
waste, or received as donations from “sponsors.” Run by an organization called Share/ 
Wheel, Tent City #4 was highly organized and, according to Ptery, had been managed 
well, better than Tent Cities 1 and 2, which no longer functioned. “But 3 still does. How I 
got here? To the village? I just heard of these new movements going on in Oregon, and 
for me it was not about finding housing, but carrying the message. So I came down to 
investigate things in Portland, and on the way back I needed a place to crash, so I stayed 
at the village one night – fell in love with it here. The fact that Dignity is a stable 
village—” 
 “Stable?” I asked. Had it ever been stable, I wondered. 
 “Well, Share/Wheel does a good job, but TC4 and the other 14 camps which they 
have on church lots, by law, get moved all the time. Nickelsville is another good example, 
you know, the one we have been reading about in the news? It was a TC too, and it was 
moved 14 times. A few months here, a few months there, and every time 100 people 
have to pack up and it’s just to be moved to another spot. To keep the city and the state 
happy. So good rich folks don’t get jumpy about things.”  
 “So this village is relatively stable then, I guess?” I was astonished. 
 “Yeah, believe me, compared to other places, this is really stable,” he reassured me. 
 Nevertheless, Share/Wheel had a policy the village could benefit from. Even though 
residents of Dignity Village could become members, if they chose to, they didn’t have to 
in order to live there. Share/Wheel required its residents to become members, and 
required them to participate in decision-making and other community activities as part of 
their membership. In other words, all members were expected to take part in the self-
management of the community. In Dignity, since membership had become a choice 
rather than mandatory, the self-regulating value of broad membership had declined in the 
village.  
 It had been argued by Ptery, and other activists he introduced to me, that this 
creative citizenship was an empowering feature of such communities. To be a member 
meant to be part of the decision-making process. In Dignity Village, this was part of the 
original design, but this practice had been and continues to be ignored. Many members 
chose not to vote for personal reasons. This is an unfortunate loss for the villagers. It 
seemed to me, and to Ptery, that what the required participation really did was give 
disenfranchised and lost people an opportunity to practice conversational and social skills 
in a highly normalized and competitive arena. In this sense their political actions and 
opinions could be seen as legitimate. They would have found voice and the freedom to 
pursue their rights as most citizens could. 
 Ptery wanted the world to enter a conversation about how we lived as part of the 
fabric of the planet. Not as a festering blight upon it. The first day Ptery was in Dignity 
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Village was the official ten-year celebration, and Ptery had met one of the founding 
members, Ibrahim Mubarak. Ibrahim, a tall, deep voiced and well-spoken man, was 
serious about housing. And for Ptery, in the midst of a journey to find a place to carry the 
message, meeting Ibrahim, and seeing the relative stability of Dignity Village were in 
keeping with Ptery’s conversational approach to life. 
 “So the universe was speaking to you,” I suggested. 
 “It’s speaking to all of us, Eric.”    
 “You know, it’s fitting that we are next to a giant compost heap. The village is kind 
of a compost heap. Homelessness is kind of a compost heap. The greatest things, the 
nicest flowers, come out of compost. People come here, and they are not here because of 
the great choices they made or because life has been good to them. Not very often. A few 
of us come to carry the message. But look around, Eric. Do you think these people want 
to, or can carry a message? Now? They are here because they can’t break down anymore. 
The crap that society makes people do to live right just isn’t working for everyone, and 
they fail. Well, at least society calls it that. But they just can’t break down anymore. So 
they come here to rise up.” 
 
                    
Fig. 8. Brad Gibson.  Village CEO, July 2011 (N. Dickson).  
 
(Video of Brad and Ptery “activating” - www.youtube.com/watch?v=tRrUJdmnJZw) 
 
Dignity in Exile (2012: 80-83). 
In the autumn of 2011, Brad and a few other members of Dignity aided the R2D2 group 
in a successful occupation of a choice piece of downtown acreage. At the gates of 
Portland’s popular Chinatown, they set up a tent camp for 50 people by signing a one-
year lease with the landowner. As Ibrahim Mubarak, the key figure in the group and ex-
cofounder of Dignity Village, told me, “This is how it is done. You can’t sit in your 
subsidized house or your apartment and change things. Carry the message, my brother, 
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carry it by showing it.” Brad, become inspired by the housing action. The logistic details 
are fairly well guarded by the group, but Brad and I discussed how they might use 
donated goods and materials to fabricate the platforms and the high wall that would 
surround the lot. I asked how much the rent was, but the amount they paid was unclear. I 
was told by one of the settlers that the fee was nominal, perhaps only a dollar for the year, 
and suited the landlord’s desire to irk city officials who had challenged him on other 
zoning-related issues. They were able to occupy the land because it suited the 
landowner’s desire for revenge. But in the meantime, their presence in a highly visited 
part of the city was carrying the message. Regardless of how successful the occupation is 
now measured, the landlord’s desire to shake things up presented a loophole that the 
group was, back then, able to exploit, much as Dignity had pounced on a loophole in 
state law back in 2001. Without clearly defined laws that guarantee the rights of the poor 
to housing, housing activists have had to be aware of any legal ambiguities they could 
exploit to push for the rights of the poor. 
 
 While the rest of the city, the state, the country and activists around the world had 
particular views on Dignity Village, views that generally reified the alternative and 
sustainable qualities of the place, my being there had quickly revealed a darker if not 
stagnant side to life.  When I told Ibrahim this, he didn’t sound surprised. He looked at 
me and smiled.  He is a tall man, Black, Muslim, devout; still proudly American.   Gold 
capped tooth. When he smiles, it is impossible to escape his charisma. He looked at me 
through that smile as if to say, ”Duh. What did you expect?” He would never say that.  
He was dignified, and dignity meant respect, for one’s self and others, at least that is 
what it meant to Ibrahim.  The following is a transcription of video I shot and my 
comments. 
 He started, “It’s like the American country, when the forefathers fought against, 
England, the British, they had a concept, and they wanted that freedom. They had that 
fight in them. And now people that’s born in this county take it for granted, you know 
they say: ‘this country’s good, bam, this country’s here, this is a good country,’ whereas, 
you know in other countries people are still struggling. And I don’t think the hard-core 
homeless (in the US) don’t struggle as much as people in third block countries. So 
they’re here with you might say a so-called silver spoon in they mouths. And that’s what 
happens to (homeless) people when they go out there to Dignity Village – they say: 
‘Wow, I don’t have to do nothing, I can just stay here and exist.’ And there’s more to life 
than just existing. It’s a difference between life and survival, man.”  
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 One of the reasons I had wanted to meet him was to understand how it might be that 
the political factions who were controlling the village’s democratic government might be 
overcome, and a more representative voice created.  
“The leadership now is only seven people, and it is supposed to be 22…” I intonate the 
statement as a question. 
“Yeah, well…no. No everybody there’s a leader, you just have spokespersons, that’s the 
way it’s supposed to be.” 
 I nod because I know how it is supposed to be because I, like most other outsiders, have 
read the web site and had seen the village promotional videos. “But no these cliques 
really control who gets into power… and that’s really a problem,” I have to insist. 
He agrees. “Yeah, that’s a problem, right.  And like I said they get that from grade school.  
We’re taught cliques and power. Its like the Blacks hang out with each other. The Whites 
hang out with each other. The women hang out with each other. The sports guys hang out 
with each other…. And it takes a community, an effort of all people  -- people don’t 
understand the Quran much here in this country, so I usually go to the Bible and I tell 
them about Babel, and how they was one people and then how God caused a confusion to 
come on them.  And they had different language, different lifestyles. So they was stuck 
with the people that could understand.  And that’s how cliques form – and the only thing 
that was missing was an interpreter. So… Dignity Village need an interpreter to interpret 
rules, to interpret life. To interpret how to survive with self-sufficiency.  You know I 
went to the US social forum in Detroit last year, I saw how that city is destroyed by greed 
and laziness, but now they’s starting to rise up with communal living. You got people 
living together – you got people growing gardens together, feeding off the land, and that 
was the Dignity Village model – a community… that’s why we called it  ‘village”.  
 He pauses briefly, and looks at me again with those eyes and that grin, and smiles, in 
a questioning tone, he says/asks,  “it takes a village? So that’s what they were doing and 
they need to stick together and figure out a way to survive, ‘cause everybody got a right 
to survive.”  He smiles looking for acknowledgement from Ptery.  (One of the Dignity 
village activists who came with me to introduce me to the active side of Portland). The 
smile capriciously framed around the phrase, “right to survive” the name of his housing 
activist group.   
 Ibrahim was very much the professional activist.  He had that charismatic capacity to 
impress ideas on people.  He was not imposing. 
 “So they need to start growing their own vegetables, they need to start cooperating 
again, they need to stop fighting from inside. Cause that’s what’s gonna destroy them.  
The city, you know the city’s just sitting back and saying, ‘okay, just watch it, watch 
them mess-up’ and that’s exactly what they’re doing because they’re free… and they 
don’t know how to make their decisions because they used to people telling them, ‘wake 
up at 6 o’clock, go out in the rain, come back at 7, but we gonna be feeding at 6 …at 
night, we gonna be feeding at 12 at noon, and you can use the showers at this time or the 
next day,’ and then, ‘we got this amount of fresh clothes…’ they always being told – 
dictated to – they don’t know how to make their decisions.  Like I said (earlier) they took 
their will power away from them and instead of making them independent, they made 
them  DEE-pendent, so that’s why they sit out there with their palms up – gimme’ gimme’ 
gimme’, and waitin’ waitin’ waitin’. (At the village they say:) ‘If I sit here long enough 
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somebody gonna’ bring something to the village, I don’t ever need to leave the village… 
I can stay here.’” 
“And they don’t leave,” I interject. 
“I know,” he says, “they stay calm, they stay in jail…”   
“Even their drugs come to them” I add. 
He pauses slightly. Looks again with that smile.  “And that’s a sin and a shame (chuckles, 
nervously).” 
I implore him. “You need to come and be a voice, just one voice.  Maybe just one day 
even –?” 
 He laughs. I am not sure if he is being humble, or if he finds some irony in this - I 
mean he was the original voice of Dignity Village: Ibrahim, Jack Tafari, some others.  
He is one of the loudest voices in Portland now.  Ptery who introduced me to Ibrahim is 
learning from Ibrahim. His smile I surmise reveals the confidence that his voice is louder 
than I know. But then why aren’t all the folks at Dignity listening? What happened to 
that voice that created the moment that became Dignity Village? I suggest it to him again, 
“You really need to get out there. They need to hear it.” 
  “God’s will,” he says, “God’s will.” Laughing, laughing, nervously. 
 There is a hesitance in Ibrahim’s voice.  He looks over at Ptery. 
Ptery, who has been living at the village for a year, was attracted to Dignity Village for 
exactly the model of sustainable democratic community that was pitched to him when he 
arrived. Since then, the other villagers cloistered in their idleness and hands-out comfort, 
a sort of terminal liminality I had been calling it when at the village, had been hard on 
Ptery, discouraging his activism.  This was, it seemed to him and me, a complete 
abandonment of the ethos that was behind Dignity Village’s triumph as the first city 
sanctioned shantytown in modern US history.  
… Ptery and I sort of look at each other. Hesitant to speak, I finally offer to Ibrahim by 
way of a polite challenge, “I don’ know what your hesitance is, I know there is emotional 
stuff there, I know you have emotional and painful attachments there to the place, 
still…that lingers for you, and I know to go back there and to speak to them is a heavy 
duty thing for you…”  
 Ibrahim looks serious, and pensive. “It may be heavy duty, I may be strict and firm 
on them to let them know what I would like for them to get a congregation together and 
walk with me…Ptery and Brad Gibson are good representatives and they should let those 
people be ambassadors for Dignity Village and come (out here) and learn and let what 
Ptery and Brad learn be brought to them so they can learn to be leadership. And they can 
get involved in things what happening in the city—go to city hall and see what city hall 
is doing. You know it’s like they sitting out there with the laws, the unjust laws being 
imposed on (homeless) people down here, and they not going to be affected by it.  Well 
they wrong, they’re wrong.” 
“Well there’s problems out there too” I add. 
“Right! Right! So the first what they gotta do is put a blockade up around Dignity 
Village and kick everyone out who’s not following the by-laws…” 
At this point Ptery and I are a little shocked. I mean, no one follows all of the by-laws. 
“Tell them to leave!” he adds shaking his head resolutely. 
“But who’s gonna’ tell them?” I ask. 
“You have people on the council doing shit (drugs or dealing drugs),” Ptery adds. 
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“People on the council are all doing shit,” I confirm. 
 Ibrahim looks a bit more serious.  “Now that’s where you come back to your 
constitutional rights. Everybody in there got constitutional rights… If the government 
aint doing for you what the people voted them to do, they get impeached. They don’t get 
voted back in. They should be replaced. So that’s the same thing in Dignity Village… 
What they need to do is follow the old concept of the village—you have to be in good 
standing. You have to come out and do activism.  That was one of the things they had - 
they have to do - come out do activist work for the homeless community - the leadership, 
the council, the chairman, the vice-chair, the treasurer, the secretary, they the ones who 
need to be out here doing that work. How can they know how to run and teach the people 
at the village, if they ain’t getting no kind of education. Their job ain’t to sit around there 
and do nothing.” 
 Ibrahim was for all intents and purposes the iconic villager activist.  He was patient, 
and motivated during our interviews. I had to add, “You really need to come talk to these 
people and let them know what it was like and what it was meant to be.” 
“God’s will.” 
“I am pressuring you, but in a friendly way,” I offer.  
He laughs deeply.  Ptery’s eyes roll. 
“I just know that if … that place needs a shaking up, and if   someone like you doesn’t 
come and shake it up, I just know it’s gonna fail.” He nods. Commits to coming out 
before or after Ramadan.  
 I ask him what he would say to people in my world, outside of Portland about places 
like Dignity Village. Should other cities let there be Dignity Villages? He and I both 
knew about or had visited some of the dozen tent camps and intentional communities, 
some permanent and vying for legal rights, in the Oregon-Washington corridor.  But 
Dignity Village was a legally self-governed corporation; it had rights.  Should there be 
more? 
“Do you think what you guys started there more than ten years ago, could be adopted in 
others cities, or should be?” 
 He didn’t even have to pause to think about his response. “I think it should be 
adopted in other cities where the government should give people a chance to redeem 
themselves. It used to be, you commit a crime, you pay just dues for it by doing 
community service, going to jail, or whatever and you can get back to the floor of society.  
We become an unforgiving nation where we don’t forgive  easily. We hold people down 
from being progressive.  And this (the village) is a way for people to get their self-esteem, 
their motivations, their scruples and their principles back together into being somebody. 
Now this is what happens when you know your constitutional rights. You can achieve 
this because nobody above their constitutional rights and you can do that but you have to 
do that and think of everybody, not just yourself, and one individual. And this should be 
done, and it can be done, and it will be done, or this country and every country like it is 
going to fail.” 
 Some hours later, I went back to my shack in the village.  There was so much 
bickering and fighting over stupid things, mundane nonsense: who received more 
donations than the next guy, why Whitefoot got the last piece of fried chicken, was Mitch 
going to use more than his share of electricity sanding wood for the mirrors he was 
making, all mundane nonsense. There was no discussion whatsoever between villagers 
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about the new city imposed contract, or about community issues like how to raise funds 
for the servicing of the outhouses. No one ever, ever, engaged in spontaneous 
communication with others about the 3,000 or so homeless men and women on the 
streets or about what the village should be doing to help out these others.  In the village, 
citizens were consumed by their personal needs and this just didn’t seem right. “They are 
like spoiled children,” I had jotted in my fieldnotes.  They were critical of each other but 
of critique, I found no evidence, at least not then.  Was Ibrahim imagining a whole other 
place? I wondered. 
 
 Ibrahim’s conversation with me is rich and exciting, and passionate, and riddled with 
conflict and counter-intuitive observations.  He speaks well; animated, clearly a man of 
skill and charisma who has given the matter of rights and housing activism a great deal 
of thought.  Still, in the same breath he talks of an alternative and self-governed 
community where people have rights and freedom, and then speaks to the need to curtail, 
restrain and structure those actors in accordance with fundamental village principles.  At 
the same time as he speaks of the need for more communities where homeless people can 
govern themselves, he insists that these places need to confirm extant constitutional and 
legal codes; freedom and constraint issue forth in the same rhetorical commitment to 
alternative community. He calls for the village and the leadership to be critical and 
conformist, at the same time, from within the same mental and physical living space.  
There is a sense of the idealistic and normative value of such space, and what it could 
represent “if only,” or perhaps as might have once been, or might be, one day in the 
future, and so there is too a certain naïve practical hopefulness to achieving these ends 
that he suggests.  While he professes liberation through democracy, he reiterates 
examples of how this liberation requires a degree of domination.    
 His understanding of events at Dignity Village, what freedom and autonomy mean, 
and the role of activism within democracies, conveys various antagonisms between 
central and competing themes in my research of homeless camps.   A central theme is the 
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difficulty with understanding, let alone challenging, events around you when you are 
poor, homeless and struggling with matters of practical existence such as safety, shelter, 
food and addictions.  Practical reason in this context is wrapped up in micro-experiential 
and often fleeting social situations where results – getting fed, getting high – are 
expected to occur quickly.  It is easy to lose sight of the ‘bigger picture’ or form 
attachments to causes no matter how noble, when just getting through the day is often 
difficult.   Having been on the streets, or queued up in waiting lines for shelters and 
welfare as part of long and unfortunate time spent on the streets, hardly instills patience 
in a person, or contributes to learning the skills one needs to be an activist. In this poor 
world where critique and action are steered towards exigencies of living and forging 
alliances with other villagers who can help you out with daily struggles, creating 
knowledge about broader commitments to housing activism for example, is difficult to 
achieve. This sets limits on the potential for a homeless survivor to become a political 
subject interested in the visionary concerns of his community, and deepens the morass of 
liminality.   
2.6 Crisis of Community, Crisis of Democracy 
  Unless one assumes that by virtue of corporeal existence all persons are at least able 
to be political, one can see how the tension between critical action directed towards 
survival anxieties, places pragmatic action towards these over the broader concerns of 
“social critique” - understood here primarily, though not exclusively, to participation in 
or deliberations about housing activism. Elsewise the citizen literally disappears 
altogether, corporeally.  Even if one might have political opinions, as most homeless 
folks do, seeing how the system works and discerning means by which to participate in 
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political action, is rare from within it because the bulk of life is spent in matters of dire 
exigency.  Yet these two needs, the need of individuals to survive on a daily basis and the 
village community’s need to collectively compete with other powerful political entities 
and thereby survive, abrade the social unity of Dignity Village, and contribute to what I 
call in this dissertation, a crisis of community.     
 This crisis is not new. It has been part of the village since 2004-2006, when most of 
the old guard who had the necessary political skill to fight for its rights back in 2000-
2001, left for other lives. The current crisis is largely because of a critical incapacity 
amongst villagers to see how the various powerful systems of meaning, such as housing 
policies and welfare systems that permeate village life from beyond the gates, might be 
understood differently and addressed with renewed critique.  The leadership of the 
village is constantly faced with the numerous problems of managing a community in 
poverty and rarely have the capacity or experience to engage in the activist ethos that has 
historically energized the village.  As Ibrahim suggests, they sit there waiting for goods 
and services to come to them, instead of actively pushing for those services as a matter of 
social justice. Villagers more or less accept the support and few services mitered down to 
them as just, if not the best they can do. This is not the case.  With the application of 
concerted effort and pressure on the city, such services and new ways of getting support 
could be figured out.  Ibrahim’s R2DTOO and Opportunity Village, a new intentional 
camp in Eugene Oregon, will be frequently referred to in this work as a counterpoint to 
the idleness of Dignity Village. 
 While some of its opponents critique the village on its consistent failure to transit 
people from homelessness to a short supply of conventional housing and jobs, the 
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villager becomes wrapped up in a village world that becomes “everything” to them. They 
limit their personal and political critical capacities to the boundaries of the village, 
grudgingly participating in council meetings and village politics, in order to fulfill the 
participation requirement of the village, eschewing any activist role that might bring 
about any meaningful change to the power that hems in the community. In the village, 
they have temporary status in homes, chores, politics, relationships and society; it is a 
liminal (transitional) world that fails to transition people to the recovered, conventional 
lives it has promised.  Suspended in limbo, drug use is epidemic amongst the villagers. 
This is a multifariously constructed space that critique has had a fundamentally difficult 
time to anticipate.  Pitched to the world as a democratically self-governed community (as 
if that is a good thing for people with few leadership or citizen skills) invites us to ask 
what that means to the formation of critical actors at Dignity. 
 Derrida (2005) famously instructs us that democracy is yet to come, constantly being 
invented, and I think then, it is perpetually liminal, and participants in democracies are 
by participation in it, to a certain degree, liminal political personae.   It is perhaps a 
Catch-22, a vicious cycle, or some other cliché of ironic despair, but the village is a 
socially produced space that is failing to be what Lefebvre understands to be more than a 
“mere container for human action” (1991:27); if one critically examines what people who 
live there say, then one must admit that it has come to resemble what De Tocqueville 
(1840) argued was all that is good, and all that is bad about American democracy,  
Although men cannot become absolutely equal unless they are entirely free, and 
consequently equality, pushed to its furthest extent, may be confounded with freedom, 
yet there is good reason for distinguishing the one from the other. The taste, which men 
have, for liberty and that which they feel for equality are, in fact, two different things; 
and I am not afraid to add that among democratic nations they are two unequal things. 
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And a few lines later,  
 
The advantages that freedom brings are shown only by the lapse of time, and it is always 
easy to mistake the cause in which they originate. The advantages of equality are 
immediate, and they may always be traced from their source ([1840] 2004 Book Two (1): 
1). 
 
 I understand De Tocqueville, to be saying that equality or one’s relative equality 
(under the law) is understood by villagers (in this case) to be a commensurate measure of 
having freedom, and in the sense he makes, being politically equal to participate (as 
freedom), satisfies the immediate need of gratification that homelessness imposes on 
people I study.  They don’t see a “greater” freedom, because it had been taken from them 
by life’s events. The freedom they have is available, while a greater freedom seems 
unobtainable. And in any event, life in the village is better than a life on the streets. A 
certain desirable quality or experience in the moment, a room in which to sleep, food to 
eat, drugs to sniff, to shoot, the rush, a few hours of bliss, are generally more secure and 
surely more satisfying, or so they think, than more freedom down the road, which might 
cost them the relative equality they now have (a shack, donated clothes and food 
stamps).12  
 Even in critiques of social justice such as debates over poverty, housing and gender 
equality, it is not given that a successful claim (one that achieves certain goals which are 
always unique) renders power and inequality unimportant for organizing social life.  The 
best one can hope for is that the fundamentally just issue at the heart of the critique is 
recognized by the action. But there is still power, and human history and the example I 
just gave demonstrates quite clearly that this can never be equally distributed amongst all 
persons, and at all times.  From the very beginning, the pragmatic critique that led to the 
building of Dignity Village was oriented towards these unfortunate ends. There quite 
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simply is no longer a fundamentally just issue that binds the group together or a sense of 
collectivity that compels them to search for one.  If you can get enough support to be 
powerful, you can make any critique work in the village, even if it is potentially 
damaging to the community. Following Derrida (1994, 2005) this orientation is 
understood as emblematic of an “autoimmune” or inherent flaw in democracy, that 
questions the emancipating possibility of its inherent logic 13  - questions equally 
highlighted by Ibrahim’s testimony. In the sense that democracy means that the freedom 
of some must displace the freedom of others, there is an inherent tension between actors 
seeking different ends, regardless of means, or the same ends but through different means.   
 Michels (1949 [1915]) presented the notion of the Iron Law of Oligarchy, which 
claims that in all democratic societies leadership eventually produces systems by which 
to dominate and oppress its members, largely through the expansion of bureaucracy into 
the daily lives of members (Hyland 1965).  In large societies, this has been well argued 
to be very true (Michels 1915; Lipset 1959; Jung et al 2010).  In smaller groups, mostly 
studied as small political parties, such as unions, there is some sense that Democracy 
works better (Lipset 1956; Enjolras and Holmen-Waldhal 2008).  That is; members have 
more direct influence on decisions and methods by which laws are carried out.  Lipset 
(1956) identified the means by which trade unions are able to avoid the oligarchic usury 
that Michels had expounded.  Lipset also argued that economic development was directly 
related to democratic capacity (1959).  In the absence of economic diversity and wealth, 
this capacity decays into factions and disarray. Participant observation in the community 
of Dignity Village by Mosher (2010), and mine for this dissertation (2010-2013), 
observes how democratic self-rule led to a series of impeachments and entrenched 
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factions that over time crippled the village in direct action and protest, and battered the 
village’s image to its critics. This tends to support Lipset’s hypothesis. Rather than 
engaging citizens in a process where they can express themselves freely by voting for or 
against ideas and principles, as autonomous citizens, the social reality now requires 
villagers to align with and vote for the representatives of powerful factions in the village 
in order to secure protection and support in village affairs.  This action is governed by 
practical concerns disguised in a rhetorical idealism, which they call democracy. To me 
this is oligarchic factionalism.  Oddly enough, Mitch Grubic, Dave Samson, Lisa Larson 
and Brad Gibson, each a past or present member of the village council, understand this as 
normal democratic “politicking.”  
 This is part of the autoimmune deficiency of democracy that Derrida had described.  
We can think of this autoimmunity as evidence of what in his deconstructionism Derrida 
(1996) would call aporia; but in this case we are talking about a feature of the system 
(democracy) that forces it to contradict the very ethos on which it professes to matter. 
Following his earlier thoughts about “la démocratie à venir,” in Spectres of Marx (1993) 
and The Politics of Friendship (1994), in Rogues: Two essays on reason, (2005) Derrida 
in my most simple terms suggests that democracy as we understand it is always an attack 
on itself from within. He explains this as an autoimmunity in two important anti-logical 
dimensions.  First, democracy suggests emancipation from sovereign rule by extending 
the power to affect change to all citizens.  Democracy needs to express liberty and 
equality in those terms, but it also needs to enclose and encapsulate participants in that 
system under notions of a sovereignty, the nation, the village for example, each of which 
supposes leadership and empowered authority, over a group, and which by definition, 
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suggests that democracy cannot exist without sovereignty. Even the terms of freedom 
and liberty that one might find in the village documents and by-laws (in chapter six) 
provide a sovereign set of standards.  Secondly, very simply put, the villager recognizes 
her freedom as paramount, and that all others are equally free. It is only in this way that 
Democracy makes any sense. The autoimmunity is that the citizens’ incalculable freedom 
is impossible where others have power over others, and that is democracy, as we know it.  
While the obvious tension between these aspects suggests the impossibility of idealistic 
democracy, Derrida argues that democracy is yet to come. It is not guaranteed that this 
will be a peaceful or emancipating transition.  There will be more and less democratic 
emergences in this perpetual event of becoming, but it suggests that in a very basic way, 
all citizens who claim to be democratically governed, are in part liminal personae within 
the system itself, and internally, as persons coming to know what democracy and 
freedom means to them.  The village provides a very unique place then, one that rides the 
emergent issues raised by its own liminal and self-regulated “democracy of poverty” as 
Dave Samson has called it, which produces a variety of local understandings, and one 
that rides currents of debate about housing and shelter within the larger democracy of 
which it is merely a part.  Each of these competing levels of democratic identity 
contributes to the villager’s sense of right and wrong, and therefore to what degree they 
might be willing to fight for the village or remain suspended in liminality. 
 At a very fundamental level essential to the formation of political subjectivities, 
participants in my research create stories and narratives to make sense of personal, social 
and political actions they take or more importantly, that they do not take, in this context 
of insecurity and material depravity that an exterior critical position about how to govern 
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could fault if the survival anxieties (finding shelter, food, drugs etc.) that underscore the 
action was not made explicit. These narratives amount to an essentially pragmatic critical 
attitude about how villagers understand their freedoms and liberties and the nature of 
homelessness within both these contexts; American neoliberal democratic thought, and 
the unique interpretation of democracy in the village.  The complexity of their standpoint 
is impossible to understand or to collaboratively interrogate with villagers without a 
critical, pragmatic and ethnographic approach.  
 
2.7 Links to Pragmatism 
 Rochberg-Halton (1982), argued that “qualitative immediacy” or “esthetic quality” 
is roughly the same thing as the subjective “I.” Because American pragmatic social 
thought has been preoccupied by the immediacy of experience, or situating agency back 
in the domain of the subject, he points out, that critics suggest it has lost its ability (or 
interest) to recognize the broader and pervasive ways that objective structures condition 
the meaning of subjective experience (162-163).  Yet Rochberg-Halton cites Peirce, a 
founder of American Pragmatism, as having argued for the mediated nature of 
internalized self-knowledge, such that qualitative immediacy should be understood as 
linked to external or broader categories of experience, not withheld from it (Peirce 1931-
1950 (5): 213-357 in Rochberg-Halton 1982:163). The resolution of this community 
crisis rests in illuminating how these micro critiques, linked to broader systems of 
knowledge that govern the village space, have diverse impact on the self-transformative 
processes of transitioning homeless people.  In other words, I will show that there is 
liminality, but I am asking the villagers to tell me how they can transcend this. 
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 There is a sense following Gadamer (1989) that every act of interpretation, however 
mundane, or noble, is given to pragmatic critique. The problem I need to confront is 
really the assumption of uniformity, which most critical positions do by generalizing to a 
population similar circumstances of experiences.  In other words, it is not reasonable to 
assume that critical attitudes can be generalized to all villagers simply because they are 
homeless, live in the same space or speak the same language.  This reduction to a key 
antagonism between central ideas has been the goal of much of Western social critique.  
Similarly, it is very possible that a number of classical social critiques that preface 
structure over agency and vice versa, might find some unity in liminal space, since this is 
a world where neither structure nor agency are well-formed or understood by villagers in 
the same ways, Brad’s decay into darkness is just one example of the contradiction. 
 What I am trying to do is understand the independent and the shared ways that 
villagers create ideas about the village, the city, laws and other socially constructed or 
empirical concepts that help to form their critical positions towards each other and 
towards political concerns. I am also trying to understand how the critiques of the village 
by other powers, the city, the press and so on, create certain conditions on the village that 
villagers must respond to in practical ways. I expected there to be a great deal of 
conformity in the village, based on a shared ideal of democratic participation before I 
began my work and what I found was diversity, conflict and a sort of institutionalized 
lack of cooperation. One might ask, “How can the village act united towards its political 
goals, when there is no longer a shared collective vision for the community as a political 
entity?”  The length of time that the village has had to give evidence to the original 
critical displacement demonstrates in this case that the inversion of the critique happened 
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very early, and the symbol of the critique, the space, Dignity Village, is at risk of 
disappearing. Ibrahim speaks of an ideal – an ideal village; the one they designed in 
planning documents and mission statements back in 2001. This ideal, as we will discuss, 
seeds sustainable material culture with emancipated villagers able and willing to 
participate in democratic local government first, and then, but necessarily too, in fighting 
for the rights of other homeless people, as a way to be a thorn in the side of capital, to 
give the village bargaining power.  
 The village was envisioned as a community, but also as an act of protest. He and I 
and many others recognize that the village is not that place, nor the individuals living 
there, the capable citizen encoded in the founders’ vision.  The conversation we have had 
is underscored by a pragmatic concern to understand why it has missed the mark, and 
what can be done to resolve this. His transcript is a textual map, in a way, albeit 
somewhat embellished by my editorial coloring of what I see on the video as I transcribe 
it, of our creating knowledge in order to deal with - that is to explain and to seek out a 
path of action - in a difficult to comprehend reality with certain idealized outcomes at the 
end.  As much as Ibrahim attempts to dress the events in the village in the language of 
freedom, autonomy and democracy, the situation he is asked to address is not emblematic 
of his ideal understanding of these values.  That is the problem.  The ideal is yet to come. 
 This knowledge creation is really educated guess work, based on trying to fit ideals 
and lived experience into the same tight container. This according to Peirce (1966) is 
indicative of a fundamentally pragmatic approach, where ideas create our experience of 
lived or environmental reality, rather than the opposite state of affairs, yet the linkage 
exists.  In short, Ibrahim has described a number of logically opposed beliefs and 
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practices that describe well the confusion that researchers, villagers and other critics have 
when speaking of Dignity Village.  Why then is the village so far off the mark? Is it that 
the idealism of a green, sustainable and democratic village sounded good, but was 
impossible? Is the village as good as it can get? Perhaps, it was because the idealism and 
the model of the village were so good and so powerful, that the city found ways to push 
back, to harness the upstarts and activists by imposing restrictive codes that the village 
could not reasonably meet.  Perhaps also, the perpetual liminality that villagers claim to 
experience is what the city had hoped for all along. Perhaps even, it is this kind of 
diffused power, but power just the same, over the affairs of new camps that city 
governance seeks. They stand back, and do very little because there is a clause in the 
contracts that gives them ultimate word in the life and death of these places.  Perhaps the 
democratic goals of the activists are not the ones being met by the critique of housing 
policy – they just want to believe that is the case.  If the vision of the village encoded in 
the mission statement did not exist, what would we see today, and how might villagers 
perceive themselves differently?  One of the pragmatic qualities of the PEOC is to 
understand the world if it functioned as villagers want to see it. 
 
2.8 Ways of Seeing, Knowing 
 There are three ways of doing this. First, we can look at how the historical 
conditions that made the claim possible are wrapped up in its performance as part of an 
ongoing critical displacement to which subsequent critical sites are linked. Second, is to 
understand the structural constraints placed on the village as a city - regulated urban 
space that we can discern, such as by-laws and zoning documents, the contract and 
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various assessments. Third, we can join in the village as a participant in order to 
understand how village life under these known conditions is imagined and experienced 
by members, and by exposing the disjuncture between what is encoded and what is actual, 
we can find room to gauge critical capacity. 
  This provides anchoring points for PEOC: Foucault’s (1991) genealogical critique 
of governmentality, understood here as the range of techniques employed by government 
to produce self-regulating subjects, and also as ideas about how space is created for 
resistance: and also pragmatic sociology of critique’s recourse to manuals and texts as 
guides for justification. These approaches helps me to explain how it is that marginalized 
and poor citizens are governed by powerful discourse, even when they claim to have 
established self-governed community, a measure of their own self-empowerment; and 
second to account for how the village citizen comes to govern herself, a measure of 
which is her own critical attitude. The argument here is that the village is rationalized 
under neoliberal governance as a monitored space where homeless selves can reconstruct 
themselves. I speak to this in great detail in chapter six. In each of these dimensions, we 
can use a number of ethnographic techniques to understand and represent the ideas 
villagers use to guide practical action and to critique the world in which they live.  These 
techniques include examining written documents and regulations, videographed 
participant observation, and fieldnotes. So we have established ethnography as a 
connection between discourses that tell us how to be, and pragmatic inquiry if only to 
expose the weakness of the former as a way to strengthen our understanding what 
actually happens on the ground. 
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 While a lot of attention has been paid to social critique as ideology critique, or to 
matters of social justice, which want to unpack the world for a blinded actor, shielded 
from the bigger truth of her domination, I incorporate visually supported participant 
observation in an ethnographic method and theory in PEOC in order to show the tension 
between two levels of critical attitude:  between mundane critique of daily life: and 
attitudes that are necessary to form attachments or to act in the name of the village’s 
goals as an activist community.  Villagers are not stupid. They are well versed in political 
rhetoric and they don’t need someone to speak for them, even though they think they 
might.  They know intellectually and pragmatically what the village needs to do in order 
to solidify its position vis a vis counter-critics of its mission.  They either choose not to, 
or find their attempts muddled by faction fighting and low morale.  We need to arrive at 
a sense of what villagers actually know, instead of assuming they don’t know enough to 
act in politically critical manners such as the fight for a new village site or the plight of 
other homeless folks. Clearly what villagers do with the information they know is 
variable - a handful is active in external matters of social justice, most others cannot see 
beyond the gates.  I imagine this has to do with the degree to which some villagers are 
still caught in survival mode and others emancipated from it. We will see. 
  Of course in trying to follow villagers’ ideas, many other levels of association 
become salient, and a certain structure emerges that is always variable (tailored by 
happenstance) to the actor, but never solely reducible to her.  There are objective, non-
human elements, and structural implications caused by other actors in her world that 
impact her own structural possibilities. I have chosen to build out from the stories people 
tell in order to get a sense of their world. Conversations about one’s life tend to establish 
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narratives that implicate their choices in constructing self-understanding over time. 
Furthermore the tendency of classical critique to reduce political and personal critical 
activity to a key criterion for action almost entirely trivializes the point of critique, which 
in order to speak to various issues of social justice, must understand diversity and 
complexity, or else we in fact simply replace one criterion over others.   
 Ibrahim’s comments, my field experience, and this dissertation argue that while 
founding activists envisioned equalitarian democratic participation by fully engaged 
political village subjects, the exigencies of post-homelessness - self-governance limited 
this to a relatively better situation than the homelessness from which they emerged. The 
critique of the village we created in that discussion is based on the application of the 
somewhat dogmatic and naïve ideal (fully participant democracy and sustainability) to 
the practical reality (faction led, economic dependency), a situation that makes Derrida’s   
rogue, quite visible.  The village is still there, but going nowhere, nor its residents. It is 
caught in the liminality of an unfulfilled American dream, while other sites move ahead 
into the unknown. 
2.9 Endemic Liminality 
 For Van Gennep (1908), looking at simple societies, rites of passage that governed 
social transformations, and movements though geographical territory were achieved 
though rituals and rites associated with such passage.  There were three phases, a pre-
liminal, liminal and post-liminal. Turner focused on the liminal stage because he 
understood that this period of ambiguous roles and identities was of the greatest threat to 
societies regardless of complexity and that managing this liminal shift was an important 
job of various institutions, like school and religion and the home.  
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 Recognition of the liminality of homelessness is due in part to the enormity of the 
problem.  Since the 1980’s a new kind of poverty hit the streets; mother’s and children, 
young people, able bodied white collar workers cast aside by the economy, and every 
decade since, the percentage of first time homeless people, white collar deportees to 
limbo, and other categories of deserving poor, have contributed to the economically and 
socially destabilizing effects of having millions of people moving in and out of 
homelessness.  Less concern was paid to the antecedent avatars of homelessness, the 
drunk men and women who lined laneways and begged on street corners because they 
were understood as tragic worst cases, collateral damage to be managed by local charity 
in a system that creates poverty, addiction and psychiatric patients just as it produces 
wealth (Marcuse 1983; Rossi 1989; Davis 1999; Bourgois and Schonberg 2008).    
 Urban symbolic systems have long recognized the streets and the shelters, other dark 
places; bridge underpasses, rail tunnels and so on, as the sleeping place for these people, 
and during the day street corners and park benches, subway benches and police cruisers, 
tend to dominate our expectations about where to see them (Ward 1979; Wright 1997; 
Mitchell 1999).  A young mother with children, unemployed war veterans, abled bodied 
youth looking for work, these are not the ones we expected to see in these places or roles. 
 Homelessness is not caused by drugs, alcohol or mental illness; at least this is what 
we now understand.  Homelessness after all is caused by rising levels of poverty, a 
retraction of long term care for addicts and patients, and a lack of affordable housing 
(NCH 2010; NAEH 2011; HUD – ‘Opening Doors’ 2012). In a current US context, 
where 47 million people live below the poverty and therefore close to homelessness, the 
3 million or so who are literally homeless, constitute a base number, one that will rise, if 
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economies and governments don’t shift how they go about business (NCH 2011; NAEH 
2011).14 With shelters and government housing filling up with the women and children of 
poverty, and with cities increasingly clamping down on homeless sleepers in parks, the 
usual places that the homeless once used are fewer and fewer, and less safe. They have 
had to form camps, something they had always done, but now more than before they are 
willing to fight for that right. Part of this fight comes from desperation. They have 
nowhere else to go. Part of this fight comes from the presence of sanctioned intentional 
homeless communities.  Liminality is a threat, and a worry to capital and neoliberalism 
because of its unpredictability and the range of possible critical moments that it might 
give rise to. These camps are just beginning to be understood by the homeless, the state 
and researchers like me for the diverse potential they have for producing social critique. 
 It is a democratic right you understand, a testament to liberty and freedom to be able 
to form these camps and self-govern in poverty.  It is a shame, really. Dignity Village 
was incorporated as a non-profit, and entered a legal arrangement with the city of 
Portland as a transitional housing camp. From the very moment they made the agreement, 
this was a community ordained by governance to manage liminality - hence its 
designation as an emergency transitional camp. There is a lesson here to help us 
understand how critical action is itself a liminal space, with no guarantees of outcome.   
 This excerpt from Dignity in Exile gives a basic introduction to how it works. 
Dignity in Exile (2012:14-15 Brad Powell CEO (2010) and Eric Weissman 
 
Brad gave me a quick rundown of the political structure and the residency procedure. 
Essentially, the village operates as a smaller version of an elected, democratic legislative 
assembly. But it starts with a homeless person becoming a member of the village. 
Basically, there have been three eras in the village, defined by changes to the way 
membership was determined. In the beginning, and according to the original articles, 
persons wishing to join the village would sign up on a wait sheet. They were required to 
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check in every week to find out if a space in one of the structures or in the commons area 
was available. When a space became available, a hopeful member would be ascribed the 
status of guest. After fulfilling their sweat equity requirement for 30 days, they could, 
after another 14 days, ask to be a member and that was it. In fact, people were expected 
to become members, but it hadn’t been enforced. Membership was important to the 
design of the political structure. Membership came with the right and duty to vote on 
village business, and gave a resident the right to run for council. Council was supposed to 
have 22 seats, but only rarely have all these seats been filled. Hence, the village has not 
really been running like a real democracy, and the interests of only a few members who 
are successful in bids for leadership positions get served. This was the kind of political 
turmoil that Brad was speaking to. Cliques and favoritism were starting to be more 
important than rules and points of order, though Brad never spoke directly to this.  
 A few years ago, for reasons that no one has been able to explain, the village 
leadership managed to push through an amendment that required hopeful members to 
pass through an election, a confirmation of sorts, by other members after the residency 
period. The Village Intake Committee, that had always invigilated the entrance of new 
guests to the village, then became a supremely important organ of the system. Instead of 
“asking and receiving” member status, the committee and the other members were given 
power to determine a guest’s status. 
 
.  
Fig. 9. Brad Powell. June 2010 Greenhouse Construction. (E. Weissman). 
(Video from first visit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHaFa8w430g) 
 
 Faced with the possibility of rejection, many villagers were putting in a minor effort, 
fulfilling only basic sweat equity requirements because they understood that their destiny 
was based on the whims of VIC members and not on the merit of their performance. A 
lack of confidence was stewing in the community based on a lack of faith in the 
leadership, loopholes in the sweat equity model, and a community-wide doubt about the 
sensibility of making a long-term moral or political commitment to the community. 
 I was terribly confused by this, so Brad explained to me that, as a result, not 
everyone who had a housing structure was a member. In 2010, under the revised 
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membership system, many residents had opted out, and participation on the council and 
in vital mandatory members meetings, where decisions were made, dropped off to the 
point where decisions could not be made. Instead of a politically motivated activist 
community, the village was becoming a housing project where mere shelter had become 
more important than engagement in processes that protected and helped the community 
evolve. Even the five basic rules that were posted in several locations around the village 
had become impossible to enforce. 
 “We have five basic rules. The first rule is no violence to yourselves or others. The 
second one is no theft. Those two we have zero tolerance on. If you get in a fight, the 
first person to throw a punch, it’s an automatic ejection (an ‘86’). We have other rules we 
go by – no drugs or alcohol within a one-block area of the village.” 
 I had only been there for a few hours at that point and I had seen empty beer bottles 
and I smelled marijuana. In fact, in ten years working on the streets for my film, it 
seemed to me that pot and drink were fundamental to the lifestyle. Almost everyone I 
had met denied it at first of course, but in short order they’d been open about it. With 
drugs and alcohol arguably the two largest leisure industries in the world, it seemed 
almost unreasonable to restrict their use here in the village. “So no drugs, even in your 
own structure?” I asked. “Well, we can’t monitor that because we don’t search at the gate. 
You know people have rights. And that’s one of their rights here in the United States of 
America, the privacy of one’s home.”  
 
 
Fig. 10. The Finished Greenhouse, August 2010. (N. Dickson, 2011). 
 
 Liminality is built into the village then by the ambiguity that attaches to the process 
and procedures for its internal governance. The village is governed by its own 
democratically elected council, but the rules and codes it follows are city sanctioned, and 
they specify literally to the inch how the community must be structured, and they specify 
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to the letter what can and cannot go on in the village - and the documents that “legalize” 
the community give the city supreme and sovereign say over the village.  The village is 
self-governing, meaning they choose from a number of sanctioned codes which to apply 
or not and are responsible to manage village affairs.  This means to administer the 
choices they made and signed into agreement with the city. This is what they call self-
government.  And individuals in the village choose in turn, which of those laws to abide.  
 As I noted, in the first few hours in the village, it had seemed to me that villagers did 
whatever they could get away with rather than work towards adhering to rules.  The 
following year, when I resided there, I noted dozens of infractions, sometimes-violent 
ones where people threatened or were emotionally abusive to others; there was even a 
brutal case of domestic abuse where Laura had pounded the daylights out of Dave, her 
partner. Neither of them was punished.  Later you will read of Jay who has been exiled to 
a culvert under the county road. He fell down drunk and was accused of assaulting a 
woman as he fell, and was exiled for life from the village. It is this kind of complete 
irregularity that the village produces, which had many of its critics questioning the ability 
of the village to self-govern, and as I stated above, had residents completely mystified 
about how to interpret rules. These stories about misconduct make it to the outside world 
through gossip, by disgruntled ex-villagers telling stories to social workers and cops, and 
these negative appraisals enter the “buzz” on the streets and council chambers about what 
is going on out there at the village. 
 The liminality of the village is also partly and importantly a spatial concern.  It was 
purposely placed as far away from the city center, a core of social services and other 
homeless networks that the villagers need, because the businesses in downtown Portland 
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wouldn’t stand for it anywhere else, and also as a demonstration by the city that it had 
control over upstarts and indigents.  The villagers are marginalized by distance in the 
geographical and the social sense from a world that could help them to find work or 
homes.  It becomes virtually everything, an island of misfit toys as Mitch Grubic and 
Dave Samson, both village council members, have said repeatedly.  So the liminality of 
the village is perpetual. People rarely transit from it into homes or to jobs.  These post-
liminal roles just don’t exist in great numbers anymore, and certainly not for misfits. If 
the village did not exist, where would these people be? - On the streets or lined up for 
shelters.  So the village for all its faults is a better state of affairs for homeless people. 
Now, it is important to know that most of these camps are like this.  None of them are 
run smoothly or without incident.  I am not doing a comparative management study. I am 
looking at how Dignity Village opened a certain critical space for other communities like 
it, and I am suggesting the critique of housing doesn’t fail because Dignity might fail, but 
lives on in these new manifestations as part of the critical displacement over time. 
 
2.10 Critical Time and Emancipation  
 It takes time to fully understand what happens in instances where critique displaces 
power. Larsen (2011) says that this temporal component is necessary because we can 
only gauge what happens to successful critical ideas as they produce new power relations 
in the course of that transformative process and this is of course a matter of time.  In a 
sense, all critical action inheres a liminal phase, but in the presence of goals and criteria 
of justification, it is possible to see the success or demise at a certain point by bringing 
the test of criteria into our observations. These tests and criteria are not fully developed 
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or expressed in liminal spaces, so we have a hard time understanding them in terms of 
success or failure. So criterion-based critique is difficult since the criterion can never be 
fully expressed (such as democracy or freedom) and hence is predisposed to fail.  This is 
why I am trying to develop a way of looking at understanding the diversity of 
understandings that liminality produces, as an expression of the degrees to which various 
criteria are immanent in liminal actors.  People in the village rarely agree with one 
another over solutions to the village’s administrative or public image problems. Even 
though they tend to share affinity towards the “American Dream,” they dispute legitimate 
means to arrive there.  They argue over what real emancipation and freedom means, a 
debate that is the reason we have the village today. 
 In this case, a bit more specifically, in 2001, when 8 activist homeless campers 
filed under Oregon law for status as 501(c)(3) non-profit, Dignity Village Oregon 
became the first city sanctioned emergency transitional homeless camp in the US. It has 
always been controversial, itself the product of a critical separation between the activists 
who founded it. The original divide was between two elements of the “Out of the 
Doorways Campaign” as it had come to be known. The first group under the name, The 
Housing Liberation Front (HLF) would not compromise with the city - they wanted their 
own land on which to govern themselves without any interference from the city - they 
rejected capital and wished to reclaim a right to the city.  A larger group from the same 
bank of activists, “Camp Dignity” exhausted by the struggle, having moved from 
occupation to occupation seven times in a year, established themselves under Portland’s 
Fremont Bridge and accepted a city-regulated compromise for temporary use of city-
owned land on the outskirts of town.  Where the more radical faction envisioned a way to 
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opt out of the system by fighting for the right to its own land, as a rejection of 
neoliberalism’s core values, Dignity Village began as a democratically self-governed 
transitional housing community, tenants of the city, as a means to giving the homeless 
the same rights and access to prosperity as other citizens.  These were two very different 
views on what emancipation from street poverty meant. 
Scott Beck suggests:  
Emancipation eludes definition, and its very meaning will differ significantly from 
individual to individual and from culture to culture.  Out of this ambiguity we might 
posit two alternate visions of emancipation:  emancipation as inclusion, where the 
oppressed individual or group acquires equal rights of participation in the existing social 
or political structure, and emancipation as revolution, or the wholesale eradication of the 
existing social structure, with the assumption that that very social structure itself is both 
the cause of oppression and beyond reform. (Accessed June 5, 2013). 
 
 In the latter, critique wants to lead to an entirely new way of organizing personal 
relationships or social life so that perceptions of the conditions of exploitation or 
domination that created an issue of justice are eradicated. In the HLF case, a normative 
vision of a just way is imposed on extant relations and the critique is towards a new 
totality; ownership of their own land, no contracts and sustainable community and 
cooperative self-government for people denied both. In the former, critique seeks a better 
piece of the pie for the claimant without changing the ingredients – the normative 
evaluation of the system doesn’t change but people’s access to power within it is 
enhanced – shelter, a safe community and a say in village affairs and a chance to get back 
in the game of being a citizen.  The critique is about the right to participate in an extant 
system, not to change the system, so contracted inequality is okay so long as inequality 
makes everyone’s life relatively better than if it did not exist (Rawls 1971).    
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 After six years of proving itself compliant, in 2007, the city handed down its first 
official contract to Dignity Village firmly setting out the condition by which their 
tenancy was sanctionable.  The village was pitched to the city as a utopian, green, 
sustainable and democratically self-governed non-profit community as a critique of 
Portland’s treatment of the homeless.  The articles of incorporation, the mission 
statement and other documents we will read clearly spell out these utopian goals and also 
the compromises included in the agreements with the city that rendered this impossible, a 
compromise that has created this case of perpetual liminality, in the added sense that the 
villager now lives in a world that is betwixt and between the ideals set out in the mission 
statement and by-laws, and the realities of living in poverty.  Villagers each share a 
similar inability to know where they are headed, and if they have goals, don’t know how 
to achieve them in practical terms.  
 Self-transformative political subjects are often seen as vital to critical action 
(Foucault 1991, 1984; Archer 2003; Shragge 2003; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; 
Mosher 2010). The emphasis is on an actor who can transcend the micro critiques of 
daily life and engage in deliberations with issues of emancipatory justice of a greater 
scale and in the process become a political being.  Very simply put; we have styles of 
critique that see a dominated actor in need of emancipatory knowledge  - the truth - in 
order to be powerful or those that see power as truth, and so actors are inherently critical, 
and their collective action is part of the regulatory needs of structure. Dignity Village 
does not fall easily into the purview of either category.  It is relatively easier to explain 
the emergence of Dignity Village through an approach that unites aspects of several 
approaches.  That enterprise is part of this dissertation. I do this to show how liminality 
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was engineered into the village to limit its critical capacity as part of the way power 
displacements are mutually constitutive. In this case the activists made a case and pushed, 
the city made a case and pushed back, and the result in this case was a village that has 
become liminal by not pushing anymore, but this incapacity occurred over time, and 
therefore was immanent in the compromise. So what kind of critique does the village 
produce now and what is its current or future capacity?  As a village model highly 
scrutinized and failing at many levels to live up to its mission statement and promises, 
that is suspended in liminality, regaining critical capacity is vital to its longevity, and 
helping villagers go beyond limbo.   
 Intentional communities, which are starting to gain more support in various cities, 
are becoming relevant because Dignity Village has proven it can manage the liminality 
of homelessness for over a decade, at less than $2.34/person per day.  Manage in this 
sense is being kind.  The village has 56 people in 49 structures on a one-acre plot of 
asphalt tarmac.  Estimates by my informants and my own observations, place the drug 
epidemic, mostly meth, at over 70 per cent, but we will read of the many horrors of that 
place.  It is better than the streets, but it is not satisfactory, not by a long shot, and with 
this I find myself agreeing with Portland’s conservative critics some of whom I met, 
mostly religious types, retired soldiers who made it big in resources and real estate, and 
who come by the village in their Cadillac’s and Lincolns to hand out meals every 






 Neoliberal governance has found an alternative place for the worst case homeless 
and it is no longer the streets, or the shelters, and certainly not decent affordable housing; 
it’s these camps.  While cities are doing more now for the new poor, and even though the 
state is spending more on housing, the numbers of first time homelessness continue to 
rise. And so does the number of camps.  Dignity Villagers made an unofficial count of 
homeless tent camps on the West Coast, those that are recognized and have names, are 
fighting for rights, and might get them. There are 55 official sites from San Luis Obispo 
in California to the south, to Seattle to the north.  And these do not include the hundreds 
of temporary camps, the unorganized ones and the ones that are popping up as I write 
this and as you read it.   
 As such these places and the uncounted number of others (but every major city has 
them) scattered across the States, have entered a critique of housing and poverty that is 
four hundred years old in the US.  It started with the importation of Elizabethan Poor 
Laws into the colonies in 1601 and it currently sets these intentional community models 
into the Obama administration’s Opening Doors campaign that stresses Ten Year Plans 
to End Homelessness amongst the number of cities who compete for federal housing 
money, which is close to 300 by now (HUD 2012).  Dignity Village and other places like 
it are not in the language of these plans, even though cities are “experimenting” with 
them.  Yet, because they manage a liminal population of homelessness, I consider them 
to be a part of what Leginski (2007) has called the de facto US housing service sector – a 
system of often unconnected (or with unrecognized connections perhaps to state it better) 
and redundant services that govern homelessness across the US. 
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 Insomuch as the critical action of Dignity activists was an attempt to resolve the 
immediate need for shelter, it had been successful.  However, its larger address to help 
people return to meaningful conventional roles, and futher the rights of the homeless all 
over Oregon, called for the community to be an activist site, one that pursued and 
engaged networking with other activist branches and the homeless. They understood 
without parsing it, that power is relational and needs to be kept up by critical social 
action.  The village is currently learning that “you never know what power you had until 
someone tries to take it away” (anon). The city’s plan worked well.  Isolated to the 
margins and wrapped up in the exigencies of poverty, the villagers expend their critical 
capacity towards one another, or to getting though the day, and are exhausted just by 
imagining what getting involved in other people’s issues of justice might be. They fight, 
but amongst themselves, and the village is in disarray.  Note the following FB message 
(spelling intact) from Dave Samson, my key “informant.” And now friend from the 
village: 
December 13, 2011: [Sic] “… just gettin up and havin some coffee. getting things done 
in a habitual manner is the key to all things for me so i shall start with coffee i do it every 
morning so why not take the time to send a few text while i am at it !! sounds right!. 
mmmmmmmmmm coffee ! any way things here on the island seem rocky and the beach 
smells bad lol. i love the way the ice crystals covering all the broken things shine! . i 
think that morning is the best time for me to focus and write before my head fills up with 
the days crap . i will be sending you some nice island in winter pics. its a different place 
in winter the vibe is very low . the frozen moral hangs off every house like a sickness 
striped of summers brite colors. the walking dead suddenly seem like what they are in 
clear sharp contrast . the portalets reek of last nights self medication like a john in a bar . 
the islanders stumbling around in recovery from there own filth and decay .complaining 
of things they carry with them . but unwilling to drop the load as if it where some valued 
commodity. clinging to there broken luck as if it will bring them warmth . lending hard 
looks at any one that dare look happy . as if the happy where some disease the needs to 
be eradicated. and running from the truth like birds from cats . my inner voice screeming 
drop the load and be free ! but they can not hear . to focused on the baggage to hear any 
thing but the song of misery the emanates from there own actions. i think making the 
switch to writing seems hard but the further i go in that direction the more it seems the 
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best path . art just dos not convey the richness of thought that seems to fill my 
head  .imagery seems to be taking a back seat to all other thoughts . not that i don't get 
lots of really beautiful pics in the head but they just don't seem to answer any of the 
really strong impulses . but the idea of starting from scratch and remaking my self leaves 
me feeling a little intimidated OK a lot intimidated !!! lol . but i have just got to know 
what i have been hiding in my shadow (a line from the tool song 46+2 about 
transformation ) things have been going well on the stay sober front. i am going to quit 
smoking as well . i had a dream that the time for that is at an end . and i am going to start 
to listen to my self more seriously . learning how to trust my self .is some thing that i 
have all ways had a little trouble with ! . you are the closest thing to a strong and guiding 
brother that i have ever had so forgive me if my lack of faith in my self seems harsh or 
that it seems i don't believe you . this will take some time but hey i have got lots of that 
lol. peace for now . your bro all ways.. dave…” 
 (I noted afterwards): ‘It’s a dream, some “Cuckoo’s Nest” of a horror show.  I left 
the village earlier than I wanted because watching the people there medicate and do 
nothing, caught in limbo day after day – bitching and complaining, debating each other at 
every turn was suffocating and unhealthy for me. I could see the big picture, they could 
see the big picture, but they were wrapped tight. Tight into each other’s shit, thinking 
small. No escape. Poor Dave, I want him to get out of there. I want him to find his way.  
It should be possible.’  
 
 This dissertation is a part of my attempt to critically understand what the conditions 
of this possibility look like.   In order to understand how I look at these conditions, the 
next chapter explains how I understand the mechanics of pragmatic ethnography of 
critique. 
 
Fig. 11. Interior of my “dorm.” All new guests spend early days in a 6 X 8 shack like this 
until they get a structure of their own.  (E. Weissman June 2011). 
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Endnotes - Chapter Two: Pages 35-94. 
 








2  Discussed at length in the next chapter, but essentially a destabilization of 
ethnographic truth. 
 
3  Modern space in Lefebvre’s account of it is socially created, but it still inheres an 
idea that space is in the first sense, natural, a vector or a “substance” after all, in which or 
onto which places are located, if not defined by the social relations which create them. 
Edward Casey (in Feld, S and K. Basso eds. 1996:15-18) suggests that space appears to 
have an a priori status over “place”.  In looking at space, then, as a category of matter, as 
a mathematical template for the possibility of human action, analysis of the social 
relations or the life histories which unfold in it, can only be explained as a result of the 
way that space is organized prior to the entry of the individual.  Where is the room for 
the person or the artefact produced by the individual to impart meaning onto the space in 
the moment that is being observed?  Where is the possibility of ethnography if 
everything is reduced to structural determinants and hegemonic values? As Casey writes, 
“Even such an [phenomenological] approach is not without its own prejudicial 
commitments and ethnographic stances, it is an approach that in its devotion to concrete 
description has the advantage of honouring the actual experience of those who practice it 
(Casey 1996:16). 
 
4  It is tempting to refer to Dignity Village as governed by a form of Indirect Rule, 
whereby the community is permitted to exist as long as it meets certain basic 
requirements of more powerful governance.  The argument is that the state determines 
laws, and regulates community life when it deems it necessary. Often in the past this has 
been done through military or police force. Indirect rule also implies a totalizing or 
centralized state that withholds its rule over pre-existing but cooperative communities, in 
which traditions and customary social relations are permitted within the guidelines set 
out by state agenda (Brundt 2004).  Indirect rule therefore suggests unilateral power 
enforced by coercion, and domination over pre-existing communities. This is not he case 
of Dignity Village. 
   
5  One might surmise that the decision was due in part to the influence of BIDS and 
residents of Portland’s redeveloping city core. From the very moment villagers moved to 
the outskirts of Portland to take up residence, the city had established that such 
manifestations or places of poverty were to be considered marginal to the core values of 
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home and land use.  Marginality has a place under neoliberalism, and “troubled” 
communities are to be avoided. 
 
6   Bevir says: A hostility to the subject runs throughout Foucault's oeuvre. Indeed, 
he himself said, "it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my 
research"; and he described as his main aim the attempt "to create a history of the 
different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects," and so to 
efface the idea of the self-constituting subject””(1999:65) 
 
7 Durkheim (1893) refers to organic and mechanical solidarity as two forms of 
maintaining social and moral order in society. Mechanical solidarity suggests a small 
tightly knit group where intermediate rituals and institutions are not required for 
establishing moral and social ties between individuals, but exist as a conformation of 
known and understood values, expressed in the “collective conscious.” I will address this 
later in my discussion on liminality. Organic solidarity is said to operate in large social 
systems where the divergent life choices and roles of members leads them away from 
this common experience. Operating through shared symbolic, ritual and other meaningful 
institutions the collective consciousness amongst members is more difficult to 
understand. Laws, routines policies and administration of law become the material of 
organic solidarity, as nerves are to the body.  Tent City and Dignity Village are examples 
of small communities  and imply the effectiveness of the former, but ethnography 
demonstrates that the links of members from this community to an external collective 
consciousness disrupts any mechanical solidarity that might exist. I discuss this further in 
my conclusions and in my discussions on Van Gennep.  But it is this observation that has 
steered me away from framing my analysis in a purely Durkheimian lens. 
 
8  They would argue that all cultures develop categories of the safe and unsafe, the 
known and ambiguous, and also they create spaces where ritual or routinized processes 
for transiting individuals through these psychic and actual conditions can take place with 
few repercussions for the rest of the group.  Holy ground,  temples, churches, shamans’ 
quarters,  and perhaps  in industrialized places, doctors’ offices, therapists’ couches and 
community centres, might be such locations or places. For Van Gennep and other 
important scholars of his time, notably the Durkheimians*, such rites not only organized 
and aligned individuals on the basis of role, occupation, age sex and the like, they tended 
to alleviate the fundamental problem for societies to maintain solidarity.  Van Gennep 
and the Durkheimians debated heatedly over the relationship between social institutions, 
such as totemism, and culture, the former insisting that institutions evolved and outgrew 
their culture, the latter arguing that cultures outgrew their institutions.  Yet they shared a 
basic understanding that defining particular rites with the same systemic role but enacted 
differently, is understood as the basis for differentiating groups, and individuals based on 
“culture.”   In this sense, we can find ways to conceptualize groups within groups that try 
to achieve similar ends whatever they might be, but in different liminal modes; achieving 
communion with God and peace of mind by opting out of conventional city life versus 
working hard, saving money and buying a large home; building a tent camp instead of 
residing in shelters or friends’ homes.  Beyond this objectifying value, the spatial 
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deployment of rites is what leads us to an understanding of the liminal process as a 
universal space for the passage of individuals from one state to another within  “simple” 
cultures. States of mind are accompanied often by spatial transitions, or at least the 
performance of the ritual in spaces and time.   Even spatial norms are the subject of 
ritualization. 
 
9  This by no means suggests that they are acceptable to everyone. In liberal 
democracy opposition is often defeated. 
 
10  HLF is discussed in chapter six as the ancestor of Dignity Village. 
 
 
11  2869 people per night as of January 2013.  Numbers rise in summer months, 
(Smock 2013) 
 
12  There is also the very real somatic drive that “coming down” or “getting high” 
creates.  I discuss this at some length in chapter seven but addicts, and I was one, rarely 
care about anything but resolving those two parts of the disease. The village we are 
looking at has had a drug problem for some years, but during this fieldwork, and as 
currently as June 2013, villagers estimate as many as 60% of the village is hooked on 
meth amphetamine. This epidemic addiction undermines any broader community 
commitments that might come up because of the way it creates social patterns of 
dependency and domination between suppliers and users.  Every community has its 
valued commodities.  In the city, it is prime real estate, health and currency; in the 
village, as of late, it has come to be drugs.  Even if villagers have opinions about social 
justice issues within the village, or which extend to broader inequalities, they are unlikely 
to activate  toward them while “using.” 
 
13  Derrida had argued that democracy, understood as rule by the people, requires 
sovereignty; without it the demos is usurped by other power, and effective democratic 
rule can not be achieved.  Furthermore, he argued that freedom and equality which 
provide essential claims to citizens claiming democracy, but which contradict each other 
by suggesting sameness, and the right to be different at the same time. As such liberty 
must mean liberty for each citizen, which once again is a contradiction inherent to 
democracy. 
 
14  As reported on Bill Maher February 22, 2013. 
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Chapter Three: Pragmatic Ethnography of Critique Undressed 
3.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter, first I briefly define what I mean by ethnography.  I move beyond 
anthropology to embrace this approach as an interdisciplinary concept.  I move very 
quickly to explain various crises over representation and how these have led to a 
hybridization and massive broadening of what we now include as ethnography.  I 
understand the current world we live in as replete with social problems and that 
ethnography is a powerful range of ideas and tools for articulating struggle and solutions. 
I am practical that way.  The last thing I want to be is merely descriptive.  In my 
monograph, Dignity in Exile, I spent considerably more time describing the village in 
terms of things we see: structures, people, economy, cliques, and rituals.   The attention I 
want to give here is askew of that traditional descriptive, “writing culture” approach.  I 
am writing critique, if you will grant me that leeway. And so then, I look at how 
ethnography is invested with a critical purpose simply because inquiry is a critical 
attitude towards a topic.  
 I discuss the critical turn of the 1980’s as a way to enter what Denzin called the 8th 
moment of qualitative inquiry – a period of messy and open-minded texts and forms of 
representation open to diversity and social justice.  I explain that later.  Then I discuss 
how my approach has ties or roots in critical ethnographic traditions. I see social justice 
equally as an issue for Marxists and capitalists, and that each way of seeing and doing 
presents tensions for the possibility of justice. That being said, critical ethnography has 
roots in Marxist critical theory and rests on revealing hidden systems of symbolic and 
ideological domination.  It was implicitly what I thought as I looked around the village at 
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all the American flags, and the t-shirts with “ARMY” and “National Guard” printed on 
them.  How does one stay loyal to a society and a federal polity that has all but 
abandoned them? Perhaps it would be wiser to ask how it is that a state that has 
abandoned the poor, still manufactures their loyalty? This is the kind of critical 
understanding that this approach has traditionally sought.  The importance of this form of 
ethnography rests in the way it attaches itself to the critical movement of actors as a part 
of their deliberative and critical processes, rather than looking in from the outside, and 
writing what is observed.  A danger is that new information can be divisive to struggling 
communities and movements because it is part of the mediations that actors and networks 
(for Monsieur Latour) have to experience, and as essentially deconstructionist, it often 
leads to a betrayal of accepted realities. In due course I critique these roots, but in 
opening up reality to interrogation by participants in fieldwork, PEOC is a critical form 
of the ethnography, even if the goal is not a massive socially transformative, but a 
practical one.    
     PEOC is also essentially reflexive, utilizing the researcher as a part of the knowledge 
making process, and tries in every way to use methods that open up the constructed 
nature of fieldwork and deliberations to an answerability to a greater authority in
the reader, whoever it might be.  For this dissertation I rely on video as a means to record 
and study fieldwork, and also the transcripts are based on it. Some of this video is 
included, as web links. However, though I discuss the ethical and moral implications of 
doing visual work in the field, in this and the next chapter, video is explored for its ability 
to extend ethnographic presence, and to keep an enduring connection with the displacing 
effect of critique over time. I explain this too. 
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 A very important aspect of my research is based on the difficulty of representing 
experiences that have passed as if they were still valid in the way they were understood at 
that time. So I discuss Bakhtin and the act of investigation in the context of video and 
other methods for doing research that link directly to originating moments.  Also, I am 
not resident in the village, but my research in the village is an ongoing process, and as I 
mentioned in the introduction, it is the kind of research we have done together digitally 
that has kept the act alive.  Of course once this is written and submitted, a certain finality 
will be imposed.  Lastly I explore the union between forms of philosophical pragmatism 
and the ethnographic method in order to produce an ideal vision of pragmatic 
ethnography of critique. At the end of this chapter I argue that PEOC requires clearly 
understanding how I arrived at this disposition towards critique, as a way of 
contextualizing the role I play as a resource amongst this particular group of collaborators.  
Having argued for the ethnographer in the 8th moment to be a sort of critical community 
organizer, in chapter four I offer a very in depth auto-historical account of how I came to 
do this work and how this experience is a resource for me. 
 
3.2   Ethnographer as Organizer 
 In particular, I am arguing here that participant observation as part of a critical 
ethnographic approach to understanding communities like the village becomes part of the 
critique in which the village is a part, and ethnographic text or films, products, must be 
represented as such and explored as vehicles for ongoing and critical engagement with 
communities. This is so because these bundled packages of ideas are repatriated to 
participants in my pragmatic ethnography, as a means of eliciting a continuous 
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understanding of how accurately they are perceived, what new ideas or arguments they 
produce, and how they might be taken as advice or criticism. Events or ideas that 
occurred two or three years ago in the field can be revisited in order to understand the 
pragmatic implications of life events, personal transformative experiences and other 
unpredictable experience. Furthermore, villagers ask those of us who have studied the 
village in a serious manner to participate as external advisors during board meetings, 
impeachment proceedings and other procedural matters, because we, unlike the village 
newcomer and most of the membership, have actually studied the laws and rules.  So 
Boltanski (2011) who had cautioned against researchers’ assuming a superior place of 
knowing, is not really correct in the sense that there are times in which the researcher 
does have a certain expertise that transcends the experience of those we study. This 
suggests that the ethnographer has an important role as one of the critical actors, and that 
this role has very specific ethical and practical implications.   
 Rapport (2010: 79-85) establishes various ways that “ethnography can also ‘right’ 
social reality. A new ethnography can set itself up in a critical position to the living that 
preceded it.”  For Rapport and others who speak of the ethnographic self as a resource in 
fieldwork, ethnography then, is at some level, a critical activity which amounts to an 
ethical position (Sanjek 1991; Ricoeur 1996; Coffey 1999; Collins 2002; Rapport 2002;  
Collins and Gallinat 2010; Weissman 2012; Rapport 2010). This does not imply a 
superior position relative to those participants with whom we work; our goal is precisely 
to limit this sense of superiority through critical and reflexive means.  The ethnography 
reveals how power works, where domination is taking place, and suggests critical actions 
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to mobilize and protect the rights of the community, but it constructs this awareness as 
much as possible as witness to villagers’ pragmatic considerations. 
 There is no pretense that this PEOC is objective or universally valid.  Very specific 
qualities of the researcher, the participants and the shifting social and political contexts of 
the fieldwork, contribute to the moral call for change produced by this research, and to 
also, the internal divisions that contested knowledge creates in the village. There is no 
way to ensure that such knowledge will be used wisely, or that it will have the 
emancipating affect that participants had addressed as general concerns for the 
community.  It is risky to do this kind of work.  Participants fight with each other and me 
over ideas, goals and strategies.  Some of the information reveals major flaws and 
weaknesses in the system, and there seems to be no solution. This is further demoralizing 
for the community.  As an attachment to the process by which the community as a form 
of critique emerges, this research remains open, and I am accessible to the villagers. Long 
after the fieldwork in situ had ended, the role of ethnographer and advisor has continued.  
I elaborate on how these risks and the extension of an ethnographic presence is part of my 
critical position, and helps one to understand how critical actions and social critiques 
change and shift with time.  First, let me in due diligence offer a basic explanation of how 
I understand the ethnographic aspects of this approach. 
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Fig. 12. Working With Dave Sullivan, member in July 2011. (N. Dickson). 
 
3.3 Ethnographic Roots to Post-Structural, Post-Critical, PEOC 
 Ethnography, from the Greek, ethnos, and graphos, quite literally, means writing 
people, or later, as,  “writing culture.”  Ethnography refers to a systematic analysis of 
people and customs, usually presented in a written text (Merriam Webster Dictionary 
2011). Ruby (1975) commented that ethnographic films are types of anthropological text; 
informed by anthropological concepts and theories, using the lexicon of anthropology and 
they further the interpretation of anthropological interests like culture and ritual. These 
statements were designed to clarify that not all films about culture were ethnographic in 
the sense that they might not have been inscribed by anthropologists in the 
aforementioned ways. Hence, by way of illustration, this observation underscores the 
particular attention paid by anthropologists to the rigorous application of anthropological 
methods and inclinations in any style of observation that claims to be ethnographic. 
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  Likewise I would suggest that since ethnographic methods cross academic 
boundaries, as long as the work informs or is informed by legitimate social inquiry, 
which derives information from people and their experience, it is to be considered 
ethnographic.  Even if one might argue all texts and all image systems contain 
information of ethnographic value that does not make the project to which they are 
attached inherently ethnographic. Hollywood films and popular novels are often about 
cultures or people.   For something to be ethnographic, it must explicitly have the goal of 
critically examining culture or elements of social life where that examination is the 
subject, and the point of the work.  I am cautioned and reassured by Atkinson et al, who 
in the introduction to the Handbook of Ethnography (2009) state, “We ourselves have 
been suspicious of various attempts to tidy up the history of ethnographic research either 
through the imposition of ‘traditions’ or through the construction of historical schemas 
and periodizations”(1). Affirming “broad family resemblances,” the editors also provide 
that social and cultural anthropologists tend to define their work from other social 
sciences on the centrality of ethnography (2). Unlike other social sciences where the field 
might be a lab or an archive, most anthropologists do their work in the field, even though 
this field is increasingly comprehended as closer to home (Strathern 1987; Hastrup 1992; 
Oakley 1992; Bourgois 1995; Fabian 2001; Pink 2001; Rapport 2006; Gallinat and 
Collins 2010). 
 While anthropologists at times claim exclusivity to ethnography because of this 
long standing commitment to fieldwork, the editors also argue rightly that this can at least 
not currently be said to be true.   As it regards homelessness and poverty especially, 
social sciences have been committed to fieldwork and ethnographic understanding at 
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least since Nels Andersen first entered a masters program at the University of Chicago 
(1920).  Urban and community sociology therefore have enjoyed almost a century of 
persistent and meaningful ethnographic research, and it would seem that if any 
encroachment has been broached, it would be that anthropology’s newfound fascination 
with our own urban cultures has led to an imbrication of its research foci and techniques 
within the distinct foci of other disciplines; sociology with cities and states, and 
geography with urban spaces and landscapes. My inter-disciplinary work unites all these 
disciplines with an ethnographic approach.  I am not going to enter the debate about what 
separates anthropology and sociology, nor any other of the social sciences, other than to 
say that despite what might have been divergent core methods and foci, ethnography is 
now shared widely as a necessary expressive tool and range of methods for understanding 
the people who reside at the heart of core issues of social justice.    The old proviso of 
Ruby and other anthropologists, much to their dismay needs to be reiterated, perhaps as: 
ethnography is the production of representations about culture and society as they come 
to be experienced by any researchers’ dedicated and reasonable efforts in various lived 
fields of experience; perhaps.  From the enormous range of possibilities this broad 
categorization offers I present a PEOC as the means of adjoining social sciences with a 
means to know how actors create attachment to matters of social justice. 
 Denzin and Lincoln (2009) begin their discussion of qualitative methods by 
quoting Smith (1999) who astutely points out that “research” is one of the dirtiest words 
in the vocabulary of the indigenous peoples.  Since the early days of Cort-Haddon1, 
Morgan,2 Malinowski,3 even Anderson4, research has been a sort of technique for staking 
the colonial or state position vis a vis “different” and manageable others (2009:1). 
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Research was a way of expanding the academic appreciation of culture, but so too was it 
the scientific basis of racist and expansionist development programs based on the 
presentation of relatively underdeveloped nature of lesser peoples. For urban sociology, 
fieldwork, including surveys and numbers taking, as well as journals and written analyses, 
became essential for helping cities and governments identify social problems and to 
gauge the measure or responses they required (Park 1915; Anderson 1923; Hughes 1952; 
Bahr 1973; Gans 1991).    
 By way of addressing definitional issues, Denzin and Lincoln use the term 
qualitative research to include; observation, interviewing participation and ethnography, 
and to describe it as a “field of inquiry in its own right” one that “crosscuts disciplines, 
fields and subject matters” (1994:2).  For my own purposes, the former three elements are 
integral parts of the latter. The intersection of these techniques within the complex 
interrelation between traditions identified as foundational, positivist, neo-positivist, post-
structural, cultural studies and critical perspectives, are what create the “somewhat 
artificial” basis for their eight historical moments of qualitative research. 
 These moments are defined as, the traditional5 (1900-1950), the modernist or 
golden age6,  (1950-70); blurred genres (1970-1986); the crisis of representation (1986-
1990)7; the post-modern, a period of experimental and new ethnographies, (1990-1995); 
post-experimental inquiry (1995-2000); the methodologically contested present (2000-
2004); and the fractured future (2005 – now)” (3).  Of these, it is with the last I am most 
concerned, but understanding its roots in the critical turn is important.  
 The well-known Crisis of Representation stage occurred in the 1980’s, and is 
generally subsumed between the covers of Clifford and Marcus’ 1986, Writing Culture.  
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This fourth period, is marked by the deliberation of truth.  Gender, age, ethnicity, class 
are once again reunited with critiques of knowledge construction and the production of 
ever evasive productions of truth (Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 17-18). The suggestion that 
writing and doing fieldwork provide a gap in the representation of experienced realities 
very much lies at the heart of the problematizations facing ethnography today and which 
were revealed in this period. Since the mid - 1980’s a variety of experimental written 
forms of ethnography have emerged.  Sometimes defined as messy texts, these forms are 
always incomplete, self-reflexive and resistant to totalizing theories (Denzin 1997:245; 
also - Law 2004; Lather 2004; Foley 2002; Strathern 1991).  Even within this 
experimental period that also opened the door broader acceptance of ethnographic 
filmmaking, debates over the ethics and limits of representation remained.   
 With the linguistic and cultural turn of the 1970’s and 80’s, social theory 
remerges as a tool to understanding the by then widely held view of an essentially 
socially constructed nature of social life and culture (Berger and Luhmann 1966; Giddens 
1973; Foucault 1977; Bourdieu 1977; Clifford and Marcus 1986).  However, under the 
scrutiny of a post-modern gaze, all theory and representation becomes suspect and 
debates rather than convergences come to dominate the social sciences, including 
anthropology and sociology (Fabian 1983; Sanjek 1990; Denzin; 1994; Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2005; Turner 2008; Drache 2008; Isin 2008).  
 Since the “turn” of the 1980’s, ethnography has enjoyed a sort of renaissance 
because they no longer have to be “true.” Ethnographic accounts no matter how derived 
are recognized for the fictional qualities they possess and also for the recognition, that the 
true authority is not the “subject” nor the author, but the reader, which suggests, that 
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ultimately all truth is of a second, or a third hand nature. Hence, the likelihood of 
deriving good information from ever reterritorialized fields increases into the 21st 
century; the rise of the hypermedia, virtual, electronically interconnected global 
communities we live in suggests that presence is no longer about being in a place, since 
places impose themselves on us, through information, news, phone calls, text and data 
messages, regardless of where we are in a physical sense. Fieldwork increasingly is 
becoming a part of the ethnographic project, and not its definition.8 On-line communities 
provide a great example of how the ethnographer’s presence is now reconstructed to 
include virtual and actual presence; one might argue that it is impossible to be in two 
places at once, but the deployment of ethnography into studies of online communities 
would suggest otherwise (Pink 2007; Ruby et al 2011; Bowler Jr. 2010).  The “turn” has 
also suggested that in a sense, we have always had a virtual or exterior presence, that the 
idea of an ethnographic presence (Fabian 1983; Sanjek 1991; Denzin 1997; Law 2004), 
was always in some ways mythical, a delusion that we could package a model of different 
realities and gift them to the world as truth; delusional in the sense that the truth was in 
fact a sort of fiction (Clifford and Marcus 1986). The Sage Handbook of Ethnography  
(2009) says,  “Whatever the range of data collection techniques, we believe that 
ethnographic research remains firmly rooted in the first-hand exploration of research 
settings.  It is this sense of social exploration and protracted investigation that gives 
ethnography its abiding and continuing character” (Atkinson et al 2004: 5).    Elsewhere 
in the introduction to the handbook, they argue that the methodological commitment of 
anthropologists and symbolic interactionists (as a type of field based sociology) to ground 
their work in bold and intensive empirical investigations is laudable at a time when other 
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“cultural specialists’ have gone in for rather less firmly rooted work with far too much 
fathomable theory and intellectual faddism, and insufficient attention to the realities of 
everyday life” (5).     
 While I would argue that experimentation with alternate modes of doing 
ethnography is essential to bringing forth comprehension of complex and interwoven 
social problems, my own work is very grounded in everyday struggles and seeks to 
inform debates of social issues that are grounded in lived experience.   To this end, there 
are some basic ties between my work and earlier anthropological traditions, and also ties 
to critical and pragmatic forms of sociology.  However, the work I do is representative of 
a number of future looking approaches that tie various fields, interconnected modes of 
representation and a virtually perpetual notion of the ethnographic present, into a critical 
mode of ethnography that tends to conflict with these traditional views. As an approach 
that pirates an essentially anthropological approach, embedded participant observation, 
within a pragmatic ethnography of critique, I seem to be seeking dual citizenship that 
flirts with intellectual fetishism.  I even argue that ethnographies have a certain organic 
quality that suggests that their temporal execution might include tendencies towards 
various modes at different times; the work can be at times descriptive and purely 
interpretive, and then critical and political (Bourdieu 1958; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992).  Law (2004), Latour (2005), Lather (2004) and Denzin and Lincoln (2005) give 
evidence of the inevitability of producing such so-called “messy” texts when trying to 
understand complex modern social problems9. 
 Given the destabilizing of its authoritative rank since the “turn” of the 1980’s, 
how then, can an investigative method that has been found wanting in its quest for, 
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“writing culture,” be conjoined with the clearly important but highly contestable notions 
of critique?  Being critical absolutely means taking a position. In light of the post-modern, 
post-structural turn, how can an ethnography that says something, that takes a position 
towards understanding critical action, be valid, if reality is unknowable, or at the very 
least, constantly shifting? Is a post-structural/post-critical ethnography possible?  
Ultimately, I argue that following Denzin’s (1997) heuristically conceived 8 moments of 
qualitative inquiry, the fractured future of ethnography rests in a pragmatic ethnographic 
approach to critical action, in politically motivated activist ethnographies, rather than its 
traditional and impossible role as an arbiter of truth told from a position of exteriority.   
Denzin and Lincoln suggest, “The eighth moment is now” and that only the most 
tentative legacies and causal links can be made.  In remarking on the latest period, they 
leave it wide open for the interconnecting of methods, theories and multiple criteria for 
adjudicating validity.  So it is that I have glanced over important works only to draw out a 
few simple strands of theory.   I recognize such a doing as derisory in its brevity, but 
necessary in the long run. Researchers “have never before had so many paradigms, 
strategies of inquiry and methods of analysis to draw upon and utilize” (20). Looking 
forward they offer that we are in a moment of “discovery and rediscovery out of which 
new ways of looking, interpreting, arguing and writing are debated and discussed” (ibid).  
Pragmatic ethnography of critique emerged out of the problem-oriented work I do with 
villagers, in which ethnographic knowledge has been used to steer various political 




3.4 PEOC Has Ties to Critical, Reflexive Ethnography 
 Critical ethnography has a long and rich history in anthropology and the social 
sciences (Conquergood 1991; Smith, G. 1991; Thomas 1993; Carspecken 1996; Davis 
1999; Denzin 2001; Lather 2002; Smith D. 1999; Kinsman 2006;). Foley (2002) provides 
one of the more complete examinations of the roots of critical ethnography: 
Such empirical investigations are often founded on the following general ontological and 
epistemological assumptions: (1) All cultural groups produce an inter-subjective reality 
which is both ``inherited’’ and continually constructed and reconstructed as it is lived or 
practiced. This shared cultural reality is external in the sense that Bourdieu defines 
``habitas’’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). It is a distinct, lived historical tradition 
``objectified’’ through structuring practices (laws, public policies, cultural conventions). 
The habitas of a lived historical tradition is marked by a collective memory of particular 
ecological, geo-political, embodied, spaces/places; (2) a well-trained, reflexive 
investigator can know that historical, socially constructed reality in a partial, provisional 
sense through an intensive, experiential encounter with people who live by these cultural 
constructions of reality; and (3) a reflexive investigator, who has experienced this 
unfamiliar cultural space and has dialogued with its practitioners, can portray this cultural 
space and its people in a provisionally accurate manner (2002:43). 
 
  Though it is impossible to pinpoint its origins, critical ethnography is increasingly 
becoming the mode of critical qualitative analysis across disciplines, where there is a 
need to understand how the lived experiences of actors often in performance oriented 
positions such as nursing (Vandenberg and Hall 2011) or political movements (Smith 
1990), are wrapped up in systems of order, domination and power struggle.  Foley argues 
for a certain detachment of the ethnographer, and this to generalize to all cases where a 
critical approach might happen. In my work, which I have often argued is critical 
ethnography, I have also argued that I am an ethnographic resource precisely for my 
proximity to the culture in which I work.  I dealt with this earlier, and in some detail in 
the following chapter, but I have to argue here, that all our portrayals are “provisionally 
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accurate” and that often, commonality with the culture provides insights we could not 
have from a distance (Colins 2008; Gallinat 2008; Coffey 1999). 
 Critical ethnography at last is about understanding action directed towards social 
justice. As an extension of the Marxist project to reveal orders of inequity, in practice, 
critical ethnography departs from the external role of observer and aligns or integrates 
with the action of individuals in critical action as a tool of empowerment. Far from 
pretending to be external or objective, the critical ethnographer adjoins the 
“transformative endeavor” and “emancipatory consciousness” (Kincheloe and McLaren 
2000:291).  In developing the notion of a subjugated knowledge; that is, on how frames 
of reference come to be shaped in the field by institutions and other regimes of 
knowledge, the authors present the case that language and communicative action are 
aspects of power and of dominated subjectivities10. Once again, yes, this is how critical 
ethnographers have understood themselves. I want to suggest that critical in the sense of 
doing work in one’s own culture, can attach itself to one of the two levels of 
emancipation I have mentioned already.  We do not have to disclose contradictions and 
domination to eradicate the system that predicates them, but we can, as an interim or part 
of a long-term strategic plan, indicate how to participate more fully in them. It might 
even seem that since I have already argued that I understand power much as Foucault has, 
that a critical position is counter-intuitive, since it seeks to render domination clearly, so 
that emancipation might be found.  Once again, I have to go back to my insistence that 
critical work and by that I mean, exposing how domination and power work in groups 
can have two emancipatory goals, and that the immanent transcendence that anchors 
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traditional critical ethea is to ignore the values and goals actors attach to their own 
position in the systems we study.  
 Because my work focuses on an impoverished and marginalized group, I expected 
to hear a kind of indictment of capital, when in fact, as we will see, most villagers do not 
reject the inequality capital produces.  PEOC really messes things up. There is no way to 
see things in a “certain way” if one is pragmatic and critical.  In the sense that a PEOC 
embraces a means to understand how truths are produced, argued and effective in the 
worlds of social actors, it in itself presents an “exquisitely tormented” understanding in 
the sense that it completely undermines the bedrock of delusions that undergird grand 
narratives and allegedly foundational truths that researchers and participants alike might 
hold (Derrida 1996:55 in Lather 2004:481). “Moving across levels of the particular and 
the abstract, trying to voice a transcendent purchase on the object of study, we set 
ourselves up for necessary failure in order to learn how to find our way into post-
foundational possibilities” (Lather 2004:482). The wonderful predisposition of the 
deconstructionist aspect of this position is its very lack of predisposition in the academic 
sense (ibid). As ethnographers we can no longer try to fit the assumption of daily 
experience into neat conceptual categories and systems of classification. Lather adds, 
“given the demise of master narratives of identification, perspective and linear truth, such 
ethnography draws close to its objects in the moment of loss where much is refused, 
including abandoning the project to such a moment” (2004:482, also Haver 1996 in 
Lather 2004:482).   
 In terms of the authority of the researcher, a deconstructionist critique leads to the 
destabilizing of traditional power relations in critical research. Successfully undertaken, 
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this kind of ethnography “problematizes the researcher as “the one who knows” (Lather 
2004:482), since in a critical ethnography the point is to understand how truths are 
constructed by researcher and actors, and the actions in which they are engaged.  
Furthermore, and in my work especially, I am free if not frequently asked to offer my 
educated opinion as it were, and this is very often rejected.   
 Lather (2004) and Denzin and Lincoln (2005) amongst others remind us that since 
ethnography has represented a form of surveillance and discipline (Foucault 1998; Said 
1989; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Fabian 1983), critical ethnography situates research in a 
position to fail; indeed, it counts on reaching points where understanding is pressed to the 
limits of capacity to inform.  I went to Dignity Village in 2010 and found Utopia. Then in 
a few days, non-utopian elements like the asylum-effect that John Boy spoke to in my 
film, Spaces, Places and States of Mind… appeared and forced me to interrogate my 
understanding.  Over the following year I worked on developing a model of the village 
based on its ability to resolve the life traumas of homeless people by forging them into 
happy and useful citizens.  When I returned in 2011, the community was completely 
dysfunctional and close to imploding. What had happened to Utopia?  Once again, I had 
reached a point where my understanding was insufficient to make sense or to remedy the 
problems of community that villagers faced. Often when I was there, a villager asked 
about my solutions to   political or social problems, and more often than not this had led 
to heated arguments and debates.  On a few occasions, some of the villagers chose to no 
longer work with me because I had taken a hard line on the idleness and low morale.   
 And I have colleagues who suggest that this was a supra-participant form of 
observation –I was acting outside my ethically participative capacity. However, this 
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debating and argumentation was exactly what villagers did in their own time, and so it 
was expected of me to take sides, to argue, to appear aligned with others and to be 
understandable by these attachments. Those who remained outside of such “factions” 
were just not trusted because their motives and feelings were largely unknowable – they 
were “outside of things.”  Inasmuch as I was forcing villagers to unravel the miserable 
state of affairs for me, in order to do so they had to confront the fiction in their own 
narratives about the village. And in turn I had to confront my own contradictions and 
assumptions about the village and the complexity of the person who lived there.  
Michelle – From Dignity in Exile (2012: 95) 
 One day, before I went to New Seasons Market to buy my daily salad, I filmed a few of 
the villagers who were trying to figure out what to have for dinner based on the meager 
canned goods they had stashed. It was a few days until the food stamps were issued, and 
the usual Sunday leftovers from the bar down the road hadn’t arrived. Normally, the 
restaurant brought its entire Sunday brunch buffet leftovers; bacon, sausage, pancakes, 
bread, eggs, fruits and rich desserts. Villagers pounced on the food. I refrained from 
eating it because, in all honesty, watching them claw into the stuff with their hands made 
it unappetizing. But it hadn’t come that Sunday, so as we ended filming I offered to pick 
up some food for Michelle and a couple of friends. I didn’t know her too well but I knew 
her well enough to appreciate how hard it must be for a single woman to be living in a 6 x 
8 foot shack without a support network. Left to fend for herself on the streets, she would, 
if the stats were correct, have to hook up with a man or a group of street people, to ensure 
her safety and that things like food and shelter were found. In the village, she was one of 
only a handful of single women. I knew she was angry most of the time. I knew she could 
rocket into incredible rants. I also knew she had a good heart. This place was her last 
hope. I knew, even if she didn’t say so. 
  Michelle was reticent to accept my offer. The two others asked what I was getting, 
ready to share it. Not Michelle. She just shook her head. I had met struggling people who 
declined my help, but usually because my offer of food or clothes wasn’t what they were 
after. They wanted cash. Michelle had never asked for a thing. So I couldn’t put a finger 
on why she in particular denied my offer.  
 I walked away. She chased after me and said, “I’m embarrassed… I’m not 
working… I’m living off Washington State food stamps.” It was embarrassing to her 
because she had real skills, but nowhere to use them. She was a journeyman carpenter, 
and was a card-carrying union member. But Michelle, like many other single moms with 
threads of mental health issues and personal trauma, could no longer transform her skills 
into long-term stable employment, even though she had a pretty impressive resumé of 
carpentry, framing and other construction gigs from Seattle to Portland. In a declining 
economy on the west coast, where “even paint shops are reducing their employees from 
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200 to 20. It just isn’t possible. I’m 50 years old, and I have no home. And, half the time 
you can’t find a place to even squat because the cops are all working for the banks and 
the banks are all working for the capitalists.”  
 Her tone became loud when she talked about the liturgy of her life, as she always 
engaged in the classic Marxian ideas about the alienation of the laborer and then shifted 
to her disgust of the police and the mental health system, wherein less than a year ago, 
she had been diagnosed as manic depressive and committed to a mental health facility for 
a few weeks. Her switches were many and they turned on and off in unpredictable 
linkages. Her circuits overloaded, her body, her face, her gestures transformed instantly, 
blurting things so quickly and so nonsensically that she welled up and her cheeks flushed. 
“I’m sorry, I’m sorry,” she said. “I know I am not supposed to get angry. I know you 
don’t like that on camera.” “No,” I told her, “that’s not it. I just well, I don’t know how to 
help you.”  
 A long pause. We just smiled at each other. A transformation in her. From anger to 
apparent tranquility. 
 “But anyway,” she went on, “I feel great here, man. Portland rocks! And the sisters, 
the ‘sparky sisters.’ The electrician sisters, are really reaching out to me and helping me 
to feel included, people are really helping me to feel a sense of inclusion, even though I 
am embarrassed that I am homeless.”  
 While I was there, from Seattle to northern California came tales of how the unions 
helped to support the unemployed. The support of local unions had been vital to her sense 
of self-worth. Her face lit up, she put her fists in the air. “We’re working people,” she 
exclaimed and looked to me with a furrowed brow, fishing for agreement. 
 Michelle was not new to hardship. We sat together a couple of days later out on the 
berm and had a conversation about that. She and her single mom had come to Seattle 
when Michelle was just ten years old. Mom had got married a couple of years into it. And, 
“She had real mental health issues, I can tell you. To this day I believe she was a perv. 
And I ran away when I was 13.” I wanted to know more about this. Michelle obliged. The 
circuit was turned on. Michelle had grown up in local state group homes and she insisted, 
“Back in the ’70’s they really cared for runaways and juveniles. Places like Echo Glen 
were like summer camps. It was a beautiful place, about 40 miles from Seattle, up in the 
woods and not like now – it’s just juvenile lockdown…”  
 Her eyes were red with anger. She swung her arm up and down like an axe. “Fucking 
lockdown, man! They don’t put a safety net under runaways anymore. They just toss 
them on the streets.” 
 She had been in that system from 13 until she’d become pregnant at 17. Her first 
child was born a week after her 18th birthday. She had seven children from four fathers. 
“I had a little confusion there. Growing up by myself like that, especially without a father 
figure. You get a little confused about those things.”  
 I asked, “So you had no father figure to look after you?”  
 She was waving her hands like a referee waving off a goal in an NHL game. 
Waving… shaking her head. “Yeah, no, my stepfather. But no, not really. And to this day, 
and you know it has taken me years to figure this out, but I really believe, to this day, I 
feel that I was part of the marriage proposal. I feel like my mother had a diabolical plan 
for me. But my stepfather had restraint and never took her up on the offer.” 
 “Which was what?” 
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 “To have me sexually, to molest me.” 
 “Really?” 
 “Yeah, and she used to degrade me sexually.” Michelle directed a fit of anger in a 
controlled fashion. Her hands cut the air, like blades. She caught her thigh with one hand 
and the slap stung her leg. She recoiled and shook her hand to release the pain. “She used 
to call me ‘whore’ and, I mean, I was only eight or ten years old and she would be yelling 
at me, ‘You filthy whore, he is my husband you’re a slut’ – CRAZY woman, but I feel 
like I have finally come to a point where I can talk about this and really let go. She lives 
in P____. My sister won’t talk to her either. And, you know, that’s the thing. Through 
Facebook and… the net, my sister and aunts and uncles I hold no grudge against, are 
there, and I just don’t feel too good about contacting family, I guess. I see other folks 
here doing it all the time, but I’m nervous about being involved with family.”  
 Except her kids. She was proud of her sons, her daughter. She clung to the ties she 
had with them. “You know, one of them has a problem with drugs, but all in all… it’s 
pretty good. One of them just got back from Afghanistan…” 
 “In the army?” 
  “Yeah, and he didn’t do too badly.” Clapping her hand around her forehead, she 
teared up. “I was just so against it when he went, but he didn’t do too bad. He turned out 
really well, he’s sending me some money.” She smiled radiantly. 
 Seated on the berm for that hour with Michelle, I had almost forgotten that we had 
started out that day trying to figure out how to get her some food because she’d run out of 
food stamps. She wasn’t worried though. When she’d got her stamps, she’d always 
bought good food, good quality, organic and wholesome, so when she’d gotten low on 
food, what she had left to nibble on was good food. She’d been scrounging like this since 
she’d left the carpenters’ union after ten years, about five years earlier. In the ’90’s she 
had been living with the father of her last three kids, in a ten-year-long relationship, in a 
nice quiet rental home. Back then he’d had trouble working and, “We had stable housing, 
and all these kids and I was on welfare. Clinton was saying he was going to kick people 
off welfare, and I was wondering what I could do. And, mysteriously someone left a 
Tony Robbins pamphlet in a wastebasket on Thanksgiving ’96 and I just went, ‘Whoa! I 
don’t need to be on welfare anymore!’”  
 She’d got into a new trade apprenticeship program for women, a program designed 
to teach women the skills necessary to compete in a man’s world, as she put it. Math 
skills, social skills, organization and “all the stuff I needed to go and get into the 
apprenticeship program for carpenters. And I just kinda dove right into it.” 
 Her breath became labored, and she frantically brushed the hair off her face, then she 
told me through a rush of tears, “And I saw the possibility of home ownership, of putting 
a roof over my kids’ heads and I realize now that was my whole problem, buying into 
that Carleton Sheets thing – investments, mortgages, equity. It’s just wrong. I don’t have 
a head for investing. But I saw the possibility of owning my home for the first time, and I 
tried, I did so try. And, you know, property prices were going up, and the work was 
getting harder and harder to find and on me, my back. I knew women don’t last that long 
in the union, in the trade, but, I was like… [she mimicked holding a machine gun] I’m 
gonna go out here and make myself a home, rrrrrrr… and one of my kids is autistic, 
and… and I’m doing this in 2001, 2002 and 2003 and housing prices are just increasing. 
And then the house we rented in got sold, and we had really loved it. We had cheap rent 
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and we loved the neighborhood. And housing prices just got so high and I felt like I was 
just struggling to keep a roof over my family’s heads after that. And after they weren’t 
dependent on me anymore. That’s when I walked away from the carpenters’ union ’cause 
there was really nothing, um, and I walked away – from the possibilities – of owning my 
home.”  
 I paused for a moment, tilting the camera downwards and she smiled at me 
apologetically.  
 “But that’s all in the past.” She wiped away the tears, took a deep breath. 
 “You know, I’m lucky I found this place when I did, because I don’t know what I 
would’ve done.” 
 After couch surfing, using shelters and sleeping behind a church, she’d become 
involved with one of the several temporary camps strewn across Seattle. What is today 
known as Nickelsville – a city-recognized, but not legalized, tent encampment that is now 
in its fourth year – became her home. She had unfortunate memories of that place. At first 
she’d felt it had great potential. The community was really fighting for land claims by the 
homeless. But, organized under the auspices of an activist NGO – Share/Wheel31 – 
Michelle insists the community’s fiscal arrangements and outreach were soon being 
overseen by a management team, rather than by the actual members. “They try to make 
us think we have some say, but it’s way worse than here at the village. If they think they 
have factions and all that crap here, they should see up there. And one guy was getting 
two bucks a head for everyone who stayed there. Two bucks a head a night.” 
 “So over a thousand a week?” I asked. “To watch the village?” 
 “To be a manager,” she said sarcastically, fingers gesturing quotation marks. “The 
tent master. Anyway, I helped build the place. I worked on the structures and I had good 
friends there. I never did dope or caused any trouble. And I left one time to try my 
business, my vintage clothing thing. And it worked for a while. But it was hard, Eric. 
Really hard. So there I was again. I was living at the Harborview, but it was no good. So I 
followed some people I knew, from the U-district parking lot. We took the bus down to 
Nickelsville. And I had busted my butt for that place. I’d never got barred from that place, 
never been disciplined, and they turned me away at midnight without even a blanket onto 
the streets of Seattle, and that was my repayment from Nickelsville. That’s how they 
repaid my hard work and dedication – by turning me away when I did need help because 
I didn’t have ID.” 
 “But they knew who you were?” 
 She nodded, “But they didn’t care.”  
 When she’d heard about Dignity Village and had come to it, it was like the angels 
were singing and heaven had opened to her, finally.  
 “But we can speak up here and have a voice. And I love this place. Just the place 
itself, and the real, uh, community, man. And, you know, now I really want to be about 
activism. I need a purpose in my life and I just want to spread a message of unity and I 
just been through all that like spirituality and I just think that we all gotta get it – you 
know sometimes I’m the worst you know for going ‘oh that person’s got money, oh, oh, 
oh’… and I don’t want to be that way. I just want us all to unify and take our lives back, 
and I want people to move back into their houses. And that’s what got me down here in 
the first place. Just seeing all the foreclosures and the tragedy in the place I lived for 44 
years.” 
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 “Seattle?”  
 “Yeah, yeah sorry… sorry.” 
 “Don’t be sorry, don’t be. This is hard stuff to talk about.” 
 She smiled. “It really is.” 
 “But maybe it’s good to talk about it?” 
 “I totally think so.” 
 “There are people who need to hear your story.” 




Fig. 13. Michelle at her dorm. (N. Dickson 2011). 
 
 As only one example of the deep structure to even mundane critical attitudes, 
Michelle’s story explains how difficult it is to write culture without the reflexive 
commitments to which I speak. This was a relationship.  There is no way to talk about 
her without revealing how she and I articulate our ideas together.  She suffers.  She 
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suffers from psychiatric and personal issues, and I can’t imagine producing an external 
summary of what I learned from her, just as this last sentence feels awkward, if not 
necessary.  Understanding that all cultures construct privacy and secrets in their own 
fashion, it is still absolutely necessary to be “present” in the storytelling as a way of 
showing trust and loyalty to the participant (Moor 1990; Pink 2007; Svenningsson Elm 
2008; Aull Davies [1998] 2008). This is very different from pragmatic inquiry that asks 
questions, looking for answers that conform to an overall agenda.  In New Spirit… 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) employed ethnographic methods including interviews but 
the questions and goals of the interviews were to address the issue of “justifications,” 
whereas in my work, the participant guides the direction of inquiry opening and closing 
subjects, providing contiguous and separate sets of ideas to the ones I might have been 
interested in when I sat down with them.  In Michel’s case, she leaps from deeply 
personal agitations, to points of view – critiques of entire economic systems, 
communities and governance.  She came to know me as a person she could talk to and 
she told me when I should or shouldn’t record our conversations because she had an idea 
of what she “wanted to put out there.” 
  In opening up investigation to its own contradictions and biases, the ethos of 
deconstructive ethnography is to reach what Lather has called the three “Aporias of 
Practice” (2004:482).  In short, the first aporia concerns ethics and is resolvable by 
recognizing research as a form of knowledge construction that is constantly negotiated 
and negotiable, where a reflexive style of representation, can illuminate the “field of play” 
(ibid)11. The second aporia concerns authenticity, representation and voice. In this Lather 
suggests, “…my attempt is not so much ‘against’ authenticity and voice as it is a double 
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economy of the text to move toward de-stabilizing practices of ‘telling the other’ (McGee 
1992) in ways that displace the privileged fixed position from which the researcher 
interrogates and writes the researched (Robinson 1994)” (484). The last aporia is the 
“Interpretation and its Complicities.”  Lather suggests the problem is that, as noble as it 
might sound to be reflexive and to avoid “othering” informants, the truth is they are not 
“me” in the sense that they do represent other sovereign beings.  How does one respect 
the collective experience of doing fieldwork with another “person,” or “persons” and yet 
pay respect to the qualities of their experience that are theirs and therefore are different; 
that do comprise the other in the “other?” Ultimately she quotes Visweswaran (1994:80):  
“Reflexive ethnography authorizes itself by confronting its own processes of 
interpretation as some sort of cure towards better knowing, while deconstruction 
approaches ‘knowing through not knowing’” (in Lather 2004: 486). This in the manner I 
understand it, is essentially a type of pragmatic issue. 
 A reflexive platform is the only way to understand how my actions helped to 
generate the understanding that I ultimately represent.  The understanding comes from a 
certain lacking of knowledge about many things. As Lather argues, “we don’t know what 
we are seeing, how much we are missing, what we are not understanding, or even how to 
locate those lacks…My interest is, rather, Derrida’s ethos of lack when lack becomes an 
enabling condition” (Lather 2004:486).  Hence at the root of the deconstructionist 
critique is the point we reach where we don’t know or where the fantasies we understand 
as truth collapse, and it is from these aporias, new knowledge, in the sense, it has not 
been known (to us) before, emerges as the necessary discovery that makes critical 
moments happen and by us, this means me as the ethnographer and those villagers with 
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whom I worked12. This knowledge may come as knowledge of the self as a type of victim 
or as having power, where such things were not imagined before; it may come as a means 
by which to reveal the capricious forces of governance that are wreaking havoc on the 
morale of the village but had hitherto been seen as benevolent; the mobile health services, 
the city assessment teams, the freedom to live on a composting tarmac; all delusions in 
governmentality (of poverty) to manage a troublesome population.  How do actors come 
to know this from within the experience of it?  Where does the critical impulse to 
challenge this compliance come from, if it all?  
 Insomuch as the village claim made in 2000 drew attention away from the 
practices of the city towards housing, and made the homeless position a priority, one can 
argue that shift in extant power relations took place.  From Larsen (2011), one might 
suggest that this is yet another example of how such power transformations shift the 
“spotlight away from authorities and those who exercise power, in order to focus almost 
exclusively on the subject of power, i.e. the student  (or in this case the homeless 
claimant)” (38).  What these critiques share is an indictment of hierarchical power and 
the use of knowledge from outside of the movement itself - from educators, social 
sciences, media and other activists, in order to present and claim alternate visions (38).  
As Larsen reminds us, time is very important here; not as a qualitative measure of 
experience, but in the sense that the degree to which a claim might be deemed successful 
can only be understood organically over a period of time, as the new power relations that 
a series of critical events produce can mature and display their own structural effects, as it 
were.   
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 Dignity Village is a case that supports the idea put forth by Larsen, that “when 
critical ideas are effective in displacing power relations, the ideas themselves are easily 
turned inside out in the same process” (38).  PEOC is useful in establishing how linkages 
between various critical positions help us to actually gauge critical capacities and action, 
and in the case of this dissertation asks that we look at how neoliberal critiques of the 
state and governmentality “claim to govern as little as possible, but still develop ever 
more elaborate techniques to extract the most of human capital” (39).    
  There is danger in this critical approach as several critics have pointed out, in so 
much as revealing the hidden structures to unwary participants is a destabilizing moment 
for the participant (Vandenberg and Hall 2011:25-30; Kincheloe and McLaren 2005; 
Denzin 1997). The authoritative stance of the researcher as the harbinger of important 
information is at once taken seriously, and often taken as inevitable; the net effect is to 
confirm the inevitability of domination and to suspend the critical moment in a sense of 
hopelessness.  Hence a number of researchers (Lincoln 1995; Hall and Callery 2001, in 
Vandenberg and Hall 2011) argue for the extension of the relations of field knowledge 
creation to the participants, as both a means to access the critical resources of actors and 
to democratize the production of truth about critical action. One of the ways this is done 
is through abandonment of the traditional privy status by the researcher and the use of a 
highly reflexive manner in the field, and in the process of representing the critical 
experience.  We are also compelled in this work to consider working towards critical 
knowledge as a type of act in the sense that Isin (2008) and Nielsen (2008) have 
suggested.  This is so because the basis on which pragmatic storytelling and oral 
traditions unite is a certain dialogic experience where the use of language and 
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communication to arrive at new knowledge is in itself a break with common practice, 
since it is new and unfolding, and also inheres answerability to an other outside of the 
participants—the critique, itself. 
 
3.5 Reflexivity and Dialogics 
 Dialogics is very simply the recognition by two participants in a speech act that 
each position is mutually constitutive despite the myriad possibilities for rejoinders 
around them (Bakhtin 1982:271-2). Since it is possible that an actor could be establishing 
meaning with a number of others and that the dialogic moment is a unique one, if it is to 
have analytic force in critical ethnography, the grounds on which that unique act took 
place need to be known by those in a position to interpret the investigative act, to act on 
the basis of its suggestive courses of action.  This tells us what other information was 
excluded, or why some information was included, and contributes the answerability of 
the investigation to the just cause (the Other), which I explain presently. A reflexive 
mode of representation is required to account for the dialogic nature of such acts.  An 
underlying premise in my research is that no matter what I am told, there are other voices 
speaking; friends, enemies, supporters, ancestors and therapists and more, who are not 
present in the corporeal sense, but exist at other levels of experience, in memory, 
imagination, just out of view, or on the temporal horizon. So part of the pragmatic aspect 
of my work is trying to understand where certain critical attitudes originate in villagers as 
a way to account for the diversity. I am really trying to understand what they do and those 
implications, on the now, or “moments” from now.   Understanding how people come to 
think and act as a matter of personal contexts helps to explain diverse responses to 
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situations that appear to be the same, to those of us outside of them. Bakhtin speaks of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces that respectively unite and pull apart the meaning of 
language and ideas (ibid).  When I speak of the investigative work I do as an act of sorts, 
I am in a sense, trying to understand these forces in the critical deliberations that occur 
between the villagers, and me but also to try and know how those forces existed in their 
knowledge-forming prior experience.  Reflexive openings to this kind of information 
don’t appear immediately, not all of the time, and so often it has been the case where 
revisiting an experience with villagers has revealed new knowledge that they came up 
with upon a period of self-reflection.   
 Reflexivity is a dominant if not essential element of current ethnographic 
anthropology and of social research in general (Bourgois 1992, 1995; Church 1995; Pink 
1997; Bourdieu 2004).  There is in general the sense that in any social research where the 
investigative “eye” is turned outward, it must also be turned inward. I would argue that 
reflexivity has always been a vital part of ethnography and of the general study of 
humanity.  The social psychology of George Herbert Mead in Mind, Self and Society 
(1934) asserts the social nature of “being human” and the essentialness of reflexivity for 
the formation of the self. “It is by means of reflexiveness—the turning back of the 
experience of the individual upon himself – that the whole social process is thus brought 
into the experiences of individuals…” (In Straus 1956:211).  Similarly, Mikhail Bakhtin, 
in Towards A Philosophy Of The Act (1993), constructs the I-other architectonic as the 
once occurrent state of being, where individuals aesthetically contemplate others, and 
upon returning into oneself, can proceed to understand, to empathize and to act.  While 
Mead does not situate reflexivity directly in the process that occurs between the “student 
 126 
and the studied”, Bakhtin implicates the dialogic process of interpenetration and self-
reflection in the investigative act (1993:4).  Bakhtin has shown clearly that there is a 
difficulty in interpreting what actors do when they act based solely on pre-existing 
concepts as if the actors come with a set of contingent-specific potentialities installed 
within them, and that the investigator cannot be free of his, or their own value laden 
“point of view”.  The “act is already folded into an event and thus into an order” 
(1993:28). The traditional “rules” of social fieldwork engagement purport objectivity in 
making observations about an event or deed and so on.  In a perfect I-other event, the 
“actors” would act as if they were merely present in the event, and that what was 
occurrent issued primacy over what was valued or expected.  In either case, as Engin Isin 
points out, if one does not make some kind of a judgment based on pre-existing notions, 
“one may have nothing to say at all about the act”. Isin calls this the “paradox of acts” 
(2008:28).  
 Traditional field research is an act the sense that we have discussed earlier; one 
that twists inverts and breaks with habitus in the sense that Bakhtin suggests, because it is 
a uniquely emerging experience. Isin (2008) points out that one of the most interesting 
points Bakhtin makes in theorizing acts is his attempt to write the investigator into the act 
as an actor.  Yet, in Towards a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin unfortunately spends 
relatively little time specifically on that point.   However, what he does demonstrate is 
that in studying or investigating an act per se, one articulates not the world produced by 
the act, “but the world in that act becomes answerably aware of itself and is actually 
performed” (1993:31). Bakhtin is pointing to the probability that the once-occurrent 
eventness of the ethnographic present presupposes the necessity of the observer and the 
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subject in a “shared” moment of becoming.  Hence the observer and the observed 
comingle and the traditional authority of a privileged researcher is usurped by an 
answerability to an emerging representation.  Hence, the only truly ethical ethnographic 
moment is the one where this duality of roles is both recognized and accounted for, and 
performed, by the observer-come-subject.  Pragmatic Ethnography suggests re-presenting 
how knowledge is made available in a co-production between the villager, and me and is 
therefore a reflexive moment. In previous fieldwork with shanty dwellers, it has been 
shown that the really difficult material to gather, the moments where intimate information, 
secrets, feelings and disappointments come into the presence of the ethnography is a 
result of this destabilization of roles through a fidelity of both or all performers to the 
once occurrent event of the ethnographic present.    
 As an example, take Eddy Johnston. I met Eddy in his shack at Tent City in 2001.  
Eddy was a murderer, an inmate at the Kingston penitentiary in 1971.  During the time he 
was incarcerated, he knifed a pedophile who had been raping young inmates, and to 
whom the guards had turned a blind eye.  He stabbed him 42 times as a message to other 
“diddlers” and the guards, that the rest of the prison population wouldn’t stand for the 
presence of rapists in their midst.  Eddy was given an extra 17 years for that 
“intervention.” This helped to kick off the infamous Kingston riots13. He is known as one 
of the original “Kingston thirteen.”  He was also a resident at Tent City when I did my 
fieldwork there in 2001. We became friends over the next 6 years, until his death due to 
crack use and other poor choices he made, despite having earned a place in Toronto’s rent 
supplement program.  When we had met, I had some difficulty reconciling his past with 
the friendly outgoing and loyal man I met in is shack in 2001.  But then he would smoke 
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some rock (crack), and this other Eddy appeared.  There was so much “pain inside” him 
that he smoked to “kill the pain, to the kill the pain.” It made him not hurt, not feel, not 
care about nuthin”  (at 6:00:00 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RC5LRioMmck - 
also DS DISC 1, Subtext ROM Cut at 00:42:24). 
 When Tent City was paved over, Eddy and Terry, who I have mentioned earlier, 
and who were good friends, insisted I keep in touch.  They had my phone number.  When 
they and the other 113 residents were evicted from Tent City and forced back to the 
streets, we kept in touch infrequently and it would have been easy to draw their part of 
the story to a natural close. That would not be the case, because as housing programs for 
the victims of Tent City were announced, Eddy and Terry got back in touch with me.  
They felt they had won rights, along with others from Tent City by aligning with housing 
advocates in a fight for rent supplements. A new chapter in their story was beginning. 
They literally told me that this was part of their story too, and that I should follow it. As 
obviously as this anecdote links their voice to the authorship of all subsequent work I did 
about or with them, it also links my willingness to help them produce a certain range of 
knowledge about their experience, that they had hoped “would help other homeless 
people.” Most importantly for how it informs my present work, my work with Eddy, for 
example has shown me that ethnographic moments are completely open ended if 
continuity exists; that is, if researchers and informants manage or need to continue 
“where they left off.” Once-occurrent events, but what are the temporal bounds on the 
event? 
 In Eddy’s case, it was interviewing with him in his apartment, three years after I 
met him that demonstrated to me how in cases, the aporia, the moment where the 
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informant’s truth, what is true to him, that is, often takes years of “showing up” and being 
present (at 00:11:54 www.youtube.com/watch?v=wIdh8kLy4AI). 
As narrator, I say, “Even early in his housing Eddy seemed, calmer, reflective, as if being 
housed were a balm to his mental health, and after losing a second child to the CAS, 
Eddy seemed well on his way to confronting his pain.”  
 Eddy says, “I cost myself the kids because I didn’t stop (doing crack).” He sits 
back on a large lounge chair.  Holding a mug of coffee.  Eyes welling up.  He looks away 
then back.  He’s sad.  I have come to know that when he is sad, his rejoinders to turn to 
humor, “Not bad for fifty years eh? Lose only two out of twelve?” he quips, but it doesn’t 
work.  His eyes well up.  
 Brian Dodge, another ex resident of Tent City is there. We have become a trio of 
sorts. They live in the same housing project near the airport.  He was in Kingston 
Penitentiary with Eddy. “Pops” as I call him, is very uncomfortable with Eddy’s tears. 
It’s a sign of weakness, I imagine. Eddy has always been the tough guy and the leader of 
their little group. Housing has changed certain things about him.   
 Eddy rises, walks towards the window.  He can’t speak. He is travelling 
somewhere, in his head.  I keep the camera on him. He is hardly aware or does not care.  
He quietly says to me: “ It’s okay buddy. Someday I’ll sit and talk with ya. I’m the 
uncaring, unfeeling whatever I am…just addict, don’t care, don’t feel about nuthin’, 
nobody, nowhere…” He walks  a bit, looks out the window. He’s sniffling. “Anyways,” 
he adds, as he walks over to me, “Ya spun me buddy…” and he laughs as he pushes my 
camera away.   
 
 The abovementioned example is that moment where  new knowledge occurred 
because of the reflexive and critical engagement of researcher and participants over time 
(DS DISC 3: “Spaces, Places” at 00:28:02 - 00:28:29 ).  We become answerable together 
to a greater Other - a truth perhaps, a critical awareness. Bakhtin adds, “An event can 
only be described participatively” (31).  In terms of observation, “it is not a world of 
objects that theorizing acts creates but relations amongst those objects and subjects as 
they unfold to each other and the investigator” (Isin 2008:30).   Two facets of Bakhtin’s 
model stand out here in the context of PEOC.  One is that for an investigator, his study is 
always in the process of becoming and is never finished.  “An object that is absolutely 
indifferent, totally finished cannot be something one becomes actually conscious of, 
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something one experiences actually” (1993:32).  Hence, defining ethnography in terms of 
some temporal index, a beginning, middle or end, is quite impossible and referring to the 
object of an investigation in terms which reflect its current status in the event of being 
may be more appropriate.  If one argues the moment I started my fieldwork, and the 
moment I left that field is a time frame, then the argument can be made that there is a 
clear beginning and end. I think by now we more or les agree that because fieldwork is a 
knowledge experience, the pragmatic deliberations, before, during and after time spent in 
situ open the temporal boundaries considerably to debate.   
 Regardless of the source, suffice it to say that “reflexivity is thus the constant 
awareness, assessment, and reassessment by the researcher of the researcher’s own 
contribution/influence/shaping of intersubjective research and the consequent research 
findings” (Salzman 2002:806)14. Insomuch as reflexivity reveals the researcher’s life 
experience, beliefs and goals at the onset and though a variety of techniques, during the 
ongoing ethnographic process, the experience we report is about these, and it is about the 
group with whom the ethnography is made. What the reflexive stance does is to create a 
knowledge creation dynamic where various actors come in and out of the process as 
contributors to the organic emancipatory project. Furthermore, reflexivity hinges on 
reciprocity; it allows for actors to critique the research, to assess the researcher’s motives 






3.6   Visual Ethnography, Time, the Other and the Practical 
Johannes Fabian (1983) argued that anthropology's traditional handling of time as 
part of history or evolution was weakened by its subordination to the visual.  For Fabian 
the problem of anthropology was the "the denial of coevalness".  We envisioned the 
textual snapshot we took of other cultures as frozen in that time. We did not problematize 
that current frame as the nexus of history, present and future possibilities. Visualism had 
for a long time stood in the way of understanding coevalness because of its insistence of 
seeing difference in progressive measures of time.  Now it must be understood that 
Fabian’s critique was addressed to traditional anthropology and its focus on “simpler” or 
different cultures.  Hence, a problem for him was that ethnography tended to look at 
others in terms of how far away they a were in temporal, spatial and therefore cultural 
senses; above this ethnography tended to treat them as if its accounts of these cultures 
were fixed in a different time than its own. Sanjek (1991) argues, 
 “Fabian is concerned with the artificiality and the freezing of time that 
descriptions in the present tense may impart. Ethnography written in the present tense 
implies a view of human behaviour as conventional, predictable and rule-determined - a 
“culturology”. Such writing conveys none of the independence of rule and action 
experienced in the ethnographer's own world, nor does it present behaviour as contingent, 
situational or deliberate…The ethnographic present, for Fabian, functions to take the 
society so described out of the time stream of history in which ethnographers and their 
own societies exist” (612). 
 
As a means to resurrecting the notion of an ethnographic present, Sanjek 
(1991:609) posits four interconnecting angles of the ethnographic present. These are the 
present state of ethnography, the mode of presenting ethnography, the ethnographer’s 
presence during ethnography, and ethnography as a material product like a gift. Video 
satisfies the problem of coevalness by offering a rich record of events and knowledge 
creation as they were experienced, and video affords participants a way to revisit what I 
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call “originating moments” in order to amend the knowledge that was created to suit new 
categories of experience.  In this way basic problems with ethnographic presence and the 
problem of coevalness are answered. And I agree with Sanjek, that we must not be lost in 
romantic notions of the deconstructed other, of the fear of ignoring the dialogicism of 
“real’ interaction (618-619). In terms of observation, video affords all involved a chance 
to revisit moments and to construct new meanings out of old.  I have thought of this as a 
certain critical capacity, and as well, an ethical, and by that I meant more equal way of 
re-presenting other people’s stories and the stories of our working together. Beyond this, 
recording fieldwork on video captures field events in terms of a coded digital time 
sequence, which unites participants in a duration where their co-mingling is revealed as a 
series of interconnecting frames and data codes that are evidence of their coevalness in a 
time, a sense of time, neither theirs or mine, but ours – digitally compressed as tangible 
evidence of what happened and in what sequence, if that matters. There can be no more 
coeval a presence than this.  If this video record stands as a sort of objective account of 
the raw experience, raw data as such, then it can be revisited and edited to be used in a 
number of ways: it can be used to review events and solve problems; to inform others of 
issues that need to be addressed, it can be packaged and presented as summary of events 
or cultures (an ethnographic account), it can be used to promote goals or as an 
educational documentary device.    
In the last ten years, I have learned that some methods afford collaborators to 
revisit these unique field events better than others.  Very few of the informants I worked 
with were willing to read or review my notes, but all of them felt engaged by more 
explicit visual representations. Video shot in an openly reflexive manner is one such 
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method. However, I suggest that ethnography must “engage with issues of representation 
that question the right of the researcher to represent other people…” (Pink 2007:22).  Can 
a video ethnography satisfy the rules of this engagement? In this sense, one of the biggest 
questions we face is that of legitimation. An ethical ethnography to me is precisely the 
one that meets many of the requirements of what Denzin has called a critical post 
structural ethnography, a response to the “legitimation crisis.” (1997:7).  Further it is one 
where a stable other and a stable subject do not exist—it is recognized that both parties 
inform the construction of knowledge and have the power to make decisions regarding 
“truth”. In a PEOC, video serves as method of recording field moments, as a tool for 
analyzing situations, and as a method for representation.  In terms of mining this data, I 
have chosen neither to code nor to quantify what is essentially a tool for storytelling in 
the sense that my interrogative or participative mode is conversational.  The idea of 
devising markers such as ‘credibility,’ ‘comprehensiveness,’ ethnographicness,’ 
‘triangulation’ , SWLS, and so on, would be to argue for a measureable ‘world out there’ 
that is truthfully and accurately captured by the researcher’s methods” (Eisenhart and 
How 1992; Atkinson 1992).  In this sense, a (visual) text becomes valid if it satisfies 
some or many of the rules; the author can claim a text’s validity and the results can then 
be taken ‘seriously’.  The danger with this is that the idea of validity, that is, relevance, or 
how closely some idea or observation approaches the state of a valid scientific truth, does 
not make it true in any fixed reality, except the context in which it is being rationalized.  
Video and film can reproduce the same misdirection.  The power of film and 
video, and the major reason we must use a self-revealing methodology when doing visual 
work, is because the stories we tell  are seen, and heard, they appeal to our ocular biased 
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western sense of being real—that they can be seen suggests there must be some truth to 
them (Ruby 1975; Loizos 1993; MacDougall 1998; Tomas 2003).  This places visual 
representations like video in line for even greater scrutiny and critique than even written 
forms, because there is sense of chicanery here that can trick the senses of those who 
watch our films that such things speak to some truth.  Speaking of photographs, Barthes 
wrote that “A sort of umbilical cord links the body of the photographed thing to my gaze: 
light, though impalpable, is here a carnal medium, a skin I share with anyone who has 
been photographed” (1984:81).  I would bring this observation to bear on film, and onto 
the video data I am watching in high definition on my 27 inch monitor in crystal clear 
perfection, which in many ways surpasses the unconscious haptic and psychic power of 
images; combined with the support of  HD quality footage, brilliant stereo sound, lighting, 
effects and motion effects,  this power to trick  the viewer into buying into a film’s 
credibility is greater now than ever before. And in my post-fieldwork, I am engaging a 
whole new virtual field of digital magnitude that extends my ethnographic presence 
virtually forever - except I see and hear things I did not before, because here in the lab,  
all I have to do is look and listen and note, whereas in the field I was debating and acting 
and creating the reality I now play back and forth on a timeline. 
Fabian (1983, 1985) had argued for an objective anthropology, and I have some 
difficulty in accepting objectivity, like reality, exists in any stable manner that we can 
measure as one might measure the weight of an object. I share with him the belief that 
“what is performative in ethnographic communication, including aspects that are play-
like…,” need to be examined, not to uncover the objective value of our work but really to 
see where outcomes are shaped by the researcher in unforeseen ways. One of the great 
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problems I confront in my attempts to be ethical in the field, in being faithful that is, to 
the unfolding story, is to be aware that other embodied senses are working with and 
against my sight and my intuition.  Fabian (1983: preface, 106, 123, 179) argued well that 
traditionally visualism had placed the eye at the top of the hierarchy of senses, 
eliminating the place of all others and thereby creating a distance between what one saw 
and one’s self.  “Vision requires distance from its objects; the eye maintains “purity” as 
long as it is not in close contact with “foreign objects.” In so doing he had suggested that 
observability, and hence the instructions of “participant observation” had evolved into a 
method that replaced the senses and the body from knowledge production, replacing it 
with signs, symbols and representation. Whether objectivity is possible or not is topic for 
another paper. If  only distance can give us space to know,  and immateriality as the 
essential component of true knowledge, I like Fabian, must query whether we  “can give 
to intersubjectivity a more concrete, palpable meaning than that of an abstract “condition” 
(31) . 
Video has a special place in PEOC for the many ways it contributes to reflexivity 
and criticality, and for the way it offers a pragmatic link to emerging intersubjectivities. I 
have introduced the idea of reflexive time into my videography.  In this case I bring the 
video we have shot over the years into people’s lives at points where they think it is 
important to understand new life events. In the example below, Brian, a long time 
participant in my films, joined the church and  found God.  He felt he had experienced a 
revelation, a life changing moment.  I went to see him and brought the films we had made 
so he could reflect. (Ethical-Traces- www.youtube.com/watch?v=vCIepUlEyeM). 
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In this experiment, I visited Brian at his home, a geared-to-income apartment in 
Toronto.  It had been 10 years since we met at Tent City, and we had seen each other 
three or four times a year when I would visit in Toronto.  We did interviews and 
discussed how housing had changed his life.  On one occasion we sat down and looked at 
the cumulative work we had been constructing. Each year, we had made new cuts of old 
footage to reorganize how these events and new ones aligned in his own understanding of 
his story. Most recently he had beaten lung cancer and then found God. So many things 
looked differently to him by that point, that viewing the original Subtext footage was 
perplexing to him. In Ethical-Traces, there is a scene where I ask him, why back in the 
days of Tent City, it took him 17 interviews to tell me about the crime he committed to 
go to Kingston.  He told us he had been to jail, that he had robbed banks, and had 
reiterated many other stories of a dark nature, which held up to verification and which are 
included in the film.  Then one day at lunch in a nearby diner, a year after I had met him, 
he finally told us about slitting a man’s throat in a movie theatre in Ottawa. “That’s the 
best part (of not telling people everything)” he says, “ because I don’t want people 
running away from me, because I’ve changed. I don’t know if I changed for the good or 
the worse.”  
When we looked at the footage I asked him why it was he never told us this 
before, or that it had taken that long – a year of seeing and interacting with him daily – 
for him to tell us that detail (I say us because at the time I was working with a colleague, 
Jeff Mayhew, a photographer).  Ten years later, in reviewing that footage, while seated 
on his balcony, healthier, off of drugs, healed from cancer, king of his castle and 
successfully implanted in a conventional identity since joining his community centre and 
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the church, he sat back and said, “Because we got to know each other a whole lot better, I 
got to know you better.” The simple lesson then, to substantiate pretty clearly what 
Bakhtin has been telling the world, is that there is no truth except that which emerges 
between actors in moments of creating such truths.  And, if these experiments if I can call 
them that, with Eddy, or Brian, have demonstrated anything, it is that the truth changes 
over extension of such experience, through the fidelity of actors reaching critical 
moments together over time. Perhaps it is the visceral linkage between sound and seeing 
and the waves and photons inherent to each, that Barthes15 had alluded too, or hearing 
one’s own voice, as a trace of one’s past, or perhaps the conceit of seeing oneself on the 
screen, but very often seen in video, informants are captivated and pensive about their 
role in producing truth and fiction.  Finally, Brian says, if I may be allowed to paraphrase, 
that you never really remember the past as it actually was unless you see somebody who 
reminds you of something, or (and he taps the computer) “you see this, you see it on this 
… the reality will come back to you” (DS DISC 2, Ethical-Traces at 7:42). 
Very often it is in these moments that critical self-awareness is stimulated, 
perhaps re-ignited, but in any event there is no way to deny that seeing and hearing 
oneself as a critical character – in the sense that Brian was a key informant in a study on 
housing and that is how he sees himself – on the video – creates an opportunity to remain 
critically engaged with the truths those moments had represented. Videography 
contributes to critical ethnography in extremely practical ways, as a way to collect, 
review and re-visit ethnographic present(s). When people see themselves in the contexts 
that others perceive them, it often changes the pragmatic deliberations they make in 
choosing actions towards themselves, others and critical positions. 
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3.7 Summary of Critical roots to Ethnography 
 Denzin (1997) argues that beyond positivist, post-positivist and post - modern 
epistemologies, there is critical post-structuralism (9). The criteria of this approach “flow 
from the qualitative project, stressing subjectivity, emotionality, feeling, and other anti-
foundational criteria” (9). “This is a an informed anti-foundational position.  …A good 
text exposes how race, class, and gender work their ways into the concrete lives of 
interacting individuals.  Lather (1986:67) calls this the catalytic validity, the degree to 
which a given research project empowers and emancipates a research community” (in 
Denzin 1997:10).  And in this, I take it to mean, gives voice to the informant, or the 
informants culture on equal if not superior terms to my own as researcher. In my 
transcriptions you will see that I have paid as much attention to mood, lighting, smells, 
social and choreometric observations; to otherwise engage as many qualities of the 
moment I am watching and retelling so that it might be more fully comprehended.   
 Taking direction from various philosophical and sociological understandings of 
critique, we understand that critique generally uses power to impose normative values on 
actors, or else equates the truth will power. In cases, it is the application of a criteria to a 
matter that determines its justness, and in others it is just to look for other ways that 
things are problematized. Aligned with critical and reflexive field methods, as an 
ethnographic form, critical ethnography seeks to show actors how reality is constructed 
by power in order to dominate them in various ways and to various degrees. It can 
impose a sense of justice such as equality onto a critical situation and then show actors 
how to achieve this, or it can at times completely undermine a group by exposing the 
futility or contradiction that their normative sense of injustice inheres.  This critical 
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awareness occurs at both personal and political levels.  Eddy’s awareness about himself 
brought about by our work might have led him to unsuccessfully confront his demons; 
Brian Dodge came to regard himself as a valid political man, a citizen and has since 
joined his neighbourhood committee, his apartment governing board and even drives 
himself on his scooter, to participate in housing planning meetings at WoodGreen 
community services in downtown Toronto. 
 As method, PEOC also wants to be clear on how such life histories and pragmatic 
information is arrived at, so it is reflexive to a fault.  There is still a sense that critique is 
thought of a way of setting ways of thinking and doing against one another in order to 
make a better choice.  This suggests that an alternative way can be imposed on an unjust 
situation that will resolve the issue and that it is critical ethnography’s role to be part of 
the critical process.    
 PEOC is similar and different.  It shares these standpoint and epistemological 
starting points.  It recognizes that in seeking knowledge, it creates knowledge. It is an 
openly reflexive if not autoethnographic approach.  PEOC is more interested in 
understanding how an unforeseen range of critiques are produced by actors, than 
attaching itself to the moral imperative of one in particular.  In Dignity Village, PEOC 
recognizes the equal and important weight of various critiques of poverty and 
homelessness that originate in actors’ pragmatic considerations.  The conundrum then is 
how critiques compete with one another and contribute to the crisis of community. 
 
3.8 Pragmatism Meets Critical Reflexive Ethnography   
 As this is not a philosophy essay, and I am not a philosopher, my explanation of 
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the term here is brief, and my knowledge of the vast literature is restricted to those 
aspects that directly correspond to the work at hand.  Pragmatism originated in the US in 
1870. Its most notable founders were Peirce, James and Dewey (Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy Accessed [SEPA] Aug. 12 2003). Pragmatism is not just a philosophical 
way for contemplating the relationship between ideas and action. Pragmatism, as an 
essentially anti-foundationalist approach to understanding the relationship between ideas 
and action, and in turn the practical potential for social change, appeals to the social 
sciences more broadly since the post-structural turn of the 80’s (Riles 2003:1; Hamner 
2003:1 SEPA Aug. 9 2013; Knight 2002). Its practical extension into sociology in 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology of critique (eg. 2006, 2010), and the 
reason I use it in my work, is its pragmatist maxim of seeking to understand hypotheses 
by their practical consequences (SEPA “Pragmatism,” accessed Aug 9:1).  
 Hamner (2003) discerns an early American Pragmatism, rooted in Peirce (1958) 
and James (1977) that imagines acts and social relations as outcomes of knowledge of the 
“self” rooted in Puritan imaginaries (2002:39). In this inherently anti-nominalist form, 
reality is formed around concepts that are understood as real in se. James had tried to 
relate vales and morality, asking why things had value? Peirce was more concerned with 
how understanding ideas could lead to solving problems. Dewey’s instrumental 
pragmatism blended the two former styles as a means to understanding how logical 
positions corresponded to actions directed at satisfying needs or values.  For Dewey 
(Hickman and Alexander, Eds. 1999) events, moments and experiences impacted the 
pragmatic orientation of individuals to ideas. 
  My sense of pragmatism follows Dewey and imbricates with what Hamner 
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describes as European praxis theory, of which Marx and Gramsci had laid out theoretical 
underpinnings, and whose interest in the moral weight of social analysis, Boltanski 
(2011) has recently avowed (Hamner 2003). In this nominalist form, the “self” is 
constructed out of ideas and knowledge that are produced for the individual and 
presented by powerful ideologies as if they were in se, and it is the moral imperative of 
ethnography in this case to expose the constructed nature of inequalities and domination 
that such power creates – though there are instances, perhaps where ideology can present 
valuable ideas too, after all kindness and gratitude can be ideological (Hamner 2003: 38-
41; and also - [G] Smith 1991; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, Smith 2006; Boltanski 
2010;). Hamner’s major study of American Pragmatism, (2002) sees “American 
pragmatism as an extended and theologically informed reflection on how a self comes 
into being through action-molded beliefs and its belief informed actions (2003:28). 
Hamner argues that self and action are important considerations, to which American 
pragmatists, notably Peirce and James had paid much attention, but they paid less 
attention to social change, and so pragmatic views towards social justice were more likely 
to be understandable in the European approach 16. European pragmatism was far more 
concerned with how ideas and actors’ orientation around them are mobilized towards 
socially transformative movements, which is a bridge to my desire to understand critical 
action amongst the homeless.  
 Despite the departure in how “truth” or reality is experienced, for American 
pragmatists or the praxis school, my pragmatic ethnographic method looks at important 
notions and concepts and the mundane personal and broader social consequences they 
produce, in the same manner of Riles (2003) and asks, “what would be the practical 
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consequences to actors if another concept or another way of looking at things were 
understood as truth?” (Riles 2003:1). Let us remember that PEOC is multi-textual, 
feminist, communitarian, wide-open and forward looking, often visual in method and 
representation, and produces field and research situations that blur traditional distinctions 
between researcher and informant, into those where the construction of the ethnographic 
relationship as a type of knowledge process in a “messy world” is a main current in the 
work (Denzin 1997; Riles 2003; Denzin and Lincoln 2004).  Generalizing to pragmatic 
anthropology, Riles (2003) adds, “Here the subjects are theorizing alongside their 
anthropological interpreters, reading some of the same texts, orienting themselves 
towards similar political, ethical or theoretical problems” (2).  The relationship, she adds, 
is more “one of sameness than difference.”  Understanding the pragmatic goals of this 
research, what makes it particularly ethnographic17?  
 Pragmatic inquiry for me, focuses on the “consequences of practical actions” 
(Barbalet 2009: 200).  Revealing the epistemic routing of ideas and values that shape and 
guide practical action, that is how actors come to act on the basis of beliefs or accepted 
knowledge, is the goal of the pragmatic ethnography of critique (PEOC) presented in this 
dissertation. Very often the pragmatic considerations that villagers make interfere with 
the village’s goals as a community, and this crisis of community is important to my work, 
because it was into that crisis I entered, and for which I have been asked to advise. 
 PEOC asks if the homeless people who fought for the right to land on which to 
build Dignity Village are to be considered active citizens, in the sense that their critique 
took the form and language of existing democratic scripts for protesting for change, or 
activist citizens, turning and twisting, finding new critiques and unusual means to carry 
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this out.  These two positions, set out in Isin and Nielsen’s (2008) model of Acts of 
Citizenship, suggest that the activist citizen is the agent of acts that seek new moral 
possibilities, and that active citizens are caught up in predictable critical practices around 
which the concept of a democratic citizen might be understood (35-38). Following Isin 
(2008), I distinguish acts from practices in the sense that a practice is something the 
scholar observes and the subject understands only as having happened (see for example, 
Foucault 1975; Bourdieu 1972). An act contrarily implies a creative moment in the 
experience of the actor (the individual) which, while it might be shared by others, or 
experienced in the presence of others, is manifest of the volitions and movement of that 
individual through a unique space and time.  Such acts often represent a break with 
common practice and therefore are problematic for theories which would try to solely 
explain acts as the result of forces external to them, that is as customary ways of doing 
things or acceptable in a range of practices directed towards some end.  Hence the citizen 
who exercises critique by voting against their favourite political party is exercising their 
freedom, but so too is the squatter who barricades herself within an abandoned building 
to protest gentrification. These are examples of two distinct ways of acting with a “sense” 
of justice, but which are perceived in dramatically different fashion, the former as a 
democratic right, the latter as an occupation, an incursion of sorts that brings 
constitutionally guaranteed rights to shelter into conflict with property rights.  The choice 
made to express freedom in certain acts or practices is a matter of pragmatic 
understanding. 
Barbalet (2009) says, 
 
The antecedents of action, especially external stimulation, while crucial to utilitarian 
accounts, are of secondary significance in pragmatism. Pragmatism, in understanding or 
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forming a meaning of action, is concerned primarily with its consequence or outcomes. It 
follows that the distinction between thought and action is not accepted by pragmatism as 
implying that each is a different entity, as in Cartesian dualism, for instance, but refers 
only to distinct functions of engagement with the world. Finally, as each action 
necessarily changes the conditions for subsequent actions, pragmatism regards agency, 
for instance, and also interest, identity, and so on as things that are not given in persons 
prior to action but discovered, emergent, or constructed by them in the course of action 
(200). 
 
 Pragmatic ethnography attaches itself to this emergent experience as a way to know 
what is becoming known, and as a contribution to that knowledge. This participant mode 
of understanding helps me to explore the ways that as a result of practical activity, 
(power) rather than as an ideal conviction that predisposes one to action (truth), citizens 
can transit in and out of active or activist roles.  Moving beyond this apparent distinction 
between types of citizens, the PEOC reveals actors who reside in both identities and 
move between them, as circumstances, and the imponderabilia of daily life dictate. The 
argument is that when critique displaces power, the result is not always a permanent 
inversion or break with habitus; a new, unjust habitus often results; or to invoke Derrida 
once again, a new democracy with its own set of internal confusions and tensions 
emerges. The villager is constantly faced with an unstable set of affairs (a series of 
tensions between how that world is imagined and how it performs) which means 
pragmatic knowledge and action must always be contingent. 
  Similarly, actors do not have to remain fixed in one or the other identity; they can 
move in and out of critical modes depending on how these tensions are understood. 
Towards some things they might fight for change, and for others remain solidly resolute.  
I suppose a good example, and one I return to later is how a few of the villagers are 
willing to support leaders who promise more computers and better distribution of the 
donations, but reject any attempt to hold 12 step meetings within the village community. 
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The former action represents progressive shift in how things are done that appeals to their 
sense of immediacy and need, and the latter (in their perspective) is an attempt at mind 
control, regardless of their raving addictions and the practical need for help.  The link 
then to simplify, is that through participant observation, conversational storytelling and 
reviewing official documentation, and in candid conversations about the village, my 
research has in an openly unstructured format, inquired about how people see the village 
and how they might want to see it.  This is the pragmatic part, the critical part is that by 
doing so, we have often reached points of deliberation where villagers came to question 
just how free and autonomous they were really were – or just “how broken” things were 
in the village.  It is on the basis of this knowledge that in my conclusions we will see how 
activist and active members of the village diverge on appropriate means to securing the 
community’s future. 
 
3.9  Summary 
 Ethnography taken in broader terms than its roots in anthropology, that is a 
something more than merely writing culture, terms that encompass the various ways that 
it is embraced by the social sciences, has a variety of practical implications for doing 
research, shaping communities and creating/disseminating knowledge. This argument 
suggests that the ethnographer has what should be an explicitly important role perhaps to 
be understood from Shragge (2003, 2013) as a type of community organizer – an outsider 
with certain organizational and planning skills dedicated to the community’s goals - and 
that this role has very specific ethical and practical implications that I discuss.  As a sort 
of response to Denzin’s (1997) call for a qualitative method of inquiry for the 21st century, 
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which is both feminist, communitarian and also seeks social justice as an end, PEOC as 
presented herein, must address its practical implications for the communities in which it 
is practiced. As both a method of “writing” about culture, sharing how this representation 
was derived, and of revealing to participants how their choices are socially constructed, 
this dissertation is critical, pragmatic and ethnographic.  
 Summarizing Hamner and Riles together, I argue that pragmatic ethnography of 
critique bridges important philosophical alignments between phenomenology, practice 
theory, acts and post-structuralism with specific practical means to address critique as a 
form of power (Geertz 2000; Riles 2003; Rabinow 2003; Foucault 2007).  The 
ethnographic approach taken in this research seeks to attach meaningful social critique to 
moral positions; as an indictment of structural and social injustices, and as means to 
understand how self-knowledge and discursive practices socially construct systems of 
domination and venues for emancipation. This is not to say that critical actors do not 
form their own valid critiques. I am specifically interested in recovering these by talking 
about pragmatic issues. Rarely, however, have the homeless participants in this research 
been asked to conscientiously engage in performances that debate and critique theirs and 
other positions of a crucial nature to the stability of their community. Following Mosher’s 
long term, video-supported community psychology of the village, which was completed 
during regular and intensive (non-resident) visits to the village during 2002 - 2009, my 
research was literally an invitation to villagers to participate in a pragmatic and critical 
way.  
  If the work I am proposing is pragmatic in the sense of understanding how ideas 
shape critical actors, at two levels; the mundane and the social, and if I am a critical actor 
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and an ethnographic resource in the sense I have argued, then it is incumbent upon me to 
provide the context of my critical attitude as well.  The next chapter provides a fairly 
tight historical account of my personal history, the work I did, the classic literature that 
has informed me along the way, and the origins of my current thesis. My days in rehab 
from booze and drugs taught me a great deal about how homelessness and recovery are 
related, and also the myriad origins of homelessness here in Canada in particular, but as 
well in the US where I did my later fieldwork.  Unlike the industrializing world, where 
the massive displacement of rural peasants to the margins of urban metropolises has 
created shantytowns with millions of residents18, in the West, great concern attaches to 
even small groups of tents in parks, or people camped out in cars over night.  In a global 
economic system that produces poverty in order to generate wealth, the fear of these 
small spatializations is dramatic in the west because of what it foreshadows: total 
systemic collapse and chaos.  Toronto was not ready for a shantytown, but events in 
Portland concomitant with those I experienced in Toronto, were conditioned by history 
differently. My journey from rehab, and my fieldwork on the streets of Toronto generated 
my insight to the critical nature of Dignity Village. In as much as the next chapter serves 
as an ethnographic account of my fieldwork and experience in Toronto and on the streets, 
my goal in presenting this is to use that experience as a way of establishing the continuity 
of important themes in homelessness research and also to how I have come to imagine 
intentional camps. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Endnotes - Chapter Three:  Pages 98 -147. 
 
1  Cort-Haddon’s “Torres Straits” visual ethnographies are amongst the earliest of 
their kind. 
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2  The ultimate fieldworker – come - armchair anthropologist and father of Kinship 
studies in the west. 
 
3  According to most, the founder of participant observation  
 
4  Perhaps the most famous American hobo who starred at the Chicago school. 
 
5  The traditional period is marked by the expanding of the range of anthropology to 
distant lands between 1900 and 1940.  Anthropologists in the field were concerned with 
providing objective, systematic and descriptive accounts of “other” cultures, often 
described of in terms of being foreign, rowdy, un-civilized, ill mannered and strange.  
Malinowski especially is well known for his derogatory commentary on the uncivilized 
and un-reciprocal relations he had with Tobriand Islanders. (In Geertz 1988:73-74; 
Malinowski 1967). The traditional stage is marked by four beliefs commonly associated 
with colonialism: a commitment to objectivism, complicity with imperialisms, belief in 
monumentalism and a belief in the timelessness of the world under observation. Since 
then all of these positions have been derided and placed within the context of a science 
emerging through colonialism into a post colonial stage (Clifford and Marcus 1986; 
Geertz 1973; Marcus and Cushman 1986).   
 
6  We still need to make notes, have ideas, conceptualize and organize information 
that is strange to us. In this traditional period, while anthropology was carving out 
traditions for dealing with distant others, Chicago School sociologists were negotiating a 
marriage between the textual novel and the science of social problems (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1994: 16).  In the interpretive method which emerged out of urban sociology in 
the traditional period, the sociologist-come-author has authority over the telling of the 
life-stories of challenged people, the unemployed, the hobo, the poor person driven from 
their home during the depression. Social problems become inscribed by the structure of 
the classic “morality tale: being in a state of grace, being seduced by evil and falling, and 
finally achieving redemption through suffering” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 16).   
 Out of this romantic period of exotic others, troubled moral characters and noble 
researchers, qualitative methods enters the modernist second phase, which ran from the 
second world war, until the 1970’s, though many of its inherent biases remain today.  
Encouraged by new ways of looking at the world through the lenses of critical theory, 
phenomenology and feminism, attention turned to deviance, social control and social 
justice.   The construction of reality and the peeling back of layers of structural deception 
to reveal the hidden mechanisms of social control, through ritual or through systems of 
law, marks a basic unification of social sciences that increasingly become attuned to the 
deceptive and repressive aspects of structure and culture (Derrida 1976; Bourdieu 1977 
1972; Geertz 1973; Becker 1961; Goffman 1959 1963).  While this period saw the 
explosion of qualitative techniques of measurement, including structured and semi-
structured interviews, the statistical analysis of words and phrases to reveal causal 
narratives in oral histories, it also presented the researcher as the guardian of self and 
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society, as the legitimate authority on and savior for the villain and the outsider (Denzin 
and Lincoln 1994: 16 -17). 
 
7  The beginning of the crises of representation for qualitative research was the 
publishing of Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures, (1973) followed by Local 
Knowledge in 1983 ( Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 16). Coining the term thick description in 
the process, he argued that all anthropological texts were interpretations of interpretations 
and that the goal should be to make sense of local scenes by looking deeply into the 
constructed nature of values and customs (17). In this the third, Blurred Boundaries 
stage, post-structuralism, deconstructionism, ethnomethodology, ritual theories of drama 
and culture emerge, but the distinctions between their theories and methods become less 
distinct (Foucault 1973 1975; Derrida 1976; Barthes 1972 1975; Habermas 1970).  The 
place of the researcher’s voice and the traditional subject are completely destabilized by 
the questioning of the authority of the text, and the suggestion that beneath 
communicative acts are assumptions and value judgments unknowable by traditional 
modes of observation. 
 
8  As David Howes (2011) offers, “the practice of fieldwork is integral to modern 
anthropology.  The origins of the practice date back to the Cambridge Anthropological 
Expedition to the Torres Strait of 1898” (1). Fieldwork was thereby inscribed in 
anthropology as new way of doing the work of the anthropologist; it was a rupture with 
the armchair anthropology that preceded it.  As emblematic of the new anthropology as 
the Torres expedition might have been, it was presaged by fieldwork undertaken by E.B. 
Tylor in Mexico in 1856, and Lewis Henry Morgan amongst several Native American 
groups in 1861 from whom he derived his classic work on kinship  The ethnologies of 
Tylor and the kinship studies of Morgan were inspired by prior “field” experiences, but 
much of their most influential work was not the result of fieldwork; it was based on the 
second hand observations of travellers to distant cultures, mostly missionaries, soldiers 
and explorers, and hence is referred to as armchair anthropology. One can only imagine 
the inspiration they derived from their prior journeys; still they are often recalled for 
being successful armchair ethnologists rather than field ethnographers.  The fact that 
much attention is paid to the importance of fieldwork and to distinguish this from other 
forms of ethnographic inquiry, exemplifies a certain Cartesian anxiety within the social 
sciences; a need to be as real, as close to the truth, and as systematic as other sciences. If 
the last 120 years of social science can be defined by any singular drive, it is towards a 
means of transmuting culturally variable participant experience into specific categories of 
authentic knowledge.  That is; ethnographers have been relaying their experience in the 
field through the idiom of their respective schools, as a sort of truth presentation that is 
superior to observations about culture made through second-hand references. 
 
9  Discussed in the next chapter thus, ‘Ethnography, from the Greek, ethnos, and 
graphos, quite literally, means writing people, or later, as,  “writing culture Even if one 
might argue all texts and all image systems contain information of ethnographic value, 
that does not make the project to which they are attached, inherently ethnographic.   For 
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something to be ethnographic, it must explicitly have the goal of examining culture and  
or social relations. 
 
10  There is a distinction and an alliance to be made here between critical 
ethnography and political activism ethnography. Taking Carspecken (1996) as an 
example of the former and George Smith (1990) as an example of the latter, I want to 
argue that the eighth moment requires finding ways to align practices that serve to the 
ultimate end, that is being critical and having effect.  Towards this end, both critical and 
political activism ethnographies conjoin in the field as part of practical critical 
ethnographic processes. 
 Carspecken’s (1996) critical ethnography is often cited as a model for undertaking 
critical ethnography in small groups.  
 
 
11  Note that Lather is rather more harsh on reflexivity as an ethical mechanism, 
largely because of an ongoing beef with Foley (2002) who was hard on her own 
deconstructionist perspective.  I understand reflexive writing and filmmaking have built 
in power dynamics; one does the best one can to expose how decisions and edits and 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
12  Of course much of my research was with non-villagers, or with homeless people 
from other sites. The same consideration apply here.  
 
13  http://www.cbc.ca/thesundayedition/documentaries/2012/09/30/1971-kingston-
pen-riots/ April 17 1971. 
 14	  	   	   In traditional textual ethnography, reflexivity is situated in the 
investigator’s experience in several ways.  First, in choosing the “field”, the object of the 
investigation, the investigator brings personal attributes, past experience and perhaps 
theoretical or paradigmatic biases, and so even before the study begins, the results are in 
part affected by a preconditioning of “choice” (Hirschkind 1994).  
 Malinowski’s A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term, (1967), published long after 
his death, reveals a troubled young man very much in touch with the prejudicial and 
emotional eddies of his brilliant mind while he was in the field.  The diary, though self-
reflective and quite disturbing in places is a good example of an ethnographic tool which 
helps to ameliorate the perversion of one’s point of view by allowing for the modifying 
influence of the interpenetration of others into the self, by affording the investigator a 
(textual) tool to keep track of why and how his feelings or thoughts might have 
influenced a finding or an opinion. In this sense, one can trace the critique of the 
investigator with the others he encounters and thus the reflexive nature of his findings 
reveals itself to us.14 
 Brigg’s (1970) Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family is an excellent 
example of “constant self-reflective” ethnography.  Her thoughts, ideas and 
interpretations are examples of applied reflexivity and in many ways are as interesting as 
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the ethnography itself.  Salzman points out that in this case the anthropologists may have 
been too included in the work, but that this self-inclusion in itself has value (2002:807).  
 Later important works like Bourgois’ (1995) In Search of Respect, Selling Crack 
In El Barrio and Righteous Dopefiend, (Bourgois and Schonberg 2010) emerged as 
excellent examples of solid fieldwork with a highly reflexive methodology yet fully 
devoted to linking important theoretical and structural models with the potential of 
changing policy initiatives.  While the ethnographies are not critical per se, in that they 
are not attached to social movements, they inhere the basic critical goal of revealing the 
systems of domination that create grave issues of social injustice.  In Righteous, 
especially, the author Bourgois, and the photographer, Schonberg develop a visual 
ethnography that presents the narrative as a story situated in debates about symbolic and 
structural violence, and places the lives of addicts within the context of a continuum of 
violence that “ spans structural, symbolic, everyday, and intimate dimensions” (Bourgois 
2001).  
 Bourgois’ work is critical as a moral form of ethnography in that it exposes the 
way poor people and junkies experience a certain structural and symbolic violence, and 
ties this in nicely with state policies life on the ground.  But it is not a case where the 
work is attached literally to an emancipatory or rehabilitative project. Recognition of the 
importance of the asocial, the mundane and the hidden forces of culture requires that 
investigators adopt a closer role, and in “entering” the field in order to understand it, it 
has become essential to understand who we are as we enter, and how we are profoundly 
altered by doing so (Hirschkind 1994; Rabinow 1997). 
 
15  In Camera Lucinda (1979) Barthes explores the physical connection between 
photons and images and the organs of sight-, which are interconnected, by vision, touch 
and mind. 
 
16  Of course from this perspective, American pragmatist come to judge or 
understand the actions of people on the basis of religious penetration of systems of 
meaning, ethics and action are aligned with Protestant work ethics and ideals.  I am less 
concerned with these religious ties to the approach, than I am to other ties that might be 
said to be of similar value: the US, American Democracy: liberty and freedom, which one 
might argue stem from religious practices of the colonialists, but I do no t address here. 
See Hamner ( 2003:  40-41). 
 
17   I have already describe it thus: Ethnography, from the Greek, ethnos, and 
graphos, quite literally, means writing people, or later, as,  “writing culture. What 
separates traveller - writers from the status of ethnographers is that ethnography refers to 
a systematic analysis of people and customs, usually presented in a written text (Merriam 
Webster Dictionary 2011). 
 
18  Well-documented, but especially so in Davis 2006, Planet of Slums. 
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Chapter Four: An Auto-Biographical, Autoethnography  
 
Autoethnography: A form of self-narrative that places the self within a social context. It 
included methods of research and writing that combine autobiography and ethnography. 
The term has a dual sense and can refer either to the ethnographic study of one’s own 
group(s) or to autobiographical reflections that include ethnographic observations and 
analysis (Reed-Danahay 2006). 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: Continuity, Literature Review and Shifting Orientations 
 In this chapter, I begin with a quick contextualization of the reflexive and qualitative 
approach I take. Mills’ (1959) suggestion in the Sociological Imagination to 
contextualize the lives we study in their broader terms of experience mirrors the need for 
ethnography done within our own cultures to reflect those contexts in the life of the 
researcher cum participant/organizer (Strathern 1987; Hastrup 1992; Oakley 1992; 
Fabian 2001; Gallinat and Collins 2010; Rapport 2006). A certain autobiographical 
context is required to situate the work we do and to expose emotional, deliberative and 
experiential knowledge of the field before “entering” it as a way of understanding how 
representations are colored by this past experience (Collins and Gallinat 2010).1 As 
Collins and Gallinat (2010:9) point out, in order to make the identification of inclusion, 
there is need to understand the degree to which an ethnographer can claim membership in 
the groups studied on the basis of how knowledge of the self is equally obtained.  So, I 
offer a reflexive history of my experience with addiction, recovery, homelessness and 
early fieldwork on the streets of Toronto.  Insomuch as the ethnography here was done in 
cities and nations that I call home, and with people for whom I establish having had a 
deep and uniting camaraderie, as members of a tangible and imaginative community, 
there is no way to separate out my self from the “traditional” others in this work. We are 
each elements of this equation and the transcripts you will read speak to the dialogic 
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manner in which our conversations turned into moments of critical awareness, and united 
with other conversations as part of a very organic field experience (Bakhtin 1982). 
 Strathern (1987) recognizes the likelihood that a greater degree of reflexivity will 
occur in anthropology done at home, or what she has called auto-anthropology but she 
suggests that ethnographers claiming sameness is an ethical conundrum bordering on 
what I interpret her to mean, as manipulation.  Gallinat and Collins do not agree, 
suggesting first, that the autobiographical ethnography to which Strathern refers is 
different than those where the ethnographer is a resource with others.  Ethnographies in 
this perspective, where the self is the only resource, are essentially unethical, and 
researchers understood to be insiders where there sameness is a conjoining element of the 
research can and do gain access to information that often is missed by other approaches 
(2010:7-11). 
 Here, I first argue briefly for a personal and subjective criticality used by Mosher 
(2010) in her important and sincere studies of the village, and by me in my dissertation 
work, both at Dignity Village and in my earlier research in Toronto that tries to 
understand the world of those with whom we create ethnography as part of our own 
world, and hence, to elaborate on one means to confront both in a critical manner. Then I 
discuss my own journey out of homelessness and addiction as a resource that benefitted 
from and was indispensible to my work on Toronto’s streets. This is followed by an 
historical account of how my work in screenwriting and visual documentary production 
led to the early video projects on the streets of Toronto where I cut my teeth as it were 
with homeless people. I was hired to do this work because of my academic training in 
sociology, my recovery from addiction and homelessness, and my ability to generate field 
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relationships with people sharing those same problems. I then begin to follow the 
evolution of my questions and inquiries as a sort of historical journey of the contexts of 
homelessness in the US and Canada during this period.  I introduce the people I met and 
notes I made, and various literatures and other documentation used in my earlier 
fieldwork that shaped the major research questions for this dissertation.    
 Importantly, the practical aspect of what I am proposing is that it is possible to look 
at social problems through various lenses, and part of the critical nature of this 
ethnography is to discern what best situates the inquiry in conceptual and theoretical 
footings that bring forth an actor capable of and motivated towards critical action in 
matters of social justice - in this case, the rights of the homeless to housing.  In trying to 
understand the tendency of activist citizens to be converted into active citizens; that is to 
lose sight of the critical ethos in favor of compliant democratic practice, I then establish 
how the researcher might have a role in fermenting a critical disposition in the 
communities where we do research.  
 I then look at the disadvantage to thick description as Geertz (1973) had imagined it 
to treat the subject of street homelessness from a purely quantitative point of view, trying 
to gauge how many, what age, and where they are, for example. Such data are essential 
for calculating how many housing spots are needed, or how many loaves of bread, and 
such, but rarely address how the homeless might help themselves in unconventional ways, 
and perhaps most importantly, these data are hard to work with because they are 
constantly shifting and contested by those who produce and use them. From a very early 
point in my research I understood that whether or not two or five thousand people were 
homeless in Toronto on a given night, was important for planners and program 
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administrators with a need to deliver services, but for me, interested in understanding 
what street life meant experientially, such numbers were largely irrelevant. I was well 
versed with Wellman’s (INSNA 1975-1991, 2005) network analysis, having graduated 
with a Masters from the University of Toronto, where I studied with him and other 
network sociologists.  As well, I understood the implications of Latour’s Actor Network 
Theory, which theorizes a world of possibility out of the number and types of ties 
individuals, have to one another ( Latour, 1987, 1999, 2005; Law and Hassard eds. 1999; 
Law 2004; Blok and Jensen 2011).   So I do not deny the importance of the numbers of 
homeless people I study or the relationships they have.  Each of the above-cited works 
will argue successfully that  larger number of ties usually means a more resourceful, 
more supportive network for members of a group.   In fact I speak to these ties and 
affiliations as measures of a kind of street power and sense of worth.  The statistics 
generated by various censuses, street counts, and other measures of the size of the 
homeless population have their place, but understanding the size of the problem cannot 
help us deliberate whether intentional communities or shelters are dignified experiences 
for the homeless, or perhaps better phrased, “what does it mean to live in a tent camp or 
on the streets?”  The underlying question that drove my work in Toronto was what it 
meant to be a street person, and later in Dignity Village, “what does it mean to be a 
villager?”2 
   As I was studying developments of homeless activism in Toronto, I was learning 
about other intentional communities and one in particular, Dignity Village, which had 
become an icon of sorts for Toronto’s own fledgling intentional campers.  It was during 
these early days, between 2000 and 2005 that I began to read literature on poverty and 
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homelessness again, material I had not read since the 1980’s when I did my graduate 
work in sociology at the University of Toronto.  In fact, much of the literature that was to 
influence me in the 2000’s had not even been written when I was learning how to do 
fieldwork and make social network models.  I offer a short discussion of some of this 
literature. I also discuss the problem with visual misrepresentation and the tendency of 
news, journals and documentary filmmakers without social science training to argue that 
they are producing truth, evidence of objective social reality, when in many cases, this 
was wrong, and the stories they told, were often convenient mistruths framed for 
audiences and funders.  For Tent City and Dignity Village, largely incorrect and negative 
portrayals perpetuated the stigma of space occupied by poor people and turned public 
opinion against them.  In the case of Tent City, I disclose how this misrepresentation led 
to its demise; in Dignity Village, it is the battle of representation that it now faces.                
 Representation is a major concern for homeless individuals and for groups of 
individuals who make claims. Classic literature on stigma, presentation and image 
management by Erving Goffman (1959, 1963) Howard Bahr (1973) and  Bahr and 
Caplow (1968), amongst others is still basic reading for those of us who study 
homelessness. I understand these notions to be important areas of concern not only for 
earlier writers of street culture, such as Liebow (1967), Ward (1979) Anderson (1925), 
London (1970 [1903]) and many more, but also as ongoing considerations for intentional 
communities like Dignity. Stigma, passing, strategies for overcoming, judging, judgment, 
ties you can trust and a safe place to heal and be heard free of prejudice, and personal 
empowerment through community are extremely important concepts to the Dignity 
homeless, and so I discuss some of the classical literature, Goffman, Bahr and others as a 
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way of explaining how I make sense of some the observations I made about strategies for 
overcoming stigma in these various periods of field work.  Perhaps most importantly, the 
notion of power is very important to my thesis, and so understanding what power means 
to some homeless people, how it manifests at personal and inter-group levels on the 
streets especially, at least in my experience is worthy of note.   
 Then I argue that in the context of gentrifying urban cores, the stigmatization of 
poverty has been used as an excuse not only to redevelop run down areas of the city, but 
also to extirpate from the urban culture, the homeless persons who made use of deserted 
inner spaces and cheap lodgings.  This process was reaching a peak of sorts when I began 
my fieldwork, and continues in Toronto and Portland as well as many cities. Since there 
are no longer any cheap lodgings in Toronto or Portland, nor any major city, that one can 
speak of in serious terms, and since “the lack of affordable housing” is now recognized 
by federal, state and local governments and homeless advocacy groups alike in both 
nations as a threat not only to those who are homeless but to millions of others likely to 
experience it, the relationship between stigma, power and affiliation remain important 
concepts for pragmatic ethnographies of critique, since housing claims often have to 
resolve conventionalized stigmatization of the claimants and their just cause in order to 
be successful.  The homeless themselves must first come to understand themselves as 
deserving and this requires taking action that defeats the stigma of being poor. 
 One of the most important things to understand about the occupation of urban land 
by homeless people is that it might take place quietly and in an ad hoc fashion for a while, 
but once it gathers momentum, once many squatters produce a situation of spatially 
concentrated poverty, it becomes a political claim, and in all cases where this happens, 
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Tent City in Toronto, Dignity Village, and Opportunity Village in Oregon, Seattle’s 
various Tent Cities, community organizing by professional activists has been vital to 
critical action. So I discuss some of the lessons I learned about community organizing by 
observing the actions of among others, The Toronto Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC) 
in Toronto, and also by briefly discussing Shragge (2003, 2013) and Davis (1991) each of 
whom have looked quite seriously at types and forms of locality-based organizing and 
their strengths and weakness.   I want to establish early, that the pragmatic aspect of 
ethnography in Dignity Village links researchers and the resources they have at hand in a 
virtual if not actual sense of organizing community.  This is not to say that researchers 
have more resources, but in my experience, participation with struggling communities as 
a researcher has helped them recognize and mobilize their resources.  I am not attaching 
any moral judgment to this, other than to say that, I have already argued that I believe the 
social sciences need to direct their collective energy towards critiquing and solving social 
problems.  Later, when I discuss how my research and this dissertation figured into the 
deliberations at Dignity Village in the last few years, this organizational/advisory role 
will become clearer. 
 The review of literature and conceptual deliberations show the strengths and 
weaknesses of various influential critical positions that have informed policy, and public 
opinion, leading to a paradigm shift in the 2000’s.  Limits to and critiques of Lewis’ 
“Culture of Poverty” paradigm are presented to show how academic construction of 
undeserving categories of poverty served neoliberal hegemonies over housing from the 
1960’s well into the 21st century.  The shift from blaming the victim to recognizing the 
potential victim in all of us indicates the beginning of a particular new way of looking at 
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the homeless by neoliberal governments and citizens where not only individuals, but the 
social system too are seen as flawed. We must look beyond conventional housing and 
welfare practices heading into the 21st century, since as I show, throughout this work, 
poverty and homelessness have risen and continue to do so, despite a constant growth of 
the wealth of the US, and the growth and range of housing services for the poor in the last 
200 years.  
 Federal regimes of government such as Obama’s current regime support “Ten Year 
Plans to End Homelessness” because they now understand that housing is not just a civil, 
but basic human right.  It is time we addressed homelessness as the human experience it 
is, in order to understand to what lengths we as a society are willing to accommodate 
people in need, and whether the accommodations we set out in policies and programs 
meet these actual needs.   One of the benefits I have had, one might say, is that I have 
been working on the streets, in the shantytowns, in laneways, mental wards, housing 
projects and shelters for over a decade so I have been able to see various ways that 
homelessness is experienced, overcome or endured, and this knowledge, and the way it 
has influenced my points of view on the village needs to be entered into this record 
because it reflects the subtle extension of these paradigm shifts over three decades into 
the critiques we will encounter in the village over the years.  So from this point on, let us 
agree that whatever critiques are generated by the village as a collective, or by 
independent villagers, are to be understood as responses to or affected by the knowledge 
produced about housing and homelessness by imaginaries outside of the village; the 
federal government, the state, the city, the public, organizers and opponents each plays a 
role in creating knowledge that impacts the identity of the villager. 
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  Having discussed my work on the streets of Toronto as a literal course towards 
knowing homeless people who shaped my understanding of street poverty and 
community building and critiquing certain readings that inform my present work, in the 
last section of this chapter I briefly discuss the current context of my work, the choices I 
have made to reimagine certain critical positions, and offer a brief reiteration of the 
broader context into which this research is continuously reconfigured.  My early 
academic treatment of the village within the model of Acts of Citizenship has led me to 
interrogate critique and critical action as means of understanding what an active or 
activist citizen might look like in real life.  One of the problems of doing pragmatic work, 
is that while the work might never end, the conditioning variables are often in flux and 
this makes it difficult to draw clear logical statements of even imagined reality.  In the 
last month alone, while I was revising this chapter and as recently as July 12, 2013 new 
laws and by-laws have been introduced in Oregon and Portland about the rights of the 
homeless that have impact on how villagers now see themselves in terms of their rights 
and freedoms. I explore these at length in my conclusions, but it is important to 
understand that pragmatic ethnography of critique must pay attention to how these 
broader and powerful centers of knowledge construction create critiques into which 
homeless citizens find various degrees of alignment.  Since these external categories are 
shifting, the critical alignments do as well, and so the work of understanding how 
homeless people in Dignity Village make choices to act or not, is quite challenging. 
These are precisely the problems that Latour (1993, 2005) cried out against, and Bakhtin 
(1993, 1982) had explained was a problem with “re-presenting” lived experience.  
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 It should be noted that while a vast amount of literature exists about homelessness, 
there is a negligible amount devoted to tent camps and shantytowns in North America.  
Many discussions look at the streets and housing as two dimensions of chronic 
homelessness, but the shantytown or intentional community is only currently being 
addressed in systematic studies because it is only recently that they are being seriously 
entertained by local governments as experimental alternatives to existing services.   
 
4.2 Researchers and Commitment to the Field 
 In The Sociological Imagination (1959) C. Wright Mills, expressed the need for 
social scientists to remain in touch with the values and senses that frame their perspective 
and the perspective of those they studied.  Without understanding the values on which 
such orientations are premised, the individual in society and the scholar each are 
vulnerable to psychologisms and therefore vulnerable to domination by power structures. 
Hence later in the book he sets out a model for sociology by which he emphasizes the 
need to integrate biographical, social, historical, economic and political values of 
individuals into their “social milieus” on which discussions about society at large are set 
(1959:64-68).  It is on this reflexive awareness of the conditioned structure of my 
inquiries as they relate to this dissertation that I offer this somewhat autobiographical 
introduction to my research.  In this section I indicate how my research interest formed 
out of my own addictions and homelessness, early research in my home city of Toronto, 
and in relation to emerging themes in the literature on poverty and homelessness at those 
times.  
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 It is also on this reflexive ethnographic premise that a participatory research 
approach had been taken in Dignity Village, by Mosher (2002-2010), which has 
constituted a main archival resource since 2003 in the research for this dissertation. In 
each case, participant observation has been based on a conversational style of inquiry and 
the production of videos and also my photo-essay monograph about the village, Dignity 
in Exile…(2012), that asked villagers who wanted, to look at their values and choices and 
how these had impacted their roles and relationships within that fragile community. 
Mosher’s work produced a ten-year long video record of life in the village, plus, and 
importantly for this dissertation since I refer to it often, an introductory video to the 
village, which has been incorporated into its village intake procedures.  
 Neither Mosher’s nor my interest has been to merely describe a community that has 
so often been poorly described.  Erroneous articles in the Oregonian Newspaper and other 
right of center press often criticize the village for the drug use and poor organization that 
are blamed for the squalor of the community.  Various other articles and photo essays by 
engaged college students and filmmakers from local colleges and schools abroad have 
witnessed the village as a unique alternative community (Finley 2003; Biswas-Diener 
2002, 2006; Bloom 20113; Street Roots 2003-2013).   
 However well intentioned or not these other representations have been, they cannot 
do the village justice, because rarely have they attached their work to the village as a sort 
of learning bridge for villagers and researchers. Unlike most other work, Mosher’s video-
graphic resources for the community may have constituted the basis for her dissertation, 
but her video work with the community has produced tools that the village continues to 
use when indoctrinating newcomers and for informing outsiders who visit (Kwamba 
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2009 (Disc unavailable but the making of the disc is on DS DISC 1, “Kwamba”)).  In fact 
the indoctrination video is a good example of how rationalized attempts at explaining the 
village often fail to capture the role chaos plays by suggesting there ought to be a certain 
order to life in the village, that exists in the imaginary of the village, but is rarely 
witnessed in practice. Even the production of this video by villagers, for villagers was a 
chaotic and trying experience. For the time that Mosher was in the field working on this 
participatory action, the village as a community was forced to confront its inherent 
contradictions and problematic social dynamics in order to resolve various conflicts 
within the village, and between the village and the rest of Portland, as a result of the 
dynamics created by the video production.4  During the production, strong tensions 
appeared in the community between participants in the video and others who wanted little 
to do with it. There was some debate about exactly how accurate and non-partisan were 
the video participants.   Some of the villagers felt the research was out of place and the 
role of Kwamba, too hands-on, while others welcomed the chance to get “organized.”  
Villagers came to be divided along ideological and political lines because of the work.  
 Critical ethnographers discuss this kind of moment often (Carspecken 1996; 
Kincheloe and McLaren 2000). The presence of the ethnographer in the field affects 
social relationships and creates unbalanced situations; critical aspects of ethnography in 
this sense can be beneficial and at the same time hazardous. Kwamba had since moved to 
the east coast and maintains infrequent contact by email, phone and yearly visits.  They 
remain on the advisory board of the village, as do other supporters, including me. The 
videos have become important resources for newcomers and recent leadership who have 
a hard time understanding the interpreting of rules and by laws in the village.  Yet as 
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producers of the ethnographic work, Kwamba is contacted frequently as an authoritative 
opinion in matters where questions of village protocol arise. I explore how this role gives 
evidence to the moral and ethical force of pragmatic and critical work in the village in my 
conclusions. 
 Despite Mosher’s efforts over several years to visually stimulate strong bonds 
amongst newcomers and long term residents in the village, the mechanisms for creating 
social bonds had become so weak by the time I had arrived that helping residents to 
regain a sense of the sociological importance of this unusual urban living space seemed 
urgent to me and to my first contacts when I went there in 2010. It still is.  Given that the 
village had by-laws, rules, articles of incorporation, established political procedures and 
judicial rituals and this very complete well scripted intake video, why should the village 
be suffering from this lack of social cohesion, low morale; why had they developed a lack 
of supporters and why should they be concerned that their time is almost up?  I want to 
stipulate then, that my role was anything but neutral, that my relationships with 
informants was both personal and professional, and that the work I produced for this 
dissertation and the monograph, Dignity in Exile is often critical of the village, but in 
these times of crisis when millions of people are without homes in the US, social science 
needs to be critical, not smug, about our actions as they relate to matters of social justice.   
 Recently, Ptery, a member and one of the few ardent activists and I had a 
conversation where he said that I wrote from a privileged position, because I have 
housing.  He also understood that at some point in my life I had been homeless and a 
ward of our own welfare state.5  In this recent conversation I had to convince him that 
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renting an apartment and owing the bank tens of thousands of dollars does not put me in 
secure housing.  He added: 
“But you have relationships that make that possible, right?” he asked. “People out here at 
the village just aren’t willing to make affiliations anymore, and that’s what we are 
working at. And they aren’t making them work here either. It’s hard to be a community, 
when people don’t trust or cooperate with each other. I mean newcomers just don’t have 
a clue why we want everyone to get out and get involved in the homeless community out 
there.  They just got in! At least now, not everyone is running and hiding in their (shacks) 
when Brad (the new Chairman) and I (the new treasurer) talk about going to visit Right 2 
Dream Too or the Sisters.6  We have had to really manage that rhetoric so the village 
doesn’t split into too many factions.” 
 
 Understanding how homelessness has come to be thought in terms of deserving and 
undeserving categories of poverty in American liberal democracy means recognizing why 
homeless activists come to resist hegemony’s domain over the symbolic and structural 
management of urban space and the restrictions placed on negatively perceived others to 
establish conventional social ties. If it can be said there is an external position that I place 
on top of things in my work, it is that resistance over just matters is never futile, but I 
make no claims over what is universally just.   I am not suggesting that this resistance is 
magically uniform or easily orchestrated.  On the ground, in the village, as Ptery’s words 
suggest, the activist actions are as divisive as they are important.   
 
4.3 Roots and a Troubled Past 
 This research began as a sort of filmic reportage back in 2000; the major 
questions I am asking now must be situated in the continuum of efforts I have made for 
several years in the field of homelessness and spatial claims making.   Much of my 
attention has been guided less by theoretical dictums and more by an experienced eye, 
something that is difficult to find approval for in some academic climes. In 2000, I began 
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writing about the homeless in a series of fictional short screenplays that included 
composite protagonists based on characters I met on the street.  My interest in this world 
was deeply personal. It was not academic. I was writing because I had personally 
troubling narratives I needed to exorcise, themes about my life I had learned of in a 
treatment center in Northern Ontario. 
 I was an addict.  I have been in recovery for 18 years now, about, four when this 
research began.  I had gone to a treatment center, the Jubilee Centre in Timmins, relapsed 
and ended up homeless for the second time in my life when I was 34.  In the years prior 
to that, despite periods where I was well paid as an artist and painter, and as a researcher, 
I was so messed up on alcohol and drugs that I ended up on welfare. I will not go into a 
“drugalogue” of my life, other than to say that I know the darkness of addiction; I 
understand the despair of helplessness and being different; I know the absolutely 
unnerving effect of insecure housing and no income, but I also know that given certain 
conditions people can recover. One of these is housing.  The reason I am most concerned 
with a mode of qualitative inquiry that can share the misery of homelessness, is that I 
have slept in abandoned spaces – a balcony somewhere in Toronto with a sheet of 
newspaper for blanket, so high and lost that shivering in the cold was the only corporeal 
connection I had to a reality that seemed impossible.  The shock of ending up that way 
was traumatizing enough, and though my experience with no shelter was mild compared 
to others, it was enough for me to realize that, regardless of the causes, homelessness was 
a particularly cruel way to almost live. I was lucky.  I did make it into treatment. 
 I relapsed a few months after the first treatment center but not before meeting 
many people who had lived literally on the streets.  In my relapse, my need for drugs was 
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so bad and my housing so insecure that I was  “literally homeless” and came to know 
many of the places where people slept on the streets, trading drugs at times in exchange 
for a place on someone’s couch, sometimes using drugs to enter the lives of housed 
people who liked to party so that they might let me hang around and sponge. If you find 
this information troubling, then you will find many of the stories in this dissertation 
impossible to read.  Suffice it to say that by the end of a six-month relapse, I managed 
through my doctor, to enter the same treatment center, and following this became a long 
term resident at the Buena Vista on the Rideau recovery house. This was a welfare-
sponsored program for up to two years where men could go to get over addictions – to 
booze, drugs, gambling. It was in the town of Merrickville, Ontario. It felt much more 
like a correctional institute or a halfway house than a recovery home one might see on 
TV reality shows because many of the men who went there were ex-cons, or recently 
convicted of drug or alcohol related vehicular offenses. These were not celebrities or rich 
kids, and most of them had been ordered to be there. It was a last resort kind of place, for 
us all.  Our being there was the contingency on which returning to our worlds depended.  
The recovery process was handed to them – they were remanded to it – as a sort of 
punishment for crimes and infidelities, and recovery was to give evidence of their 
commitment to self-govern once again. 
 On the banks of the Rideau River, in a two hundred year old mansion, the rehab 
looked like a beautiful colonial building. There were no fences or guard posts.  It was not 
a “facility.” The rehab program offered highly structured living; shared accommodations 
- no single rooms or private baths; it imposed on us daily and enforced routines and many 
“programs” about recovery that we had to pass in order to stay there. Almost half of the 
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residents had come there as results of sentencing for DUI or assaults related to addiction, 
not because they were homeless and had nowhere else to go.  Another quarter of the men 
were diagnosed with mental illnesses of various kinds and placed there to conquer co-
addictions and to wait for funded long term care beds. For the rest of us, and the 
distribution varied as men came and went, the program and rules were preferable to 
fighting for a shelter bed, especially in January when I got there. For me in particular, 
recovery depended on my family not enabling me any longer, so I quite literally had no 
where to go, except to the streets.  One of the staff members told me, “The place always 
filled up in winter, and cleared out come summer.”   One man had come in late March 
from the Rideau Regional (Psychiatric) Centre7, having beaten his father to death in a 
drunken rage.   The hospital itself has a troubled past and is subject to ongoing litigations 
about mistreatment of the psychiatric patients who lived there.  He suggested such abuses 
went on when he was there.  One of the reasons that statistics such as how many mentally 
ill patients might be on the streets only partially satisfies a rendition of that human 
condition, is that abuse, and other qualitative conditioning experiences that take place 
“while in care” cannot be quantified and their impact on homelessness requires a 
qualitative mode of inquiry. He would sit by the river in the evening, by himself because 
he was native and the rest of the guys hated him, and he burned Sweetgrass. He was 
oddly serene.  He had to do 18 months sober time at the Buena Vista before he could go 
back to regular society.  Only a few of us were there because we knew we had hit bottom 
and having no home, no sense of self-worth, some last fiber in us still wanted to get it 
together. I befriended him.  If two men had ever hit rock bottom from two very different 
staring points, we were those: he, a murderer from the reservation and me, and an ex-drug 
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dealing cokehead from a good Jewish family.  Both of us on the banks of the river, me 
fly-fishing for pike, he, praying to something I will never know. It was at Buena Vista, 
really that I began studying upon reflection of the days leading up to that moment, the 
characters of the homeless, especially my own, and it was there where I learned that 
addictions don’t have to cause homelessness.  Anyone can develop addictions, but 
addictions don’t always cause homelessness. However, several of the men I met at 
Rideau, or at recovery meetings had become addicted as a result of becoming homeless 
for other reasons.  
 The truth was that many of the men I met, almost 50 over 7 months who lived 
there, had become addicts for various reasons, some were housed and some were 
homeless. Most of them had families and jobs waiting for them, and this recovery was 
instrumental to returning to those lives, as a condition of reconciliation with estranged 
wives and families, or keeping a job.  Transition, it occurred to me meant different things 
to certain people.  So transitional programs were going to have to identify the disparate 
needs of transitioning persons in recovery.  For me, transitioning meant climbing from 
the bottom, learning to manage my affairs, and other personal hurdles I discuss in another 
volume - while for others it meant significantly less rebuilding. They had only to learn 
not to drink or drug, because their lives were otherwise intact. 
 Remember, the men in that home were not there because they were homeless.  
This was not transitional housing per se.  We were there because of various addictions.  It 
was a recovery house that gave men time to form an aftercare plan, which for those of us 
with nowhere to live, normally included some kind of housing which might be 
transitional or permanent. At the time, and today, transitional had meant part of a 
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continuum of housing into which one entered after leaving Buena Vista.  Usually, for 
those of us without homes to go to, this included treatment and recovery, managed 
conditional welfare supported housing, and then regular market rental units.  However, 
very importantly, it should be noted that most of the men there potentially had homes, 
and normal lives to return to, but that they were in jeopardy of losing all this because of 
addiction.  The several literally homeless men there, including me, had no alternatives, 
but the streets.  It seems almost redundant to suggest that all the homeless men I met 
there were addicts, and some were cross-diagnosed with various psychiatric problems, 
because it was a recovery house, and it was for addicts. Statistically this seems obvious.  
However, having become friends or at least very acquainted with them over those months, 
and also with many of their family who rejoined their lives as they recovered, I learned 
that they had not all been addicts or mentally ill when they lost their housing.  Some had 
lost low paying jobs, or been burned by the market collapses in the late 80’s and mid 
90’s; a few were mentally ill and their residential stays were terminated by cut backs. Of 
these men, their psychiatric symptoms presented or became worse when they lost their 
housing, and their addictions became worse or appeared for the first time as a result of 
time spent on the streets, or when access to prescribed medications was cut off.  They had 
turned to street drugs like meth amphetamine, crack cocaine, cocaine, opiates especially 
heroin, and alcohol. All these are abundant and feasible to obtain on the street, whereas 
the prescribed meds that might have really helped them had been cut off or made 
contingent on humiliating and oppressive medical diagnostic procedures. 
 It was not common at that time to think of the streets causing addiction or mental 
illness. For the most part, the popular imaginary saw matters in the reverse order.  This is 
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a perception that is discussed in due course in this dissertation.  Of course some of the 
guys there lost everything because of drinking and drugging or gambling.  The early 
lesson for me, was that drug use of the kind associated with the streets; meth, sniffing 
glue, addictions to Percocet and heroin, often occur as a result of being on the streets, as 
coping mechanisms or as the material basis for dependencies and alliances in street 
relationships (Bahr 1973; Ward 1979; Bourgois 2003, 2009). I speak to this later.  One of 
the interesting twists on my own perception of this is that where people used to think an 
addict would do anything to get high, on the streets the truth is that a homeless person 
might do anything to have friends and company, to get a bed or a protector, or to have 
power, and this includes doing and getting drugs.  
 My recovery was very “white” and “male.” The only women in my recovery were 
therapists or drug councilors. I discuss gender very rarely in this dissertation, not because 
it is unimportant, but because, gender like race, or ethnicity, were qualities I let 
participants bring up on their own accord.  Gender issues appear in some of the stories in 
Dignity in Exile, but I speak to it here only for its descriptive and usually statistical value. 
Here, let me point out, a basic observation of the streets is that women and children take 
shelter spots and get housing as a priority; the streets, based on various street counts 
where users of shelters and soup kitchens are tallied up as a sample of the population,  are 
overwhelmingly male, the population is between 65 to 85% male across most cities in 
North America (Weissman 2010, unpublished). There were no men of colour there, 
except for two who identified as members of first nations.  The rest of us were white.  It 
was not uncommon to hear every form of racist joke, or to hear misogyny tales well into 
the wee hours of the morning. I was a Jew.  One guy was kicked out for calling me a 
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“fucking Jew” and threatening to shiv me (stab me with a sharpened toothbrush to be 
exact). Still, that recovery house was the first time I had to recognize that homelessness 
and addiction are powerfully if not unclearly interconnected, and that people of all races, 
religions, socio-economic background and education can end up there regardless of what 
distributive statistics suggest.  As I mentioned, of the 50 men I met there, in seven 
months, only two identified as non-white, seven were literally homeless at the time they 
entered, and most had employment of some kind waiting for them as well as housing. 
 Residency at the recovery house was strictly governed. We were free to leave 
anytime we wanted to - it was not a prison - and many men who got fed up with the rules 
did leave, usually returning to unhappy friends or family or to later stages of addiction 
where they might have eventually ended up on the streets.  I did not track any of those 
men who left the Buena Vista.  We heard stories. Of the three who left on their own 
accord while I was there, we learned that one had been killed on the streets, another had 
gone back to jail, and the other had died, apparently homeless on a park bench in Thunder 
Bay, Ontario although this has not been confirmed.  
 In another volume, I am writing of this experience in detail, and recounting the 
trials of getting clean and becoming functional. For some of us however, case workers 
were explicit about our not “fucking up” because for most of us we had no where to go, 
and getting into housing, finding jobs again and maybe going to school, reuniting with 
family too, was for us, contingent on good behaviour.  This program was in every sense 
of the word, neoliberalism’s answer to the need for a good healthy and self-governing 
citizen.  It incorporated 12 step meetings, demanded regulated living where we each were 
to monitor others, urine analysis, re-education and therapy, and of the 50 or so people I 
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met there, when I last checked in 2005, only two of us had remained sober and had got on 
with our lives.   This is consistent with figures touted at 12 step regional meetings and in 
some recovery literature; for every 100 persons who seek treatment, between 2-8 percent 
get sober, over time the number drops to less than 2 per cent (AA Survey and Status 
report 2007-2008). 
 In each of our cases, we had become successful because certain conditions were 
in place. First, we had family who supported us during this process.  We were loved. And 
though this is another hard subject for scientists, the power of love trumps the power of 
denial in some cases.  It was after all a well-timed tear that saved me.8 We had education 
and skills. While I was there I wrote a chronicle of life in the house and did a very serious 
study of the Alcoholics Anonymous Big Book (1937) with my sponsor Pat Fortune, who 
has since passed away. The two of us that embraced the program had hit our last bottom. 
We each knew we had no further bottom to go, and so we embraced the recovery house 
as exactly that, a chance to recover.   None of this was consciously understood as “an 
attempt to reclaim our dignity” or as an internal debate over “what conduct of conduct 
means.” These were all very real factors of existence - corporeal, practical and timely 
matters about how to live, period.  Perhaps more importantly than any of this, we had no 
place to go and this rocked our sensibility. Housing, having a home was central to the 
imaginary that framed our identity as Canadians, and as men. Faced with nowhere to live, 
if we continued our ways, we would be dumped into the streets when our tenure was over, 
or placed in some welfare hellhole like before.  As humbling as this admittance is, there 
is no way for me to prevent its disclosure here.  That would be tantamount to a chemist 
ignoring the observations she made of acid burns she received as a child, or a biologist 
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who pretends his swim with whales hasn’t given his work a certain compassionate eye, or 
a fly fisherman writing about dry flies, having never studied hatches.9  The homeless 
people I work with in my research are interchangeable in ways we will discuss 
throughout this work. In my case, it was the compassionate eye I developed towards the 
relationship between housing, home and self-worth that ultimately led to my work.  I 
shared my past with all the participants in my research. This constituted the basis of trust 
for us. This horrible deficit, these defects of a troubled past, are priceless resources in the 
work I do. 
  Most importantly, there is a shame to having no housing that is unimaginable for 
those who grow up housed and in a culture where the home is the center of the universe. I 
stuck it out and completed my training.  My family had rallied behind me.  My painting 
skills had become even better since I had time to practice free of drugs and booze, and I 
was writing again.  I had come to enjoy the safe, structured life at the house, but I was 
ready to reclaim myself.   My after care plan was carefully constructed: return to Toronto 
and live at my parents’ home, start work as a muralist again, save money, go to AA 
meetings, move out and get into housing – Don’t use drugs, and keep my housing. 
 In June of 1996, I returned to Toronto where I immediately (two days upon my 
return) re-started up my business as a muralist and sculptor, and also began writing and 
reading about homelessness, addiction and poverty.   What just a few months earlier had 
seemed to be the biggest threat to my existence and stigmatized me amongst most of the 
people I had known prior - my addiction and homelessness – had become my most 
valuable resource. Combined with my graduate training as a fieldworker in the mid-80’s, 
and my serious contemplation of rehabilitation and homelessness while in recovery, in 
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the final analysis it was shame that provided me a certain eye to the homeless problem in 
Toronto.  
  In 1996 to 1998 I lived in a cute studio apartment in Cabbagetown, historically 
known as Toronto’s poor white district. There were half way houses, cheap rundown 
Single Room Hotels and shelters in the vicinity. It was being gentrified, as were all 
neighborhoods in the core. I was content with my living space, listening at night to the 
sounds of car windows breaking, footsteps running from the alarms, and I understood that 
the suffering went on.  I met a lot of guys who shacked up together in rooming houses on 
Parliament Street, in one section, where there remained such places, and we talked.  A 
few had said they recognized me from the years previous, but they were mistaken, and 
were only trying to stimulate a sense of camaraderie so I might dispense them a dollar or 
two.  I did very well at business, and by 2000, as the streets were literally filling with 
homeless people, I moved away from Cabbagetown to High Park, a move upwards one 
might say, but in the interim I had been writing, writing. I had written a number of short 
stories and a few screenplays.  One of them was called “The Horseman” and was about 
an elderly homeless man who became homeless after losing his job as a racehorse jockey.  
His dying wish had been to ride again.  He dies, and his street family duct taped his 
cadaver to a horse at Woodbine racetrack for his last ride.  It won a prize as best 
screenplay at Ryerson University for a screenwriting course I was taking at night. It was 
black comedy, but comedy just the same.   
 Except it was also very accurate, even though this character was a composite of 
various men I had met. I had learned, once again, that the homeless are not just junkies or 
alcoholics. Some people become homeless simply because they lose their job and are 
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poor.  A man I used to talk with in Allen Park near Cabbagetown, did not drink or do 
drugs.  He had been on the streets for twenty years by then, a defrocked jockey who had 
been accused of throwing races, and who had never got over the loss of his vocation. It 
had depressed him so much at a time when depression was rarely discussed especially 
amongst men, that he floated from park to park, shelter to shelter, adrift in memories of 
past glories on the dirt. I met a social worker who had tried to get him housing and 
psychiatric help.  He declined these offers. I think in his mind, he felt that accepting such 
services would be admitting his guilt. In real life he didn’t die, though by now he surely 
has.  
 In the 90’s, if one wasn’t actually studying homelessness in Toronto, one simply 
had no room in their imaginary categories for people who become homeless in Canada 
because they chose that life, or for those who had lost their job, nor that these kinds of 
breaks can be so great a schism to some, that they never regain a sense of place in the 
order of things.  It’s a sort of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder that we commonly had no 
understanding of at the time, though today we understand to be a fact about street life. 
The homeless were the “bums” we saw on the streets begging. That other category of 
people in jeopardy of losing their homes or who experienced episodic homelessness just 
was not a common idea to most Torontonians.  This imaginary was beginning to shift in 
2000 when I approached a contact in the movie industry about making this film. 
 We did not make the film, since his interests were now in theatre, but the script 
was good enough that they hired me to write character sketches of the people I was 
meeting in my jaunts about town for a proposed musical on homelessness.10  The Toronto 
representative of this American firm knew me as an academic, had witnessed my bottom, 
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and was “thrilled” to read these stories, as a symbol of my resurrection.  Most of all they 
were keenly aware that Toronto and other major cities in North America were beginning 
to present higher numbers of poor people and of different kinds than ever before. He 
wasn’t interested in a head count, “anyone can see how bad it has gotten.”   As it turned 
out, he wanted stories like the Horseman, about “people that don’t deserve to be 
homeless.”  This was the first time, I thought with any serious deliberation, what exactly 
deserving and undeserving poverty was.  His feeling was that within this vast sea of poor 
people invading downtown parks and churches, there must be more than drunks and 
criminals (who deserve their homelessness). They wanted to put a face to what was 
beginning to be Neoliberalism’s greatest indictment, abject poverty in the richest cities on 
the planet. This is when my research really took off.  
 
4.4 Toronto, The Streets and Questions, Questions… 
 In Toronto, figures of the homeless ranged from 5,000 to over 20,000 depending 
on to whom one spoke.11  It was impossible to walk a block of the downtown core 
without being harassed by beggars or seeing tents and lean-tos in public parks.  Street 
homelessness was not new to Toronto, but it had been concentrated to the Yonge and 
Dundas Streets corridor.  This broader distribution of the homeless across the city core 
was new for Toronto. I started out by meeting homeless people by chance on the streets, 
telling them about my theatrical work over a coffee and then with an audio device and a 
note pad, jaunting down their stories.  Those who participated, for the most part, felt that 
there was a sense of liberation in telling their stories.   By the winter of 2001, video 
handy-cams exploded onto the consumer market, and I progressed to a Digital Video 
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device.  While the character sketches I was compiling were not driven by any particular 
scholarly interest, the interviews I was getting and the stories I was collecting provided 
insights into the lived experience of what was for most Torontonians a very distant 
unlikelihood, homelessness.  Suddenly, articles, news stories, old books I hadn’t read in 
years became important to me. 
 I had been employing a form of interpretive reportage; perhaps best understood 
through a Latourian lens as a sort of Actor Network or assemblage approach in which I 
was guided by individuals and their practical metaphysics into the assemblages that 
constituted their street life, and thereby, I defined various fields that I mined for rich 
character stories (Law 2004; Latour 2005).12 If I wasn’t aware of it then, this is very 
much how I write about this experience now as the reader can discern for herself.  I was 
struck then as I am now, as I do work on the streets in Portland, Montreal and Toronto by 
how the imbrication of human and non-human agents; people, places, things, materials – 
tough guys, passive loners, church parking lots, road underpasses, food, clothes, a bag of 
dope or bottle of Percocet – have as much to do with the choices made by street homeless 
as do the laws and other external contexts into which their lives are inserted by a sort of 
narrative fate.  Even if outsiders could only begin to imagine how chaos is structural, 
following homeless guys around and listening to their stories reveals discernable if not 
fleeting patterns around food, shelter, drugs, and friendships, eluding police and finding 
medical attention.  All of these things were easier to do in Toronto than anywhere else in 
Canada, as nationwide devolution increased the numbers of homeless by cutting welfare 
and closing long term care facilities.  Even Buena Vista had been closed as a non-profit 
and reopened privately as a Drug and Addictions Center. 
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 By 2001, a visibly higher number of poor people had come from all over Canada 
(and other countries) to Toronto, especially the zone near St. Michael’s Hospital where 
there was and remains a concentration of detoxes, churches, soup kitchens, community 
centers, shelters and growing grass roots activism.13  A period of federal and provincial 
(state) devolution that began in the early 1980’s was followed by a continual retraction 
and downloading of social services to communities and by then was a North American 
truism.  Toronto, being the largest and richest city in Canada, in due course, found itself 
overwhelmed by welfare and poor claimants from all over the country looking for 
emergency welfare support, handouts and shelter. By 2000, it seemed that Toronto was 
engaged in an outright war on the street poor, as police were forcibly rousting and jailing 
rough sleepers in various parks and other city spaces. Across the U.S. at the same time, 
cities were facing proportionately similar high numbers of people on the streets.14   
 Tent camps and large-scale inner city squats were more common in the US than in 
Canada.  In Vancouver, an occupation by homeless squatters of the vacant downtown 
Woodward’s department store was routed by Police after it had gained some momentum 
in the Press in 2002.  Emblematic as it was of a growing problem in major cities, 
Vancouver evicted the squatters and used their actions to mark the need for urban 
redevelopment.  The building was torn down in 2006 long after the squatters had been 
routed.  Those homeless squatters like most at that time dissipated into the street 
Diaspora. Simply put, North America was very wealthy, but governments were not doing 
much for the homeless, many of whom had lost their welfare cheques and their 
permanent long term beds in special care facilities under Reaganism in the US,  
Conservative Party rule in Ontario and more broadly across the continent.  In New York 
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for example, an entire community of squatters whose actual numbers were never known, 
had occupied places in the Con-Eddy service and rail tunnels and had established covert 
access routes and diurnal patterns of entering and leaving in efforts to avoid surveillance 
by police.  The film Dark Days (1999) captures this culture over several years, leading up 
to their evictions and failed attempts by housing authorities to seed them in apartments.    
 In Toronto, the street poor had reached such high numbers that, massed as they were 
in parks and sidewalks near shelters, the police were unable to arrest everyone.  In 
Toronto at least, the common experience was to see homeless people in daylight, in 
public places, or gathered in long queues awaiting a bed at one of the downtown shelters.  
We did not imagine they were occupying city spaces; we saw the homeless population as 
temporary and transient much as we had always perceived the vagrant, even though along 
river valleys, under bridges and in feral plots of rail land, we saw the relics of 
campgrounds and fire pits. In my own experience too, despite my time in recovery, I did 
not imagine permanent claims like tent camps as part of the city. The evidence of a 
pervasive subclass of the poor was there, but we either chose not to see it or, when we did, 
elected to imagine it as a fleeting reminder that there were those amongst us who made 
poor choices.  For me it was a reminder of a hell I had no wish to reenter.  
  The historical record shows that many North American cities were suffering a loss 
of inner city industries and businesses concomitant with unprecedented rises of numbers 
of literally street homeless persons  (Bahr and Caplow 1968; Caton 1990; Ward 1979; 
Leginski 2007; Hulchanski 2009).15 The relationship of the two events was not causal 
(Burt and Aron 2000 in Leginski 2007). Rather it reflected a relationship between the 
lack of willingness of governments to spend money on the poor when such expenditures 
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were portrayed by ideologues as negatively impacting the economy, regardless of its 
performance at the time; there was also the fact that such empty real estate was attractive 
to developers and city planners who had been encouraged by the state supported ideology 
of urban renewal to buy cheap and redevelop broken inner city cores. Chronically 
homeless residents of downtown, with few places to sleep at night, and with restrictions 
on daytime occupancy at shelters, were increasingly more visible.  One morning I opened 
the door to my van and found a street hooker with her john sleeping in it.    In the spring 
and summer months, especially, the parks were literally overflowing with people, and 
downtown office workers often complained to me about having no park space to enjoy at 
lunchtime.  This had led to some conflict as local restaurateurs and community 
associations raised the issue with police and city councilors.  With the numbers of 
homeless women, single moms and children, and disabled street persons on the rise, the 
single homeless person, especially if male, was increasingly hung out to the elements and 
the whims of the police, while these other groups quickly took up the few shelter spaces 
left available.16 
 The homeless problem increasingly became framed as an obstacle to revitalization 
of the downtown core of Toronto.  And because it was mostly men left out of the shelters, 
the problem was with “ drunk men.”  Traditionally they had occupied Toronto’s version 
of the “Main Stem,” and “Skid Row.” At the turn of the 21st century, Toronto’s skid rows, 
pockets of unused or poor quality housing, isolated in small zones  of roughly the areas 
bordered by Broadview and Church to the east and west, and Bloor and Lakeshore to the 
north and south, were well into a phase of redevelopment.  A similar process was 
underway in Portland, Oregon 2500 miles away.  In fact, events in Toronto and Portland 
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paralleled one another over the next several months providing a sort of conjunctural 
frame of experience for those of us investigating street poverty at the time.  In each of 
their respective geopolitical territories, state and province, as the largest cities, they were 
receiving the human fallout of a retracted social services system. Their respective urban 
imaginaries were to handle it very differently. 
 The presence of small gatherings of the homeless in tents along Toronto’s Don River 
Valley was not new.  They had been there for decades, but went largely undetected.  In 
Portland, by 2000 a fairly persistent occupation of the Columbia River Sloughs by lone 
indigent men and women in tents and lean-tos had become something of an institution for 
over a century, according to one man who had told me on my first trip there that he slept 
in and around the same site his father had used for years before settling in a small rural 
community outside of Portland. In every major city on the continent, the classic homeless 
nomad with his or her shopping cart had become a persistent historical form, and urban 
citizens seemed to be more comforted, perhaps reassured by their presence, a visual 
reminder that homelessness was isolated to the very worst of possibilities.  These other 
worse off cases, squatting in the fringes rarely crossed our minds (Wright 1993). 
  It occurred to me that congregations of homeless people by the hundred or more in 
several of Toronto’s downtown parks bespoke the utter failure of one of the richest cities 
in the world to care for the poor, and then also, that secure housing, once the bedrock of 
the Canadian identity was being derided by the way governments managed poverty.  
Newspapers, other media17 and concerned scientists from various universities engaged in 
a debate about housing policy and basic rights. I came to questions about how such abject 
poverty is reproduced over long periods of time in cultures that continue to create wealth 
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and advance in other areas of medicine, science and most importantly, urban renewal.  As 
a Torontonian, that people should be camping in numbers and in full view of the public 
seemed urgent.  
 Homelessness is as old as history. Skid row, which is not a term used much 
anymore, was the perceptual spatial embodiment of street-engaged homelessness for 
almost a century in North American cities (Bahr 1973: 21; Ward 1979).  It is, therefore a 
relatively new concept and a North American invention, which resulted from a series of 
spatial mediations in the city over time, which demonized the homeless man for his role 
as casual laborer and for his intemperate manner (Anderson 1923; Bahr 1973).  As such, 
it occurred to me then, though only as an idea, that space is what we make of it, and that 
this usage shifts over time by the influence of laws we create to reign over it.  I discuss 
shortly how the isolation of the poorest men to rundown sections of town can only be 
understood as a type of social and structural segregation. Not all civilizations have treated 
the homeless the same way; under the ancient Greeks, the homeless were revered; Zeus 
was the God of “strangers” (Bahr 1973:20). And wasn’t Jesus a friend to all beggars?  
The poor have always suffered material poverty, and some might argue that they have 
always been the embodiment of discourses about insanity, crime and all manner of 
deviance, a theme expressed in many early ethnographies such as Anderson’s, The Hobo 
(1923), Liebow’s Tally’s Corner (1967) and most influentially in Lewis’ (1966), The 
Culture of Poverty. 
 It is important to understand that poverty does not equate with homelessness of 
the kind I am referring to here.  In my early days on the streets, the housed urban 
imaginary in Toronto understood the street people we saw as a certain worst-off case, 
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while poverty was something mysterious government and state, or economic forces 
managed.  In classic Marxian language, the poor in general were of some value within the 
urban imaginary as proletariat or workers; the busboys, construction apprentices and 
factory slaves we saw about town, but these others, famously discussed in Marx’s The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852), as lumpenproletariat, a miscreant class 
fraction, were those that we chose to imagine as not willing or incapable of participating 
in the economy or the social world we understood.   
 Even today, poverty does not mean homelessness; homelessness more recently 
occurs to people who were never poor, when economies crash, investments turn sour, or 
major illness takes away one’s assets.  Still, in 2000, despite the work of Caton (1990), 
Marcuse (1983; 1990), Rossi (1989) and many others that spoke to diversifying “new 
poverty” in America, popular media and urban imaginaries remained fixed on a 
characterlogically flawed poor person as the coefficient of homelessness and the basic 
actor in cultures of poverty. 
 
4.5 Classic Literature - Legacy of the Culture of Poverty 
Oscar Lewis wrote The Culture of Poverty (1966), A Study of Slum Culture (1968) 
and Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty (1962). The 
determinism of this model is something I want to move away from in this dissertation, 
even though it has had significant influence on how ethnographers examine poverty and 
homelessness and was essentially, the manner in which  common urban imaginaries 
understood the homeless.  Lewis’ culture of poverty model works on the premise that 
through early childhood socialization, the tendencies of poverty are inscribed in the 
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individual and henceforth into the culture, in much the same way Bourdieu (1972) had 
later examined the force of habitus on the bodies and minds of actors.18  The culture of 
poverty suggests the experience of the following: 
(1) A cash economy, wage labor and production for profit;  
(2) A persistently high rate of unemployment and underemployment for unskilled labor; 
(3) low wages;  
(4) The failure to provide social, political or economic organization, either on a voluntary 
basis or by government imposition, for the low-income population;  
(5) The existence of a bilateral kinship system rather than a unilateral one; and finally,  
(6) The existence in the dominant class of a set of values that stresses the accumulation of 
wealth and property, the possibility of upward mobility, and thrift and that explains low 
economic status as the result of personal inadequacy or inferiority (Lewis 1968:4-5). 
 
 Lewis’ ethnographic realism suggest that there are seventy traits that are generally 
associated though not in any degree or order with poor populations; these traits include: 
unemployment, absence of savings, lack of privacy, gregariousness, frequent use of 
physical violence in child training, predisposition to authoritarianism, inability to defer 
gratification, fatalism, mistrust of government, and strong feelings of powerlessness, 
marginality, and helplessness. Lewis was adamant that the culture of poverty was a sub-
cultural aspect of capitalism (1968:20).  However, his realist approach was compelling 
during a period of economic prosperity amongst the wealthy in the United States where 
the image of a “poor” personality resonated well with claims that individuals, and not 
structural conditions were to blame for poverty. Bourgois (2001) has argued that the 
continued presence of Lewis’ model in academic and scientific discourse corresponds 
with the historical manner by which others have been treated throughout US history: 
 In the USA, irrespective of the theoretical orientation of researchers, most discussions on 
poverty polarize around value judgments concerning individual self worth or around 
racial/ethnic stereotypes. US attitudes towards poverty are rooted in the country's colonial 
Calvinist/Puritanical heritage and are exacerbated by the historical importance of 
racialized hierarchies that have legitimized genocide, slavery, colonization, and 
immigration control. This helps explain why the culture of poverty concept continues to 
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generate so much emotional heat while shedding so little conceptual light. The uses and 
misuses of the concept offer a fascinating case study in the sociology of knowledge 
illustrating the political interfaces between theory, empiricism, art, and ethnocentric 
moralizing in the social sciences (2001:906). 
 
 The moral call to recognize the imbedded despair of homelessness in American 
society is quite old. The first major works of note include Jacob Riss’ photojournalism19 
(De Pastino 2003:3), Jack London’s The War on Classes (1905), Nels Andersons The 
Hobo (1923) and later, in terms of the culture of poverty, Harrington’s, (1962) The Other 
America which takes a stand against poverty by arguing that the state and local 
communities had failed in a time of great technological innovation to induce any 
bettering of the poor.  These arguments are revisited further on. Whereas Anderson and 
others had recounted in novel and detailed ways, the ethnography of being poor, and 
migrant labor, Lewis and Harrington each sought to redress the injustice of economic 
inequality by tasking regimes and states with services for the needy. However, Lewis’ 
position suggested a poor actor incapable of superseding their prescribed poverty, and 
Bourgois (2001:904) suggests this tended to confirm the image of an undeserving and 
pathological poor person, a negative othering that resonated well with the “blame – the 
victim – discourse” so prevalent in the west under capitalism in the 1960’s and 70’s, and 
under neoliberal governmentality as it entered the 21st century; critique of the poor that 
rewards the capable self-governed citizen.   
 By 2001, on the streets of Toronto, and across dining tables in the GTA, the 
debate over whether or not the poor were deserving of more assistance was a heated one.  
The Premier of Ontario had by then established his “Common Sense Revolution” that 
effectively closed over 20% of mental health long term care beds, and reduced welfare 
expenditures; he introduced “Ontario Works,” a workfare program that required able 
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bodied welfare recipients to work for their assistance.  This position like other workfare 
policies of the Bush Administration at that time reflected the belief that forcing people to 
work would redress the psychological deficits of poverty and replace idleness with an 
incentive to improve oneself though hard work. I discuss this attitude in chapter five as a 
fundamentally neoliberal conveyance of systemic economic need onto the personal 
requirements of citizenship.   A basic premise we explore later is that the contradiction of 
having ability yet living in idleness are facets of the undeserving poor under neoliberal 
value systems. 
 Bourgois’ treatment of Lewis’ culture of poverty is harsh as it should be. By 
presuming domination as the human condition of poverty, Lewis’ position invites certain 
types of social critique, of which Critical Theory and Boltanski’s pragmatic critical 
sociology would be useful, in the sense that each perceives domination as a case where 
actors are duped or forced into believing what more powerful, and therefore, more 
persuasive groups and individuals want them to know.20 Hence, even the poor have 
historically emerged over time as a group necessary to capital, and who understand 
themselves as a class whose powerlessness is emblematic of their status (Dean 1991).  
However, Boltanski, whom we discuss at length later, argues that it is the moral 
imperative of critique to establish the ways this false powerlessness is constructed by 
institutions and those who run them, and implores sociology(ies) to take on the moral 
burden of critiquing towards social justice.  However, as I am about to argue, there is 
power in homelessness, but until it becomes organized, it is victimized and quieted by the 
way knowledge about what poverty means and how the poor should act, is created, 
distributed and enforced by groups for whom subjugation of the poor is vital, namely 
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capital and the neoliberal regimes of knowledge that serve it.   
 Perhaps this is what troubles me the most about Lewis’ work, and any work that 
looks to individuals and their malfunctioning; it is this characterlogical diagnosis-based 
analysis that gives neoliberal governance the sanctimonious gall to blame the poor person 
for a lack of effort, which in cases might be true, but does not in itself explain systemic 
wide poverty, like the 147 million Americans mentioned earlier.   As only one example, 
my own case presented childhood psychological traumas experienced in abuses hidden in 
a well off family, but which later manifest a post traumatic stress disorder cross 
associated with substance abuse, and this despite many years of prosperity as an 
academic, businessman and artist.  It was not a lack of structural possibilities that 
produced my addiction or my homelessness – I did make poor choices. Once in that 
retrograde spiral of the streets and drugs, matters only got worse for me.  At the same 
time, others I knew who were equally troubled managed to get out of that scene on their 
own and to become prosperous if not happy.  There is no predestined or predetermined 
effect of socialization on the possibilities of emancipation from any debilitating condition. 
Should a poor person be destined to be poor by a young age simply by learning it?  
Should we solve that by changing their thinking then, or by working on the economy and 
the school system to provide better opportunities? In cases where homelessness is caused 
by addictions, from drinking to gambling, let us say, the route to homelessness needs to 
be identified and a treatment based solution presented.  In other cases, homelessness is 
not associated with prior addictions of any kind, and all models of housing, or for 
understanding homelessness, must address at least these two simple facts. Simply put, 
homelessness is described as having no shelter, but how that happens is now widely 
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understood as more complex than the faults of poorly socialized or addicted individuals.   
 Lewis’ work is worrisome because of the emphasis it places on psychiatric 
interventions to correct the weakly developed poor child; that is that although Lewis 
correlates the culture of poverty with structural inequality, he also suggests that by the 
age of six or seven a child is pretty much doomed to being poor, and to pass this on to the 
next generation, if there is no intervention to redress the psychological effects of early 
socialization. Ideally this might have benefits, but in a practical sense could never reach 
enough people, nor with the adequate frequency to produce results, especially if the 
“corrected” child has no role into which she can transit. What about people born poor, 
seeking work, but who cannot rise above the limits the economy forces on them? The real 
key is to produce a situation where children are not born into abject poverty. As a sort of 
implicit nod to the emerging work of Bourdieu this position supported the contention that 
poverty is inscribed at birth through the corporeal and symbolic values poor actors learn 
during early socialization into the culture of poverty.  Valentine (1968) was critical of 
this position as well, arguing that Lewis’s observations suggested addressing the 
characterlogical defects of the individuals rather than the conditions that produce poverty, 
even if the latter is less expensive overall to achieve.  The emphasis on the individual 
defects of character associated with poverty and then homelessness is rooted in the shared 
tradition of  “rugged individualism” inherent to urban mainstream imaginaries under 
capitalism.21  
 Wasserman and Clair (2010) suggest, for modern capitalism under current liberal 
democracy in the “West”, the market ideal paves an equal path under fair rules of 
competition for all members of society, and has resulted in a situation where the same 
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structures that conspire to produce wealth, conspire to produce poverty as part of the 
natural order of things (7).  With Lewis’ theory conservative forces in the United States, 
during the 1960’s began to ignore structural issues, which might be related to poverty, 
and to focus on the visible dysfunction of the undeserving individual (Wright 1997:15).  
Opposition to Johnson’s War on Poverty was sufficient to ensure that the field of 
engagement, as it were, was limited in scope, and this opposition was based on the power 
of the culture of poverty discourse. The onus of the government to provide was 
transferred onto the individual to contend with his or her own problems through 
subsidized education and food programs that might abet personal management.  
 Lewis himself advised the US Head Start Program that provides nutritional, 
social counseling and other service to children 0-5 years.22  Bourgois criticizes the 
effectiveness of a program that seeks to reinvent poor children who live in slum 
conditions into bright eyed and alert students, by giving them a good meal at school and 
supports, but does nothing to redress the violence, material depravity and emotional pain 
of living in slum like conditions (Bourgois 2001:1995).   Bourgois points out that much 
of the negative response by academics to Lewis’ portrayal has manifest in a political 
desire to demonstrate the able attributes of the poor, to otherwise shed this mantle of 
undeserving character cast upon them in the wake of their apparent “hopelessness.” 
While Bourgois criticizes Lewis for his psychological reductionism, his weakly 
developed cultural model and his inability to (genealogically) imbricate economic, 
gender and ideology and culture, he is more critical of the subsequent attempts by some 
academics to look past the intolerable violence and self-destructive behaviors that Lewis 
discusses as being universal and inevitable, and, which Bourgois knows from his in-depth 
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field experience are all too real (Bourgois 2001; Wagner 1993; Harvey and Reed 1996).  
These features of the poor life are empirically valid. They are the sort of symbolic and 
structural violence that Bourgois speaks to in his current work (2009)23, by bringing many 
of Bourdieu’s ideas to bear on ethnography of heroin injectors in San Francisco, and are 
discussed later in this dissertation. Whether it takes the form of spouse or child abuse, 
violent assault or self-abusive addictive behaviours, or more aptly for this dissertation, of 
people governing themselves in slum like living conditions,  “none of the behaviours or 
personalities described by Lewis, should shock anyone who is familiar with everyday life 
in the US inner city (Canadian) or Latin American shantytowns” (Bourgois 2001:905).  
 In much the same way that Moynihan (1967) had pointed to the failure of Black 
patriarchs to carry the burden of emancipating the poor black family from poverty, Lewis’ 
image is that of a culture of individuals predisposed early on by (habitus) to remain fixed 
in a state of poverty.  Bourgois suggests that this seeming morass out of which no 
resolution was forthcoming deterred ethnography from revisiting the problem of 
homelessness and poverty in terms that might liberate the image of the poor person and 
indicate how their potential is blocked by systems, gender, ideological, or other structures 
outside of their own experience; to assert the ways the poor are deserving rather than at 
fault, always.  Furthermore, such explication suggests targets for a pragmatic 
ethnography that seeks to understand the power of critique in poor communities fighting 
for rights. Bourgois notes:  
 From a theoretical perspective, the legacy of the culture of poverty debate has 
impoverished research in the social sciences on the phenomenon of social suffering, 
everyday violence, and the intimate experience of structural oppression in industrialized 
nations. Most importantly, by remaining mired in debates driven by identity politics, 
researchers have minimized the painful experience of day-to-day survival among the 
persistently poor. Epidemiological data on the associations between social class 
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interpersonal violence, domestic violence, health outcomes, education outcomes, 




4.6 Power and Political Subjects 
 
 One of the biggest flaws of the culture of poverty debate is that it completely 
misinterprets what power is and therefore does not really understand how power might be 
a useful tool for addressing how to unravel the problem of poverty.  This has been a very 
common problem for urban ethnographies in general and remains so today.  By looking 
at power in terms of its binary expression – less/more, powerful/powerless, 
dominated/liberated, the popular ethnographic discourses on poverty that emerged in the 
60’s and 70’s tended to isolate resistance in obvious or clearly observable phenomenon 
such as protest, riot and rebellion - the kind stuff that active citizens might do.  Hence 
resistance is hard to find, since these responses are empirically rare.  Citing Cruikshank 
(1999), Fairbanks Jr. (2004:49) argues that this “myopia” prevents us from understanding 
the ways “in which poor subjects are both effects and measures of political power, and 
therefore fully political entities.”  The basic conflict perspectives had tended to place 
poor and the homeless under the weight of social control discourses and the exigencies of 
the welfare state.  Their political emergence was possible only in collective or mass 
revolutionary undertakings. Without eschewing the enormous inequalities that persisted 
and continue to persist, between the haves and have-nots, an empowering pragmatic 
ethnographic approach seeks to understand where the enduring source of this power is 
imagined by the poor person herself, and for communities of poverty under neoliberalism 
and late capitalism. 
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  For my generation, having been educated at a time when the culture of poverty 
was still a very potent model, the idea that the poorest of the poor were likely stuck there 
for good was very common. We pitied them, if not felt completely helpless to understand 
how to really help them.  For me, my own experience into and then out of homelessness 
and addiction completely shook the foundation of this imaginary.  I was lucky in that 
sense. Understanding what imaginary concepts and systems of knowledge governed 
popular belief became central to my work.  
 The more I met people on the streets and did research, it became clear to me that 
the streets were far more organized than I had imagined, and that several individuals in 
my work had a certain authority.24 While the idea of street families, the fictive kin 
structures that emerge on the streets was widely understood, (Liebow, 1967; Bailey 1972; 
Anderson 1975) the chronic homeless, the “lifers” had expressed on occasion that the 
streets were the only place they felt they could fit in, or feel empowered.25 This we will 
see is vital to understanding Dignity Village and the shantytown community model later 
because for some, this is the first spatialization of their poverty in which they found their 
voice and a sense of power.  Material needs aside, there is reason to understand social ties, 
engagement and feeling socially relevant, that is, as having personal power among others 
as part of people’s goals from housing. Lisa Larson who has lived at the village for close 
to four years with her husband Scott has often commented that living in the village was 
the first time she felt she could speak freely without being judged, and further, that it was 
the first community that had offered opportunities to use her voice.  While she and Scott 
imagine moving back into conventional lives, reuniting with friends, (her children) and 
family, they are not anxious to leave the safety and the sense of the community that the 
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village offers.26  They are content to live there, despite the often unhappy mood of the 
place, because they feel they have influence over the governance of the village and, 
therefore, over themselves.  In June 2013, she led am impeachment of the CEO and took 
his place as leader of the village. Not every poor person wants to live with yuppies in 
neatly appointed neighborhoods.  That is a sort of ethno-centric middle class delusion.  At 
the very least, the village model, and this extended to Tent City, had the promise of 
uniting people with many conflicting attitudes and personalities under a common locality 
based cause and to establish socially dignified roles therein. 
 Back in 2000-2001, however, with disturbing numbers of visible homeless on US 
and Canadian city streets, it was easy for governments to identify this group as “the poor 
in general”, which in fact left hidden the thousands of others who lived in dubious 
housing and poverty off the streets.  The structural conditions producing poverty, and the 
real dimension of poverty and poor housing remained hidden in the bodies of the visible 
poor on the streets or isolated in welfare programs.  Even under Johnson’s War on 
Poverty, policy measures directed at encouraging broader participation by the 
disadvantaged in the labour market and access to education were suggested as means to 
restore “victims” to the status of functioning citizens. But concrete and effective plans to 
do so failed to materialize (Valentine 1968; Rainwater 1968; Lewis 1968; Harvey and 
Reed 1996). 
 Insomuch as some people are empowered by the struggle of homelessness, I am in 
no way arguing that street life is more empowering or desirable when compared to 
conventionally housed lives.   I am not a relativist to the point where I don’t recognize 
unhappy people adapting to poor life conditions and expressing it as beneficial. There is 
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also a symbolic and a very actual conventional disempowerment on the streets that is 
vital to understanding the stigma that the city social imaginary attaches to being homeless 
in general.  Concentrated spatializations of poverty like intentional camps confound this 
already dubious outlook on normal deviant behaviour.  Bourgois’ sentiment is exactly 
that we ought not forget the deplorable human condition that structural violence creates 
in the lives of the homeless; we should not be distracted from discussions about how to 
redress systemic poverty merely because a few homeless groups have made successful 
claims.   Being very poor is not only a hard way to live, it is reinforced by the stigma of 
being homeless that blocks the likelihood of overcoming it.  
 
4.7 Stigma, Power and Affiliation 
 In Stigma, (1963) Goffman discusses the way personal attributes of (any) 
individual can be discrediting and the various ways one might attempt to overcome the 
deleterious social and political consequences of this self and public perception. A method 
he discusses which has gained a great deal of discussion is “passing”. Passing involves 
hiding the behavioral or obvious “signs” of a discrediting trait; a Satan worshipper wears 
a three-piece suit to the office, a homosexual hockey player flirts with girls in front of his 
teammates. Passing is easy if the stigmatized attribute is not visibly obvious.  For the 
cross-dresser, or the extremely poor in their tattered clothes and private appropriation of 
public spaces, this passing is not possible. Snow and Anderson tell us: 
 “Their tattered and soiled clothes function as an ever-present and readily perceivable 
"role sign" (Banton 1965) or "stigma symbol" (Goffman 1963) that immediately draws 
attention to them and sets them apart from others. Actual or threatened proximity to them 
not only engenders fear and enmity in other citizens but also frequently invites the most 
visceral kinds of responses, ranging from shouts of invective to organized neighborhood 
opposition to proposed shelter locations to "troll-busting" campaigns aimed at 
terrorization" (1339-40).  
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 A part of the stigma of being poor reflects the hopelessness and the non-
redeemability of the homeless condition. Helplessness embodies the antithesis of the 
capitalist ideal.  In as much as capitalism absolutely requires a scale of economic and 
power inequalities, the absence of power altogether, of its opposite, dependency is 
ironically ridiculed in this system, even as it is required amongst some of the population 
for capitalism to be effective.27 Under neoliberal governmentality, homelessness signifies 
a failed conduct of conduct (Foucault 1991; Rose 1999) Historically, social analysis has 
tended to study neoliberal hegemony as a model of the top-down flow of power where 
poor people are interpreted in terms of their unequal power relations within capitalism.  
Street poverty confronts those who are desperately close to it, as a proviso of what could 
happen, if, say for example, they gave up their low paying labor job. 
 Massey’s (1994) feminist cultural geography, Smith’s, Institutional Ethnography 
(1987, 2005) Wallerstein’s (2004) core-periphery studies of globalization and Drache’s 
(2008) “defiant publics” and others have validated studying the other end of the power 
continuum that is, from the point of view of the less powerful.  This dissertation assumes 
a similar vantage point and looks to understand the ways that homelessness, odd as it may 
sound, creates certain under-recognized opportunities for empowerment amongst the 
Dignity Village poor.  Conventional attitudes and marginalized ones do not separate 
along a clear dividing line. There are sympathies towards the less fortunate amongst 
haves, or those with relatively more than the homeless, that can be mobilized, and in this 
sense, the stigma and marginality of the homeless become a sort of discursive rallying 
point for action around more widely held visions of justice. 
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In the case of this fieldwork-based research, we are examining how activists 
making claims for their rights challenge the normative imaginings of the urban space of 
poverty.  By fighting for the right to space, a number of issues that condition the 
homeless activist are concentrated into a neat bundle that fits into rationalized categories 
of governance that are clearly defined by law and practice, such as zoning codes, 
constitutional laws and camping or sheltering traditions in local areas.  Insomuch as the 
claim on space imbricates with indictments of the economy, partisan political rhetoric, 
and human rights discourses, fighting for space is a concrete and focused action where 
the success or failure of the claim is easily understood by its result; rights to a space are 
granted or not. Such actions when they occur must be understood within the political and 
economic context that undergirds the claim and which created power relations that were 
available to the activist community at that time.  While the poverty of the village suggests 
a position of weakness, the poor people who participated in this research have powerful 
capacities that are under-realized because establishing conventional ties has been an 
historic problem for the poor, and part of that stigma.28  
 Power is variously described as the ability to motivate others to do action, to 
exercise influence in decision-making or to instigate processes much like energy does in 
the “physical world” (Bahr 1973:29).  Weber, who described power as the ability to make 
people choose to do things despite the cost to them, also speaks of the positive status 
attached to individuals who have power (1946:180).  The absence of power can at worst 
be valued as “none,” but the negativity attached to the stigma of being powerless is 
considerably more than none (Goffman 1963; Liebow 1967; Snow and Anderson 1991; 
Moynihan 1967).  Powerless is tolerated amongst the infirm and amongst infants, but for 
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adults, the “incapacity to produce results” is rarely tolerated (Hawley 1963:423). Even, 
then, “tolerating” a human condition or an “other” is hardly the same thing as loving or 
caring for another. Tolerance implies a recognition of the other as less, and deviant from 
one’s own values, and therefore, as “outside” (Fabian 1983; Brown 2006).  
Bahr (1973) suggests that part of the mainstream’s stigmatization of “skid row” 
men was the abhorrence of powerlessness, which is not measured in terms of a void, but 
in the language, and valuations of the social system of relations in which it is embedded  
(22). The powerless are persons without relations to others, or those lacking “office” (22). 
In the context of the street then, the homeless I met were appraised through conventional 
symbolic imaginaries as powerless and less than because, following Bahr, the potential of 
their homeless affiliations remains undisclosed or underestimated.  
 Borrowing from Foucault (1991, 1994) who we visit at length in chapter five; in a 
liberal democratic urban conduct of conduct, the ideas of dignity, freedom and worth are 
wrapped up in the sense of personal empowerment through good government, and is 
culturally commoditized in the same way the economic and political individual is 
commoditized over time through participation in mainstream economic and political 
structures; though a sense of being deserving is something “owned” by the individual it is 
a tap root turned on and off by performance of the lived  and meaningful life, and thereby 
satisfies the regime’s need for citizens to self-govern.  In this sense, dignity and worth, 
two components of the deserving soul, and often understood by individuals as fulfilled by 
the rights to freedom and autonomy, are seen as rationalized outcomes of social practice 
and regimes of power, and their absence is the source rationalization for practices that 
stigmatize others (Bahr 1973; Caton 1990; Foucault 1994; Dean 2010; Weissman 2012).  
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Powerlessness, then is aberrant not only because it implies weakness, but because it 
defines the person so assessed as a failed citizen, as someone whose government is 
flawed; they are different, other and less than, undeserving. 
Foucault (1994) wrote: 
Perhaps the equivocal nature of the term conduct is one of the best aids for coming to 
terms with the specificity of power relations. For to “conduct” is at the same time to “lead” 
others (according to mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a 
way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities. The exercise of power 
consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. 
Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to 
the other than a question of government” (1994: 237). 
 
 In the social sciences the problem of power can be understood as the main vector 
in a continuum of debate over structure and agency.  One might imagine structure and 
agency as points on a spectrum where a diversity of arguments on the one side of an 
imaginary centre places structure over agency and, on the other side, are those arguments 
that place agency over structure.  The imaginary centre is where much of the literature 
tends to rest; positions such as structuration (Giddens 1984) that see agency as the result 
of empirically observed and theoretically deduced basic structural “facts” like language, 
practices and ideological space, amongst many others. One might say that the debate 
really hinges over two opposing views.  First are methodological holistic approaches 
which say that individuals are embedded in social structures and institutions (and spaces) 
that shape, constrain and determine their attempts at social action (Marx 1858; Marshall 
1950; Durkheim 1964; Parsons 1968; Lefebvre 1974; Weber 1992), and in opposition, a 
second position, that of the methodological individualist that says structures are really an 
epiphenomenon of the interplay of individuals bound up in structured relations but 
capable of choosing some things over others, hence the subject is at the centre of social 
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investigation (Goffman 1959, Garfinkel 1967; Bourdieu 1972; Giddens 1984; de Certeau 
1999; Law 2004; Latour 2005).  
 The debate is further complicated by normative attachments to these positions that 
appraise the relationship between structure and agency in terms of positive and negative 
outcomes for society.  For example, where Durkheim (1964) and Parsons (1968) saw 
structure as recreating social facts such as institutions and forms of association, and as 
such as a positive mechanism for maintaining social stasis, Marx (1848, 1867) on the 
other hand, saw structure as a detrimental force, which placed the majority of society’s 
members at risk of exploitation and oppression. The tendency of oppressive systems to 
reproduce intolerable conditions of lived experience, and to use coercive force to 
guarantee this state of inequality, would create an intolerable state of exploitation that 
would lead to an ultimate emancipation through mass collective action through revolution.  
In these positions, agency understood as the relative power an actor possesses, suggests 
that power, or the struggle for power is what makes existence meaningful. 
 On the streets of Toronto, and amongst the advocates I spoke to, talk was of 
obtaining for the homeless the same rights as any citizen - a home, a job, medical care 
and privacy.  While everyone knew that capitalism had produced the conditions of their 
poverty - high rents, low paying jobs, government cutbacks – few spoke of revolution or 
overturning extant power relations.  They simply wanted what other people had, but were 
lost about how to obtain it. Later when we talk about how two activist factions in the 
struggle of Dignity Village split during negotiations with the city, this split definition of 
emancipation will be important as well.   
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 I remember sitting on a bench at the corner of Victoria Street and Queen East, 
with a half dozen homeless guys.   They were all big, tough and experienced street men. 
In the park behind us were over 150 other homeless people, waiting for the church to 
open the doors to their soup kitchen.  Around 5 pm the doors opened and people queued 
for the soup and bread.   There were only casual police drive bys.  Almost every night the 
robbery and fraud squads would set up surveillance since those were two activities for 
which some of the street men had been issued warrants. The “beat” cops were around the 
area 24 hours a day and it became something of a sport, to watch back, taunting the cops 
with smirks and leers. At 7 pm after the serving was completed, the park became very 
densely occupied and two representatives from OCAP (The Ontario Coalition Against 
Poverty) had come to encourage people to join a protest march against police park 
sweeps to be held a few miles away at Ontario’s Parliament. The crowd became louder 
and I had remained, still seated on the bench with one of the same fellows - we could 
hear the propaganda and the jeering.  Within a few minutes there were a dozen police 
officers on foot, a half dozen squad cars and four Cops on horseback.  “Looks like we 
scared ‘em again,” he said.  His name was Mike, and we had interviewed several times. 
In the background we could hear one of the activists on a megaphone: “We can win 
housing, we can get off the streets, but we have to act together.  We have the power.” 
And the crowd howled.  The cops looked really edgy, hands on their belts, a gesture to 
the crowd not to escalate, and the horse cops moved out of sight towards a commotion in 
the church parking lot.  Mike looked at me and he just laughed, spitting out, “Yeah, like 
that will ever happen.” I could feel the energy, the force that was there in that angry 
group.  It was pretty tense.  The cops kept looking at each other as if ready to pounce on 
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the group.  And then a stream of perhaps thirty protesters left with the activists and 
marched up Victoria Street followed by the four horsemen, and escorted by two squad 
cars, lights flashing.  The event did not make headlines, or change anything, but there 
was power in their action.  It’s quite fair to say that in the hour of the protest, and the time 
it took to march to Queen’s Park, the protesters felt that they had some power - that 
emancipation needed to be understood as at least possible and sometimes fleeting – at 
least in the moments we are fighting, the emancipation is nascent, and possible, however 
unlikely the outcome. 
  Boltanski (2011:1-3) has argued all sociology can see is power, and therefore has 
a hard time isolating the conditions of emancipation from rare instances of domination. I 
don’t share this position but I give it some consideration in chapter five. In this 
dissertation I take the problem of structure and agency as elements of understanding 
social critique, and that for the homeless, the same rules that structure their poverty also 
provide means by which to be empowered thorough critical action in pursuit of their 
rights.29 The collective action of homeless people is interesting for another reason.  It is 
one of the rare opportunities where the condition that stigmatizes them also grants them a 
way of participating in conventional power struggles that are essential to democratic 
participation under neoliberalism. One must ask,  is acting in protest marches, or sleep-
ins, a break with, understood as an act of resistance, or a convergence on practices of 
resistance?  I say conventional power struggles in the sense that protest and public 
marches are understandable in democratic imaginaries about how and where to resist as 
free (active) citizens.  This minor protest was not a militant occupation, a kidnapping, or 
some other unusual form of resistance. It was quite regular and anticipated, and that is 
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why the cops were always in the vicinity. This might not have been a huge march, but it 
was at least to a degree effective at mobilizing some actors, and in garnering a measured 
response, that as far as we know did not lead to oppression, although that was not always 
the case. Democracy as we understand it in the West, includes the right to freely associate 
and to complain about political matters in public. In 2001, most Torontonians had 
difficulty understanding how “bums” could become mobilized and effective at 
influencing social change.  We hadn’t learned yet of the diversity of their composition, 
nor the strength and importance of social ties in their street groups. Most importantly, 
Torontonians thought of the homeless as idle and disorganized, and therefore as non-
threats. 
 Bahr (1973) has pointed out that when exploring homelessness as a human 
condition, the idea of disaffiliation is less primary then power.  This is because we “haves” 
have a good idea of what power is, but we generally do not understand disaffiliation in 
this concrete lived way.  Disaffiliation implies something about how one’s life is 
structured without others or with a limited few, and relates the size and form of 
assemblages with valuations of love or “belonging” and even power (31).  Power is 
essential to the lived life, but in speaking in terms of the homeless it is prudent to 
construct these notions of power around assemblages, how they are constructed out of the 
places frequented, how durable they are over time, because power manifests through 
(social) organizations (31).  It is for this reason, that urban imaginaries resist 
congregations of the homeless, and the shantytown, even more poignantly than marches 
and churchyard protests, is if nothing else, a superior example of the spatially 
concentrated power of the poor. As Bahr points out, the presumption is that, “A homeless 
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man lacks the power to influence others or to mold his own future. It is an unenviable, 
and at the same time, a threatening condition. Skid Row, [the streets] is reputed to be full 
of men in this state” (1973:31, [my words added]).  I would add that the view of the 
streets and of poverty as depleted of power is one of the reasons conventional symbolic 
imaginaries and housed citizens fear it as they do. 
 Bahr and Lewis had succeeded in informing many debates about homelessness. 
Their influence is at least implicit in many works, including what follows.  It was 
becoming clearer to me, the more I roamed the streets that equating homelessness with 
absolute powerlessness was a mistake. It was really a question of relative power within a 
system of unequal distribution of resources and social ties that was of concern. And then 
again, it was questionable, just exactly what kinds of power the homeless wanted.  
Absolute notions of power, or of domination seemed to be of little use other than as 
abstract ideals by which to provide an external measure for a condition that is best 
understood as it lived, from the inside, from within the social relation where it matters.  
For conventional imaginaries, power is a force that resides in experts, leaders, doctors, 
parents, clergy, teachers, police, employed and housed people and the bank, and so on.  
On the streets power resides in the guy who protects his lady, and sticks up for his friends, 
with the one with a full bottle or a room where people can crash, with a person who earns 
street credit by never ratting out or ripping someone off (Bailey 1973; Wagner 1993; 
Capponi 1997; Bourgois 1995, 2010; Weissman 2012). But then again, power can be 
merely the result of perceptions about others and might have little to do with who they 
are actually and what they can do. 
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 Interestingly, the homeless person in general, but the street man especially is 
faced with a unique kind of perceptual dualism.  His identity as “friend” or “foe” largely 
reflects mainstream symbolic norms about night and day, weakness and power, and space.  
Hence, we can see and value the street person the very same street person, in different 
ways; depending not only on where, but when and in what context we intercept him.  One 
rarely takes notice of these street people begging on a sidewalk during the daytime, 
because one is so used to seeing them on street corners in the capacity of a beggar, in a 
normal state of weakness. The same group in a laneway becomes a potential threat.  In 
public, passersby rarely question that they are anything other than a tragic case or lowly 
beggars. One might toss a coin into a tattered hat, but more often “others” may as Simmel 
(1950) has suggested, retreat into a cosmopolitan blasé, or a “Grey Area,” to invoke 
Primo Levi (1986) and manage to ignore such persons. Once again in times of normal 
activity, the day, we may recognize in their rough appearance, in their swift canter about 
the sidewalk, in their determinedness to push a loaded shopping cart against the flow of 
traffic and rain, a sense of the “noble” hobo, and find some peace in the knowledge that 
these characters are following a sort of urban script, but more often than not we will pity 
his demise or blame him for it as a means perhaps to eschew any role our prosperity 
might have had in reproducing it as the function of relations of production we implicitly 
encourage.  Still we generally are not afraid of him under the protection of daylight and 
in public.   
 Regardless of how one interprets the street person during waking hours, the same 
tolerance is quickly discarded upon nightfall.  It is not normal for residents of the 
“mainstream” to skulk about in dark places. The same tragic beggar I gave a muffin to 
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earlier today becomes Satan’s handyman tonight as he shuffles in and about the parking 
lot as I unlock the car door.  These are the people I was meeting in my early fieldwork.  
Though they may have resorted to hostels or fallen in and out of housing and welfare, 
they always ended up on the street, this intersection of laneways, bridges, parks and 
basements. The street came to define them, and under the brush of night, they redefined 
the street as dangerous. Many of them had criminal records and blamed their 
homelessness on long periods of incarceration.  Many of them broke into cars and went 
“boosting” – shoplifting, but highly organized and in packs.  It was only in darkness that 
we in the mainstream saw that they had power, all bad, all dark, and all street.  It is within 
the image of this dark power, this propensity to do harm perhaps, that urban planners and 
conventional citizens perceive street homeless.  On their own or isolated to the fringes, 
they are not a threat to the mainstream in a physical or symbolic sense. Should they group 
together, put up tents and claim the right to land, the stigma and the fear attached to them 
by conventional imaginaries magnifies.  The concentrated spatialization of poverty must 
also mean a concentration of crime, drugs, mental illness and all manner of depravity.  
An editorial comment in Portland’s Street Roots magazine is a good reminder of how this 
power has generally unfortunate implications and corresponds to notions of space that 




May 31, 2008 at 6:51 pm 
There’s a small strip of city property next to my house where two homeless Vietnam vets 
lived for five years. The police explained a few times that they couldn’t remove the men 
because the City of Portland wouldn’t let them. My brother and I spoke to the vets and 
they seemed harmless enough and promised never to go onto my property – I was told 
this was all I could do. 
 Two days ago, I discovered that the vets were gone and I was stunned by just how 
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happy and relieved I felt. I’m a single mother with two children. I’m also a caring person 
but I have an obligation and an instinct to protect my family. I am sorry for homeless 
people who want shelter and can’t find it, but it has been very stressful to have men living 
so far outside social rules and mores living a few feet over my property line – I didn’t 
realize how stressful until the stress was suddenly gone. It really did feel like a heavy 
weight had been physically lifted off my shoulders. 
Not only was I periodically frightened (why is the tub inexplicably filthy on a day when 
the windows are left open? What happened to all the tomatoes in the garden? Did my 
daughter really see someone at the window?) [sic] but I was also very tense when it was 
freezing cold or pouring rain, even though our homeless guys were campers who didn’t 
want a shelter bed or affordable housing. They had desks and a table and chairs as well as 
tents and sleeping bags and had been sent to us after living on the property of a Christian 
church for over 20 years. These men had defined their freedom and attained it. Does 
anyone have a plan for the campers?  
 This morning, after two days of this wonderful, free feeling and while I was 
mowing the city’s property, I discovered that a new man has pitched his tent behind my 
house. He’s a foot taller and two hundred pounds heavier than I am. I spoke with him 
(he’s on my property so at the very least, he’ll have to move twenty feet or so) and he’s 
agreed to leave by this time next week, but I know another or others will come, if he 
leaves. It’s a convenient spot to downtown and fairly hidden. The fellow said right away, 
“I don’t have to go; this is city property!” It isn’t possible that the police are actually 
shuttling people to this space like realtors, is it? 
 I’ve been tense for five years and not even admitting it to myself because I 
wanted to be politically correct and think of myself as compassionate and liberal but I 
cannot live like this any more. Should I sell my house? Who would buy it? I won’t be 
able to send my children to college if I have to sell it at a deep discount – this collateral is 
my plan for tuition and I’m lucky to have it. Plus, we just love our little house; it’s the 
first one I’ve owned. 
 Talking to and helping the homeless as part of a job – or just thinking about the 
homeless from behind a newspaper – is very different from seeing the homeless through 
the trees in your back yard every day and hearing the twigs snap as they visit their privy. 
“Fewer police sweeps” does not appeal to me. Each case ought to be considered 
individually – in some cases, it’s appropriate to move the homeless; in other cases, it’s 
not. 
 The old, dead ideas about fixing the problem are actually painful to hear. Section 
8, shelters, low-income housing. All good ideas coming from people who never talked to 
the homeless people I’ve known. The new fellow has a beautiful, insulated tent, a boom 
box, furniture – even (apparently) a cell phone. His new home looks like a studio 
apartment, and we can see it from our living room window. Beyond it is a road and 
beyond that, nothing much. It is just him and me and my children. 
 I welcome advice but I hope any accusation that I am a “not in my back yard” sort 




 Clearly then, perception has much to do with how we understand not only the 
homeless but also the proper space for them to inhabit.  When homeless people are not in 
the streets or hostels, they are rarely understood in positive terms. They are making a 
claim, taking something, some land, some fruits, they are occupiers and therefore 
powerful.  However some ethnography examines more positive, even communitarian 
perspectives amongst homeless street people.  Bailey’s (1973) The Squatters, recounts 
the organizing efforts amongst Rethbridge’s (England) squatting community, focusing on 
how their success with local councils expanded to other locales throughout the country.  
Ward’s (1979) The Street is their Home, the Hobo Manifesto, spoke to the unique and 
colorful culture of the streets and to the probability that the presence of hobos and “skids” 
was a benefit to the communities in which they lived. Of course, Ward, once a hobo 
himself was biased. Ward pointed out that skid row men were consumers; even if only of 
cheap motel rooms and bar room booze.  He argued that they provided dispensable labor 
and did odd jobs; their presence on street corners and in parks wasn’t encroachment or 
trespass necessarily, but added color and vibrancy to otherwise decaying neighborhoods. 
Though other “pro-skid” positions might exist, I did not come across this particularly 
positive portrayal often. Bahr's, Skid Row, (1973) provides an eloquent spatial and 
cultural interpretation set in an historical approach to understanding the vital “main stem” 
in North American cities where street poverty was most highly concentrated.  Wagner’s 
(1993) Checkerboard Square, takes the opportunity to express the strides made by the 
homeless to build communities and to fight for their rights.  Wagner explored alternative 
routes to homelessness: opting out, resistance to authoritative bosses, rejection of 
landlords, governments and spouses. He explains through the stories of the homeless 
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themselves, that homelessness is not just about a lack of housing or jobs but results from 
the very structure of dominant institutions, such as work and social welfare.  
 These views are a far cry from the moral high grounds taken by Ferguson (1911) 
in The Vagrant: what to do with him, or Syme’s (1904) Honour all Men, a plea for the 
Vagrant. Each of these establishes a moral imperative which identify the homeless (male) 
as an outcast and spiritually troubled figure in need of saving either through moral or 
labor intensive means.30  As much as Lewis’ Culture of Poverty is a departure from these 
early post-Victorian-era accounts, it too, essentializes poverty as a “type” of human 
condition, that confirms rather than rejects the hopelessness of poverty and sees the 
solution to the poverty as state, professional or otherwise exterior interventions into 
homeless subjectivities.  As such it invites policies and interventions necessary to rectify 
a broken subjectivity into a self-governing one as the only means to redress poverty. 
 Despite some good attempts at understanding homelessness from the point of 
view of homeless persons, the dominant political framing of homelessness as a social 
problem affecting a troublesome population, led to the bulk of statistical data obtained 
and discussed for the sole purpose of driving policies of containment and (ware) housing 
the poor on the basis of how they differed from conventionally employed and socialized 
groups, when in fact there are other points of contact between cultures than merely 
housing or work. The irony is that in either enterprise, the traditional ethnographic or 
state-funded policy study, finding indisputable cases of positive identity building and 
community engagement in the literature has been rare, not necessarily because it isn’t 
there in the actual world of the poor and the homeless, but largely because of how 
literature has traditionally framed the problem. Despite the numerous protests, legal 
 210 
claims and temporary occupations by homeless people and advocacy groups, the frame of 
understanding had until very recently been filtered though conflict theory, rather than 
taking seriously the power that homeless people might have within neoliberal 
governmentalities. A somewhat cynical explanation is offered by Wagner (1993) when he 
suggests that “the research methodologies used by social scientists; self-interested 
professionals in certain formulations of social problems; and the ideological pre-
conceptions and political strategies of most advocates and researchers, are the reason for 
holding back a progressive understanding of the “homeless” (7).31  So, while one author 
might present a single valid ethnography of empowerment, many more other studies will 
point to the uniqueness of this quality, and its incongruence with policy initiatives or 
goals on a much broader scale.  More recently, as I discuss in my concluding chapter, the 
paradigm shift away from undeserving to deserving poor has begun to reframe these 
treatments of the homeless. 
One of the crippling effects of the power debate in early urban ethnography is that 
trying to discern what power might ideally mean, tended to frame ethnographies in terms 
of ideal binary positions in the sense that policy or laws governing the poor were 
interpreted in terms of how they fit into dominant perspectives within symbolic 
imaginaries about what ought to be.  Under neoliberal governance, the homeless person’s 
power was to be mitigated through continuum of care housing models, shelters, treatment 
and rehabs, diluted and scattered to dark places, which I discuss later as negative space. 
With masses of poor people congregating in parks, participating in sometimes violent 
protests against policies targeting the homeless, and with this occurring on a continent 
wide level, attention amongst scholars and activists turned to understanding how as a 
 211 
result of devolution, new subjectivities were being created amongst a largely un-serviced 
poor population. One of the ways that the power of the homeless was starting to manifest 
was through the actions of deliberate housing and homeless advocacy.  Beric German of 
the TDRC had explained it many times, “It was no use, you see, to gather a group and 
make promises they expect you to keep.  Mobilization and organization are about 
demonstrating ways that the poor person can have power. First you have to know who 
shares your policies and beliefs, who wants to participate, and then you lead by example.  
Protest, yell, scream, fight for your rights.”  Homeless activism was beginning to change 
how we thought of the poor, even if their power was limited, it was power nonetheless.32  
  While I was in the streets of Toronto, participating in sleep-ins at local parks, or 
covering rallies in church yards, unbeknownst to any of us, in Portland, activists huddled 
under the Fremont Bridge in tents and toting shopping carts filled with their belongings, 
were organizing in a fight for the right to land on which to build homes. With all the 
activism and hype around us, in Toronto, it was impossible not to sense and to feel a 
certain energy amongst elements of the homeless. Amongst Toronto’s homeless, I had 
conversations about other parks, other cities, and other tent camps.  A few even shared 
romantic stories of riding the freight trains out west.  One had been to Seattle and 
Portland, and then to Sacramento.  There were “unbelievable amounts of homeless people 
there” (Mike, homeless man at “St. Mike’s,” from Street Beats (2003) 2001).  We were 
not even aware of the tent-camp taking root down by the lakeshore on Toronto’s booming 
waterfront. 
 One of the homeless campers I met had travelled on five continents chasing the 
“spirit of alternative community.”  He had remarked many times that Canadians ought to 
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give more graciously to the poor, because most of us had no idea how the rest of the 
world lived – he was referring to Davis’ billion or so poor who live on this Planet of 
Slums (2006).  He had just arrived from “Christiania” a large squatter community that 
started in deserted military barracks in Copenhagen.  Fed up with the lack of housing for 
the poor, activists and the poor had squatted and successfully claimed the barracks for 
occupancy as long ago as 1971.  Though the city recognizes it as a commune, “The 
Christiana Law of 1989, transferred regulation of the commune to the state.33  Though not 
a legally sanctioned city operation, and continuously steeped in controversy over its own 
dogmatic rules and codes, it remains one of the avatars of intentional squatting in the 
west.34  Even Denmark had homelessness?  He had been also in Kolkata, Karachi, Soweto, 
and he was in Toronto to help organizers build their own homeless camp, on the 
lakeshore, not far from my home, because he had heard rumour that homeless folks were 
organizing in Toronto.  Apparently it had been there for over two years, but only a few of 
the park people knew of it, and certainly, even though it was next to the Gardiner 
Expressway, a highway with tens of thousands of cars passing by, few Torontonians had 
any idea what the six shacks on the empty lot had meant.  There was no room in our 
urban imaginary for a shantytown.  It was unheard of.  Our imaginary saw the parks, the 
doorways, the underpasses and the street corners. Those must have been deserted 
construction sheds stashed up under the sumacs. 
   He took me there one day in late Spring 2001.  He was going to build shacks for 
folks to live in during the winter. His earliest comments to me were about how people 
from all over the world had come together in these different places he had been to help 
local communities voice themselves in a world where cities were increasingly displacing 
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and marginalizing poor people.  What was different about Tent City was that compared to 
the rest of the places he had been, there were relatively fewer homeless people per capita 
in Toronto than these other places. The 2003 Street Health Report card, reported 
approximately 5-6000 people on the streets of Toronto on any given night, and that close 
to 32,000 people accessed shelters in the previous twelve months.35 Assuming that this 
number excludes many others who eluded street counts and shelters, such numbers are 
significantly less than the 1.3 million who live in Rio’s favelas36 or the 1.5 million in 
Karachi’s Orangi Town.37  The 24-acre plot of land at the foot of Cherry Street looked 
like a deserted field with sporadic outbursts of trees, mostly sumacs and small poplars, 
large enough to barely conceal the four (in 2000 and then six, in early 2001) structures in 
which homeless people were secretively living.   
 Next to abandoned grain elevators that remain something of a landmark on the 
lakeshore, the six shacks by mid summer were fifteen with several tents and a few trailers 
that been brought on site by The Toronto Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC) in 2000, 
and soon the Press was calling this place Tent City.   The occupation at Tent City was 
very different than what was happening at Dignity Village.  In Tent City they were 
squatting on land owned by Home Depot, but which was undevelopable at that time 
because it was toxic; the soil a few feet down was a putrid benzene broth from the 
Toronto dumps of 1908.  Some of the squatters made good money digging in the toxic 
soil for antique bottles and other collectibles.38  Home Depot had not bothered the 
squatters, and police had no cause to enter the site unless the property owners requested 
this.  They didn’t, at least not at first.  There were many differences between Tent City 
and Dignity Village. For now, most importantly are that Dignity Village originated as a 
 214 
mobile caravan of homeless claimants seeking private land on which to live and Tent 
City evolved rather organically and quickly, much to the dismay of its original 
inhabitants who had snuck onto private property largely undetected.   
 This period was also my first real contact with community organizers going about 
the business of organizing and literally building a community.  And I was very aware of 
the importance of their role and also the tension between organizers and competing views 
on how the community should evolve, many of these views originating from the residents 
themselves. They had different views on the direction they should take as individuals, as 
a community, as poor folks who were beginning to accumulate property, and lastly, as 
supporters of competing activist and advocacy organizations. 
 
4.8 Community Organization  - Some Basics 
 Community organizing is about crafting a mobilizable community (Stall and 
Stoecker 1997 http://comm-org.wisc.edu/papers96/gender2.html - accessed online June 
12 2013, also 1998 ).  This form of mobilization differs from a social movement in the 
sense that community organizing is local, concentrated on the needs of a specific group 
of residents or inhabitants, and though it might be tied to broader mobilizations, social 
movements link manly localities into this broader experience. One could think of the 
organized community as a locality based building block for social movements. Tilly 
(1984) has said, that a social movement is a "sustained series of actions between power 
holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking 
formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible 
demands for changes in the distribution of exercise of power, and back those with public 
 215 
demonstrations of support” (ibid). Shragge (2003) suggests that community organizing 
on the other hand, is more about people identifying problems with their space of living, 
their community and identifying desirable means around which to organize their power to 
pursue these ends.  
 Shragge says,  
Community organizing at its best has created sites for the practice of opposition. Those 
interested in progressive social change and social justice were attracted to the community 
movement because it was a place to organize resistance to the system of global capitalism, 
patriarchy, racism, and other forms of socio-economic oppression and domination.  They 
believed that the local community – the neighborhood – was a place where people could 
meet to challenge those forces that oppressed them and in the process, learn about the 
relationship of personal issues to wider forces that shaped them… I am not only talking 
about protest and confrontation, but the creation of democratic opportunities through 
which people can learn about their collective strengths and build social solidarity. In the 
community, there are a variety of practices that may not seem oppositional, but which do 
question relations of power, build alternative visions, and shift power to those who 
usually do not have it (2003: 11). 
 
 While Shragge argues further on that organizers are outsiders (12), there is no way to 
distinguish the role of an organizer, nor the process of organizing from its pragmatic 
connection to revealing unseen systems of power, domination and oppression to members 
of the community.  Indeed it is on the basis of how these revelations represent a disjoint 
with values about justice, that mobilization can take place. It is also clear that community 
organization suggest a different form of action from social movements. In the former 
roles are clearly defined and individuals set in certain capacities as part of the critical 
action, and in the latter, the action is decentralized around many such similar locales (25).  
Interestingly, Shragge points out that surprise, or “spontaneity” of action in unexpected 
places creates the sense of movement (26).  The two, then four, six then 15 shacks that 
were more or less hidden under the landfill and Sumacs on the lakeshore, went largely 
undetected by Torontonians, until in late summer of 2001, they became 20, then 45.  And 
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it was in this period that we became aware that the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee 
had been advocating for those residents, supplying them with a few DuraKit® shacks, a 
trailer and other vital services as part of their attempts to organize this group into a 
community with power.  
 Though we did not see it, and it was not in the news, in Portland, tent camps were 
popping up under bridges and every few days they were moved by police.  These were 
the early days of “Camp Dignity” which would become Dignity Village. This movement 
of homeless persons through the city in organized processions – people pushing shopping 
carts with all their belongings, went on for three years and eventually worked in favor of 
the protesters by creating the image of a much larger movement.  In fact, and I discuss 
this in chapter six, these parades of poverty as I call them actually grew as they travelled, 
picking up supporters from within the homeless and conventionally housed community. 
They began as 8 homeless people and ended with over a hundred.  The emergence of 
Toronto’s shanty community was insidious, even secretive, and those original campers 
were not happy that others had found their site.  It was a very different type of 
organization than Dignity’s. Still, once word got out that people were living in shacks 
“down there,” it became difficult not to crane our necks as we drove by at 100 km/hour 
on the Gardiner Expressway.  
 This was the first shantytown of its kind in Toronto’s modern history, even though 
shanties and shanty communities were part of the fabric of settlement for turn of the 20th 
century immigrants.39 Having been led to Tent City and watching the initial community 
of six well-concealed shacks grow into over 50 with a population of 115 people over the 
next 12 months, I recognized that notions of basic freedom and rights were important to 
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questions of citizenship in Canada as much as they were in The U.S.  Having grown up in 
a nation that most of us had thought quite skillfully ensured my generation’s rights to 
health care, welfare and safety, that a shantytown should emerge, was an uneasy 
recognition that devolution had revealed the illusion of “welfare” and was questioning the 
meaning of freedom, even in Canada.    
 My first experiences at the village were that of being in a surreal canvas of broken 
things; rough shacks made of tin siding and old discarded lumber.  One shack, was built 
from discarded lumber and siding that had been tossed into the dumpsters at First 
Canadian Place, one of the tallest towers, perhaps the most noticeable of Toronto’s 
phallic tributes to capital, to invoke Lefebvre (1974).  Eventually, disposal companies, 
construction crews and many other businesses began dumping clothing, materials, and 
other garbage directly in the village, an illegal act but cloaking their actions in the dress 
of a good deed, a donations of sorts to the burgeoning community.  I shot many hours of 
video with the man who lived in the southwest corner, set off the main drag and next to 
the lake; we dined on Bok Choy he grew in his garden, at a table he made out of old 
wood crates and that sat on the fine marble slabs he had recovered from the same 
dumpster.  Surreal. Quaint. Six shacks that spring of 2001, then two more shelters closed.  
By July, 15 shacks and tents put up and the TDRC was organizing building and cleaning 
crews, looking for donations for the site and was fielding questions and critiques from the 
Mayor’s Office, the news and concerned citizens (These images are viewable on the 
attached DS DISC 3, Subtext).  The TDRC included on its board of directors some 
wealthy business supporters, community organizations, concerned street medical 
specialists and activists.  Against the criticism of downtown businesses and residents, 
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TDRC personnel pointed out that this site should be granted title to the land so they could 
organize and govern themselves, and that treating the site as a permanent location was 
tantamount to recognizing the absolutely fundamental relationship between housing and 
healthcare. In 2001, few of us could imagine that healthcare could be served living under 
those conditions.  Today uneasiness over healthcare, welfare and public services is 
common.  Not so back in 2001.  And I understood, having been in both worlds, that these 
shacks were better than laneways but not much better. In those few months after I saw 
Tent City for the first time, I shot over 40 hours of footage, was spending 3-5 days a 
week there, building houses, getting to know people, and completely in awe of the effort 
to organize this modern day shantytown.  
 Shragge also suggests that the evolution of the action is not fixed and can be thought 
of as occurring in stages: “Each new round of activity contributes positive and negative 
lessons about how to go forward to the next round of struggle” (26). After the Twin 
Towers went down on September 11, the project I was working on was cancelled and I 
was left with many hours of footage and the request by some of the informants in my 
work to keep working on their stories. A competition emerged between OCAP and the 
TDRC as external organizers from Toronto’s activist community vied for the right to lead 
the community into a new permanent location, a proposed intentional community a few 
blocks away on city owned land. While Tent City had been “occupied” on unusable land 
owned by Home Depot, the desire to move was not generated from within the community 
itself, or by Home Depot who had tolerated their presence.40  When the possibility of a 
permanent location arose, residents of Tent City were divided; some had wanted to be in 
charge of their own encampment; others argued over which community organizers should 
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be in charge of the proposed site.  The city would not even entertain the idea of a self-
governed community and insisted on a board of directors that incorporated the interests 
of the city, advocates, the homeless community and representatives of the city ward.  
 As Tent City became more densely populated, as the war on camping in parks swept 
the city, Tent City suddenly found itself in the media, amongst debates between 
politicians and finally in conversations at dinner tables across the city, as part of a 
growing critique of housing policies.  In short order, the plans to build a permanent 
settlement of squatters on a larger piece of serviced land on Commissioner street was in 
most papers and if one hadn’t read it in a paper or heard about it on the news, it was hard 
to believe; a rumour, an impossibility.41  So difficult was the idea of a permanent squatter 
community to the conventional mindset that Tent City became increasingly surveilled 
and the subject of erroneous partisan articles, news reports and films.   My own video 
interviews became part of the personal journeys of several of the residents there and they 
hoped that in our participation on this project, the truth about their lives would get out.42  
 In the end, the new site did not happen.  Downtown community and business groups 
would have no part of it, and it was not part of Housing First models from the US that 
were beginning to be considered by cities in Canada.  The fact that the city and other 
levels of government had considered building the planned community, however, meant 
that the homeless claimants who had aligned with various activist organizations to bid for 
their respective visions for the community had more power than most Torontonians had 
imagined.  Power struggles do not always end in favor of the underdog, but the struggle 
itself is a sort of proof of agency. 
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 Towards the winter of 2001, this same fellow announced that he hoped to go to 
Oregon, to help build a community called Dignity Village in Portland. Tent City 
continued to grow to the point where as many as 200 people would be squatting at any 
given time, even though the official count of residents was pegged at 115.  The TDRC 
remained heavily involved in the community, and what order there was resulted from 
their organizers being on site and advising residents. Beyond that, the community was 
chaos.  With no concrete government or leadership in Tent City, fear and drug use had 
grown to the point where it was less safe than the shelters, several members moved in 
with family or into slum-like lodgings paid for with their emergency welfare payments, 
with as many as 10 people living in a bachelor apartment outside of the community, and 
it was clear to most of us that its days were numbered.  My film Subtext-Real Stories is 
the most thorough visual study of this transitional time.  While Tent City was crumbling, 
“In Dignity,” this man explained, “they were doing it right.” 43   He wanted to be part of 
an action that confronted the problems of housing and community “head-on.”  Tent City 
was not doing that.  He had heard of this new city-sanctioned shantytown from other 
homeless nomads and from activist sites online.  So, I also went online and read the news 
clippings and the comments on their developing web site.  It was true; there was a legally 
sanctioned homeless shantytown in Portland called Dignity Village.  My first question 
was,  “how is that possible?”  How did they go from shopping carts and tents, to a real 
village? 
 In many ways it is that question that shapes the spirit of this dissertation. My point 
of inquiry was further tweaked by the astute comments made by one of the participants in 
my film, Bonnie, who as an activist and as a resident of Tent City, had recognized that it 
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was the establishment of the discursive site, that is the political claim for a space to live 
on, presented by organized individuals within the arena of the law that delineated the 
difference between Dignity Village and the doomed Tent City. state laws in Oregon gave 
the homeless a legal right to emergency shelter camps.  Though a homeless camp had 
never successfully challenged them, Dignity advocates exploited that loophole as a 
mobilizable resource. Those provisions did not exist in Toronto. Bonnie was quite 
convinced, 
 “They aren’t fighting to be different, well I guess you could say that this fight for homes 
is different, but they don’t want anything different than other so-called normal people 
have.  They want homes, Eric.  Just like other Canadians, or Americans. You know what 
I mean! They are willing to build their own.”  
 
 There was something about a loose aggregation of homeless people coming 
together, uniting over a definition of freedom and citizenship and making a concerted 
claim within the legal-political system that they were deserving of housing, and then 
winning, that represented an “impossible possibility” for Tent City.44  In the film she 
discusses her conviction that if the city had allowed them to lease the land (“like in 
Dignity Village”), they could have made a go of it in Tent City. 
 Shragge also argues that democracy, that is extending democratic privileges to 
those often silenced in broader political actions, through community organizing is 
essential to the initial success at meeting goals, and then to the longevity of the 
community (19).  One of the weakness though by no means an indictment of such work is 
that most community studies and studies of community organizing assume the pre-
existence of the community as a locality based problem.  That is; how can one study what 
doesn’t exist in a concrete sense? I have discussed in the introduction to this volume how 
community studies suggest both the physical and symbolic vectors of community. In 
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some ways community is locality based, and in others, locale is meaningless.  Not for 
Tent City.  It was all about a place for emplaced community experience. It had been a 
perplexing problem for me; what was Tent City?  Surely it wasn’t a legitimate 
community, in the sense it was neither city sanctioned nor legally tenured, but in 
appealing to my earlier discussion of community studies, it was an emplaced experience 
for residents who recognized each other as members.  Tilly and Shorter (1974), Davis 
(1991) and Shragge (2003) each argued that it was important for social science to 
understand the conditions under which collective action occurs on a territorial basis.  Tent 
City had a fence and areas that were defined by the residents: the crack section, where 
dealers and crack whores did their business; the gate keepers, Brian and Hawk who lived 
by the front gate, and the back end, which Brian called “party central” where a group of 
long term residents had established a sort of central core of die hard partying and 
drugging.  So it had physically and spatially definable characteristics that corresponded to 
how people spent time in that space.  Since they had no sense of legal propriety over the 
land, or the community, it was hard to think of life there as emplaced.  It seemed and was 
often described as not only temporary, but doomed. 
 As Davis (1991) points out, the bulk of theory which denied that collective action 
occurred on the basis of community, that is on a territorial basis, did so because they 
reduced community actions to attachments between segments of a community with 
broader movements, such as labor or animal rights, or as pre-existing cleavages based on 
religious, class or other “residues” such as poverty (1991:4-5).  Davis argued, based on 
his own experience, that “place-bound communities” act for a variety of reasons, often 
for infrastructural needs, tax battles and for or against proposed zoning changes (5). 
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Examining extant community he has argued that locality-based action, which applies to 
neighborhoods and communities, is largely understandable and critiqued on the basis of 
the conflict and differentiation between domestic property interest groups (257). The 
implication of this statement is that the effectiveness of community organization and 
action will hinge on the degree to which actors are attached to their homes, and beyond 
that, to the interconnectedness of their propertied status to others who possess property, 
and for whom the exercise of democratic rights through protest and action is organized 
along the value of this action to their propertied status.  This is not just about property 
value, but also to the ancestral and aesthetic value of properties, understood as homes.   
When we discuss Dignity Village later, it will be important to understand that there, 
citizens are defined by their attachment to property, whereas in Tent City, they had no 
such entitlement, nor the identity of a citizen, even though they felt such attachments to 
the homes they had built and what goods they had gathered. 
 Both Shragge and Davis offer vantages for understanding Tent City and Dignity 
Village.  On the one hand, they both share the notion that communities are emplaced, and 
that territory is a basic way of defining the organizing efforts of activists. They also show 
that within the territory of the community there are other affinities and ties that go 
beyond the residence of the actor, but that “living” in the same community establishes a 
residential unity that underpins critical potential. They each acknowledge that on the 
basis of variable wealth and the status of members of the same territory, there is the 
potential of cleavages that community organizers must confront and mend.  They also 
point out that in the face of a common enemy that threatens the territory or the 
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community collectively, community organizing becomes more facile.  At least that has 
been their experience.   
  Tent City confounded these community studies based approaches because it was 
a struggle that tried to generate a community - a territory and a symbolic imaginary – out 
of garbage. The TDRC and other organizations such as Street Health45, worked hard for 
the rights of the Tent City residents, but I witnessed the demise and fall of this 
shantytown first hand, despite all good efforts to organize and take it to the next level.  
The residents of the community simply could not organize themselves or control the 
image of what was happening in the community because they had no legal title to the 
space, an illegal occupation of someone else’s land, and could not establish rules of 
residency that restricted who settled there.  This meant that drug dealers, prostitutes, 
criminals with warrants, underage runaways and legitimate homeless activists moved in 
and occupied the same place. What had started out as a reasonable, bucolic, if not quaint 
demonstration of alternate housing, had soon turned into a lawless shantytown. A few of 
the activists that had started the village found ways to get out by crashing with friends or 
returning to the streets, while others formed tight clusters of housing, which they defined 
as neighborhoods within the camp. Beyond this, there was no room, in the symbolic 
imaginary of Torontonians, for a massive 24-acre shantytown, not there, next to the 
boardwalk, the fine condominiums and business towers.  If this was the work of activist 
citizens, Toronto was to have nothing to do with it. Fairly confident that Tent City would 
be shuttered by the police, in the summer of 2002, discussions turned to where and how 
to establish other squats and whether or not they could do something like Dignity Village.   
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 I toyed with the notion of fluid community in my early film work at Tent City. At 
the time I imagined the membership, the orientation of the buildings and the uncertain 
future of the site as denoting a certain amorphous and constantly shifting reality, which I 
termed fluid. As much as the term may have defined the ambiguity that defined life there, 
the fact that the residents were squatters who had occupied privately owned land meant 
that the structures they had built could never have been legally claimed as their property, 
and the organizing efforts of activists in the TDRC and elsewhere, amounted to rallying 
support for lawbreakers and trespassers.  In those final months, roughly the summer of 
2002, we were all well aware of the successful claim made by Dignity Village, and we 
wanted to know how to make Tent City worthy of a city sanction.   It has only been in the 
last few years that I have reframed fluid, as liminal.  
 Bonnie and I debated whether the community model at Dignity Village 
constituted a true alternative or not.  “You mean are the people free, is it c-o-m-m-u-n-i-
s-m? I don’t know, Eric. Geez I ‘ve never been there. You go! You’re the filmmaker,” she 
said one day a few months before they were evicted in September of 2002.  Bonnie had 
moved out of the village and into an apartment in Hamilton because she had a 
relationship that made that possible, and stayed active in the metro area as a harm 
reduction activist, looking for a job in that field while Tent City began to overflow with 
ex-cons, drug dealers, legit homeless folks with nowhere else to go, and then again, there 
were two shacks on the eastern border of the community that housed young people, just 
teenagers.   Rumors of the underage residents and babies born in Tent City circulated in 
the news and in conversation around town.  In the autumn of 2002 these rumors inspired 
the Mayor to evict the squatters. 
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 As Drei, one of the first Tent City squatters iterates in the film, “Basically, it’s an 
empty lot.  How much damage can a bunch of hippies do to an empty lot?”  The damage, 
it seems was not to the lot, but in the mindset of more conservative elements in charge of 
the city at that time: the damage was being done to the image of “Toronto the Good,” a 
moniker we had all grown up with.  The city was embarrassed.  In three days, the site – 
dozens of structures and the accumulated belongings of 115 residents was leveled. They 
had each been given two hours to get their stuff and get out. As an illegal occupation they 
were not given prior notice, except that most people there knew the eviction was coming. 
Terry and Eddy, two key participants in my work were scouting new squats by August in 
anticipation of the eviction.   After their forced eviction in September, most of them were 
scattered once again to the streets.  They literally had nowhere to sleep that same night, or 
in the near future. There was significant public outcry against the evictions; if Tent City 
had looked bad, then kicking 115 homeless people onto the streets looked worse in the 
eyes of the international press and amongst concerned Torontonians. Evictees linked with 
activists and legal council, even concerned local politicians like Jack Layton and John 
Sewell campaigned in front of the press for compensation in the form of housing. As a 
temporary measure some were placed in motels and low rent apartments.  They were 
scattered across the Greater Metro Area  (GTA), some as far away as 15 to 20 miles from 
the downtown core and social services they required. Remarkably, as some disappeared 
from the radar altogether, others knew exactly where their friends were and how to 
contact them and this without cellphones or the “net.”  The TDRC held meetings with the 
evictees and advocates in order to strategize legal and political solutions to the eviction. 
What had seemed to most of us who really studied the place as a lawless homeless camp 
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was finally coming together as a coordinated community, but only after the locality had 
been eradicated.  
 Responding to the combined efforts of evictees, the TDRC, Street Health, 
WoodGreen Community services and other concerned politicians and housing advocates, 
the city of Toronto and the Ontario Government, introduced The Emergency 
Homelessness Pilot Project (EHPP).46 It was based on an American model of housing 
called Housing First. The evictees were placed directly in mainstream rental units that 
ironically, the condo boon had left vacant.  This was different than programs I had been 
offered in rehab, where successfully graduating from rehab had been seen as evidence of 
my commitment to a new way of living and hence deserving of housing support, if it had 
been available.  Welfare was willing to support outpatients from the rehab at a time when 
welfare had been severely reduced by the Ontario government, because they had passed 
its courses and treatment program. 
 The idea behind the EHPP was that housing people first was essential to getting 
them to look at other issues, addictions, community and so on, later. This landmark 
program has impacted the broader housing movement in Canada, as many other cities 
have introduced rental supplements and housing practices based on this prior experience. 
Cathy Crowe, author, street nurse and co-founder of the TDRC had called it the “Tent 
City housing win.” And for many of us, it is still understood as that.  Community 
organizers walked into Tent City, did their best to organize the community, and later kept 
the relational part of community alive by actively uniting them in their right to shelter. 
Though it was the organization skills of the advocates and activists that orchestrated the 
success, it was the homeless person herself who provided the power. By speaking to the 
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media, signing petitions, marching behind advocates and by acting like activists, the 
homeless ex-resident of Tent City was no longer an addict or an ex-con; they had 
reestablished themselves as legitimate claims makers.  Though the City of Toronto 
suggests that it acted immediately to find rental supplemented units for the evictees, it 
took up to a year for many of those I knew to get housing.  Regardless, it was clear to me, 
that even the worst off, could be organized and could fight for their rights and had power; 
it was exactly this kind of power that frightened conventional imaginaries. 
 In a candid interview three years after she instructed me to go to Dignity, Bonnie 
who was housed in the EHPP and by then was working in Toronto as a harm reduction 
worker and an activist, referred to life in Dignity Village as cooperative, democratic and 
sustainable.  We had learned more about the community on the web, in the news and 
amongst housing activist organizations in Toronto.  At the same time, I had contacted 
Kwamba Productions, the video archivists of the Village, and they had sent me footage of 
the early days at Dignity, to use in my films.  In crafting the first cut of Subtext, I looked 
at the footage of Dignity.  It seemed to be the homeless utopia that everyone had talked 
about. The first cut of Subtext was completed without the Dignity footage and I 
remember a photographer friend of mine who had joined me in Tent City quite often, 
asking me, why I had edited the film as I had.  He felt I had painted a rosier picture of 
Tent City, than perhaps it really represented.  Several cuts later, we agreed that to tell the 
story of Tent City meant showing unfortunate and wonderful aspects of the shantytown.  
This experience asked me to question what footage of Dignity hadn’t I seen.  Utopias are 
not supposed to be real, are they? How accurate was the footage that Kwamba sent me? 
As activists, I understand that their early footage was motivated by the need to present an 
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image of a viable alternative to the streets because Portland was literally overwhelmed by 
street-engaged poor, much as Toronto’s had been.  Still, my scientific mind imagined that 
there must a certain darkness to Dignity Village, much as there was in Tent City, so how 
was it possible that they managed to organize and run a real village?  
 
4.9 Issues of Representation 
 It was only then, three years or so into my filming that I began entertaining ethical 
debates about visual representation.  Up to that point the only ethical requirements on my 
work were those that a few local broadcasters had inquired about if they were to show my 
footage on TV.  Beyond letters of consent, however, which I had obtained, there were no 
restrictions on my freelance work.  As a few documentaries came out that talked about 
Tent City or Tent City residents from a position of exteriority, many of the ex-residents 
grew disenchanted by the poor representation of life at Tent City.  A number of filmed 
documentaries and a book capped off a spate of representations through various media 
that seemed either to miss a lot of information or that chose to ignore it. 
 One film in particular, Mayor of Tent City47, focuses on the life of Karl Schmidt, who 
acted like he owned the place and earned the moniker “Mayor”.   This film portrays Karl 
as a poor, talented soul betrayed by the shelter system and cast aside to the margins, but 
who is making it work at Tent City by building his own home and helping others to do 
the same.  The film was financed by a major Canadian Broadcasting corporation and is 
flawed at many levels.  Most of all, this film has an agenda; the first is to not portray the 
community or Karl as defective.  They describe life in the community as “charmed yet 
difficult.” 48  Every member of the community who saw the film and who I had 
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interviewed was aghast at the film and their description of the community.  This film was 
exactly the kind of portrayal of poverty against which Bourgois had reviled.  In looking at 
a camp that was in fact dysfunctional and replete with dangers, as if it were charmed, fed 
into the myth that such places are a noble actioning of needs by homeless people, and 
removes from public opinion, the structural and symbolic violence that Bourgois had 
implicated in the life of the homeless, because a simple solution, crude housing, was 
possible.  
  In my own footage of Karl, as interesting as he is, he also reveals the truth about his 
addictions, his nefarious past; he blames a lot of other people for the position he is in, and 
eludes to fantasies about properties he possesses and friendships he believed he had.  I 
watched him from the early days transform from an enthusiastic, “bullshitting” shack 
builder and a sociable character into a drugged out and deluded man who rented out bed 
space in his shack for a few rocks of crack or in exchange for other comforts. A few days 
after he was almost beaten to death by a group of residents a few doors from his, he 
exclaimed it was because his assailants were stoned and looking for drug money.  Others 
who were there said it was because he had been entrusted with donated funds for the 
community and used them to get (sexual) favors from other people and had spent the rest 
on drugs.  In the time I knew him, he lost 40 pounds and had become cracked out, as 
were many of the people in Tent City.  No one there felt he’d been in charge of anything 
or thought that his story was emblematic of life on the camp.  Tent City was troubled.  
Shanty camps are zones of struggle at the best of times.  This unfortunate truth is not 
emphasized in the film, when in my understanding it is overcoming – the act of struggle - 
that is at last, empowering.  Very few stories about Tent City were gathered ethically or 
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presented accurately.49 It was as a result of the misquotes, the malicious articles and 
agenda based documentaries coming out of the coverage of the Tent City-as-an-event 
phenomenon that I chose to wait several years before presenting my own work to the 
public.   
 Another film,  “Shelter from the Storm,” 50 (2002) by Michael Connolly, extols the 
virtues of tent City by looking at the efforts of Cathy Crowe and the TDRC in the fight 
for a permanent location for the community.  Once again the community is a backdrop to 
the efforts of activists to care for the poor. It’s an important film, one of the few that was 
made about the place, and helped to create public opinion about the event that was Tent 
City.  Connolly lent some of his footage to me for my documentary. As with most 
representations it does not look at the community in brutal terms within larger critical 
debates about self-governance, nor does it follow into the lives of the residents as they 
moved into housing. 
 One of the most informative if not troubling volumes about Tent City was 
Shaughnessy Bishop-Stall’s Down to This (2004), which is an autobiographical journal of 
a writer who planted himself in Tent City in the fall of 2001. The book is well written – a 
collection of anecdotes and remembrance, observations and personal meditations about 
giving up conventional life and ties, and assuming the role of a homeless shanty dweller.  
He smoked crack, got drunk, hung out and more or less lived the life of the folks at Tent 
City.  In many ways, I think it is accurate and makes for good ethnography. It’s a sort of 
extreme participant observation that had me wondering if I should have been drinking 
and smoking crack with the guys too.  I did not. I didn’t have to. I had enough insight into 
that world as I have already discussed. The controversy over the book is that many of the 
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tales and quotes he derives from the actual residents of the community were obtained 
when they were incapacitated – they were often incapacitated.  There can be no informed 
consent when someone is out of his or her mind. Some of the releases he obtained, I was 
told later, were obtained under similar circumstances.  When we (some of the ex-
residents and I) discovered that his book deal, which he had secured before entering, 
included the option to make a feature film, several of the residents were irreverent and 
spoke of suing “his ass.” I tried talking to him about his book one night at the Tent City 
reunion party at the Winchester Pub on Parliament St.  He did not want to talk about the 
book or the complaints by some its characters. Most of all, those who have a problem 
with the book felt they had no say in how they were represented, and furthermore that 
since he was paid to do the book, they ought to have been reimbursed in kind. Brian 
Dodge, referred to in the book as “Pops,” says, “Who the hell is he to use our names and 
my experiences, He called me a lot of things in that book, and I never gave him no 
permission. He wrote a lot of things about me he – he called me a pervert and everything 
in that book.  I’ll tell him when I see him. I’ll pervert him in the ass if I ever see him. He 
had no shame.”  I am not sure where the reference to being a pervert came from. I didn’t 
find it in the book.  The point is that the work of a social scientist, in the role I am trying 
to construct, as someone who informs and is informed by the community, is that such 
gonzo storytelling or ulterior motives must not deter from a certain fidelity to the people 
and the community.  In the 2007 Ryerson Review of Journalism (accessed June, 2013), 
Bishop describes this work as immersion journalism, what Gay Talese had called 
“hanging out. ”51  
 Bishop says,  
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Contrary to logic and what you may have learned, preliminary research is not always an 
asset. When I moved into Tent City (an area of Toronto inhabited by squatters) in 2001–
’02 to write a book, I knew nothing about the place. This was foolish, but no amount of 
reading or interviewing could have prepared me for a spot populated by con men, drug 
addicts, fugitives and brilliantly brave vagabonds — an anarchistic community where the 
rules changed nightly and your life depended on knowing them. In fact, my ignorance 
was an asset: I was less scared than I should have been, and the need to figure things out 
fast became an integral part of the story. Also, my missteps led to discoveries. When I 
showed up in the freezing November rain with a tent on my back, a large woman named 
Jackie, with a huge smile and giant Rottweiler[sic], took mercy on me and invited me 
into her wood stove-heated shack. It hadn’t occurred to me that there would be women 
and dogs, but not a single tent in Tent City. I abandoned the tough-guy act I’d sharpened, 
and started building a shack instead (ibid). 
 
 I had approached the community in much the same way, but I had never pretended to 
know what it means to be a resident there.  Still, Bishop’s words support my contention 
that places like tent camps defy easy description, and having even the most articulate and 
well-thought out model or method by which to figure things out, are doomed to fail – 
they are of no use at all – if one does not abandon them for a participant method of 
critique.  So I never positioned myself through my films, or in my subsequent writing as 
one of them.  This did not put me in a weaker position to understand what occurred at 
Tent City.  By making the work about me, and them, I could explain what it was like as 
one who had reclaimed himself from similar demises to be witness to the depravity, the 
humanity and the demise of the community.   
 I recognized after Stall’s book came out and was, for the most part, absent of theory 
or organized critique, that I had been filtering my experience at the village through 
various lenses I had learned in my graduate training; Marxist theories of exploitation, 
Lipset, and Michels, Parsons, Durkheim and Mead: George Herbert, and Margaret. 
Looking at my films now, I see image systems that suggest the seminal works of these 
and other scholars. For all the time I spent in the village, I could not escape the 
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experience I had had as an academic, as an addict, as a person in recovery.   While I had 
not been engaged in organizing the community, I understood that, especially in light of 
events in Portland, the demise and fall of Tent City was part of a much larger and 
important discourse on homeless rights and citizenship, and of the way capital values 
urban space. In 2003, the only serious appraisal of Tent City that I had found was 
presented to the Canadian Social Welfare Policy Conference. The author, Mike Bulthius 
argues exactly this sentiment; that Tent City’s demise was explainable by the negative 
valuation of city space it created. The stigma of poor derelicts tainted the valuation of that 
space, and hence, it became a target for elimination.52  My understanding was that events 
at Tent City and the subsequent rent programs that resulted from it were too important to 
merely put together without serious deliberation about the theoretical and practical 
implications this information might mean going forward. So I took eight years to create 
three versions of my film, the first was character based, the second looked at transitional 
housing, and the last began a comparison between Dignity Village and the rent 
supplements programs in Toronto.  
 To this day, there are those from Tent City who speak of anger at the way aspects of 
their story were pirated by Bishop, “just like the news jokers and the magazine fuckers,” 
Terry has said, “who came here, got what they wanted and put it together for an audience.” 
Since the uproar caused by his book, I have tried to include the participants of my 
research in helping me to shape the outcome, the films, my monograph, and the articles, 
even the exhibitions (discussed shortly).  The problem with Bishop’s book was not the 
informative aspects of the village it presented, but the ethical limitations of presenting 
stories without entertaining how the stories are constructed. In my video work and my 
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storytelling I try to avoid silencing the voice of others, by revealing how we constructed 
certain field realities together.  Most of all I promised not to exploit people in moments of 
drug or psychiatric weakness, not unless they felt such imagery and truth was important 
to their sense of the story, and this only after they had seen the footage.  I do this by 
showing awkward and uncomfortable moments between me and the participants on video, 
by writing about conflicts as much as agreements, and by showing the truth of this place 
to be messy and often counterintuitive.  I have had to stash countless hours of footage in a 
hard drive that no one has ever seen because I believed it was compromising to 
participants, and this despite their desire to show the footage. As one example, I had run 
into a man in 2005 named Chris who then bragged he had set a series of fires and slashed 
tents while living at Tent City. He wanted that interview to be included in the 2005 NFB 
cut of the film.  I did not include it because I could not verify this and also because I had 
made a commitment not to publish matters the implications of which were not fully 
understood. Had I used this information in that way, he might have been incarcerated by 
police or assaulted in a vendetta.   As it turns out, he had psychiatric issues and his 
confession was a delusion, according to street health employees.  The fire was set by two 
brothers who burned down their structure because they were leaving -  kicked out by the 
“gang” at the back of the camp, and they didn’t want anyone using their home.  
   I continued to follow the lives of the participants in my film as they learned to 
adapt to housing, or didn’t.  In its fifth year of being the first and only city sanctioned 
shantytown in North America, Dignity Village in 2006, represented to most ex-Tent City 
folks, an example of what their community could have become, “ if only…” These same 
people often described a sense of “not belonging”, of having had a sense of place while in 
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Tent City that housing did not provide.  While they were grateful for having a roof over 
their head, many of my informants had no idea how to live conventionally or how to feel 
engaged with their neighbors or communities. Thrust into conventional living 
arrangements and asked to unite in conventional affiliations, many struggled.   Most who 
had addictions, remained addicted. A few died as a result.  Questions about the validity of 
Lewis’ “Culture of Poverty” re-emerged in my notes, and in discussions with housing 
workers.  One housing worker exclaimed that, “We are always in crisis mode with them 
(ex-Tent City residents), so its really hard for us – we’re housing workers - to do our 
jobs.” She also understood that many of the poor people she had met were from other 
countries, and had always lived modestly but had never been homeless. “The poor 
immigrants I see here, at WoodGreen are not crack heads.  They manage their poverty.”   
I think the implicit argument here is that housing without supports for people off the 
streets is tantamount to warehousing the homeless, and this becomes problematic.   
 Still some ex-residents of Tent City have managed to use housing to root in new and 
more conventional lifestyles.  All of them looked and continue to look at Dignity Village 
as a statement about what could have been, once again… “If only”. Brian Dodge, who 
remains a key informant, though I call him “friend” by now, who had been a crack head, 
a bank robber and lived in Tent City in its heyday, is now housed in a geared-to-income 
unit; he has three cats, a live in friend and participates regularly in the Salvation Army.  
He wouldn’t go back to the shantytown style of living because he has managed his 
liminality and passed from the mindset of a homeless man into a conventional imaginary. 
Penny Marotte has also made a transition to housing and is having her knees and hips 
replaced.   After selling her body for 20 years on the street for crack and cash, her 
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housing has provided a stable enough space for her to address addiction and health issues, 
though she admits she will never be fully clean.  In speaking of Tent City, she says, “ I’d 
never go back to that place.  Fuck that.”  
 Many others, who feel like their conventional units are similar to prison cells, are 
largely isolated from the rest of the world, stigmatized for their history, their current 
poverty and their addictions.   Terry Potts, who also remains a good friend, has said often 
that at least “Down there, at Tent City, I felt I was a part of something.” In his current 
housing, “ I dunno, I’m lost buddy, I don’t know what to do.”  He too wonders what his 
life would be like now if he were still struggling to build his life and contribute to the 
building of Tent City.  I drove by the site of Tent City in January of 2013. It is flattened. 
It stores vehicles and trucks, and trailers. Construction crews are getting ready to blast the 
grain silos in advance of building a billion dollar waterfront development.  I called Terry 
to tell him.  He laughed.  As if on cue, he asked me, “if only eh, bud? If only…” 
 “If only” suggests conditions of possibility - and the corollary of this is of course, 
“what if.”  My storytelling work with the street people of Toronto, has led me to pursue 
both an analytical and personally satisfying rendition of the conditions of possibility and 
the meaning of that life for people who live in Dignity Village.  Initially I was interested 
in understanding how spaces like Dignity Village come to be in the first place, and how 
living there is experienced by residents.  What does living there do for people who are 
homeless beside give them a roof over their heads? How is that village different than 
Tent City insomuch as Dignity Village is considered a legitimate living space by the 
state?  As the first city sanctioned shantytown in North America and now in its 12th year, 
Dignity Village is the measuring stick for current claims being made by other intentional 
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communities for the homeless. Back then, the stories I heard from homeless activists, the 
video I saw of the village, and the village’s website painted a truly charming image of the 
place.  If my experience at Tent City had taught me anything, it was to look beyond the 
appearances, and I knew then, in 2006 that someday I would have to go to Portland and 
live for a while in order to understand life in Dignity Village.  
 
4.10 Acts, Practices, Citizens and Critical Actors 
 In 2008 my documentary Subtext –real stories was incorporated into an exhibition 
at the Royal Ontario Museum (ROM) called House Paint Phase 2: Shelter.53  The 
exhibition invited 25 of the country’s most widely respected graffiti artists to paint on 
replica shacks modeled on the size and crudity of those at Tent City.  The panels and 
roofs were sold later in auction as individual canvasses to raise money for Habitat for 
Humanity.  In addition to the shacks, one artist was asked to paint a large model of a 
suburban home that was suspended from the walls.  Over some weeks, visitors would 
come and check on his progress, and they would watch the film on a computer bank set 
off from the main exhibit.  The idea behind the gallery was to use a multimedia 
exhibition to explore the history of such land claims in Toronto, the plight of the street 
person, and the different ways excluded voices are heard in cities. Graffiti and tagging, 
shack building and rough sleeping as examples; one of the shacks had a peephole that 
visitors could see through. In the dark interior the names of 500 homeless people who had 
died on the streets of Toronto since 1985, over 95% of whom were men, scrolled on a 
perpetual film loop.54  It was quite astonishing to watch visitors stare into that little hole, 
 239 
while the ten-minute loop of names went by.  I spoke to some of them and they said they 
had watched because they had no idea so many people had died that way, “here, this city?” 
 Towards the end of the exhibition, Subtext was screened in the theatre at ROM, 
and about 150 people came to see it. On stage with me were Brian Dodge, Terry Potts 
and Beric German of the TDRC and  Rima Zavys of WoodGreen.  She passed away 
recently, but she had been a major supporter of my work and a key player in the EHPP 
and subsequent programs for the poor.  After watching the film, it was surprising to see 
how many people were interested in the short section where I show footage of Dignity 
Village being constructed, and Bonni talking on camera about it as a viable alternative 
community.  The question and answer period went for almost 90 minutes but was 
supposed to run for 30.  A number of issues were raised by these questions. Some in the 
audience had argued that the EHPP program was superior for the residents to Tent City 
because Tent City was out of control. Rima and Beric both expressed that Tent City was 
better than the streets, but that housing with supports for everyone was basic if we were 
to really tackle the problem.  “Housing is healthcare,” Beric said.  In asking why the 
village didn’t organize, Terry cited the drugs and the other criminal content of Tent City, 
and also they always felt they were doomed for eviction because they had no lease; “We 
were occupiers after all,” Terry said, so they “were always ready to boot it.”  There was 
no community organizing because there was no community, really. “You can’t organize 
an idea,” Terry had said.    Except as Brian pointed out, every year they have a Tent City 
Christmas party at a local pub.  WoodGreen has Tent City barbeques to help keep the 
memory alive, and the ex-residents who still have housing under EHPP, have it because it 
was a program for folks from Tent City. All these and other connections speak to the 
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fluid community I had been trying to conceptualize for some years by then. Beric spoke 
the most important truth and that was that no one wanted to live in Tent City, but as 
citizens with rights they had the duty to make that statement and to take land to build 
shelter, if society wouldn’t do it for them. And that in itself was a bold attempt to 
establish themselves as a deserving community.  I had applied to several doctoral 
programs but few had seen the lapse between my Masters and this new work as a 
resource.  However, with the support of some mentors from my University of Toronto 
days, and with this considerable portfolio of real life fieldwork under my belt,  each year 
I was able to refine my search to programs that embraced  diverse experience as an 
academic resource.  I applied to the Special Individualized Programs at Concordia 
University in Montreal and awaited a reply.  
 During the exhibition, an ex-professor of mine from my days at the University of 
Toronto suggested a recent book had come out, Acts of Citizenship, (2008) edited by 
Engin Isin and Greg Nielsen that would be of use to my queries.  We discussed a way of 
framing places like Tent City and Dignity Village by trying to understand how these 
claims for conventional lives, that is as housed “homeless people” in communities, 
confirmed structural impact on agency, or how the process of claiming an alternate mode 
of community was in fact an act of some serious nature by deserving citizens.  
 I have earlier discussed how I use Bakhtin to understand acts; both speech acts, 
and political. I draw my understanding of the act from Mikhail Bakhtin (1993) because 
his model of the act requires situating it in the every day. In the sense in which it is 
understood in the 1993 translation of Towards a Philosophy of the Act, act/activity is 
used for akt-deital’nost’, a given activity as expressed in an act or instance of that activity” 
 241 
(79).  For Bakhtin (ethical) acts, in fact any act and its account are never a priori, and 
emerge not from a pre-existing structure, but must always be achieved. This point of view 
seems to parallel the position of Latour (2005) where understanding the actants practical 
metaphysics leads us to discern the assemblages that frame her world.  At this juncture 
allow me to point out that the key to understanding Bakhtin’s “act” is not that there is no 
structure, but that structure is not pre-existing, and is unimportant for determining the 
“outcome” of acts.  Structure assembles in the form of a unique unity between ideas and 
perceptions regardless of from where they come.  This is essential to practical 
metaphysics as well. As Bakhtin writes: 
“....  It is only the once occurrent event of Being in the process of actualization that can 
constitute the unique unity; all that which is theoretical or aesthetic must be determined 
as a constituent moment in the once-occurrent event of Being, although no longer of 
course, in theoretical or aesthetic terms” (2). 
 
 For Bakhtin then, any discourse, power or ideology that tries to usurp, generalize 
or replace the moments that occur between actors, or prevent an actor from the freedom 
of dialogic integrity of the social world is to be challenged and abandoned (Bakhtin 1982, 
1993; Gardiner 1992:4).  For Bakhtin, it was dialogic interaction that led to communities 
of cooperation, akin to Habermas’ (1981) “ideal speech situation.” In the latter, 
communities of communication are governed by rules governing language, that might not 
be present in all speech acts, but which reside as an implicit or immanent guide for 
communicative action. In the former, a dialogic interaction with others is necessary for 
developing one’s own coherent self-image and engaging in cooperative tasks (Bakhtin 
1982; Gardiner 1992). Bakhtin had imagined communities that respected the ‘act’ would 
support social differentiation and cultural diversity, and in this manner challenge what he 
had grown up to see as the overtly authoritarian and oppressive structures of modern 
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government. What made action critical then for Bakhtin, is simply that dialogic moments 
remain sovereign in the sense that the dialogic act is self-encouraged, self-propelled, 
regardless of dogmas, or ideology or administrative ends that might frame the context of 
such emergence.  His concept of the act is therefore an ethics driven notion that situates 
acts and actors in a position relative to ideology and governance that is necessarily 
critical, because understanding the act means acquiring knowledge of the other and 
making a decision to act in a certain way that is always unique.  Bakhtin’s definition of 
the act and discussion of dialogism inspired me to rethink what I had previously seen as 
chaos on the streets, or in Tent City as rather a space where different conversations took 
place. If the act that homeless people took was based on agreeing to a new encoded 
habitus confounding their once-occurrent activist phenomenon, what did it mean that 
critique displaced power? Had it really displaced power or just fit right inside it?  Is the 
contract a sort of recognition of the power of Bakhtin’s observations of a once-occurrent 
and unpredictable basis to human inter-action – the contract an attempt to imbue such 
acts with the governing policies of the city? 
 This question had led me back to the distinction I made earlier about 
emancipation: there are two levels at least, one where the claim is for more participation 
within extant systems, the other a rejection leading to a fight for a whole new way of 
organizing citizenship. It is more or less the same distinction made by Isin and Nielsen 
between the active and the activist citizen, and in even broader terms, presents the 
possibility that governmentality suspends democracy in a perpetually liminal or nascent, 
yet-to-come configuration, by limiting the actions of citizenship to the former, in order to 
prevent the possibility of the latter.  While I had witnessed the rise and fall of Tent City 
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as a failure to establish a community of communication able to mobilize, their demise 
had resulted in housing programs for the poor and this raised many questions about how 
community activism diverts, veers and fails to achieve some vision of its goals, but can 
still achieve others. It was at this point that I had recognized there were two ways to 
access the problem of critique.  The first required understanding how powers that govern 
try to get results from citizens based on what regimes of power or in this case, neoliberal 
hegemonies want from active citizens.  The other required entering the minds of the actor 
to understand how their unique deliberations on certain knowledge situated them in one 
or either category of citizen, or perhaps both?  
 By the time the exhibition had ended, I learned that I had been accepted into an 
interdisciplinary program at Concordia University. I had something to say and I would do 
so in doctoral program in the social sciences.  By then, based on all my research, Tent 
City had been described as a shantytown, a lawless community of addicts and criminals, a 
statement of how Toronto had failed the poor, but there had been little or no theorizing on 
what the community meant beyond these opinions. In Portland, Dignity Village was 
touted as an alternative community, green, sustainable and a successful claim by worthy 
citizens. How different was the claim in Portland, if it was considered legitimate under 
the rule of law? What do rejection and a “break with habitus” mean? What is critical 
activity? It seemed to me that the EHPP resolution to the Tent City closure was evidence 
of each - that is that structural forces and the power of critical groups create new 
structures and new types of agents when claims are successfully involved.  So there is 
structure but also agency. So what did a legitimate homeless camp mean to the discussion 
of structure and agency?  To begin to answer these questions, I wanted to understand how 
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an act, which leads to absorption into existing legal frames, can be considered activist? 
My understanding had always been that activists challenged, not only the ways things 
were done, but also the very legal principles, some very antiquated, that continued to hold 
people down. 
 Where Bakhtin was primarily concerned with the notion of the ethical act/deed 
per se, Isin, Nielsen and other contributors (2008) offer the concept of acts of citizenship 
as an innovation in the way social sciences can study citizenship. In this work, the idea of 
the citizen is expressed in a variety of performative contexts that go beyond the 
traditional notion of a state with borders, which imposes obligations and rights on 
individuals, thus creating a citizen, or ascribing citizenship.  What separates the concept 
of acts of citizenship most importantly from many mainstream citizenship studies, is that 
it insists on showing how citizens occupy a dichotomous position within the legal-
rational state (structure), and in their “own” constitutive state, (their Being), and hence 
are not merely subject to containment  (Isin 2008:15).  There is an individuated 
performative quality to the “actors” in acts of citizenship, which transcends points of 
view that proffer abstract ideals, and theoretical models to the unique circumstances 
surrounding acts of citizenship.   
 Citizenship has many qualities.  Two important ones are that it inheres the rights 
and duties inherent to a particular model of citizenship and the other is the definition of 
that citizenship based on geo-political identifiers.  One is a Canadian. One lives in a 
liberal democracy where to vote is considered a right and a duty, and so on.  The 
traditional model of the citizen is any subject who has earned the rights of a citizen by, 
for example successful immigration, or having been born in a certain place is ascribed 
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those rights, but is in general any person to whom a geo-political citizenship is attached 
to a particular country – I am a Canadian.  It is less easy these days to make this 
definition stick because we see more and more examples of subaltern and inventive ways 
of claiming citizenship, for asserting what are inherently the rights of the legal citizen by 
illegal citizens.  Such is the case with the millions of undocumented workers in North 
America, who make claims on the rights accorded citizens, such as workplace safety and 
minimum wages, and who organize in creative ways to assert these claims and to protect 
their position in the market place (Drache 2008; Nielsen 2011, 2012).  We are clearly 
faced with an image of the citizen, which is arguably more complicated than say, a 
hundred years ago, an image that reduces the determinism of birthrights and systems of 
indoctrination programs by opening up other creative venues by which non-citizens can 
act as if they were these more traditionally understood citizens.  
 Isin (2008) once again, points out that the citizen is involuntarily caught up in a 
web of rights and responsibilities which overlap such things as the environment, rules of 
copyright, (traffic rules) and so on.  Such accords cross objective-subjective interstices of 
social and political choice and are clearly related to the structural mechanisms of the state, 
so that the state is “implicated in varying degrees of influence and autonomy” (2008: 15).  
Still, a further complication in the current context of the political world is that citizens 
now carry these “webs of obligation” with them and are affected by those of other 
(citizens) well beyond local contexts into the global arena. “The intensification of social 
relations through movements and (global) flows has generated new affinities, 
identifications, loyalties, animosities and hostilities across borders (16).  It has become 
difficult to locate citizens within their local belief systems or to isolate the origins of a 
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trend, which seemingly makes it way onto the local scene. Drache (2008) similarly 
dresses the citizen in a coat of many colors, explaining that the boon in information 
technology has provided new modes of action, new modes of interaction across borders 
without the need for spatial demands on citizenship, so that the citizen now comprises the 
citizen of the nation and world simultaneously.  The act of citizenship then can be 
retooled slightly to include acts, which may require no more then writing a protest letter 
and then hitting the “send” button. 
 The most influential element of Isin’s construction and one that propels this 
dissertation to inquire into the nature of critique, is the distinction I began with in my 
introduction, one made between activist citizens, and active citizens. In the former, actors 
are created by engagement in writing new scripts about how to approach just and critical 
aims; in the latter, citizens act out according to or within the limits set out by pre-existing 
critical scripts (38). Isin argues that acts of citizenship do not need to originate in the 
name of anything, but are interpreted in how they orient themselves towards justice.   
Tent City had never really oriented ‘itself’ towards anything coherent.  Some residents, 
from time to time, acted cooperatively, or went to protests, usually at the request of 
TDRC or other organizers. And these were citizens, all of whom were born in Canada 
and had ascribed citizenship.  For some, this was entitlement enough to what they 
mistakenly thought was an inalienable right to housing. So they did nothing, because as 
citizens, they possessed, but did not have to fight for rights.  I would also suggest that in 
the context of extreme drug use, mental illness and no real tenure on the property that 
they occupied, fighting for community seemed unreasonable to them. So one way I 
interrogated the matter of acts and citizenship was by asking, “Why don’t people act 
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when they really must in order to preserve their way of life or for their rights?”  For eight 
years at that point, all we knew, (Me, Bonni, other activists) about Dignity Village was 
that it represented the first successful claim by homeless activists for the right to land.  
This is how it had been pitched on its own website, in the media and in the news. So what 
made this claim so unique? There was some discussion about how the village in 2001 had 
represented a group of people motivated to produce positive living conditions for 
themselves, as a tribute to the self-help ethos of neoliberal governance. This was Bonni 
and Drei’s position, as well as that of Beric German and Cathy Crowe from TDRC, all of 
whom understood the idea of people gathering together and helping themselves form a 
community as a necessary, but positive response to the lack of services in the age of 
devolution. Clearly, in he 1990’s, addicts, alcoholics, the poor and the mentally 
challenged, together with the communities in which they lived had been left to find 
solutions to their problems.  A number of articles examine the spaces occupied by the 
homeless as evidence of the self-help ethos (Marin and Vacha 1994; Rivlin and 2001; 
Rivlin and Imbimbo 1989; Swithinbank 1997;	  Mental Help Net 2002; Fairbanks Jr. 2004; 
Kwamba 2005).  The National Coalition for the Homeless  supports a “self-help and 
empowerment web-site” that supplies the web sites and email addresses to other links 
that establish a self-help network for the homeless and community organizers.  Kwamba 
who had been working with Dignity since 2001, had produced the “Tent City Tolls Kit,”  
a video that shows would-be tent camp builders how to do it.   It is out of the spirit of the 
self-help ethos that the noble actioning of needs perspective has evolved as one take on 
intentional camps.  Having witnessed the utter decay of Tent City, having learned more 
about Dignity Village, I had been left with something of a conceptual conundrum. 
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 If these places were evidence if not spatializations of poor people “self-helping,” 
building homes and trying to recover from homelessness, wasn’t this a type of 
governmentality? I mean surely the squatting and fighting for community was unusual, 
but was it the break with habitus that I had been trying to imagine?  
 I went to Montreal to meet Dr. Nielsen who had agreed to be my supervisor.  One 
of the keys he told me was (I am paraphrasing) to try and understand how critical actors 
come to be and what the real critical act is, ideally, not just a deliberation that chooses 
from amongst common practices, but something that inverts, twists, tries on, abandons 
and settles into a new way of approaching a matter of social justice.  We agreed that 
governmentality was a powerful and persuasive tool for understanding the tension 
between acts and practices, especially in the self-help era, where “we are constantly being 
told to fix some thing or another” but that in order to understand the act as something that 
stands outside of governmentality, one needs to understand how critical actors come to 
the point in their deliberative and performative capacities to act beyond those 
constraining tendencies.   There are several levels to which this question finds relevance.  
First, there is the personal level, and asks how it is that like me, a person stuck in a 
liminal and troubled place, might find the resolve to reclaim a conventional and useful 
purpose; second, one might ask how it is that a group of people might organize, as they 
did in Dignity Village to fight for the collective right to pursue such ends; and finally, as 
we will examine throughout this dissertation, how is it that villagers can transcend the 
liminality and state of limbo that the village currently represents as yet another way to 
help themselves? 
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 These are important deliberations for me, and constitute the aim of pragmatic 
ethnography of critique. To begin to understand Dignity Village as a community, as a 
discursive point on a continuum of debate over the rights of the homeless, requires that 
one understands the degree to which the action that created Dignity Village confirms the 
activist citizen’s role to invert and reinvent, or the active citizen’s role to follow scripts 
about how to be critical.  For me this suggests that we need to know how it is that a 
homeless and struggling subject finds empowerment and becomes a political subject. 
 As a start to this, I next discuss several approaches to social critique to come 
closer to an understanding of why and how it is that subjects become critically engaged 
with issues of social justice.  I am going to suggest that elements of many critical 
approaches are relevant to understanding the critical capacity of the village, but in the end, 
it is Foucault’s governmentality and pragmatic sociology’s critique of justifications and 
worlds, that provide the best anchoring for PEOC. 
 
4.11 Summary 
 In this chapter, I began with an introduction to the various concepts used in this 
section. I offered a reflexive history of my experience with addiction, recovery, 
homelessness and early fieldwork on the streets of Toronto. I argued briefly for a 
personal and subjective criticality in my research.  This was followed by an historical 
account of how my work in screenwriting and visual documentary production led to the 
early video projects on the streets of Toronto. I followed the evolution of my questions as 
an historical journey of the contexts of homelessness in the US and Canada during that 
period and offered a short discussion of some of this literature. I discussed the problem 
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with visual misrepresentation by news, journals and documentary filmmakers. I discussed 
the notion of power as a central theme in my work.   
 Then I argued that in the context of gentrifying urban cores, the stigmatization of 
poverty has been used as an excuse to redevelop run down areas of the city, and led to the 
extirpation of the homeless persons who made use of deserted inner spaces and cheap 
lodgings. I discussed some of the lessons I learned about community organizing by 
observing the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC). I briefly discussed the current 
context of my work, the choices I have made to reimagine certain critical positions, and 
offered a brief reiteration of the broader context into which this research is continuously 
reconfigured.  My early academic treatment of the village within the model of Acts of 
Citizenship led me to interrogate critique and critical action as means of understanding 
what an active or activist citizen might look like in real life. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Endnotes - Chapter Four: Pages 152 -250. 
 
1  Strathern (1987) refines this position by pointing out that there is no reason to 
assume that the conditioning of a Western observer to western subcultures is likely the 
same as that of a non-Western observer to her subcultures.  That is; because cultures 
construct self-knowledge differently. 
 
2  I see ways that counting, comparing and cataloguing have merits as parts of 
ethnography (Collier Jr. 1969).  It is important to understand the kinds of material, 
technological, familial, and other resources or conditions where we are working.  An 
early rejection of the “how many are there “ position was to change as my work later 
imbricated with the goals of housing activists and policy programmers, where I came to 
understand that they too had to fight for policies and programs that fit into their critique 
of the problem. That is; that critique has quantifiable vectors too, especially in the realm 
of policy and planning. For my fieldwork however, I have only approached the 
measurement of homelessness as a means of situating my observations in broader 
contexts of the participants’ and my experience. Throughout this dissertation I refer to  
but do not emphasize statistics as a basis for my critique. 
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3  Deborah Bloom, writer, Ethos Magazine. 2011/09/26 -
http://ethosmagonline.com/archives/13755 
 
4  Heather Mosher and Wendy Kohn, whose company Kwamba Productions have 
produced several videos about the village also created the Tent City Tools Kit, a resource 
video for other intentional homeless communities and the film Doorways to Dignity, yet 
to be released, which looks at the emergence of Dignity Village between 2001-2008.  
During the early days of the village, they produced the Village Intake video with the help 
of a core group of members from the village.  In doing so they encountered resistance 
from some factions and support from others, much as I did when doing my research.  As 
noted in chapter six, the tension created by the ethnography had real and lived results and 
must be understood as effective in determining the directions critical actions take.  
Sometimes this can be devastating to the community. There is risk. 
 
5  In 1994 and  1996 I went to welfare supported drug and alcohol rehabilitation. 
 
6  Sisters of the Road is a long standing homeless café where homeless men and 
women exchange labor in the establishment in exchange for food and other donated 
goods; R2DTOO is the homeless tent camp that Ibrahim established at the gates of 
Portland’s popular Chinatown 
 
7  “The Rideau Regional Centre, located in Smiths Falls, Ontario, opened in 1951 as 
the Ontario Hospital School. Along with similar residential institutions throughout 
Ontario, it was designed to house individuals who were deemed to have cognitive and 
physical disabilities. Individuals could be admitted by parents and guardians, training 
schools, or the Children’s Aid Society. At its peak, Rideau’s population exceeded 2,600 
people in 1955, even though it was only built to accommodate 1,500.  By the mid 1970s, 
the Ontario government operated 16 such facilities across the province.” 
http://www.institutionalsurvivors.com/background/rideau/ 
 
8  In April of 1995 my sister entered my rat hole of a studio and stood over me as I 
slept in my only possession – a futon. Her tears literally hit the ground next to my head, 
and one landed on me.  I awoke to her words. “ You need help.”  I agreed, for some 
reason - having ignored those words for over a decade. 
 
9  Dry fly fishing requires studying entomology and then tying replicas of insects 
onto hooks in order to catch trout.  A person writing about this without having experience 
of which insects hatch and when in the seasons would be quite impossible. 
 
10  At first I was astonished.  However, between 2001- 2004 a popular satirical stage 
play, Urine Town, by Holliman and Kotis, ridiculed capitalism and social programming 
by presenting the struggle of the poor as a pre-revolutionary moment -- it was quite 
successful with over 900 performances. It won three Tony awards.  This was not the 
project I was working on. db.com/production.php?id=1293. 
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11  I discuss in greater detail futher on. Essentially the figures vary between the value 
systems presented by the number collectors.  States tend to downplay the problem, 
advocates to inflate the numbers.  Whereas StreetHealth and the TDRC had told me many 
times, there were countless thousands that headcounts and point-in-time stats never 
recognize.   If 32 thousand plus individuals had accessed shelters over the year, it was 
likely that many thousands of others never had that choice.  
 
12  Loizos 1991 refers to this filmic method as a sort of reportage. 
 
13  In the spring of 2000, the homeless began to appear in greater numbers than in 
previous years. They were everywhere in parks and at city hall, by fountains and other 
public spaces – in the summer months their numbers swelled, and many expressed the 
truth, that they were “summering” in Toronto, en route to family elsewhere across the 
country because the welfare and social services they had sought in their points of origin -- 
remote communities or other provinces – had dried up or disappeared altogether.   The 
sketches were to be incorporated into a theatrical production that hoped to explore more 
unusual street identities; the failed lawyer, banker, doctor, professor or the few that had 
“opted-out” of the system and such – images not commonly associated with the street 
“bum,” the addict or with common popular attitudes towards homelessness.* I conducted 
several hundred interviews.  A selection of 30 of these made it into a preliminary video 
catalogue called “Street Beats” (2003). 
 
14  Street Health in Toronto had conservatively estimated numbers of people on the 
street per day as between 5-9000, with annual shelter visits as high as 32,000/annum.  
However, these numbers did not account for countless others in jeopardy or on the 
streets.  In the U.S., at the same time, estimates are conservatively listed between 250,000 
to 650,000 (HUD 2002; NAEH 2000). In Portland, as many as 2,000 people were literally 
on the streets (from transcribed minutes in “Doorways to Dignity”). 
 
15  It is largely impossible to present incontrovertible or even matching numbers, but 
grass roots organizations in various cities such as StreetHealth and the TDRC in Toronto 
regularly reported numbers as high as 5000 – 9000 per night in Toronto, while other 
cities like New York (NCH 2005) reported figures over ten times that amount. It is 
impossible to discern the reliability of these figures. 
 
 
16  In an unpublished paper called Mean Streets (2010), I cite several sources that 
place the street populations of North American cities at on average, over 75% male, and 
in the US, over 60% of the time, black.  The mean age was between 18-34.  Women, 
when counted, amounted to less than 30%. The figures are rough due to the irregularity 
of figures collected from site to site. 
 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Discussed at length in chapter seven. 
 
19  Pascal, Janet B. Jacob Riis: Reporter and Reformer. New York: Oxford 
University Press 2005. 
 
20  These are outlined in chapter five. Each of these critical positions looks to reveal 
the patterns by which dominating powers and ideologues keep actors down through ideas, 
institutions and coercion. The assumption is that the poor are homeless because the 
domination they endure produces this state.  I want to argue that the poor in fact can and 
do have power choices. 
 
21  Low wage earners in Canada and the U.S. do embody the “insecurely housed” 
included in the definition of homelessness by the United Nations, (Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, UN 2002) and recently remarked on by Dr. Stephen Hawg of the 
University of Toronto (Gazette, November 20 2010:A-22).  As such they represent an 
often-overlooked number of homeless even though they are a much larger population in 
real terms.  Much as it was in the 1800’s, a poor person begging on the street is more 
visible and notable for their poverty than for any other quality. A poor person who goes 
to work and returns to tenement housing, or to the single room motel unit where they try 
to raise four kids on the salary they make as a parking attendant at Disney World, is 
rarely even understood as homeless by the “mainstream”, since they maintain the 
dignified illusion of having a “home”.  Hidden within this imaginary is a conditioning 
over time of hegemonic values about dignity that are related to how and where one lives 
as a function of the number and types of affiliations within which one is bound; further 
that the crystallization of these mediations over time has produced “only very certain 
ways” of legitimately achieving it.  
 
22  http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ohs/ 
 
23  Bourgois and Shonberg 2010, Righteous Dopefiend.  
 
24  Following Weber, (1974) the social organization of the street families I met 
inhered organization and leadership, sometimes based on age, experience on the streets or 
physical prowess, but these individuals were able to lead and this suggested power to me. 
 
25  This is not to argue that people should live on the streets to feel empowered, nor 
that many informants shared this view. It suggests that of the 47 million people in the US 
and the 3. 8 million people in Canada, who live dangerously close to the streets because 
of their poverty, some will land on the streets, and some will find that experience more 
empowering than life in conventional communities. 
 
26 As of June 2013, she is the village CEO and this after three years of moving up 
the political ladder at the village and also conspiring to impeach the past CEO mid-term. 
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27  On the one hand capitalism requires a class of poor workers to fill roles as cheap 
labor, but at the same time it creates stigmatizing laws, spatial codes and other means to 
reduce the social capital of the very poor.  Poverty is to be avoided, yet is necessary to the 
process of accumulation. 
 
28  One of the most economically powerless persons on the planet is the homeless 
person.  Once again, the study of power amongst the poor has focused on the big 
problems, the repression of farmers in Central America (Sachs 2005), the shanties of Asia 
(Davis 2006) and so on.   This is so because these large categorical groups are easily 
situated within critiques of globalization and global capitalism where the sheer size and 
isolation of the poor population in sites like flavellas and massive shanty-cities, abets an 
easier description of the parties involved in the struggle for resources and power in well –
established cases of alienation and marginalization (Bayat 2009; Sachs 2005; Harvey, 
2003; 1989; 2005).  Such massive power struggles in these places confront international 
aid organizations and the world banking system, so they have received great attention. 
Power struggles on these massive scales, are generally defined as collective actions, 
actions defined by their numerous affiliations and tendency towards massive struggles or 
social movements, (Bayat 2010) whereas looking at issues of power in the case of a 
homeless man in Toronto, or family camped out in their car in Portland requires situating 
notions of power in a specific and highly transient localized personality. 
 Powerlessness in itself, however, is closely related to notions of disaffiliation, 
Bahr (1973); and it is, therefore, very much an expression of the street people I was 
studying in 2001.  Once again, I reiterate that the street people I looked at, were best 
described in terms of their having few or no conventional affiliations, except with 
authorities such as police or medical officers, and, therefore to being powerless in the 
mainstream.  On the streets and within their own networks there was a sense of 
empowerment.   
 
29  Wagner (1993), Bourgois (1996, 2010), Wasserman and Clair (2010), Caponi 
(1999) Represent urban ethnographies that connect poor urban subjectivities to political 
economies as a way of overcoming the stigmatizing and reductionist tendencies of the 
culture of poverty legacy.   But this means abandoning dogmatic positions about what 
freedom and worth might ideally mean, in favour of a messier understanding grounded in 
the shifting categories of experience amongst the people we are studying. 
 
30  These positions of course influenced by the dominant discourse of dignity and 
poverty expressed in poor laws and labour reform acts which we discuss in the following 
chapters. 
 
31  Fairbanks Jr. (2004 Dissertation) takes a different route but arrives at the same 
conclusion.  He states that the “urban ethnographies of an earlier era – built on the 
foundational ethos of a War on Poverty – were either tacitly or explicitly in support of 
direct state action to ameliorate the devastating immiseration of structurally produced 
urban poverty and racial exclusion” (60).   He then calls for urban ethnographers to find 
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inventive ways to understand how these conditions currently play out. That is what this 
dissertation intends to do. 
 
32  It was as result of this mindset that I began to entertain Foucault’s work on 
governmentality that we address in chapter five. 
 
33  http://www.christianiaooo.dk 
 
34  http://www.christiania.org   -- http://www.christianiaooo.dk/english.php 
 





37  http://blogs.newschool.edu/epsm/2012/05/24/orangi-town-karachi/ see also: 
Hasan, A. (2003). Urban Slums Reports: The case of Karachi, Pakistan. Global Report 
on Human Settlements. Hasan, A. (2006). Orangi Pilot Project: the expansion of work 
beyond Orangi and the mapping of informal settlements. Environment & Urbanization, 
18(2), 451’480. 
 
38  My film, Subtext-real stories, contains stories of these bottle diggers. 
 
39  In my film, Subtext-real stories, I gathered images from the city of Toronto 
Archives of shanties built by immigrants from 1902 to 1938.  They were set up in many 
places, next to the original city hall on College Street, and on Bathurst next to the rail 
lands. My own ancestors recall the shacks and shanties belonging to friends and relatives 
during the depression. This is an underexplored part of Canadian urban history. 
 
40  Even The Toronto Disaster Relief Committee, which had championed Tent City, 
has closed its doors as 2012. 
 
41  “…after a year of hard work to provide Tent City squatters with safe housing, the 
Toronto Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC) was shocked to learn that city staff’s final 
solution for the "Tent City situation" involves neither TDRC nor Tent City itself. At an 
October 18 meeting of the community and neighbourhood services committee, the TDRC 
proposal for the relocation of Tent City to a city-owned site at 525 Commissioners Street 
was rejected by city staff in favour of a Homes First proposal for the same land. The 
Homes First project will result in the construction of 29 prefabricated transitional housing 
units, providing accommodation for 32 homeless people. But the tenants will be drawn 
primarily from Homes First’s existing clientele, meaning that most of Tent City’s 60 
residents will be left squatting precariously on their current, heavily polluted site. A 
subsequent motion by TDRC to allow Tent City residents to settle on the unused half of 
the Commissioners Street site will be considered by council on November 6. But few can 
shake the feeling that the Tent City residents, who got the "prefab housing" project 
 256 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rolling, have been left out in the cold. "Of course we’re happy that anyone is going to 
build affordable housing,’ says TDRC member Beric German. "But the people here are 
the ones who have campaigned for this type of affordable housing. And the solution that 
is proposed won’t house all those at Tent City who need housing." From NOW | October 
25-November 1 2001 | VOL 21 NO 8. 
NOTE --This site never materialized; yet the consideration of the project suggested to me 
that even the homeless had power when they coordinated their efforts with experienced 
organizers.  
 
42  My film series, Subtext-real stories 2002-2012 follows the residents of Tent City. 
 
43  He was misguided.  While the village had been legalized, it was replete with 
drugs, poor health and many of the issues facing Tent City.   Until the film Doorways To 
Dignity (2010), no one really knew the extent to which the village had suffered. 
 
44  I had envisioned this process as an “act of citizenship,” following Isin  2008.  
However a central tenet of their argument is that the act constitutes a break with habitus, 
and addressing the shantytown claim as a break with habitus, would prove tautological in 
the sense that what activists had sought was a return to conventional lifestyles, using 
existing laws and practices to secure those rights democratically.  I speak to this more in 
the concluding  
 
45  Street Health is a non-profit community based agency that improves the health 
of homeless and under-housed people in Toronto. We offer both physical and mental 
health programs. Our work is focused in the neighbourhood around Dundas and 
Sherbourne Streets, an area with the largest concentration of homeless shelters and drop-
in centres in Canada.  www.streethealth.ca 
 
46  On September 26 2002 The City of Toronto announced the Emergency 










49  Down to This, By Shaunnessy Bishop-Stahl used participant observation to 
describe aspects of people’s private lives. The New York Times had reported that a baby 
was born in the camp.  That never happened.  
 
50  http://vimeo.com/58645229 
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53  http://housepaint.typepad.com/housepaint/about-housepaint-phase-2-.html 
 
54  http://www.thegridto.com/city/local-news/counted-out-toronto-homeless-deaths/ 
offers a higher figure.  The names from the TDRC are included in the Blue Print to end 





Chapter Five: Critical Approaches 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
 In this chapter, I first address Latour’s challenge to critique. In Reassembling the 
Social (2005), he makes critique pretty impossible by saying first of all that reality is 
constantly unfolding in the practical metaphysics of actants, so it is therefore impossible 
to critique as a “social fact.”  He might ask, “What exactly are we critiquing anyway?”  
He also questions the ability of anyone outside of lived experience to understand it well 
enough to critique it, so when we are critical of social situations, the only critical nature 
we need to consult, once again is that of the actant.1 In his famous essay “Why has 
critique run out of steam?” (2004), he reviles against the emotional and often reactionary 
critiques that have come to be acceptable in the social sciences post 9/11.  He claims that 
critique has been reduced to conspiracy theory because of the way it no longer attaches to 
empirical knowledge. He challenges critique to reunite with realist perceptions and to 
abandon its reductive tendencies. Accepting that we need a mode of critique that does not 
reduce critical possibilities to basic or fundamental elements but anticipates the agonizing 
process of making sense of critical diversity from the critical assemblage of actants, the 
PEOC is exactly that kind of method. It seeks to open up critique, rather than to lock it 
down.  
 Simply to arrive at a clear understanding of my position, I look at three main 
branches of philosophical critique, critical dogmatism, transcendental critique and 
deconstructionism and give a sample for each of how they might look at the homeless. I 
then discuss five major critical approaches that have the common goal of trying to 
explain the potential for emerging political subjects in matters of a critical nature.  These 
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include Critical Theory, Critical Sociology, Critical Realism, Genealogical Critique and  
Pragmatic Sociology of Critique.  Of these I emphasize the latter two for the powerful 
role they give actors and for the way they imagine resistance. Ultimately I see some 
utility in all of these approaches, so I weave in and out of these where transcripts and 
analysis make sense to do this.   I am going to conclude later though, that Foucault and 
Boltanski give the best approaches to making sense of the critical capacity of liminal 
communities. 
 
5.2 Getting Over Latour – Introducing Social Critique 
  
 First, is critique possible?  This seems to be a ridiculous question in the sense I 
have just critiqued space and ideas to some degree. Latour has imposed a certain burden 
of legitimacy to social critique in the wake of current popular tendencies to treat any 
nervous response to events around us as license to critique. All human actors are to some 
degree practitioners of critical thinking, and one’s worldview could be understood as the 
basis for a type of critique, but as it regards social justice, there must be more to an 
approach than merely being critical or reactionary.  
 There are views of social critique that suggest that normative and moral categories 
ought to be imposed on the exigent life in order to determine if it is justly experienced at 
all levels, personal, community and so on.  My problem with the “either-or” tendency of 
normative – diagnostic critical schools, is just that, either, or. Life is just or it is not 
because justice, equality and  freedom are allegedly discernable and stable values that we 
can impose on situations to determine their justness.  This classic position rooted in the 
Hegelian-Marxist critical tradition is focused on social transformation and social justice.  
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It appeals not to the individual’s critical capacity, but the moral weight of convincing all 
people of how false consciousness or ideological suasion has duped them into believing 
that a form of domination is a natural state of affairs.  Since the post-modern turn, the 
possibility of grand foundations serving as critical catalysts is severely undermined, and 
critique tends to look at how actors can appropriate space to act from a world that is 
increasingly understood as socially constructed and complex (Turner 2008; Delanty 
2011; Bohman 2008).  
 Current debates over what constitutes valid social critique correspond with the 
traditional tendency to separate rather than unite these styles of critical thought that have 
divergent philosophical premises about how knowledge happens or what such things as 
justice mean (Sayer 2000; Biesta and Stams 2001; Turner 2008; Larsen 2012).  What my 
observations in the village present to me is a number of situations where various critical 
identities and scripts adjoin the villager in her daily life.  So what I want to suggest is that 
when, in the next few pages I talk of critical dogmatism, transcendental critique and 
deconstructionism, as three major types of philosophical critique, or when I refer to 
critical approaches, such as critical sociology or critical realism, we listen to the 
possibility that an actor might be understood in the terms of each, at different times, and 
further that since this is the case, PEOC must be open to finding or recognizing critical 
scripts from these traditionally divergent approaches in the same actor, the same 
community and on.  The inability to do this, which means in other words, the tendency to 
reduce complex critical moments into simpler modes of understanding (i.e. as grand 
moral narratives or diffuse weak micro level approaches) is the demise of critique, which 
Latour discusses, in his famous 2004 address. I want to spend some time on it here, 
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because despite his pessimism for critique, I find many of his ideas useful in my own 
approach. And I want to say that his challenge to see even more complicated 
repercussions of undressing critique is the ethos of PEOC. 
Latour asks, 
Do you see why I am worried? I myself have spent some time in the past trying to show 
“ ‘the lack of scientific certainty’ ” inherent in the construction of facts. I too made it a 
“‘primary issue.’” But I did not exactly aim at fooling the public by obscuring the 
certainty of a closed argument—or did I? After all, I have been accused of just that sin. 
Still, I’d like to believe that, on the contrary, I intended to emancipate the public from 
prematurely naturalized objectified facts. Was I foolishly mistaken? Have things changed 
so fast? (Latour 2004:227). 
 
 In his important and long article, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?” Bruno 
Latour (2004) is skeptical of the usefulness of social critique suggesting, “our critical 
equipment deserves as much critical scrutiny as the Pentagon budget” (231). Quite 
simply, he just seriously doubts the veracity and competence of those in positions to 
make important observations.  Baudrillard mysticizes the attack on the Twin Towers as 
some affect of capitalism, and the rest of Latour’s world has become (over) taken by 
conspiracy and weird forms of truth, which are nothing more than matters of concern, 
that are impossible to prove, but come to be presented as critiques of government, science, 
capitalism, the CIA and so on.  Latour is arguing that critique has come to mean little 
more than skepticism and suspiciousness to the point of a common faith in delusional 
conspiracy theories.  Later he adds,  
My argument is that a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, 
encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends 
by the wrong sort of allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. 
The question was never to get away from facts but closer to them, not fighting 
empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism (2004:231). 
 
 
 In his regard, critique needs to attach itself more fully to an understanding of 
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objects as facts, matters of fact, that is, rather than matters of concern which tend to paint 
facts or objects with a certain truth, as if they were facts (243).  All objects are created, as 
are all matters of fact, out of concern, or as objects of matters of concern, but that does 
not mean that the computer created to compute, is merely that thing – it has implications, 
some social, some economic, some capital (he who has the new Mac is king; in the 
village we will find out later that Brad Gibson was accused of theft because he used the 
village computer too much!) and so critiques that attach to ideas and things, should lead 
to a broader understanding of their implication, literally implication in other aspects of 
reality. In sum, (as if it were possible to summarize Latour) he is simply arguing that 
critique needs to rejoin with realist positions that ascertain how certain matters of fact 
come to be understood that way. His call to see multiplicity instead of simplicity, 
inherently not a deconstructionist, but in fact a sort of expansionist critique, suggests not 
the reduction of ideas and facts to a basic underlying aporia or truthful principle, but to 
find “more, not less, with multiplication, not subtraction” (248).   In his point of view 
social critique passed away many years ago, because of its tendency to reduce what is 
observed critically to a simpler state of affairs, a truth, a function, a theory, a moral 
imperative or normative diagnostic precept.  He puts it to us, that we must, therefore, in 
order to look at things critically, including material objects, living entities, even ideas, 
look for the way they mediate, integrate, assemble and deploy (248).  
 Okay, so I too agree that a certain critical attitude needs to be extended to the 
relationship between our social lives and non-human elements of the lived life, categories 
of thought, theorems and laws of physics, computers, the sun and rocks and the sea. I 
agree also, that to a certain degree we have tended to try and simplify reality through 
 263 
critique by reducing social problems to key elements and to disclose transcendental and 
dogmatic principles that mess things up.  We can critique social movements on the basis 
of the ideologies they profess to resist, but it would serve us well to see how the 
integration of people in the movement expands social complexities by linking directly 
and transitively an almost virtual assemblage of things, resources and actants. I don’t see 
Latour’s indictment as the end of critique. PEOC is quite frankly my attempt to address 
his and other criticisms that we will discuss, but most importantly to open up critical 
thought to diversity rather than impossible oversimplification on micro or macro grounds. 
For the village we experience on the ground, critique grounded in stubborn views to 
idealized codes and rules that were part of the planning process, must always present the 
village in terms of failure, whereas its actual potential as a community remains 
undisclosed. 
 One of the dangers of pragmatic and critical ethnographies is the very 
uncontrollable and often-unpredictable kinds of information that are revealed in groups, 
when the simple dogmatic truths that help them organize their poverty are uprooted. The 
safe, simple and convenient patterns of dependence and order that homeless citizens of 
the village tend to ride; “the safety of structure,” as one had put it, explode into messy, 
confusing and seemingly unmanageable patterns when brought under a critical and 
reflexive mode of examination.  What was considered a simple relationship with the head 
of the IT department in the village for example, comes to be understood for how control 
over food, or a bag of dope favorably impacts others’ access to the computer and presents 
complex possibilities for alignments and conflicts.  The current grip on the village by the 
city is not because of some legal code in a democratic constitution, but because no one 
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will fight for another way to see this code.  The villager does not want to know that 
because they have no idea on their own how to go about making this change.  It is easier 
to cede a potentially critical position to the more powerful when one does not know how 
to create a response. We will examine this in detail in the concluding section, where the 
recent impeachment of the village CEO is literally a perfect example of the kind of 
conspiracy-oriented critique on the basis of material misconduct to which Latour reviles.  
I have already mentioned the divisive effect Mosher’s participatory work had on the 
village. After I discuss the classic traditions of critique, I address this multiplication to 
which Latour commands us because I understand a diversification of the choices actors 
must make as a necessary outcome of pragmatic ethnography of critique in liminal spaces, 
because out of ambiguity a number of positions could take hold, given that certain 
conditions are met. 
 I find some commonality with my approach to that of Latour’s later Reassembling 
the Social (2005) in so much that I see no basic reality to social life; reality is 
unknowable until it is found out or lived through the way actual individuals occupy it; 
this knowable principally by following their practical metaphysics in order to map out an 
actant’s impact in daily life and the assemblages their lives represent.  Latour argues that 
it really is not the place of the researcher to critique anything, because society, or visions 
of society are largely fictional, “a cosa mentale, a hypostasis, a fiction” (163). How do 
you critique fiction after all? Since the origins of critique lie in a false sense of a reality, 
then the critique is a fiction too.  Critique then contributes to the construction of the 
social as much as it tries to excavate it, and to this I agree, but this does not make critique 
pointless.   He writes,  
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Thus, all things considered, critiques of sociology of the social are misdirected if they 
forget to consider their extraordinary efficacy in generating one form of attachments: the 
social ones, or at least that part of the social that has been stabilized. There cannot be 
anything wrong in forming, formatting, or informing the social world (226). 
 
Latour’s argument, hard to simplify is that critique cannot stand outside of the 
observations it makes or the justness that it tries to see.  His criticism attaches to critical 
approaches that pretend to be outside of the world they are critiquing - outside - of the 
reality they are presenting, but for PEOC this is not a problem.  He says,  
To add in a messy way to a messy account of a messy world does not seem like a very 
grandiose activity. But we are not after grandeur: the goal is to produce a science of the 
social uniquely suited to the specificity of the social in the same way that all other 
sciences had to invent devious and artificial ways to be true to the specific   phenomena 
on which they wished to get a handle on. If the social circulates and is visible only when 
it shines through the concatenations of mediators, then this is what has to be replicated, 
cultivated, elicited, and expressed by our textual accounts. The task is to deploy actors as  
networks of mediations—hence the hyphen in the composite word ‘actor-network’. 
Deployment is not the same as ‘mere description’, nor is it the same as ‘unveiling’, 
‘behind’ the actors’ backs, the ‘social forces at work’. If anything, it looks more like a 
PCR amplification of some small DNA sample (136). 
 
 The form of pragmatic ethnography I employ is exactly a way of looking for this 
messy and diversely routed actor’s experience based on what they say and do.  It’s goal is 
not merely to describe – description being what he hates most about critique – it is to 
examine this information as a means to co-creating knowledge about critical attitudes and 
options for meeting such goals with actors, not outside of that performance. Latour 
argued for the deployment of the actor “as part of networks of mediations” (136).  In the 
context of the liminal community I am studying, everything is mediation of a kind, and 
the point of view that guides us through them is the actor.  PEOC is a way to deploy the 
actor and the researcher (as a types of actants in this process) into the critical 
deliberations, the movements through time that these create and the potential for other 
critical action. These deliberations and mediations still inhere normative, practical, 
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political, emotional and other considerations that contribute to a sense of justice, and this 
to social critiques. Regardless of how I study it, the homeless who live in Dignity Village 
have perceptions of the world that guide their critique of social justice, or their lack of it, 
and it is these I follow. This is not to argue that a particular objective social reality or 
ideal just situation is conceivable or knowable in the scientific sense. Once again a 
diversity of such imaginings, mediations or whatever you choose to call them condition 
liminal communities towards complexity and an incapacity to act collectively. 
 
5.3 Critical Philosophical Approaches 
 There are a number of ways to organize the philosophical roots to socially critical 
approaches.  I am going to explore two critical approaches in great detail in the following 
chapters, Foucault’s genealogical critique of governmentality and Boltanski’s pragmatic 
sociology of critique because of the ways each structures my pragmatic ethnography of 
critique.  Other approaches will fit into my argument so I briefly introduce these here.  As 
a way to get there let me introduce two useful ways of understanding how critical 
philosophical positions organize the way critical social analysis is done.    
 One way is to identify how a criterion or a group of criteria are put to critical tests 
by actors, or by groups of actors. Biesta and Stams (2001) offer: critical dogmatism, 
transcendental critique and deconstruction as three main taproots from which “to be 
critical” can be understood (2001:1).  They argue it should be noted however, that where 
dogma resists inclusion of other ideas, criticism can be inclusive of ideas that come from 
positions often thought of as divergent. Furthermore some dogmas might be correct.  
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Love your neighbor is perhaps an acceptable dogma.  Dogmatism is a valid approach to 
explaining the world, as long as it reveals its underlying assumptions to debate.  
  Critical dogmatism requires the application of a given criterion or set of criteria 
to evaluate a “specific state of affairs” (Biesta 1998:475-477; Biesta and Stams 2001:60). 
The action of this kind of critique is dogmatic because the evaluation is geared toward 
understanding through the performance of the criterion, but the criterion, a sort of “truth,” 
resides outside of the field being evaluated (Biesta and Stams 2001:60).  In this case, the 
occupation of a park by homeless campers is argued by opponents and supporters on the 
basis of its constitutionality, a value defined in laws that exist outside of the action - 
people have a constitutional right to shelter, as one of the freedoms of being American, 
and this is transcendent and fundamental to all citizens, but what freedom means to 
differently held dogmatic versions of the truth becomes the source of a struggle for power.  
 One of the main difficulties in understanding resistance to alternative housing and 
homelessness claims like the shantytown, is that the issue, homelessness, is approached  
by sides having very different ideas, or truths, or who apply a number of truths to produce 
a discourse of truths about what is acceptable housing, and what are the moral limits on 
providing welfare to the less fortunate. Amongst activists, it is common to hear that 
current housing shortages are a violation of human rights. Hence many housing activists 
criticize the lack of effort by US housing authorities in light of this truth about the 
inalienable right to housing. They often invoke a Marxist lens, pitting the interest of 
capital and the economy against the basic rights of individuals.  However, there is an 
equally vociferous camp, mostly from right-leaning conservatives that impose 
characterological defects onto homeless people, and therefore blame individuals rather 
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than government for the homelessness problem.  They argue that people choose to be 
homeless, or at the very least, they don’t have to be if they choose to act differently.  
While all sides agree that people have a right to housing, they debate whether camping in 
parks in tents or building shacks, constitutes acceptable housing.  In effect, they are each 
correct, and they are each mistaken.2 Dogmatism, then, tends to look at social problems 
from a particular moral position that largely disregards the values of other moral 
positions.3 It does little to understand how those moral positions themselves might be 
constructed, and in the sense of justice for example, or understanding what is just, might 
lead to excavation of the judgments that make the claim. 
 Transcendental critique also conceives of the critical operation as the application 
of a criterion but whose meaning is open to dispute and argumentation. Originating in 
Kant’s notion of transcendental philosophy, moral actors are rational, and as such they 
choose to act morally because the repercussions are favourable, or rational, to them as 
beings.4 In this sense, the individual’s freedom and autonomy are to be found in the 
liberty to act morally.  Liberty and morality come to be understood as ideas manufactured 
for the domination of unwary individuals understood as resources under capitalism. 
Under Adorno (1947, 1951, 1966), Horkheimer (1930-38, 1947), and Marcuse (1933, 
1940, 1964) Critical Theory in what is well known as the Frankfurt School, emerged as a 
normative form of Marxist inquiry based on the proposition that an alternative to 
prevailing social and political orders was always available even if not recognized.  This is 
a normative-diagnostic approach that centered on revealing to the masses how they are 
duped by capital as a means of mobilizing society towards its immanent transcendence, 
which I take simply as its latent inherent capacity to change towards a more just order of 
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things. The Frankfurt School was primarily engaged in ideology critique that sought to 
demonstrate how false consciousness was affected onto subjects though capitalist run 
media, knowledge and other social institutions that served the interest of dominant 
(capitalist) ideology.  As an empirically based sociology grounded in an image of society 
as political, critical theory sought to disclose a world of misleading facts, disguised by 
ideology, and to change the ways the world is envisioned (Delanty 2011:73).5 
 Transcendental critique suggests a style of critical thinking that looks to find  
performative contradictions. That is to say that it is a kind of internal critique, that takes 
as its starting point the presence of actors or ideas in the context of a group or a 
community, where actions often betray rational or accepted values about performance 
that pivots on a central criterion, and thereby the performance of ideas and values can be 
put to a test, an argumentation; we are duped or betrayed by ideologues and capital, but 
we can debate alternatives. Hence a proposition, or alternative is presented in terms of 
whether it is rational in that context or not but the key to action is an actor’s functionality 
within communities of communication (Habermas 1987; Biesta and Stams 2001:65).  The 
ability to present arguments and to comprehend the debate is essential to understanding 
how alternative means can achieve legitimate and just ends. 
 In this frame, the village represents a community in which the argument over 
reason and justification is taking place; a small lifeworld where argumentation and 
debates over various criteria of social justice constantly place actors in a position to 
question the root that led them to this place, and to look into this history for alternatives. 
Except they rarely do this.   For them, transcendence means a revisiting of the activist 
arguments that led to this community.  At least, this is the ideal of the village.  This 
 270 
possibility is immanent in the democratic structure of the village, and in the design of the 
village property, but is it reasonable or even useful there? Ibrahim’s transcript would 
suggest an inherent conflict between what ought to be, and what is, and PEOC 
investigates the space created by this disjuncture.  There is also the very real observation 
I made while there, and that others have noted, most notable Mosher (2010) that 
argumentation in the village is common, whereas resolution is not.  This will become 
apparent when we discuss the argumentation that is present during council and other 
meetings in the following chapters.  
 In chapter six, I think as we go along, we will find that as much as the village 
inheres the immanence of this liberty, that is the “promise” or capacity to provide 
democratic participation – all voices to be heard equally – the way the village does not 
function well as a democracy suspends this possibility in a liminal stage - it never has 
been imminent – to Derrida’s chagrin, it might not even be a democracy yet to arrive, 
despite its immanence - this is what makes it perpetually liminal. If it hasn’t by now, why 
should it in the future? Of course Derrida, understands the future to be forever, a sort of 
constant goal, but the village does not have infinity to prove itself. One of the arguments I 
have made repeatedly to villagers is that they need to understand how to invite new 
modes of participation into their community in order to achieve the democratic 
functionality they seek.   Villagers have had a hard time seeing that possibility because 
the legacy of being “self-governed” is very narrowly interpreted.  In asking villagers to 
imagine doing things differently, pragmatic inquiry provokes a certain mysterious 
flirtation with the unknown, and not to annoy Latour, actively seeks a way to adjoin 
villagers and my work as a mutually constitutive form of critique.  We can look at 
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Derrida (1996) as a way of understanding how to look for diversity by dismantling the 
way we think about things but there is no way to guarantee that even in the face of 
obvious truth, if such a thing were possible, villagers might act towards it. 
 Derrida’s metaphysical exigency is the tendency of western philosophy to look at 
“presence” in terms of its natural, whole, and self-sufficient qualities, instead of interior 
qualities of decay, complication and accident (Derrida 1988:93).6  Derrida’s argument is 
that we can never isolate ourselves, no our inquiries from this tendency because it is the 
tradition out of which we have emerged as cognizant and articulate beings. Hence, all 
ideas, representations and critiques inhere some dogmatic qualities.  His project is to 
show that “being”, and ideas about any “thing” cannot be understood without discerning 
how they come to make sense in relation to other beings, states or ideas or things, 
sometimes referred to as elements. This is a pseudo-metaphysical issue. There are no self-
sufficient meanings. So the goal is to discern how things achieve meaning by their 
articulation with other things in that structure their togetherness produces (1978, 1991).7 
Perhaps we can think of this as the mediations of ideas in networks of ideas. It is though a 
process of deconstruction, of dismantling, that this articulation is made knowable.  
 Deconstruction has a unique way of contributing to critique.  The two prior forms 
of critique assume that one can critique extant and observable states of being or structural 
conditions of knowing based on the degree to which identifiable external concepts and 
positions can be inserted into the arguments that are present. Deconstruction tries to open 
up such systems to an awareness of what is generally not thought of within that system; 
deconstruction affirms knowledge not simply of what is known to be excluded from the 
system, but affirms what is wholly other, what is unforeseeable from the present as it 
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appears to be (67-68).  The key to this is exposing the conditions that make an idea or 
state of affairs possible, but for this there is no word, just a specific way that elements 
impact the future possibility of others; this he called différrance. There is no material or 
grammar for understanding this imminent or emergent quality, it is as yet to be known, 
and therefore does not look to know what is excluded from a system, but provides an 
openness to what is not foreseeable (Derrida 1992:27 in Biesta and Stams 2001:68). 
Derrida insisted deconstruction was neither method nor form of analysis and as such, this 
“non-method” does not seek to contain ideas or to re-present the conditions of possibility 
for extant notions; it seeks to suggest, perhaps more correctly than to say, ‘understand’ 
the inevitability of invention, of the “otherness” contained in systems and programs and 
anticipations (Derrida 1991:27).  Biesta and Stams (2001:68) suggest it is this concern to 
find or to understand what is wholly other from a system that deconstruction is not 
merely critical, but seeks justice as its outcome by revealing how what we take to be the 
natural state of things can be opened up to new ways of doing and being – inequality and 
domination are not natural vectors of association simply because we experience them. 
Something has made them so. In their sense of it, the justness of the deconstructive 
method is opening up to inclusion, what has been excluded, and this then is the matter of 
social justice.  
 The judgment deconstruction offers comes from a different place than dogmatic 
or transcendental critique.  There are no absolute truths, so no way to impose a dogma of 
any kind. There is no way to argue the case for an idea in fair and reasonable 
communities of consensus, because Derrida would argue there is no way to guarantee 
language is capable of expressing the un-expressible—which is quite literally the point of 
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différrance.  Unlike the former, it is not pitched onto an idea from behind the rationale 
construction of an external ideal or truth; unlike the latter, it doesn’t result from within 
communities of communication as the result of actors’ judgments about performance of a 
criterion because the “universally” just criterion cannot really be known, since the 
identification of the criterion is generated by the same system that generates its need. The 
contribution of deconstruction, is that it points to the fact that critical criteria are not self-
sustained, or self-actualized units of meaning, they require events or information outside 
of themselves to become relevant; the elements of activist critique of homelessness are 
meaningless without the housing policies to critique; without the unpredictable actions 
and reactions of bureaucrats, media and activists that condition the critical action itself. 
Such action is not only unpredictable, but only critical in the degree to which it disrupts 
the routinized modes of signification that represent the injustice. For shantytown dwellers, 
their self-meaning becomes structured by their very connection to one another in the 
structures of resistance produced by homelessness. Otherwise they become mere wards of 
the state.  This is why Ibrahim is so adamant that village residents must get out there and 
activate with other homeless people.  It is a means to complete their meaning in the 
struggle to which they owe their community. Then again, there is the resistance their 
community faces because of the way it disrupts the comfort of conventional communities 
that prioritize the home as normal.  The shantytown becomes part of a critique because of 
what it represents to systems of signifiers in a complex system of meanings about space 
and normalcy, rather than for what actually takes place in the village.  If the villager is 
not out there in that debate, joining the conventional world through charity or 
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volunteering, perhaps working or going to school, then they have no way of inflecting 
what their lives mean into the construction of conventional imaginaries. 
  Hence, deconstruction finally seeks to “open up critique for its own uncritical 
assumptions…not to destroy, but rather to affirm what is excluded and forgotten, to open 
up the possibility of the unforeseeable” (70). Very often, as the ethnographic 
transcriptions of this dissertation show, conversations at Dignity Village were set on the 
axis of wanting to know how to change the way things were, but villagers were not aware 
of how things actually played out in their time, in their previous and current experience of 
things.  They had perceptions but not an analytical awareness of their connection to 
systems of power and dependence.  Furthermore, to demonstrate a more just system than 
American democracy even to the homeless is no mean task.  Take for example the 
following experience I had in Dignity Village. 
 In 2010, one of the first people I met at the village was John Boy Hawkes. He had 
been released from prison and was camping in a friend’s backyard the year before, when 
a villager, Brad Powell, told him to try the village.  The following descriptive anecdote 
taken from my film, Space Places and States of Mind, (2010) speaks to the fact that 
villagers very often don’t understand their poverty, the lack of housing or any other 
measure of the human condition they endure as a function of the American way of life - 
democracy is sound and so is America.  
Transcribed from DS DISC 3,  Spaces Places… at 56:00 - John Boy Hawkes, June 2010) 
John Boy lives in a small shack, a half structure called a dorm.  He has only been in the 
village for a year and is waiting for a full structure for himself.  It amounts to little more 
than 2X4 struts and beams, clad in chipboards, plastic and peeling paint. Sit has one door, 
a bed, a few shelves, and  two foot by three-foot window.  He has many decorations 
tacked to the walls,: Japanese fans and art, lace and other fabrics.  Several large and 
boldly placed Stars and Stripes. His personal belongings, including clothes and other 
goods are piled in heaps here and there, stuffed under his bed.  It is dusty and stuffy, but 
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still this is better than street, and it is safer than they lawn heh ad been camped out on, 
safer that is because the cops can’t hassle him here in the village.  Freshly released from 
jail, he had nowhere to go. He had gone from “one crazy place to another crazy place.”  
Being in the wilderness with a tent and a sleeping bag, “ Ain’t all its cracked [sic]out to 
be,” he said.  Like Terry Potts had said earlier that year in an interview in Toronto, “ I 
dunno, man, I need something to do, to be part of something. If I don’t have that I get 
into trouble, I don’t know what to do.”  Jon Boy didn’t know Terry, but I shared that 
comment with him. He understood it well. Nodding his head the  entire time,  he admitted 
that the stress of street life is often misunderstood by people who don’t have recourse to it 
as “What did Reagan say, that prick? Ah yeah, a sort of choice you would say?  Isn’t that 
what he said?” I concurred.8   Looking around Jon Boy’s space it was impossible to 
ignore the prominence of the flags. 
“How important is patriotism to you?” I ask.  
Well my door has flag on it, my wall has a flag on it, I got a flag here… I… I’m a pretty 
goo… I’m a patriot! You know?  I don’t believe that I would go anywhere lese and kill 
people for us, but damned sure it they’re gonna come here, I’ll be the first one to pick up 
a rock and stick and fight like a caveman!”  
 
 The metaphysical exigency of philosophers is equally persuasive amongst the 
Dignity homeless who struggle to comprehend a freedom or autonomy in any manner 
other than what has been taught to them in the past. There were thirty American flags in 
the village, stars and stripes flapping in the wind, dusted in compost tailings from the city 
waste facility only yards away from where people ate, washed and slept.  People walked 
around in T-shirts with the Stars and Stripes silk screened front and back.  Fourth of 
every July they walked the half mile from the camp to the Columbia river, and sneaked 
onto a small cove that only the homeless folks and cops knew of and from which they 
were usually ousted by cops, and they raised beers, bon fire burning, toasting “America 
the Beautiful,” 
“America! America! 
God shed His grace on thee, 
And crown thy good with brotherhood 
From sea to shining sea!” 
 
 On July 4, 2011 when I sat with them looking at the fireworks, they sang “Oh 
Canada” for me, as a tribute to my nationality. They didn’t know the tune, so it came out 
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in the harmonies and rhythms of “Happy Birthday.” It was eerie, Laura B., Dave M. 
Steve and Carol, Lisa and Scot, wasted on beer and smoking joints. The bonfire lighting 
up their faces, as for miles, literally 60 miles up and down the Columbia, fireworks went 
off to celebrate American Independence, and I listened to:  “Oh Canada, Oh Canada, Oh 
Canada to you…” because they had no idea what the words were, but they figured that I 
was like them, a patriot above all us.  It seemed almost indecent to me that they would be 
so enraptured in celebration of the same system that marginalized and trivialized them. 
As I filmed this display, I had to wonder how they could feel so strongly towards a 
country that was failing them at so many levels.  Rather than blame the way that their 
democracy and the economy worked, they accepted the mistakes they had made, and 
there they remained.  They could see the flaws in their system, but it was easier to blame 
themselves because they could not see other systems as a solution.  I was Canadian after 
all,  and to them, my country was socialist because we had health care.  They were at the 
point of awareness where going any further would have had to lead to an indictment of 
their perceptions of the American Dream, and that they were not prepared to do. 
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Fig. 14. Dave Sullivan. Long Time Villager at his structure.  
July 2011 (N. Dickson) 
 
 
5.4 Five Categories of Critique - Finding Space to Act 
 Taking the three basic ways of approaching critique helps us to isolate the 
mechanics of the critical deliberation that can inspire action towards justice. They do 
little for explaining why action is not taken.  Within these ways of seeing are some 
classical traditions that can be distinguished by how they problematize critiques of social 
justice around truth and power.  Delanty categorizes five approaches into two groups: the 
first includes Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, which I have discussed, Bourdieu’s 
Critical Sociology and Roy Bhaskar’s Critical Realism, although my reading of this 
school is primarily through Sayer (2000) and Archer (2003). The second includes 
Foucault’s genealogical critique and Boltanski, Chiapello and Thévenot’s pragmatic 
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sociology of critique. Delanty makes these distinctions on the basis that the former group 
looks for ways that normative truth is imposed on the power of individuals by structural 
and normative systems that control how individuals act. Critical action then is 
empowered by a truthful normative proposition that is either widely held to be true, or 
that is presented in a contest over normative criteria, where the criteria present a certain 
proposition that people argue about, but are empowered by.  They stress a macro form of 
analysis where reality, observable or not as an objective phenomenon, imposes 
experiences of injustice on actors that cause them to question the state of things. In this 
case truth becomes power, by providing reasonable cause for action. In the latter group, 
power is truth.  These are largely discourse-oriented approaches that look at how 
knowledge created about subjects or by them, is empowering and also, potentially 
overpowering. Theirs is a micro level of analysis that wants to understand the ways that 
individual actors experience power, and come to be political in critical self-
transformative processes that occur in a socially constructed and therefore objectively 
impossible world.  
 
5.5 Critical Sociology 
 Of the first group, we have already introduced Critical Theory.  I will speak to 
Habermas in places, especially in chapters five and six, where communicative acts and 
issues of “reason” came into play in the history of the village. I want to look at Critical 
Sociology now. Bourdieu’s Critical Sociology also tries to understand the limits on 
critical capacity by the ways that structures limit this through restraining cultural 
practices or what he called habitus.  In Outline of a Theory of Practice (1972), Bourdieu 
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provides an important step towards integrating structural and subjective explanations of 
social realities. Without wanting to provide a treatise on Bourdieu and his many works, it 
is important to understand that his direction in social thought was in part an attempt to 
provide a bridge between phenomenology and structuralism. The long-standing antimony 
between objective and subjective foci in the social sciences is bridged by his use of 
habitus, which includes a system of dispositions, which an agent develops in response to 
structural forces (1972: intro).  The individual or subject as an actor with agency 
internalizes these structural forces in a personalized mental and somatic set of manners 
and behaviours within the field, be it art, politics, work and so on and thus the objective 
and subjective are synthesized and compatible.  
 Bourdieu in this model of “generative structuralism” explains that the subject has 
little (initial) say about his or her disposition towards choice, having been born into 
particular cultural and class-based value systems that code the body from birth, through 
ways of “standing, speaking and thereby of feeling and thinking (Bourdieu 1972:32; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Vandenberghe 1999; Lizardo 2009). A doxic relationship 
emerges, doxa being a deep internalized set of beliefs and understandings in the agent, 
particular to field (setting-structure, like art, culture, food, work…) which favour the 
“rules” of the field, and therefore satisfy the need of those vested powers and structures, 
which underpin the field. The individual,  by involvement in the field, submits to the 
implicit rule that acts against it are incongruent and unacceptable.  His use of field differs 
from Lefebvre, where the usage implies three distinct parameters of being, the social, 
physical and mental, which manifest into types of spaces (1971:34). Predating 
contemporary feminist theoretical concerns with the body and embodied difference as 
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both material and symbolic grounds for experience and subjectivity, Bourdieu (1972) 
argued that the body is the source of cultural reproduction for, it is in the body that 
subjective qualities combine with the social and cultural world. Mediation of the 
“social/cultural “is a somatic process; the body mediates subjectivity and the “objective” 
world (32). According to Delanty 2011, 
Bourdieu's conception of critique is double edged. On the one side, it is a critique of 
power and inequality and, on the other, it is a critique of the received wisdom and 
institution of science, which he terms' doxa'. Critique is thus both aimed at the viewpoint 
of the habitus and scholarly' doxa'. Against the later he aims to show that social scientific 
knowledge is caught up in the paradox of being an account of the social world while itself 
being a creation of a specific institution of the social world, for science is an institution. 
Indeed, many of Bourdieu's studies have been designed to apply the self-critique of social 
science to itself, showing how particular fields of power and the habitus lie behind 
academic activity (81). 
 
 Criticism of Bourdieu usually focuses on how its critical capacity really only 
extends to understanding how forms of capital accumulation – social, symbolic, cultural 
and economic – are repeatedly generated by structural properties of society. This has 
traditionally suggested that normative or moral transcendence by weaker elements is 
impossible, and that freedom is limited to the opportunities afforded by habitus. Freedom 
is not impossible within Bourdieu’s critical sociology.  Hilgers (2009) suggests that 
freedom is one of the most recurrent themes in discussions of habitus. Hilgers suggests 
that in an epistemological sense, habitus is not confining or deterministic.  There are three 
elements of Bourdieu’s construction of habitus that provide openings to understanding 
the freedom that habitus can impart on actors. The first is the production of an infinite 
number of behaviours from a limited set of principles, the second is permanent mutation 
and the last is the intensive and extensive limits of sociological understanding (Hilgers 
2009:730-732).  
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 The first of these parameters suggests that while habitus is a dominant force of 
cultural inscription and social structural organization, it affords actors, who are unique in 
terms of their being separate from other actors in a corporeal and metaphysical sense, a 
set of principles that allow for interpretation.  Furthermore, various principles can be said 
to be operative at different times in one’s life, or at different times in one’s day, and so it 
is difficult to ascertain whether having principles is emancipating or limiting.  As Hilgers 
suggests, “the form of rules at the heart of these ‘matrices’ functioning are limited but 
transposable to a plurality of contexts, and their content can vary infinitely” (730).   
 Permanent mutation suggests that by participating in practices of habitus, the 
actor in effect invests them with unique qualities, and also that because such practices are 
exposed to heterogeneous contexts and situations, the degree to which adherence or 
change might follow from a practice can’t be said to be self-contained by the practice 
itself.  The dynamism of habitus in flux is something that can only be witnessed as it is 
happening. This clearly aligns with Archer’s (2003) sense of analytic dualism (which we 
discuss momentarily) insomuch as actors are said to influence structures, to influence 
other actors and that the inverse is true also. Rather than being solely a matter of 
downward or central conflation, (on which grounds, she condemned Giddens 
Structuration) the very idea of causation is left to the possibility of being questionable 
because while it can be argued that habitus is essentially a collective experience, there is 
no way to gauge the collectiveness of this experience because any recounting of practices 
by different actors, or even the witnessing of practices by observers can only ever be 
approximate (Hilgers 2009:731).  Even if there is a “structural unity” between members 
of a community, individual experiences of that context will vary widely.   
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 Hence wrapped up in this second point is the third, namely that we study what and 
how we can.  In the empirical sense, obtaining enough data to know each actor’s 
experience in a modern city for example would be impossible, quite literally, impossible, 
so Bourdieu suggests we invoke “conditional totalizations”; a theoretical proposition 
limited by the incapacity to produce empirical results that remains “hypothetical,” and 
often in the absence of violent upheavals, makes it hard to see change (Hilgers 2009:732). 
This in part has influenced my choice to invoke a type of storytelling and conversational 
form of data collection. Furthermore, I am not looking at the village as a social 
movement, but rather a site of discursive and practical value to homeless activists. It is a 
small place, and if not completely knowable, much more so than a large population. 
  Hilger’s argument is that these three premises offer sufficient ambiguity and 
unpredictability to practices that the “hypothetical” possibility of a departure from 
common experience is not impossible.  In this sense, critique must anticipate liminal 
mental and structural spaces as providing the potential for unanticipated results, and these 
I argue give the actor a sense if not the actual capacity of freedom.  Systems beak down, 
economies fail, disasters happen and people lose homes. These are ruptures in the way 
anticipated life happens and present moments where actors might exercise new choices.  
Clearly Bourdieu was less concerned with change, than forces that restrict. While habitus 
suggests acceptable ways of achieving necessary ends to actors distributed across 
different fields, there is enough instability in its performance to allow for change.  Later 
in this chapter, Rose (1999) and Dean (2010) approach the concepts of freedom and 
autonomy within a Foucauldian model of governmentality, as the values that 
neoliberalism produces across cultures and classes in order to shape this choice making. 
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It is correct to not immediately confuse unpredictability with freedom.  Within his system 
of class and habitus, Bourdieu has constructed a situation where freedom, to be freedom, 
must be understood as a feature of or resulting from regulating mechanisms, and this in 
many ways ties back to Derrida’s auto immunity problem with Democracy – freedom 
happens under regulation which demands the restraint of some to the benefit of others. 
    It is perhaps a truism by now that there is no need for a concept like freedom, in 
the absence of restraint. How is necessity converted into free choice, and how can this 
conversion be regulative enough to maintain structures intact, while satisfying the 
autonomous goal of the actor? Critical sociology says that habitus works because it 
produces in fields a synthetic mechanism that links necessity with choice.  In other words, 
actors choose from a set of practically oriented behaviours within fields, but with enough 
sense of self-determinism (according to what they know of freedom and autonomy) to 
satisfy the basic expectation of personal liberty, within practices that do not deride the 
overall security of structures into which these practices are embedded.  The key to critical 
action for Bourdieu then, and which is not impossible, is to locate how actors come to 
change the way they “feel” (habitus) about how things are done in situations (fields).  
  It is fair to point out that not all power exerted by structures is bad or dominating. 
Some of it is designed to afford individuals opportunity. Indeed one might argue that 
under neoliberalism, opportunity is the propagandizing of freedom. According to 
Bourdieu, habitus “is an ordering principle of regulated improvisation, it generates 
practices that tend to “reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of 
their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective 
potentialities in the situation” (Bourdieu 1972/1977:78, in Hilger 2009:739). Ultimately, 
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while habitus instills limits and bounds to the creative and inventive capacities of actors, 
freedom comes to be defined by the ability to make choices within that range of 
constraint. 9  Still that choice making moment is often under-recognized because of the 
tendency to look at antecedent narratives, structural or moral imperatives, as impacting 
internal deliberative practices in actors. For Bourdieu, the practical and common sense 
experience of the subject is already cast by her habitus in various fields, and so 
deliberative aspects in these areas of mundane life don’t have anything to do with self-
transformative critical attitude.  As much as I want to understand how actors make 
alternative choices to how things are commonly done, I think that common sense and 
very subjective, even imaginary aspects of the actor impact her as matters of a pragmatic 
nature. 
 I have to argue as Archer (2003) does, that very often, actions with structural 
implications occur in a place of which we can only know its relics or phenomenological 
expressions, its objective truth is beyond the capacity of knowing in an empirical or 
positivist sense. Delanty suggests a connection between Critical Sociology and Critical 
Realism. They each are explanatory exercises.  The former wants to “unmask” the limits 
of common sense, and the latter, the limits of empirical reality as a source for critical 
attitude (2011:80). There are other similarities in the work of critical realists and 
Bourdieu.   
 
 5.6 Critical Realism 
 Critical realism stems from the premise that through our primary senses we are 
able to discern objective physical truths about the world, yet our secondary perceptual 
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senses often misinterpret this “pure” information. So it is necessary to be critical of 
realism (Sayer 2000; Bhaskar 1975).    From a critical point of view, this means we must 
be critical of what we sense to be real, because, given the same set of physical stimuli, a 
variety of misinterpretations might arise among individuals.  The opposition of the two 
ways of knowing is between a mind-dependent experience of the world that tries to 
comprehend a mind-independent reality. In a very broad sense, this approach suggests 
that the representative value of objects, and by extension, events often linked with objects, 
are constitutive of basic perception, and therefore, perceptions about reality are key to our 
understanding of critical processes.10  
 Very simply, for critical realism, reality is largely non-observable and highly 
contingent but there are objective underlying structures that shape action. Margaret 
Archer (1995, 2001, 2003) had argued that sociology suffers from the problem of 
conflation in the sense that the tendency of sociology to present social phenomena as 
oppositional, structure and agency for example, has created a situation where we tend to 
see causation as a unilateral or one-sided affair. In the sense that structure is seen as 
causal, one speaks of downward conflation. In the case of agency affecting structure, one 
speaks of upward conflation.  Structuration, as proposed by Giddens (1984) suggests 
central conflation whereby each, structure and agency are mutually implicated in the 
agency of actors (Archer 1995).    
 Archer’s analytical dualism (1995:165-94) is a way to overcome the conflating 
tendency of traditional modes of thinking.  In this model, one starts with the assumption 
that structures exist, and are real, but not directly observable. Pre-existing structures 
influence the agency of actors, whose subsequent action in turn produces new and 
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different structures aligned with the goals and objectives of actors in concert or acting 
independently.  This is an open-ended process.  The future is indeterminate because the 
subsequent results in a proposed future are unknowable.   However, she argues that it is 
possible to trace the elaboration of the articulation between agents and structures – to 
unpick them - through a process of analyzing what she calls morphogenetic sequences 
(ibid).  Looking at independently oriented actor-structure sequences, which contribute to 
overall social systems, allows the researcher opportunity to discern how such sequences 
were internally produced - what their internal dynamics were. In this way Archer finds 
means to link agents and structures in social outcomes. 
 Critical realism tends to observe ontological arguments before epistemological 
arguments, since they are more concerned with the structure of social reality, and because 
they argue that objective reality is not observable even though it is there.  The action of 
individuals give evidence of the choices they make often based on unforeseen or 
unobservable ontological experiences that contribute to a uniquely understood sense of 
reality. In much the way that Latour’s (2005:64-68) “personal metaphysics” unites us 
with an understanding of ontological imperatives that lead to an actor’s understanding of 
social reality, critical realists similarly suspend imposing a measure of reality onto the 
socially constructive powers or engagement of actors in their own lives, except they do 
say there is a structure that underscores social relations even if we cannot see it.  We see 
its results in the ways people choose to act in it.  Archer says, “People are indeed 
perfectly uninteresting if they possess no personal powers which can make a difference” 
(2000:19).   
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 Critical realism then is critical for the way it problematizes reality as a category of 
knowledge for actors.  Another departure for the critical realists is the engagement of 
actors in a world that is not merely social nor simply agential, but imbued with other 
physical, spiritual and unknown qualities that have impact on what people do. This once 
again unites it with Latour.  In We have Never Been Modern, Latour argues that strategies 
and political ideas might take the form of arguments or discourses, but that they also 
manifest in forms like missiles, or tax forms, or police actions. As such it is impossible to 
separate the idea from the material and non-human aspects of its possibility (1993:41-43, 
98-100, 103-105).  The tendency to separate culture from Nature is a fallacy of 
modernism, equally dealt with by critical realism.11 
 It is simplistic to say that the cultural realist model is simply a way of explaining 
how everything in nature, which stands independently of our knowledge of it, and 
therefore has an independent objective reality, is related to explaining special 
consequences, such as the events of one’s day.  This is not the case.  The emergent nature 
of cultural reality in human actors is embedded across three axes; the empirical, the 
actual and the real (Sayer 2000:11).  The empirical is what we see as observers, and what 
the actor perceives or experiences as a result of daily life events. The actual refers to a 
world of events with consequences that are produced by the real domain.  The real refers 
to the underlying structures or generative mechanisms that have determining power but 
which owe their existence to other mechanisms outside of their own activation and exist 
beyond the immediate observations of the observer (ibid).  These mechanisms include 
institutional arrangements and individual social actors. Within this perspective, the 
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critical goal of social science is to reveal the objective reality of the real that exists 
beyond our primary sensory apparatuses.    
 Critical realism, for the most part, is guided by the inevitability of multifarious 
causal relationships between different mechanisms, and between different actors; actors 
in themselves become mechanisms to the degree to which they influence the 
consequences of other peoples’ actions, and by the actions they take having effects on the 
structures in which they are engaged.  Hence an actor is part structure, and structures are 
part actors. The critical access points in this mode occur within and between the three 
levels of understandable phenomena so there is no default “reality” in which to place the 
actions of defined actors and structures, nor a single external point of query to initiate a 
critique.   One might sense a certain degree of vagueness in this simple summary.  It is 
not within the scope of this dissertation to treat cultural realism in its entirety. Margaret 
Archer (1996, 2003) has sought to explain how actors enter into processes of critique and 
critical action by defining a new locus of freedom; the individual’s inner-self that is 
already composed by its experience of other mechanisms and linkages.   
 Archer’s construction of the “internal conversation” (2003) is a way to understand 
how the freedom and autonomy of actors and also thereby their potential for critique 
really reside beyond any observable phenomenon.  Although she expresses the tendency 
of cultures to limit freedom, in the senses that one might be limited by language or 
custom, or by experience, freedom always appears a matter of choice (1996).  Freedom, 
however, must not be understood as the constant value that underwrites all action and 
choice. Freedom is especially expressed in transformative moments and events. Archer 
supports the idea that all moments of cultural reproduction inhere the possibility of 
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change, which is essentially a problem with liminality (Archer 1996:91-93).  Interestingly 
she argues quite astutely that the very limitation one’s generation perceives of in its ideals 
about freedom, are often the mechanisms the previous generation created in pursuit of 
what it called freedom.  Hence, Freedom, like the individual, is subject to change, and 
universal discussions that beyond locating where ideas of freedom are computed (the 
internal conversation) are moot unless situated in actual cases. The key to understanding 
reality, the key to engaging in a critique or to understand broader social communities of 
critique, therefore, cannot be found outside of the intimate thoughts of the individual.  
The main thesis of Archer’s (2003) Structure, Agency and The Internal Conversation, is 
that social agents compute and imagine the results of thorough reflexive deliberations 
about their ultimate concerns in an existential and deeply personal context to which they 
commit themselves as the result of an “internal conversation”.   The causal powers of 
mechanisms, the links between structure and agency are mediated in a thought process 
that determines how actors align themselves with the social or political projects that 
create the appearance, literally appearance in a phenomenological sense, of this agency.  
In other words, it is not the case that actors are engaged in all actions that might take 
place in a social system.  
 Structures or mechanisms cannot be said to be effective in the capacity of 
producing the same outcomes for all actors, or for each actor in the same pattern over 
time and space.  So, for example of a critical action that meets resistance, protesters who 
resist the imposing of an oil pipeline might unite and blockade a road. Likely the 
protesters will meet with executive force, police or soldiers. The choice of protesters to 
be at this protest is based on the internalization of experience for which  there exists no 
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universal anticipatory test in social science as such. An actor who does not protest that 
plant, will not experience the same resistance, this seems obvious. However, if the same 
non-protester becomes a protester on another site, because they are personally motivated 
by cruelty to animals, and they decide to picket a lab, they are likely to meet some form 
of resistance, or to be in a contest in which they must resist other mechanisms.  So 
resistance as an example of action towards issues of justice, is universal only in so much 
as people choose to be in a contest, but not all gatherings of protest, nor all gatherings in 
any sense, can presume a reaction out of a knowable future based on structural 
probabilities. Resistance may have the same net goals, but the form it actually takes in 
practice, contributes to a variety of internalized experiences that create the matter of 
internal conversations. In a sense this ultimate potential for action suggest that there are 
always mechanisms, but that the engagement of actors within them is merely latent, so 
there is no way to determine how agency will effect structure, nor vice versa except in 
concrete terms.  Delanty (2011) suggests that this is a general weakness of the critical 
realism model; despite claiming to be a model of social transformation, it “does not offer 
much in the way of an interpretation of how social change happens” because there is no 
concrete model of events and actions, actors and mechanisms that provides any kind of 
anticipatory capacity (77). 
  Hence, a mechanism’s total effect on action or agency is unpredictable, and the 
idea that empirical observation can possibly observe the entirety of human complexity 
that might be represented by it, is misdirection.  The only constant in all this, is 
something that sociology has had a hard time dealing with, the internal mechanisms of 
the social being. So while mechanisms and structures can be said to exist, the individual 
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articulates her own objectives and values from an immeasurable range of such things as 
they may be made aware to her from her experience, and by exercising choice can be said 
to mediate her own social and cultural reality. This is freedom. 
   In line with Bourdieu’s (1977) generative structuralism, the internal 
conversation takes place in the actor as she mediates her places in a field though her 
perception of habitus.   Society therefore is either reproduced to the degree that actors act 
commensurately with habitus, or it might change, to the degree that situations arise where 
the internal conversation  creates the need for alternate ways of doing things.  Actors are 
determined, but not by structure, not by agency as such, but by the way an internal 
conversation produces agency in various alignments with established practices or towards 
to new ends.  This has implications for practical undertakings for social scientists, 
especially as it regards critical action and critique.    
 Delanty suggests that much of the force behind critical realism is the detailed 
illustration of myriad and complex connections between things and the mechanisms that 
have power over the consequences of these connections.  In this sense, it parallels much 
of the classical structural analysis of society, but also finds affinity with Latour’s Actor 
Network Theory12 (Law 2004; Latour 2005), Social Network Analysis (Wellman 1991) 
and in fact incorporates much of the network language in its formulations (Sayer 2000).  
Furthermore, it suggest a pattern of connectivity between mechanisms, and between 
mechanisms and consequences, that while not necessarily random, since it corresponds to 
an undiscerned objective reality, still inheres dendritic and polymorphous nature that is 
rhizomatic in a Deleuzean sense and that suggests a readiness to deal with the messy and 
often chaotic manner in which critiques and critical actions manifest.  Hence despite 
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many critiques of critical realism, the strengths of critical realism are in its interest in 
going beyond the empirical or apparent. In doing so, it asks to keep in mind the 
underlying mechanisms that shape the imbroglios and other events that actors 
alternatively step into and out of largely on their own volition.  This mode of critique is 
also open ended, allowing for the actor’s agency in any one action for example to be 
linked to their experience in many others. Furthermore, there is no reason to separate out 
the actions of agents, nor the influence of structures, since ultimately each system is 
implicated in the consequences of the other, and so it is a forward looking mode of 
understanding. A such, normative mechanisms, spiritual mechanisms, authoritative others, 
can all be generative in the sense of a particular action, because their effect, following 
Archer, is computed, perhaps correlated into consequences within the actor as a internal 
conversation.  
 The implication of critical realism, for understanding critical ideas about freedom 
and autonomy is that ultimately, choice resides in the individual and they have the power 
to reconcile the influence of various mechanisms internally.  Hence, predictability is not 
so likely from a critical realism perspective, but understanding an event, or a 
consequence, unraveling the links between mechanisms and consequences back though 
time, in order to see their current status is very much the end result.13 
 Delanty argues that, like Foucault, critical realism is about power (77).  But in the 
former power is generally assumed to be everywhere, something all people have, and 
domination is less common, and generated by technologies of government (the state) as a 
means to regulating power relationships, or for CR in particular generative mechanisms 
(Lemke 2001:5; Delanty 2011:77).  In CR, power is perceived as generated by 
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mechanisms, and catalyzed or rejected in the internal conversation (Archer 2003; Turner 
2008; Delanty 2011).  
 Each of the previous modes of critique suggest that sociological critique can 
identify how domination happens as the result of objective and asymmetrical 
distributions of power. They suggest that transcendent truth about a just state of affairs 
can be mobilized to overcome inequalities and domination, as a way of giving the 
dominated power to overcome objectively understood structures of domination. They 
also understand the role of the researcher or social scientist to be in a better position to 
understand these hidden systems or internal mechanisms than the person whose common 
sense awareness is all they really have—what critical capacity they have on their own is 
really limited to their first hand experience of situations. This places a moral burden on 
social critique to determine means by which to identify the just cause and to pursue it.  
Put another way, the mission of critique is to demonstrate how truth is dominated, and to 
argue for means out of this suppression.   
 The usefulness of these three approaches is subject to debate. For my purposes, I 
see the importance of structural tendencies to control actors as a matter of concern for 
freedom or for critical action. Critical theory is weak largely because it cannot prove a 
false consciousness, nor can it demonstrate how social transformation on the scale it 
argued for can happen.  It’s value to my work is to consider the implicit and unpublicized 
ways that power works to control others – to dominate, if you wish, though media, 
powerful institutions in the service of capital, envisioned in my work as central to 
neoliberalism and the governance that oversee Dignity Village.  Bourdieu, if taken in the 
generous parameters I have extended, leaves room for actors to act, but he has very much 
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underplayed the unique and commonsensical types of critical moments that impinge on 
the choice to act, in the sense of activists’ breaks with habitus.  Critical realism wants to 
give it all to us, a sort of holistic critical perspective, but it is difficult in several ways.  
First, it assumes that there is a basic structure to the world, and I in agreement with 
Latour have said earlier that I do not see this. Furthermore, there is no way to understand 
how the critical attitudes expressed in conversational types link up to lead to acts of 
resistance, or to form socially transformative critique, nor to anticipate how research 
might impact this.  I find the idea of an inner conversation very interesting, but I cannot 
see its applicability to anything but ideal situations.  The idea of conversational “types” is 
difficult to support in reality.  People change their arguments frequently and often say 
and act in contradicting manners. It is in fact these contradictions between ideas and 
action that Boltanski will speak too at the end of the following section. In the cases of 
Tent City or Dignity Village, on the street and even entering housing, for the first time in 
many years, the people I have worked with experience ambiguous transformations, and 
the conversations, the ideas they come to find some recourse to, all these things are not 
typical nor static.  So I want to see that there is an internal conversation, but I understand 
it reflects the shifting and merging critical attitudes of liminal personae, and so of types 
there can be none.  
  All three of these positions furthermore, as I stated earlier, suggest that there is 
truth out there, that must be known to the actor for her to act. And they leave no room for 
anticipating or understanding action generated in spaces or modes of living that are 
poorly formed in terms of structural or other cultural values - of ambiguous and liminal 
cultural spaces like the village, they are of little use, in that sense.  The next two 
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approaches reverse the fundamental arrangement of truth over power, arguing that you 
cannot mobilize truth to produce power because power is truth. Foucault’s genealogical 
approach is a deconstructive form of critique14 in the sense that he seeks to understand 
how problems come to be imagined as they are by powerful people, subjects, groups and 
government. Essentially he argues that there is no truth outside of power, that power 
creates what societies take as true by creating powerful discourse and provides 
technologies of the self though education, medicine, science and so on by which 
subjectivities learn what power wants us to think about ourselves.   So social critique 
wants to ask how a certain way of knowing has come to be thought of by regimes of 
power, and might be thought of otherwise.  This is essentially the question, I have asked 
villagers. 
 
5.7 Foucault and Genealogical Critique 
Foucault writes,  
 
“Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary.  It operates on a field of 
entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and 
recopied many times” (Foucault in Rabinow 1984:76).  
 
 Despite that often cited quote, genealogy is a difficult concept to define, and then 
even harder to easily describe against other forms of historical analysis, including 
Foucault’s prior attachment to “archaeology” (1967, 1969).  Assuming that one can 
accept the differences between Derrida’s deconstructionism and Foucault’s approach, one 
can also accept that there are similarities.15  Perhaps most importantly is a shared interest 
in understanding how current affairs come to be understood in a certain way, and to 
reveal other ways of seeing an issue, such as madness or democracy. During the 1960’s 
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before his turn away from structuralism, Foucault described his method of writing the 
past as “archaeology” (1967, 1969).  In The Order of Things (1967), Foucault agues that 
history itself is not a safely packaged record of events, but a telling story of how reality is 
constructed by dominant epistemes of a place and a time, and converted into the way 
certain “eventalizations,” of a time are treated or experienced, such as madness ([1961] 
2006 ).  History then was not about point in time events, but about thought and ideas 
since history as written manifested these and not the essence of anything tangible per se. 
“What is madness,” is not as important as,  “how is schizophrenia now understood?” The 
archaeological method was useful as a way of understanding how to compare different 
points of view about similar concepts, such as madness, between cultures or time periods, 
but could do little to explain how such notions shifted and changed over (through) time, 
from episteme to episteme as it were.16 Genealogical critique looks at how powerful 
regimes of knowledge manufacture the object of discourses that impact how subjects 
understand the world. Governmentality then is a result of how government comes to be 
imagined throughout time. 
 A “history of the present” as Foucault’s work is often called, is “mental” space in 
which to advance a critical appraisal of practices or ideas, rather than to impose the key 
elements of a dogma about power or historical patterns in a epistemic view of the world 
at all times (Dean 1994). Dean (1991, 1994, 2010) correctly suggests that Foucault’s idea 
of governmentality is “less a technique of the empirical sciences” and is more of a way to 
keep in touch with the processes of knowledge production by which life attains relevance 
to actors.  However, the routes by which this relevance is directed into the action of social 
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actors are divergently constructed, and it is by understanding this construction of action 
that critique can convert into action capable of displacing power. 
 Foucault’s work on governmentality employs a genealogical approach, which 
provokes criticism. “Genealogy is characterized as a diagnostic of the present by 
‘problematizing’ taken-for-granted assumptions and anti-anachronistic refusal to read the 
past in terms of the present” (Dean 2010:3).  Governmentality, however, is not simply 
about the government that controls us administratively, but is critical analysis directed 
towards understanding modes of constructing the self (Delanty 2011:83). Genealogical 
criticism stands out against classical “critique,” such as that associated with the Frankfurt 
school, as a form of criticism under the frame of “universal norms and truths pointing to a 
necessary end” (Dean 1991:3). Most importantly, as Dean (1991, 2010) and others 
(Gordon 1991; Hacking 1999) note, Foucault’s genealogical approach carries a certain 
burden of critique, and it cannot remain descriptive or contented with simple 
observations or the reduction of events to universalizing principles that bear no moral or 
ethical consequence for society.   
 Foucault asserts that neoliberalism is “not Adam Smith; neo-liberalism is not the 
Gulag on the insidious scale of capitalism” (1978:131). Neoliberalism(s) describe an 
indefinite range of rationalities and references to a style of liberal government and 
therefore to speak of an ideal type of neoliberalism is impossible. Rose and Miller (1992) 
suggest that all rationalities are moral, epistemological and idiomatic. To understand a 
rationale therefore, means to discern how these qualities are uniquely manifest.17 My 
understanding of neoliberalism is that it imposes on the actor the responsibility of self-
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care and conduct and produces this responsibility as a type of autonomy that successfully 
achieved, confirms (the fallacy of) freedom.  
 In the U.S., shortly after the Depression, economic and social policy emerged that 
was influenced by intellectual movements at the University of Chicago and the social 
becomes re-described as a form of the economic (Gordon 1991:42). “Economics thus 
becomes an ‘approach’ capable of addressing the totality of human behaviour…” (43).  
Gordon reminds us further that under American neoliberalism, classical positions on the 
subject - that is simply as a free thinking, free-choosing economic man – no longer 
remains outside the reach of government, but is transmuted; “homo - economicus is 
manipulable man” (43).  The manipulation is achieved through direct measures that 
stimulate economies and by reconfiguration of the worker subjectivity. Hence the worker 
is no longer merely a labourer, under neoliberalism, workers are envisioned as producers 
and consumers - entrepreneurs of themselves (44). 18   Under neoliberalism, the 
maintenance of this enterprise, this human product as it were, is what comes to be known 
as “care of the self” and is central to his critique of governmentality (Foucault 1991; 
Gordon 1991; Dean 1991; Rose 1993).  The implication of this for the Dignity homeless 
is that their poverty is a symbol of their failed conduct, and life on the streets is a sort of 
brutal punishment for millions of people who either chronically or periodically fall in and 
out of neoliberalism’s expectations for conduct and personal government.  The village, 
living in the village, is for the lucky few a certain sign that they are free and moving in a 
positive direction (away from the streets and shelters, towards home ownership and 
community).  In fact, the sample of the mission statement at the beginning of this 
dissertation speaks in this tone of reintegration, community involvement and positive 
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contribution by the homeless villager as a testimony to the village’s imaginary and 
potential capacity to fulfill this need of neoliberal governmentality.   Governmentality, 
then, “the art of government,” as Foucault called it, is a rationalized system for ordering 
the conduct of citizens.  Below are the first five things a would-be villager needs to know. 
Each one of these rules is violated several times a day by different people, and are 
frequently used by powerful factions in the village to control the behaviour of villagers or 
to outcast others.  One must memorize these and sign the document – after that you can 
pretty much abandon them as sees fit. 
Fig. 15. The Five Rules of Dignity Village 
 
To stay in Dignity, you must agree to and follow our five basic rules: 
1.   No violence to yourselves or others 
2.   No theft 
3.   No alcohol, illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia on-site or within a one-block radius 
4.   No constant disruptive behavior 
5.   Everyone must contribute to the operation and maintenance of the Village. A 
minimum of 
10 hours are required 
per week. 
I understand that Dignity Village is incorporated as a membership-based non-profit 
organization. By signing this agreement, I become eligible for membership, according to the 
terms of the bylaws, and recommendation of the Tents and Population Standing Committee. In 
addition, due to the participatory culture of Dignity Village, I understand that it is sometimes 
necessary to convene meetings of the members or Village Councilors with less advance notice 
than required by ORS Chapter 65. Therefore, in signing this agreement, I agree to forego and 
forfeit all rights to advance notice of emergency meetings of the membership or Village 
Council, as provided by section 4.10.1 of Dignity Village bylaws. I have read the Dignity 
Admittance Agreement and agree with its terms and I agree to live by these terms and the rules 
of the village. 
Signature:    Date:   
 
5.8  Governmentality 
 Above are the infamous 5 basic rules of Dignity village.  Beyond being 
reasonable or practical, they are intended to make a statement to would-be villagers that 
their lives will be governed.  Not one of these rules goes unbroken – residents there break 
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each rule at some point, and I am beginning to think that this rule breaking is a form of 
resistance to the village’s own governmentality.  In other words, the village and its 
political front - the leaders and council, must mediate city governance of the community 
by appearing to enforce the rules that bind the village to a neoliberal episteme of housing 
governance, of which the five rules are a small part. The leadership struggles to ensure 
that the village complies with the demands of the city. Within the community however, 
these rules and others, are an unevenly applied set of conditions that leadership and 
village members use to govern each other’s conduct.  Each of these rules in their own 
way is a discourse or contributes to an anti-discourse of street life.  One enters the village 
then agreeing to terms that demand a mental shift towards conduct of conduct that is 
representative of broader conventional imaginings of how good citizens ought to be.  So 
why are the rules broken so often?  I look at governmentality in detail, and determine 
what gaps it leaves for misunderstanding places like the village. 
 In his chapter on governmentality in the important, The Foucault Effect: Studies 
in Governmentality (1991), Foucault offers: 
In conclusion, I would like to say that on second thoughts the more exact title I would 
like to have given the course of lectures, which I have begun this year, is not the one I 
originally chose. ‘Security, territory and population’: what I would like to undertake is 
something, which I would term a history of ‘governmentality’. By this word I mean three 
things: 
 
1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form or power, which has as its target population, as it s principal form of 
knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of 
security. 
2. The tendency, which over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led 
towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of 
this type of power which may termed government, resulting on the one hand, in 
the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses and, on the 
other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs. 
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3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice 
of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes ‘governmentalized’ (Foucault, 
1991:103). 
 
 I have condensed governmentality as follows: The various techniques and systems 
of governing conduct that shape both individuals and society in places and over time, are 
what Foucault (1991) has called “governmental rationality” or governmentality. Under 
neoliberal governmentality, power is not just repressive or dominating, it is creative and 
unites subjects with knowledge produced by society for the very purpose of creating 
freely choosing subjects as a function of political economy (Dean 2010; Delanty 2011; 
Rose 1999).  As Lemke (2000) suggests, for Foucault, 
Domination is a particular type of power relationship that is both stable and hierarchical, 
fixed and difficult to reverse. Foucault reserves the term “domination” to “what we 
ordinarily call power” (1988b, p. 19). Domination refers to those asymmetrical 
relationships of power in which the subordinated persons have little room for 
manoeuvre because their “margin of liberty is extremely limited” (1988b, p. 12). 
But states of domination are not the primary source for holding power or exploiting 
asymmetries, on the contrary they are the effects of technologies of government. 
Technologies of government account for the systematization, stabilization and 
regulation of power relationships that may lead to a state of domination (Lemke 
2000:6). 
 
  The central questions in governmentality studies are “how” questions, how we 
govern our selves, how we are governed by others (Dean 1999, 2010). This approach 
differs from theories of the state, which are rationalist discourses and “may be 
characterized by: a state-centric position that anticipates the global environment as 
anarchical, political action is carried out by atomized independent actors; the bases for 
analysis is a positivist and clearly defined subject-object position where theory invests 
actors with predefined potentials, and the world with probable outcomes from certain 
types of actions; and actor’s political agency is external to their social lives” (Che 2007: 
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3).   Though governmentality did not become a central part of Foucault’s work until later 
in his career, and then only briefly though his lectures (1991), this “art of government” is 
tied closely to his earlier analyses of power and the state.19   
 As techniques of governance, these sites and the power of the expert constitute a 
basic structure in the “conduct of conduct”, or “governmentality” which Foucault has 
called the key problem of modern neoliberal government (Dean 1999).  To flesh out this 
problem let me suggest as Dean (1991) and Foucault (1978) have, that under sovereignty 
the problem of government was relatively simple; a monarch had supreme power over 
life or death, and sovereign power worked though legitimate or illegitimate means, (by 
taking that life or through authority of the right to take that life). Poverty and charity were 
managed by local parishes, religious orders and until the advent of capital, the homeless 
were understood as somewhat divine in the sense that Christ was a peasant, charity was a 
virtue and poverty inhered the symbolic quality of piety (Bahr 1973; Wrightson and 
Levine 1995; Marx and Engels 1975).  Marx characterizes the poor, prior to capital,  as 
"those whose property consists of life, freedom, humanity and citizenship of the state, 
who own nothing except themselves" (Marx and Engels 1975:256). Sherover (1979) 
reminds us that according to Marx, the poor had the mystical ability to see beyond the 
materialist and vain attachment to gold and (in this case, an anecdote about wood thieves), 
wood (56). Marx said, “The poor are not deceived by an "abject materialism, “which 
“enthrones the immoral, irrational and soulless abstractions of a particular material object 
" (1975:262 in Sherover 1979:58).  The poor therefore, in the West, continued to inhere 
this essential, incorruptible simplicity that deserved pity if not compassion, at least until 
their poverty became a device for capital, and a problem for governance (Marx and 
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Engels 1975;  Marshall 1950; Dean 1991; Proacci; 1991). 
 Foucault reminds us that governmentality begins with the separation of the state 
from the direct service of the sovereign.20 The state was very much concerned with proper 
management of populations and encouraging economic health.  Thus the state for 
Foucault begins, “not in the negative and pejorative sense we give it today, but in a full 
positive sense. The state is governed according to rational principles which are intrinsic 
to it and which cannot be derived solely from natural or divine laws or the principles of 
wisdom…” (1978:212-13).   
 Foucault also cautions us not to overvalue the state as a totalizing system in 
current neoliberal governmentality.  It is not that the state has taken over society as much 
as the state has become governmentalized by what he would call, “governmentalization 
of the state” (Dean 2010:36).  Furthermore it is important to look at government not in 
terms of who has power and who does not, but more so in terms of how the definition of 
government is contested, constructed, assembled, and “transformed from multiple and 
heterogeneous elements” (2010:37). Hence understanding power requires us to look at 
how it operates through techniques, practices, procedures – rationalized systems - that 
produce observable effects.  In this sense, one might argue that to see power one must 
look at how people are politically activated since, “power is exercised by virtue of things 
being known and people being seen” (Foucault 1980:154).  
 It is important that Foucault imagined conduct, as government, in very much the 
way it was used prior to the 20th century; not only in the common use, as an institutional 
or other system of managing a population, but also as the way one imagines and proceeds 
to manage their spiritual and physical well being, on their own. The government of one’s 
 304 
self, as a sense of order in one’s moral, spiritual and daily life. Hence governmentality is 
from the outset a concept that incorporates conduct of the group with conduct of the self.   
In another sense, governmentality implies that the way one conducts one’s personal being, 
also determines the group’s well-being, and so one of the central problems of (neoliberal) 
governance, regardless of the level, is well-being; conduct should be directed towards the 
well-being of the self as also a means of achieving the well-being of the group.21 
 The ethical implications of “conduct” appear from the reflexive qualities of the 
word, conduct. Insomuch as conduct as a noun suggests a form of behaviour exercised 
within or compared to the behaviour of others, “to conduct oneself” means to gauge one’s 
choices of behaviour in relation to others, as a conscious decision and is therefore ethical 
and moral (Dean 2010:17). Government is dependent, therefore, on the way people come 
to know about themselves and the world around them; on language and vocabularies, 
symbolic systems and signs, and on administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms, each of 
which contributes to specific knowledge about a governable subject.  There are two sides 
to governmentality then; the first is a subject who is governed, and the second is a subject 
who governs him or herself.  
 In Technologies of the Self (Foucault 1988) knowledge created about a subject, 
and therefore, that can be held over it, creates power over the subject. Within this 
classification or understanding of one’s own subjectivity then, is the key to freedom, a 
freedom gained through self-control (Foucault 1988:18-19). Clearly it stands that not all 
subjects will comply or meet all expectations of themselves or others all the time.  There 
is no way to anticipate that the personal habits or conduct of populations will embody all 
that is ideally framed for them in rational policies or rules.  It is out of this range of 
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possibility for human action towards or away from normalized practice that the state 
finds reason to exercise its power; it is also within this range that individuals can define 
for themselves the habits or actions they accept or reject and is, therefore, the source of 
their own freedom, their own power.  It is perhaps why people in the village behave so 
inconsistently - as a means to feel powerful.  Where Bourdieu (1967) had seen habitus as 
a system for restricting the action of actors within culturally reproduced values and goals, 
and thereby expected their power to be a socially and culturally restricted commodity, for 
Foucault, power is not total control by subjects, or by forces external to them, like the 
state.  Power is relational and fluid; freedom is regulated not withheld (Dean 1999; 
Foucault 1977, 1988, 1991; Rose and Miller 1992).   
 Governmentality then, can be understood as a way of describing how subjects are 
empowered by the freedom they are accorded by regimes of truth, and the patterns of 
actions such rationalizations produce, within strategies of governance (Dean 2010:37; 
Foucault 1991:78-80) as revealed by for example the language inherent to laws and 
policies regarding housing.   Once again, governmentality studies ask how questions: how 
did a certain subjectivity come to be understood that way, how did a certain social issue 
come to be understood as a problem – and later, for this dissertation, how do undeserving 
problems become deserving recipients of assistance?  Of particular interest to my 
research is how homeless people in the village understand freedom and autonomy.  If 
these are things that Ibrahim says we must work towards, then towards what, and against 
what impediments?  Foucault said,  
On the other hand, I do not think that there is anything that is functionally by its very 
nature absolutely liberating. Liberty is a practice. So there may, in fact, always be a 
certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even to 
break them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will 
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have liberty automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of 
men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. 
This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned 
around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because "liberty" is what must be 
exercised” (1984:245). 
 
 I take this to mean that the ambiguity is in the underlying values; liberty, freedom, 
or autonomy.  Hence in a space like the village, where the rules that delineate the proper 
accords by which to experience such values, rules, one might say, are poorly and 
irregularly interpreted and executed, ambiguity extends to how life is lived, and this is a 
condition of liminality.  The liminal nature of life there is because there is but an 
imaginary structure to how such important values should be achieved, and therefore, no 
way to know how, in a practical sense, to work towards them, as Ibrahim, Foucault and 
others have stated. 
 
5.9 Freedom and Autonomous Actors 
 Nikolas Rose (1999) analyses political power and the concept of freedom, 
primarily by re-evaluating Foucault’s notion of “conduct of conduct” and mirroring 
closely Foucault’s elucidation of the heteronomous and autonomous expression of 
subjectivities, in which there are ranges of action that are delimited by the world of others, 
by cultural principles or norms, in the former, or within personal frames of choice in the 
latter (Foucault 1982).  Rose (1999) proposes that traditional normative evaluations of the 
state (the state is good or bad, governance is good or bad) are problematic themes, which 
more or less dominate the traditional literature (16). The values inherent to these 
judgments are based on appraisals of how governments or associated agencies are 
organized within a structure of power, control and influence. Governance has come to 
mean in this tradition of inquiry, and for the “advanced liberal democracy”, the outcome 
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of all these interdependencies and linkages (17).  In the West, the tendency to reconfigure 
the various domains to which the government must be addressed; the family the economy, 
the community, and its new ways of doing this, through associations, communities and 
private citizens is what Rose calls “advanced liberalism” (140). The goal for this 
governance, the preferred outcome from these linkages is a self-awareness of the subject-
citizen as a free, yet responsible subject (of governance) (1999:68).    
 According to Rose (1999) governmentality separates out the tendency to dominate 
as an essentialized result of power and governance. “To govern humans is not to crush 
their capacity to act, but to acknowledge it and to utilize it for one’s own objective” 
(Rose 1999:4).22  This ability to govern, this rise of a governmentality of advanced 
liberalism, a term used often by Rose (Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 1993; Rose 1999) of 
which current neo-liberal regimes are to be considered a part, lends itself to a 
genealogical undertaking which more than explaining the history of the event or idea, in 
this case, wants to show the infusing of certain values such as deserving or undeserving 
into the concepts of autonomy and freedom in order to clarify their current meaning.  
 Rose says, “Freedom is an artifact of government, but it is not thereby an illusion” 
(63).  One point of query is that while he asks when governance is good and when is it 
bad, he generally assumes that freedom is always good and not accidental (16). I have to 
argue later that much of the crisis of community at Dignity Village results from too much 
freedom, or at least believing they are free too much. However, Rose shows that freedom, 
like notions of merit, deserving or undeserving, rather than being some accidental by-
products of the evolution of human civilization, are historically things which were 
considered, and discussed and that the “strategies” of liberal market economies and social 
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planning have been crafted and pitched on the very basis of a consciousness about the 
essentialness of including, (not defining), values of freedom and merit, though the 
measure of this freedom, and the means to earn it vary across time and place (67).  Hence, 
a genealogical undertaking of current social relations that hinge on these valuations is 
likely to reveal the patterns of power and regimes of knowledge that any emancipatory or 
critical action needs to understand and is therefore an aspect of pragmatic and 
deconstructive consideration. 
  Restoring the poor to a place in the economy by providing conditions by which 
the poor can prove their worthiness of charity through casual labour denote a peculiar 
sense of freedom and salvation grounded in the religious ferment of the 19th century. 
From Hobbes, Locke and Smith, and later in Hayek, von Rustow and under current 
neoliberal planning23, freedom of the subject to engage unhindered in the social and 
economic avenues of her life receive major consideration, since governing over a free 
citizen, “validates liberal systems against the tyranny of despots of and dictators” (Rose 
1999). However, freedom, is a capricious, not transcendental value, and the limits to it, 
the routes to experiencing it, are differently composed across time and place, which 
means values of who is deserving of freedom must also shift.24   
 Place is important in this sense, since freedom, as an object of pragmatic 
investigation has come to define the space “within which contemporary rationalities of 
government compete” (1999: 94). If freedom and power are not solely to be found in or 
to result from the venue of government, if they can reside outside of this space, perhaps 
in many spaces, then to define power and freedom requires a retooling of the 
investigation of what and where the strategic practices, devices and relations of agency 
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take place. “In short, one must abandon the political calculus of domination and 
liberation… because power also acts through practices that “make up subjects as free 
persons” (95).  Rose’s description of “practices” of government echoes Michel de 
Certeau’s (1984) strategy; Rose says, “practices of government are deliberate attempts to 
shape (human) conduct in relation to certain objectives…” (4). In this way practices act 
as any strategy would in de Certeau’s framework. Where de Certeau had implied that the 
human (“end-user”- my words) consumer was victimized and potentially dominated by 
strategies, and more or less needed to appropriate only what was useful to him to avoid 
total domination, Rose is arguing that domination and governing are not the same thing.  
Where all strategies in de Certeau imply a certain attempt by an institution or  “group” to 
serve its own interests by co-opting the agency of “user-consumers” (my words), thereby 
combining governance and domination in a single category of a strategy of potential 
usury.  Rose does not do this.   
 Rose points out that Foucault saw freedom as a way of practicing upon oneself, 
rather than as a state or a quality outside of the agent (95). Hence while notions of 
deserving and undeserving tend to set out the limits of material and spiritual well-being 
that are said to define such conditions for the public, they are more important in how the 
individual understands those as qualities of the self.  And Rose in the end, reminds us that 
as humans we have at least evolved to the point where we constantly exercise free choice 
and make decisions about our selves, and that freedom, within normative systems like 
government, is that which allows those caught up in the stratagems which define the 
practice in question, to “accept or transform the practices that subjectify them” in the 
sense that they understand themselves to be deserving of such amendment (97).  
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 Transformation, transition, choice, action and acts are a function of the actor’s 
criticality, and are fundamentally rooted in the belief that one is or ought to be free to do 
so. Rose’s contribution here then, is to point a study of governmentality to look at 
freedom as more than a coefficient of politics or law, but as a result of diverse and myriad 
relationships that crisscross the totality of lived experience for a subject and thereby 
provide opportunities to exercise choice and to make autonomous decisions in political 
and other areas of life, beyond the political.  Freedom is ultimately manifest in attempts 
to alter one’s present and in the case of the Dignity homeless, to do so because one sees 
one’s self as deserving of a way out of the liminal ambiguity of poverty.  On the ground, 
this is rarely the case. Poverty can become a new self-regulatory reality, a conduct of 
conduct constructed by history for the poorest, and to be exercised in spaces especially 
set aside for them. Freedom can be interpreted within the mundane and petty critical 
actions a villager takes towards another, without ever being framed in terms of values 
that transcend the self’s desires and enter the political or socially critical.  
 Rose’s genealogy of freedom shows that these spaces evolved commensurately 
with the evolution of the citizen-subject since the mid 19th century. The subject therefore 
was reinterpreted and the everyday reshaped by policies which sought to ensure that the 
individual was to adopt a “new relation to his or herself in the every day world, in which 
the self itself is to be an object of knowledge and autonomy is to be achieved though a 
continued enterprise of self-improvement though the application of a rational knowledge 
and technique (93).  As Bevir points out, this idea of autonomy is very different than 
autonomous actor capable of acting outside of socially constructed limits of freedom – or 
outside of “social contexts” (1999:67).25  Ultimately then for Rose, it is the norm of 
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autonomy though a process of “intense self-scrutiny” which binds us in our pursuit of 
ourselves, to our search for self-realization and hence to pedagogies of expertise (93).  In 
pursuit of this pure subjectivity we are governed as much as if by objectification as by 
our pursuit of ourselves.  This drive to do so, this initiative that springs forth and defines 
our rationality for every day life, is merely a result of the fact that “regimes of power 
establish, deploy and promote and intensify the truths of our selves (95). Freedom is not a 
dead thing. It is not a concept.  Freedom,  
“… as a set of practices, devices, relations of self to self and self to others, of freedom as 
always practical, technical, contested, involving relations of subordination and privilege, 
opens freedom to historical analysis and historical criticism.  …The fact that freedom is 
technical, infused with relations of power, entails specific modes of subjectification and 
is necessarily a thing of this world, inescapably sullied by the marks of the mundane, 
does not make freedom a sham or liberty an illusion; rather it opens up the possibility of 
freedom neither as a state of being nor a constitutional form but as a politics of life (94). 
 
 Rose argues that in the last 40 years, freedom has been elevated from a mere 
“notion” to a central current in political thought, “ … the ethics of freedom have come to 
underpin our conception of how we should be ruled, how our practices of everyday life 
should be organized, how we should understand ourselves in our predicament” (61).  
Rose is not blind to the violence perpetrated in the name of freedom, yet he would argue 
that despite this, there is in general a belief that “human beings are in their nature, 
actually, potentially, ideally, subjects of freedom and hence they must be governed, and 
must govern themselves, as such” (62).   
 For Dean (1999), actions by the poor for more housing programs, or for legal 
permits to land on which to build a camp, might be conceptualized as claims for more 
participation within government programs as a type of freedom (for shelter) rather than 
freedom from governmental controls.  This more or less summarizes the two poles of the 
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critical debates in Dignity Village that I mentioned in the introduction.  The implication 
of this state of “compliance” is that despite the fact that others may see our collective 
action (our mentality) in different or contradictory terms, the process of governing 
ourselves with respect to others about what we believe to be ideal, tends to be self-
reproducing, a teleological “reflexivity” which gives rise to different ways of producing 
truth (1999:18).  The use of the space might be unusual, but the moral essence of the 
claim, and the desire to be “legal” represent a commitment to governmentality. There is 
in a sense, autonomy of the ethical from the political, mirrored in the distinction between 
“practices of the self,” and “practices of the government” (21). Foucault (1991) largely 
rejects the notion of fully sovereign subject that ideal notions of autonomy might suggest, 
for this would suggest a case where individuals could determine their actions in isolation 
from or free of the influence of other agents and this would make the social construction 
of anything, quite impossible (Bevir 1999:67).  Freedom in this sense, and autonomy are 
an agent’s ability to make choices within the limits a given social context has constructed 
for them.   
 In this sense, Bevir argues that the two Foucaults, the excitable and the composed, 
use hostility towards the subject as an indictment of agency and as an endorsement, thus 
confounding what is already a difficult contemplation: the apposition to structure and 
agency.   On the one hand, it seems reasonable that no subject stands outside of the social 
context, and on the other, rejecting autonomy does not necessarily spell a rejection of 
agency. “Different people adopt different beliefs and perform different actions against the 
background of the same social structure, so there must be at least an undecided space in 
front of these structures where individuals decide what beliefs to hold and what actions to 
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perform” (Bevir 1999:68).  In this ambiguous, unformed space we will locate the ideas of 
homeless people and try to discern the critical capacity of their community.  
 Once again, take John Boy as an example. I asked him about how he we would 
describe his transition into the village.  He was quick to explain (my words) that the 
village had quickly colonized him, and that this was very different than the streets where 
in fact, that is in the hard facts of trying to survive, that sort of freedom is scary, and 
“your mind gets filled with all kinds of stuff that just doesn’t work for a person,” (I 
understand these to be paranoia, fear, selfishness,  physical pain, discomfort and others 
which comprise what Dave Samson another villager calls “street survival anxieties”). 
From video (DS DISC 3 at 00:56:00): 
John Boy crosses his arms and looks me straight in the eye.  He is absolutely sure that 
what follows is true: “ I tell everybody when they get here – when they get here they’re 
like this is so great, this is so great. I tell them, ‘there will be a time that comes when you 
will regret and dread going out of those gates.” 
“And do you feel that way?” I ask. 
“Ah, not anymore. But I did for along time…” A pause.  
I want to suggest that the village colonized all that damaged mental space.  
I suggest, “Because this became…”  He nods to me, and with his hands creates a closed 
circle implying wholeness. 
“This became everything, and that’s the way the psychological part of it works,” he adds. 
“And so do you think in that process of it becoming – everything – you become more 
whole yourself, and then you can go out again?” 
“Yeah, yeah  motioning with his hands, looks like he is crafting some clay piece), it 
definitely fixes the way you think.” 
 
 John Boy’s belief that he was being fixed by the village is suggestive of the same 
self-help ethos that neoliberal governing requires of its citizens in other city contracted 
spaces; to conform and to abide, and this is a matter of governmentality (Fairbanks Jr. 
2004; Weissman 2012).  So there is reason to explore the limits of this concept. However, 
the argument that had him evicted only a year later, his assault of another villager, was 
 314 
based on a drug deal gone bad, and what he later admitted was a “personal desire to get 
vengeance. To set things right in the village.” Several villagers shared his disdain for the 
other villager, but none would have resorted to violence despite having wanted to. It is 
not the case that there is an “average villager” nor that self-governing is done very well 
by all citizens of the village, so governmentality has limits.  In this sense, even 
disciplinary power, a key to Foucault’s work, had no impact on John Boy’ actions. He 
had told me in a recent interview, that it was hard not to think “street,” even in the camp, 
because “getting fixed up in the head takes time.”  Furthermore, because the village fails, 
in the imaginary of capital and other regimes of power, to produce a fully self-governed 
citizen out of homelessness, it fails as a transitional housing community. An example of 
this is that approximately 85% of persons who leave the village reenter homelessness 
immediately, and that during my fieldwork, no one transitioned into conventional jobs, 
school or housing, and these are some basic conditions of general transitional housing 
program (PHB 2009; Notes 2011).  The critique of this failure is only sensible from a 
Foucauldian perspective if one critiques how the villager is governed or governs others.  
 There is no real mechanism in his work for understanding this failure from the 
experience of the villager, except as a reflection of their poor governance, when in fact, 
the governing episteme of the village, the rules, leaders and other variables that impact 
the villager’s self-conduct by creating skewed knowledge about their self, are incomplete, 
in the process—and so once again, we have a failure to understand actors who are defined 
by this perpetually transitional experience, caught between conducts, as it were.  Faced 
with such criticism of its organizational and managerial capacity since its inception, the 
village has evolved a sort of world, to invoke Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). And 
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discussed at the end of this chapter, where entirely new and diverse scripts about 
community and human rights are created to rationalize what happens there, or perhaps, 
what should, but do not. This is a pragmatic issue.  
 Brad Gibson, prior to becoming the CEO in 2011, and I had a conversation.    
 
People just aren’t getting a lot of things done. When this place started… when, I mean, 
this was supposed to be an activist organization. And help other people out of the 
doorways,” he whispered. “And nobody... I mean once in a while you see one or two 
people go out [of the village].” Then, stone-faced: “There’s 60 people here… it needs to 
get involved in its roots. Ya gotta get a spark, you know. Ya gotta understand why this 
place was here.” 
 “Lot of people aren’t getting that,” I replied.  
 Brad was adamant, “A lot of people are not getting that. They’re here for the 20-
dollar stay over fee, you know. Twenty bucks is the insurance, you know, it’s pretty 
cheap to live, and they’re not bringing it [the message] back to the other organizations, 
they’re not bringing it back to people who are still in the doorways.” 
 I asked him about Dignity Village being a transitional place. He was absolutely clear, 
slapping the rail so hard that his, by then, empty coffee container fell off. “Well, it could 
be.” 
 “How so?” 
 “Well, if people would get out and activate, they would get into networking that 
would lead them into different situations! See? That’s where it was all supposed to be. 
Working with other organizations. Now, transportation is a big part of it. A monthly 
pass… Where’s anybody from here going to get 82 bucks a month for the bus? 




Fig. 16. Brad Powell, John Boy Hawkes. June 
2010. In the next six months Brad would 
become addicted to Meth, and ousted from 
office. John Boy similarly addicted took over 
office.  A year after that he was ousted from 




5.10 Critique, Resistance and Power 
 In ways, Foucault’s governmentality project is about the limits self-governing 
imposes on actors, and therefore it is also equally about the conditions that make struggle 
and resistance possible for actors. For Foucault all these struggles revolve around the 
question, “ Who are we? …To sum up, the main objective of these struggles is to attack 
not so much “such and such” an institution of power, or group, or elite, or class, but 
rather a technique, a form of power” (1982:82). While it is important to understand the 
previous transformations of knowledge and power within historical circumstances that 
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shape governance, it is also important to understand how actors come to understand 
themselves as beings, as subjects within a system that asserts its rationales upon them, 
and as subjects with power to comply or resist.  It is the subject that exemplifies power, 
not the other way around.   This understanding is summed up thusly by Foucault:  
 “This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes 
the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to 
recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. There are two 
meanings of the word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and 
tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.  Both meanings suggest a 
form of power that subjugates and makes subject to” (ibid).  
  
 What Foucault has instructed us to do in a way is to look at how the present state 
of power relations unites groups of individuals with the state through regimes of practice 
such as court or health care systems, and then to ideas about themselves that are  linked in 
various ways through techniques that produce identities, or “subjectivities” - identities 
that are at once caught up in the power of others, and in their own sense of it too.  The 
procedures for gathering, formulating and disseminating knowledge therefore must be 
understood in order to understand how subjects understand themselves. Hence scientific 
discourses, juridical proclamations and political dogmas are examples of commonly 
accepted types of knowledge that critique must challenge. 
 It might be further argued from Foucault, that knowledge creates a mental or 
analytic space in the realm of rationalities, but also in the body of the subject herself.  
Knowledge imbricates with the potential for action, compliance, and rejection of rules, 
codes or other persons, by undergirding this analytic space and underpinning such 
possibilities for power. In the case of this dissertation, this suggests understanding how 
homelessness has been problematized by dominant political and economic rationalities; 
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but further and this is where much of the literature is weakest, in how the homeless come 
to problematize themselves as relatively empowered and deserving identities, as “ subject 
to someone else by control or dependence and tied to his own identity by self-conscience 
or self-knowledge” (ibid).  Wrapped up in this is the crucial separation of power from 
domination.  Power is not destructive or restrictive.  Power creates objects out of its 
desire to know. But it does not wish to subdue.  Ideally, power is about understanding 
what freedom requires and approaching that ideal by constructing social, political and 
moral practices around that knowledge.   Foucault tells us:  
When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the actions of others, 
when one characterizes these actions by the government of men by other men – in the 
broadest sense of the term—one includes an important element: freedom. Power is 
exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.  By this we mean 
individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which 
several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized. 
Where the determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of power; 
slavery is not a power relationship when man is in chains (790). 
 
 Foucault cautions against notions of essential freedom and essential power.  
“Power exists only when it is put into action…but it is not by nature the manifestation of 
consensus.” (788).  Power, unlike oppression through force, unlike domination though 
violent means, works indirectly on subjects by creating possibilities, ranges of possible 
action that fall within its desires, and thereby suggest a certain freedom on the part of 
those engaged within a relation of power (789). For Foucault, it appears, that freedom is 
better described as the perpetual antagonism between the will of the subject, and the 
forces that would hem it in or steer it in a given direction. Freedom, therefore, is a value 
that exists within, rather than externally to relationships between people, as subjects and 
“governments” charged with conducting their own affairs and well being, and between 
people as subjects to powerful regimes of knowledge through regimes of practice and 
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governance, like the housing programs or the policies of a state.  Freedom is not an 
absolute value that exists outside of this relational probability (786). Hence in Foucault’s 
genealogical history of the present, understanding a governmentality of poverty requires 
social critique to discern the probability of freedom within the historical conditions of 
possibility in which the subjects being examined are placed.   
 In a much later published series of talks from the year before his death, The 
Politics of Truth (2007), Foucault confronts what critique might ideally mean.  He 
considers critique in much the way Kant did, as “virtue” directed towards truth, in the 
sense that being critical is something reasonable actors are, by their nature, and also that 
there is conjoined with the essence of this “critical attitude” a certain virtuousness 
(2007:42-43). In this frame, there is no need for an ultimate or transcendental external 
position like there is in classical critical theory, nor  a reaction to objective or forces of 
structure like habitus - critique is a simple critical attitude that people have by virtue of 
being reasonable creatures. Larsen suggests that highlighting the plasticity of critique and 
power in this way helps to establish “who the real critics of today are” (2011:43).   I have 
already in some detail explained how Foucault excavates the truth as first, a dogmatic 
religiously inscribed knowledge, second, the inscription of types of individuals based on 
population management strategies, and finally, various scientific, educational and 
methodological examinations of individuals within governing strategies of neoliberal 
rationalities that I argue are more or less employed in some fashion within the village.  
With the self-regulated  and fully critical citizen now firmly constructed under the “art of 
government,” the critical moment is asking “how not to be governed” (44), or more 
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precisely, as he corrects this statement later in the discussion, how not to be governed in 
that way or as “the art of not being governed quite so much”(45).   
 This first position stems from the aforementioned three stages, which he calls 
anchoring points. The first is a question of reexamining what Scripture means, and 
thereby questioning the authority of religious leaders and orders.  Critique in this sense 
originates in a sort of discourse analysis of the scriptures in order to discern what has 
been written by men into the underlying laws of God as a means to achieve their political 
goals; one might look towards the language of civil laws that encode moral imperatives 
based in religious mentality. The second is the desire “not to want to be governed” which 
is akin to rejecting certain laws because they might be antiquated or unjust.  Foucault 
suggests these rejections are rooted in perceptions of natural law. In this position, which 
sees its thrust amplified after the renaissance, the question is to the limits of the law, and 
critique is essentially a legal issue (46). Finally, there is the attitude of “to no to want to 
be governed” but accepting governance only insomuch as one believes in a valid 
authority.  The root of critique here is the question “of certainty in its confrontation with 
authority” (46-47). 
 “One can see how the interplay of governmentalization and critique has brought 
about phenomena which are, I believe, of capital importance in the history of Western 
culture…However above all else, one sees that the core of critique is basically made of 
the bundle of relationships that are tied to one another, or one to the two others, power, 
truth and the subject.  And if governmentalization is indeed this movement through which 
individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through mechanisms of power 
that adhere to a truth, well then! I will say that critique is the movement by which the 
subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effect of power and question power 
on its discourses of truth.  Well!:critique will be the  art of voluntary subordination, that 
of reflected intractability”  Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the 
subject in the context of what we would call, in a word, the politics of truth (47). 
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 In a way then, Foucault offers a very similar proposition to Boltanski’s 
(2011:155) treatment of institutions and critique that also corresponds to the two levels of 
emancipatory critique to which I have referred.  The critical attitude is not an outright 
rejection of being governed; it is “both partner and adversary to the arts of governing” 
(Foucault 2007: 44). Boltanski might say that critique parallels institutions, or in this case 
regimes of power keeping them in line, constantly engaged in a feedback of responses 
and across ideological and actual spaces of resistance and compliance. One might ask to 
what degree a claim on space represents an expression of freedom or an act of resistance, 
if it is imbricated with the normal functions and expression of government as a form of 
critique. This is a key question in my work.  Is it the case that Dignity activists agreed to 
be governed that way because self-government was envisioned as a desirable outcome of 
housing critique? Or was it that the city (as a regime of power) created the terms by 
which the villagers had to choose. This is different, in the sense the former suggests the 
city power was displaced by the village power, and in the latter, the city adapted the 
village claim into its own rational system, which we will examine in the next chapter. 
 Boltanski and Chiapello’s position in The New Spirit… was that since 1968, a 
form of managerial domination of the capitalist world took place where instead of 
resisting opposition outright, capitalist institutions began incorporating various social 
critique into their organizational and managerial culture.  This suggests that the actors 
and activists who produce powerful critiques are absorbed into more adept institutions 
that thereby extinguish their effective capacity, producing a type of domination.  I am 
sure that the homeless who push for more communities or housing, would wish such an 
usurpation would always take place. We get into this in a moment. First: if the goal of 
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critique is to produce an action that leads to redress of the second goal of emancipation - 
for more of the pie - then such absorption is a “win” and the action is to be understood in 
terms of power, not domination, and not as an act in the sense Isin and Nielsen have 
described earlier.  Such was the case where Camp Dignity forced the city to encapsulate 
it – to literally incorporate it – and hence, we have Dignity Village, a community perched 
on the very constitution and democratic system that created their inequality in the first 
place. This asks one to examine at what level their emancipatory goal was towards 
domination, or towards a sense of freedom, despite the apparent contradictory logic this 
inquiry presents.  In either case, the incorporation does not happen without the critical 
action that is produced by the critique, that is without the establishment of a fixed or 
mobile, symbolic, material or human, physical site of resistance. We explore such sites in 
chapters 5 and 6. 
 According to Foucault (2007) such resistance to be governed in certain way can 
result in “counter-conducts” that reflect the choice of actors, groups of actors in the 
pursuit of alternative ways to achieve the same ends, through new leaders, new political 
alliances, new rationales and strategies, vis a vis political, economic and social areas of 
living. Hence these are to be distinguished from revolts against state sovereignty or 
economic exploitation however much they are at work in them” (Dean 2010:21).  
Freemasons, anti-war protests are offered as examples.  Camp Dignity, fixed under the 
bridge, and the mobile shopping cart marches, contributed to the power of the movement 
by creating broad public support. These were mobile an fixed sites of counter-conduct 
and resistance. However, the physicality of the resistance is less integral than the actors 
who make it work. The point for understanding Foucauldian resistance is to isolate the 
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locus of freedom in the actor who gives the movement force by engaging in the 
empowering relations of resistance.  For it is in the ethical directions that one takes that 
freedom is found and power is exercised.  Spaces of resistance to Foucault are not limited 
to the explicitly spatial, such as a place. We must remember that for Foucault space is 
mental, social, and physical and so resistance exists in language, discourses, actions, and 
emplaced experience (Elden and Crampton 2007). And so too does governmental 
tendencies to control these spaces.  Leaving linguistic heterotopias and temporary 
protests aside for the moment, where resistance digs in its heels as a demand for actual 
space, like the Dignity claim, one has reason to investigate how the state responds to the 
spatialization of the claim. As a power struggle in which a critical position is trying to 
displace another, the fight is not just over land but also over power, and governments do 
not give this up easily. Resistance from political subjects to laws governing uses of land 
for example, generally lead to a forceful response by the state, and this we understand as 
a conflict, as an attempt at domination by the state over the subject.  In the “mind” of the 
state, it is very likely they feel the corollary might be true.  In this spatial conflict, where 
critique is successful at displacing some leeway for a village let us say, there will always 
be some kind of resolution that the state can live with. 
 In the rationalization of such claims, we often find that such contests first attend 
to the regulation of the spatial coordinates of living and then by extension into the way 
life is performed (Lefebvre 1968; Castells 1983; Soja 1996; Barker 1999; Davis 2000, 
2006; Bayat 2010). Recall, and this is important, that Foucault understands 
governmentality as a triad - sovereignty, discipline and government.  Spatial claims that 
pit power against power lead to conflict, repression and, it is in such times that the full 
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weight of the imagined sovereignty of governance, through discipline over counter 
conduct (or resistance) is exposed.  Though we understand that societies defined by 
Discipline have been usurped by neoliberal government, disciplinary capacity remains as 
a part of the triangle of power. Foucault said,  
It must also master all the forces that are formed from the very constitution of an 
organized multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects of counter power that spring from 
them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, 
revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions-anything that may establish horizontal 
conjunctions. Hence the fact that the disciplines use procedures of partitioning and 
verticality; that they introduce, between the different elements at the same level, as solid 
separations as possible; that they define compact hierarchical networks; in short, that they 
oppose to the intrinsic, adverse force of multiplicity the technique of the continuous, 
individualizing pyramid . They must also increase the particular utility of each element of 
the multiplicity, but by means that are the most rapid and the least costly, that is to say, 
by using the multiplicity itself as an instrument of this growth (1984:207). 
 
  Where the tactical displacement of power through critical action leads to a 
compromise like the village, there is no violent repression, or cause for discipline, but 
when we look at how the rationalization of the village in codes and other documents, we 
will see that the language of discipline underscores everything. So space matters to 
governmentality studies, and to how governors govern; it therefore has much to do with 
how we choose to be governed in a certain way. The contest over principles or over 
regimes of power cannot be understood without undertaking an appreciation of the space 
of resistance.  It only makes sense for the state to neutralize the effectiveness of a space 
of resistance - liminality makes sense in some ways.  I will give the ideas of spaces of 
resistance much more attention in chapter seven. In the next section of this chapter we 
will discuss Boltanski’s worlds and justifications as another way of understanding the 
space of resistance, and the limits of critical action in what I call liminal worlds. Together 
these concepts help PEOC understand liminal spaces of critique in terms of critical 
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capacity. First, the events in John Boys life again underscore the complicated relationship 
between freedom and poverty. After being kicked out, he had nowhere to live but his van.  
This is not an unusual case; there are no statistics, but it is well known on the street and in 
foodbanks that tens of thousands of Americans are living in their cars. This descriptive 
passage from my monograph, visualizes the experience of democratic denial, which is my 
way of saying that democracy is broken.  
Dignity in Exile (2012:52-56) 
 
I had been wondering about Jon Boy. I had heard rumors that he had come by and asked 
about me one day while I was out. But I hadn’t seen him. Dave told me he wasn’t looking 
good. “But you know Jon Boy. Jon Boy’s Jon Boy!”  
 “There he is now,” Dave said.  
The sun was bright that morning. I could see into the open back of the van through the 
windshield. The first things I saw were his American flags draped over the rear windows 
and a small flag rigged to his broken antenna.  
 Jon Boy threw open a rusty, squeaky driver’s side door. It lurched on the hinge as if 
it wanted to fall off. Jon Boy swaggered out of the van and made his way towards me. By 
then, villagers – Dean, Rocky and a couple of others – had showed up at the berm to have 
their coffees and smokes and to greet Jon Boy. He looked pretty much the same. His hair 
was ragged and his front teeth broken. He sported his trademark leather vest and he 
looked like he hadn’t been sleeping much. His skin was sallow and his eyes were dark-
rimmed like most of the meth addicts I knew. His scabs and skin blemishes, though, were 
much more widely spread, and it was clear that he hadn’t been doing well. 
 So, I asked him, “How are you?” as he reached for a hug. A hug. I have to tell you 
that as much as I liked the man, the soul that was Jon Boy, his body in its state of decay 
at that time worried me. I didn’t want to touch him, but resisting the embrace of a friend 
would have been disastrous, not only to my working with him, but with the others. So, we 
hugged it out man-style. And he answered me. “Well, you know, I’m doing great, great! 
You know, I’m very sorry about the mix-up and all, but well. You know it ain’t easy 
sometimes and I was wrong...” – he had the beginning of tears in his eyes, but he cleared 
his throat and continued – “…but I hope you are getting on okay. I heard you was coming 
soon.” 
 A little while later, I drove Jon Boy in my rental car, a Ford Fusion I had exchanged 
for the Subaru, so I could buy him some gas. We talked about the incident while I drove. 
The camera was mounted on my dash. He did hit the guy. He did think that TC was a 
deadbeat and a rat, and he would, if the situation presented itself again, do it over. “I miss 
the village, but I don’t need it anymore,” he said. “I have to make some moves, and it was 
time. It wasn’t right me being a leader, the Chair, and all that, and hitting a person, but 
there was two of us and he wasn’t any angel, and he should be out too! That’s what’s 
gonna kill this place, anyway, all those little drug gangs and stuff. There’s no balance. 
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There was a fight. How can one person only be accused, be responsible for a fight? 
Violence of any kind is not tolerated! Fact is they wanted me out, so they could get their 
own people in council and I fucking blew it. Fuck them. Fuck this. And it’s too bad 
because this place, the village, is really important.” As I slowed to turn into the gas 
station, he looked at me and said, “I just hope I didn’t fuck up your faith in the place.” 
 Why would he worry about my opinion? I had enjoyed meeting him the year before 
and interviewing him, but who was I? For the first time since I’d got there, I realized that 
the villagers had distinct expectations from me. I pulled up in the queue to the pump. 
“Well, you’re here,” he said, “and the first thing you find out is I ain’t here no more. And 
no one told you until you get here. That chokes me up. That ain’t right. And it is really 
my fault for fucking up in the first place, I guess.” I tried to calm him. I told him it was 
all okay. “Everything happens for a reason” and other common phrases. “It all makes 
sense ten years later.”  
 After a moment of silence, I told him what was really bothering me. “I just look at 
you and it worries me. You can’t tell me you aren’t doing meth.” He said nothing for a 
moment. It was hot, sitting in the queue for the pump, and the smell of gasoline overtook 
us in the van as the guy on his motorcycle in front of the line overfilled his tank. Jon Boy 
took it in with a deep haul and laughed. I get that, I get that he liked the smell. (It is 
interesting how many of us addicts, in recovery or not, enjoy that biting, gaseous aroma. 
And skunk too.) “To tell ya the truth…” he said, “…I prefer smack, but I don’t do much 
of anything these days.” The motorcyclist pulled away and I pulled up to the pump. I put 
the car in park. He asked, “Can you spot me ten bucks for gas?” Jon Boy filled up the 
small gas tank he had brought and I also bought a couple of sodas and ice cream bars for 
us. 
 On the drive back, we didn’t say much. He asked me how long I was staying and he 
suggested we get out and see Portland together. It was a real shame to see Jon Boy like 
that. Even though he had been using substances when he’d lived at the village and when 
we had first met, at least he had been maintaining his structure. He had some order in his 
life, and was getting involved..  
 We drove past a stretch of riverside mansions, and one of the most exclusive golf 
courses in Portland. The villagers used to collect stray golf balls and sell them, but the 
golf course management had put an end to that when villagers started lingering around 
the course too often. With the car windows open, I could hear racing car engines off in 
the distance. He told me that they were coming from a track where he and some of the 
other villagers worked once a week, doing security and other odd jobs for cash. He didn’t 
seem jumpy or edgy, he was smiling, and I wanted to believe that this was the real image 
of Jon Boy, driving down the open road in the sun, with the wind blowing in the window, 
arm crooked on the door, enjoying a haul off his cigarette. Was it possible, I asked myself, 
to be content with this lifestyle? So I had to ask him, based on the video shot back in 
2010. “Jon Boy. Last year you said, and these are pretty close to your words, you said, 
‘This is America and I can be anyone I want to be.’”  
 “Yeah, I remember that, in my structure. I ’d like to see that sometime.”  
 I made the right turn onto Sunderland Ave, and I asked him if he didn’t mind that I 
stop for a moment. We pulled over about 150 yards from the berm. A beat-up camper van 
we had not seen before was parked there. A young Afro-American man was cleaning 
stuff out of the back of the van.  
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 “He’ll learn pretty quick,” Jon Boy said.  
 “What do you mean? Do you think the cops will roust him?” I asked.  
 Jon Boy looked at me like I was the greatest fool he had ever met. He propped his 
chin up and cocked his head back. “The cops? Not the cops. Eric. How many black guys 
have you seen in there?” he asked, pointing directly at the village. 
 “Well, I…” I stumbled. I hadn’t seen any, but the village did have a few native folks 
and a couple of gay people so I … “What are you saying, the village is discriminating?” I 
asked. 
 “Naw, I ain’t saying nothing. Nobody knows what to do in there…” 
 We watched the young man as he tried to unload a big box of old clothing. A cat 
leapt out of the van and he hustled after it, trapping it in the thick hedge next to the 
moving company yard. He picked up the cat and kissed it. Then scolded it. Returning to 
the van, he opened the side door and we could make out a couple of other cats.  
 Jon Boy smirked at the man. “Well, he might get in. He’s perfect for that place. Ya 
never know. They’re supposed to let anyone who needs it get in if there is room.” Jon 
Boy kept his eyes on the man. I had to get out of the car. The aroma inside was beginning 
to sour from the gas, from his clothes. The sun was heating it up.  
 I asked, “Well, can you?”  
 He turned to me. “Can I what? I forget what we were talking about.”  
 I tethered the conversation. “You still feel that way, you are free to do anything 
you—?” 
  He turned away from the man, who was, by then, fiddling with his headlight. He 
looked me deeply in the eyes. “This is America, Eric, and anyone can be anything they 
wanna be. I am doing what I want to do, for right now. I’m free.” 
 
 
Fig. 17. John Boy in his van. July 2011. (N. Dickson). 
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 If this was freedom, I wanted nothing to do with it. This world, this poor, addicted 
and temporary world made life so contingent that big pictures were invisible to the 
critical attitudes of the villager.  Beyond the fact that he had become addicted, over many 
years of street life and time in jail, John Boy was still caught in a sense of freedom that he 
very obviously associated with being American.   It was the same sense of patriotic 
identity that the villagers identified with when they toasted him on the banks of the 
Columbia – “America the Beautiful…” The most amazing irony for me was how clever 
neoliberalism was in producing extremely harsh conditions for urban living - high 
medical costs and enormous rents, few social subsidies for low income folks, and rapidly 
increasing unemployment; and this despite the fact that the fastest growing number of 
homeless in cities were poor persons who had as many as two or three low paying jobs 
and still could not afford rent.  John Boy’s story includes a lot of mistakes he made, but 
to see him in that van, decorated with stars and stripes seemed to me to be a desperate 
attempt to convince himself that he was the broken one, not the system, and this to me 
again, was indicative of a certain evil governmentality. It was domination of the mind, 
and after that what good is autonomy anyway? 
 
5.11 Summary of Foucault 
 As Delanty (2011:81) points out, Foucault’s critique is not oriented towards 
criteria of truthfulness, in the sense that normative diagnostic positions try to impose a 
vision of truth onto the potential of political subjects.  For Foucault there is no such thing 
really as false knowledge, since all knowledge is constructed at some level and mediated 
by power over time to the point where it comes to be understood by subjects. However, 
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this appreciation for how power and critique push and bend each other over time to shape 
current understanding is his mode of “social” critique.  He argued that the relationship 
between power, which we recall as understood to be relations of power, and these 
systems of knowledge or discourses, as “tactically polyvalent (1976:132) Earlier I 
discussed how Larsen explains this as the result of their heterogeneous and irregular 
nature over time; hence the need to examine critique through time. So we can understand 
that subjects come to be thought of in certain ways by the push and pull if you will of 
power(s) with points of view.  Foucault’s “counter-conduct” (2004:199), as a discursive 
or physical resistance to power can therefore become a new form of conduct, which 
presents a new discourse into the world. The subject then is always understood from 
some other position and so we are always using this positionality to understand the 
potential for freedom or domination (in my work, anyway) on the basis of how this other 
position uses its power to particular ends, in this case, governance.   Clearly this ties 
Foucault with the three other approaches in the sense that institutions, ideologies or 
“generative” structures create positions by which the subject comes to be aware of herself. 
Foucault’s understanding of discourse is unique in that it locates the target of discourse in 
the creation of the subject herself, whereas, the prior approaches look at discourse and 
language as a ways by the which the world comes to be organized and the subject lost to 
this dominating force.  Moving beyond language and speech acts, Foucault has looked at 
how institutions and relations are produced by discourses rather than intelligible points of 
debate, or matters to be argued. Discourse is empowered by Foucault to create the 
categories by which subjects are governed, and by which they govern themselves, which 
includes as I mentioned, a certain critical attitude. This gives the subject power too.  So 
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the subject can be critical and as a result of her power can exercise social critique in a 
number of ways, which he considers resistance. I mentioned in this section, that mundane 
inter-personal critique takes on importance in the village as exactly an expression of 
freedom and resistance.  Unfortunately, in terms of emancipating the village from city 
control, it is misdirected critique.  
 In so much as disciplinary power, sovereignty and government operate on 
neoliberal subjectivities at the same time, the main weakness of governmentality, which I 
mentioned much earlier, is that it lacks the capacity to explain “acts” that might be unique 
or novel, or in many cases, especially regarding the homeless, considered homeless, or 
that transcend the capacity of disciplinary power (Delanty 2011:83). Beyond this, there 
really is no room, or any need for mobilizing large numbers of persons in socially 
transformative capacities because resistance is not futile, but resistance is power, and 
therefore anticipated in the current episteme as a matter of governance. 
 
 5.12 Pragmatic Sociology of Critique 
 Another critical perspective that links critique and power is pragmatic sociology 
of critique. A work by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, called The New Spirit of 
Capitalism (2005), is noteworthy for how it links various critiques of capitalism over the 
last 100 years to shifts in how capitalism organized itself and managed its concerns, in 
response to critique.  A matter of critique displacing power one might say, though in a 
different way, in that instead of a new conduct becoming conduct, the critique is 
incorporated in various ways into the managerial capacity of institutions.  New forms of 
capitalism emerge as expressions of critique.  Very interesting at some levels, and a 
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bridge of sorts to Foucault, but not the reason I am interested in it here.  In early work, 
Boltanski and Thévenot ([1991] 2006) and then more recently Boltanski (2011) 
investigate the pragmatic understanding and experience of normative orders called “cities” 
that produce repertoires of justifications that actors use to critically navigate the world. I 
explore this in detail now, because I think there is utility for understanding the village 
better by looking at how these justifications and worlds (which is a word often used to 
describe the cities) link up with Foucault’s empowered subject as essentially critical 
actors. 
 In this perspective, social life, and society are about interruptions, conflicts, 
claims and change, not stable order. Pragmatic sociology popularized by Boltanski and 
Thévenot (2006) is sometimes referred to as the “sociology of critical capacity (Blokker 
and Brighenti 2011:1) or a pragmatic sociology of critique (Boltanski 2011).   As a means 
to reunite social analysis with the moral political disposition that years of post-
structuralism had all but stripped away, Boltanski has said, “Moral sociology should be 
understood as an attempt to reinsert, in the analysis of the action of persons in society, the 
reason for acting and the moral exigencies that these persons give themselves, or want to 
give themselves, if not by way of ‘ideals’” (Boltanski 2005:20). 
 One of the main objectives of this approach is to remedy the cleaving of theory 
and ideas from practice by which, I mean, resolving how grand narratives and small 
narratives are acquired, incorporated and integrated into the actions of social actors, and 
this understanding, without stripping the actor of a say in the matter.  Thévenot (2009) 
stated this goal as reuniting the moral and philosophical character of the social scientist 
with his critical capacity to do research. Hence, researchers are supposed to say 
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something rather than to feign some post-modern fantasy of neutrality. Based on the book, 
On Justification, (Botanski and Thévenot, [1991] 2006), the following themes have come 
to define this approach: exclusion of the researcher from a position of exteriority to the 
research he engages, an irreducible plurality of practical-viewpoints in social reality, and 
the linking of knowledge forms used in social practices of justification to themes 
expressed in political philosophy (Boltanski 2011:360; Blokker 2011:252).  While critical 
sociology has a somewhat unclear meaning in the rest of the world, loosely revolving 
around scholarly attempts to observe and critique social movements and social problems, 
in France, it means the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and his “habitus-field-capital” 
paradigm (Blokker 2011:252).  While its roots sought a departure from Bourdieu’s 
critical enterprise, pragmatic sociology of critique has been reunited with this approach in 
more recent approaches, most notably Boltanski’s (2011) On Critique...  
 One of the key departures from critical sociology is that this newer approach 
invests the common actor with the capacity to be deluded or inspired, and hence to be 
understood as a locus for critique; whereas critical sociology, and much of the Marxist 
tradition, use Engels’ conception of a false consciousness to strip the actor of any self-
contained potency, and to render them critically ineffective at the personal level (Marcuse 
1964; Boltanski and Thévenot (2006).  In light of Hilger’s reading of Bourdieu, I find this 
criticism wanting, although at least empirically, Bourdieu represents this domination 
frequently (1972, 1999, 2002). In this section I deal primarily with the work of Boltanski 
and Thévenot to whom the approach is largely credited.  While offering a way of uniting 
structure and critique in a model where each is implicated in the meaning of the other, at 
a practical level, this approach suggests, following, Latour (1991, 2005), Sayer (2000), 
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Archer (2003), De Certeau (1984) and Dean (1994) that actors contribute to what 
Foucault (1976:132) has called the ‘tactically polyvalent” unstable nature of critiques in 
the lived world.  
 The bridge between structure and agency in this approach is to not separate out 
the two “forces” in the first place. There are morally capable human agents, and there are 
structural forces, manifest in forms of knowledge, sometimes embodied in what we call 
“institutions” and they are linked insomuch as human agents make diverse moral 
decisions about how to engage in this unstable and threatening world of ideas and 
situations (Boltanski 2011:55).  The world is a threatening place in the sense that reality 
is dominated by conflict; between persons, groups and between persons and institutions 
and is further made precarious by institutional and administrative failures, all which lead 
to “Boltanski’s  “hermeneutic contradiction.” Reality is constantly shaken up by forces 
“external” and “internal” to actors. Hermeneutic contradiction is the critical moment in 
the space opened by the discontinuity between “the forms of domination in a certain 
social order from a position of exteriority…” and “from within, by actors involved in 
disputes, and inserted into sequences of critique and justification, of highly variable 
levels of generality” (50).  
 Instead of trying to find a single moral-normative basis, (or dogmatic truth) if you 
will, this approach recognizes that neither the sociological enterprise nor the varying 
moral capacities of agents are neutral or reducible to others.  In pragmatic sociology there 
are numerous “criteria of justification” that recombine in the actions and choices of 
human agents to produce a plurality of possible views on common good.  Hence, in this 
approach, the critique that comes from actors is similar to the position of personal 
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metaphysics,  discussed earlier by Latour (2005) and Archer (2003) that unites the points 
of views as expressed by actors with the establishment of meaningful realities.  In this 
sense, the approach distinguishes itself from critical positions that impose an exterior 
force like ideology, or universal normative theories of value, upon the actor as a vessel 
open to suggestion and incapable of internalizing, and, therefore, forming a relations with 
the idea.   For Bourdieu, this meant that individuals were more or less powerless to the 
force of doxa, or to symbolic power and violence.  For Critical Theory, it meant that 
actors knew not of what they should reject, and for critical realists, it suggests, that moral 
capacity is less urgent than quirky and behavioral capacities of thinking actors for whom 
a bright sunrise, or an unanticipated assemblage of people might lead to critical 
motivations. While I see ways of understanding aspects of Dignity Village in each of 
these lenses, pragmatic sociology of critique assumes that actors commonly and basically 
establish a critical relationship to known ideals.  
 This stands in stark contrast to critical sociology for which Boltanski especially 
felt the need to find separation in his early works. Later, however, Boltanski (2011) 
approaches an erudition of critical sociology from the starting point of social domination, 
a wary topic he insists because, on the one hand it has come following Weber, to mean 
the different ways, modes of domination, that power comes to be in the service of politics 
(2011:9).  On the other hand, it has also been used to critique egregious forms of 
domination that are blatant, exploitative and cruel.  He uses domination as a conceptual 
problematic by which to explore the possibility of a convergence between critical 
sociology and critique, a convergence that though feasible, will never be free of tensions 
(1). 
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 For Boltanski, traditional modes of sociology create a synthetic object to make a 
mode of analysis possible.  The only subject sociology can see is power relations (2).  
Because social relations are imagined as shot through with power, this object is easily 
visible and reproducible.  Power, again, following Weber (1978) as opposed to 
domination, or oppression, tends to be rationalized in order to meet the requirements of 
justification.  These rationales and the practices associated with them become routinized  
to the degree that once performed so correctly, they suggest a certain legitimate authority.  
Critique of authority in this case would be directed to the very principles of rationality on 
which it is founded. An action is determined just on the basis of constitutionality, or fair 
on the basis of legality.  Seen as arbitrary as opposed to legitimate, power cannot be 
measured on the basis of a set of principles and so resistance to it through collective 
critique seems incomprehensible (2).  Critical theories of domination however, “posit the 
existence of profound, enduring asymmetries which, while assuming different forms in 
different contexts, are constantly duplicated to the point of colonizing reality as a whole” 
(2).  
 My argument (2012) has been that under neoliberalism, domination hides behind 
the mask of liberty and freedom; “it (domination)  does not speak of itself and is 
concealed in systems whose patent forms of power are merely their most superficial 
dimensions” (Boltanski 2011:92).  There is still power.  Domination creates the 
conditions by which individuals not only serve the interests of others in unwitting ways, 
at times, but during others, like military service, as if they were willing to extend its 
exercise. And in the case of the Dignity Villagers, a willingness to live and govern in 
poverty as part of their contribution to a better world. The point behind all this is that 
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theories of power and theories of domination create different objects, but objects just the 
same.   Power can look at various dimensions without necessarily integrating them all 
into a total picture. Power can be appropriated by weak and strong, as it is in Foucault. 
 Boltanski would argue that this is somewhat naïve, and that we need to undress 
domination for what it is and how it is enacted.  Domination critique seeks to unmask the 
relations between these dimensions in order to provide an imagining of an holistic system.   
Hence, sociology (the gaze to power) looks at societies; critical theories of domination 
look at social orders (3). Rarely, however, do they look at the critical capacity of actors to 
engage outside of the structures of domination or power that social sciences impose on 
them.  This as I mentioned is a weakness in Foucault.  Put another, way Boltanski would 
argue that in theories of domination, all human activities are integrated with the forces of 
domination, and under theories of power, all relationships are about power, even if it is at 
a personal level. Beyond this tendency to wrap social life up into neat bundles that 
constrain research by setting up its objectives, Boltanski questions how critical social 
sciences that seek emancipation can still employ a model where researchers know more 
or understand better than those living out the injustices that are observed.  
  Boltanski wrote: “Bourdieu’s critical sociology is unquestionably the most 
audacious enterprise ever attempted to try to conjoin in the same theoretical construction 
highly constraining requirements supervising sociological practice and radical critical 
positions. That is also why we can find in this oeuvre most of the problems posed by the 
linking of sociology and critique to which I have just referred” (2011:18).  Beyond the 
misconstruction of power as the critical object for critical sociology, pragmatic sociology 
also sought to distance itself from the over determination of structure through the 
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universal effectiveness of habitus to unconsciously constrain human potential.  Quite the 
converse, pragmatic sociology sees human action as “deeply implicated in situations” 
(Blokker 2011:252).   The drive of this position is that situations are always in need of 
interpretation partly owing to their own elasticity, but more so because human agents 
have the capacity to influence the world around them in mundane and in profound ways. 
The transcendental element in this arrangement is the agent’s recourse to “justificatory 
narratives” - an ability to make choices that run counter to the sociological imperative of 
self-interested capacities is pluralistic and uncertainty and critical moments are always 
present in institutions, daily lives and semantic structures, regardless of what researchers 
wish to find (253). In this approach, pragmatic ethnography  would want to understand 
the critical capacity produced by actors trying to make sense of hermeneutic 
contradictions, and devising ways of overcoming these. 
 As part and parcel of a set of underlying structures in Bourdieu’s critical 
sociology, Boltanski argues, “The stress put on the circular relations between underlying 
structures and incorporated dispositions thus combines to reduce the uncertainty 
confronting actors in situations in which they must act” (Boltanski 2011:22).  For 
Bourdieu, the tension in making a decision to act is based on the temporal confrontation 
of possibilities, that is considerations paid by the actor to the cause and effects of her 
choices of action, as elements of a temporal range of choices, so that each element is 
perceived of as linked to the other in a causal way. This is the pragmatic deliberation that 
unites our work.  
 Boltanski’s main criticism is that in the sense that they must be observed in an 
order of occurrence, by an exterior observer in order to have analytic capacity, such 
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observations are retrospective and preclude a critical moment for actors because they tend 
to reproduce the illusion of causal logic in the order of determination (165).  Pragmatic 
sociology looks at each act as a moment unto itself, and asks what the uncertainty is for 
the actor if she should choose to go in one direction or another, despite the normative or 
common tendency of others to act in a certain way, because life is full of examples where 
this kind of divergent action occurs (ibid).  
 Inherent to this possibility for actors to act in other ways, is Boltanski's endowing 
the actor with greater awareness than Bourdieu, or Habermas, or perhaps even Foucault 
would give them.  Boltanski is arguing quite simply that when power operates though 
sublime or unrevealed categories of experience on actors who apparently are unaware of 
its manipulative effects, one is really observing a case of domination. But he asserts that 
actors are not necessarily “the “deceived beings” or “cultural dopes” referred to by 
Harold Garfinkel” (in Boltanski 2011:20).  A pragmatic sociology seeks to redress the 
tendency of other theories of power and domination to overlook the actor’s critical 
capacity. Critical capacity should be understood as both the innate qualities of the actor, 
but also of the conditions that varying situations impose on actors to act or to comply. 
Situations have a relation to the larger structures in which they are imbedded, but to 
which common actors rarely give much analytical attention. However, I have to argue 
that in cases, a critical and reflexive ethnographic method is a means to mutual awareness,  
co-creation of critical attitudes and not to domination or manipulation.  
Take this exchange for example:  
 Terry Potts/Eric Weissman (DS DISC 1, Subtext ROM Cut at 54:40) 
Terry is standing in his bedroom leaning against the window. It’s a tiny place. His 
neighbor’s are cracked out and he ahs been trying to quit crack.   He just came back after 
sleeping on the path at Cherry Beach because the crack was so bad.  Someone had just 
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put a bullet through his window accidentally, just nights before.  This was the kind of 
housing he had received in the program.   WoodGreen Community Services had just 
announced the opening of its Housing First, supported housing project.  It would open in 
a year to so and I was suggesting that he should get into that. 
 I tell him, “There’s gonna be a bunch of units for people to live in for a year to 
two years. And they're not going to be allowed to have people dropping in and hanging 
out. ” Terry is anxious already. He had been in jail for over thirty years of his fifty, and 
just the idea of a controlled living space like that has his communicative blockers on. I go 
on, “They are going to have counseling and vocational therapy, and it’s going to be an in-
house system…… and.” 
 He’s agitated but polite, “Okay so let’s say it was me. They’re gonna put me 
down there for a year and you’re not gonna have nothing except what’s inside that 
building for an entire year.” 
 I speak loudly and defiantly. We are having an argument, and its on camera,  
“That’s not true, you can go out and do stuff!” 
 He is equally defiant, “No, No, but 90% of the time you’re stuck inside,” he is 
convinced.  The conversation went on.   
 We discussed the fact that he is using Percocet too much - faking back pain at 
hospitals to get scripts that he sells so he can make cash to buy pot and crack. That kind 
of activity was common amongst the folks I knew at Tent City. 
 I reminded him, “ You said that people need supports and they need rehab and 
this is what they’re offering people.”   
 He concurred, “I agree, but I think they are going about it the wrong way.”   
  A few minutes went by. Terry retreated to the ledge of the large picture window. 
He was shuffling and edgy.   I zoomed in on his face with the camera and I walked closer 
to him, imposing proximity on him, in order to force a rejoinder.  There’s a close up of 
his face.  
 I say, “You and I have shared some very powerful moments (he is nodding)… 
correct?” He nods more with a quiescent  smile.  I add, “ Let’s be honest, you’re going 
into hospital and lying to them about back pain and getting thirty ‘perks,’ do you think if 
there was a program ( on the word program he becomes restless again)  you could go 
into—let me say if,  and at the end of it you could come out and feel great about yourself 
and not have to do that would you do it?” 
 “—But why?! I am not hurting anyone…” 
 I insist, “That’s debatable. There are people who think that that hurts.” 
 He admits, “ Okay but I’m not standing on a corner punching somebody out an 
robbing them…” 
 I assure him, that there are people who would prefer he did that because then they 
could put him in jail again. My point being that guys who are ripping off the system for 
drugs at the taxpayers’ expense  are generally understood as criminals anyway.  The 
place in the conventional mindset for criminals is jail. 
 I push him further, “Do you not think if there was a system that could actually…” 
 “No! Because they’re not going to supply my weed.  And that’s the major thing 
for me. Above anything.. I wanna smoke weed.  And if I can’t smoke weed then I am not 
interested in it.” 
 I asked him what it did for him.  
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 “I like the buzz. It mellows me out, look at me. I’m nice and calm, my face is lit 
up, I’m happy – you seen me smoke a twenty-piece (crack)?  You seen me smoke a 
twenty piece. (Chuckling) –  there’s a big difference between  smoking a joint and doing 
that!” (This conversation is viewable on DS DISC 1 - Subtext ROM Cut at 00:55:00) 
 
 By the time our conversation was done, we had reached the critical moment, 
which I can only describe as a sort of typical aporietic moment; his choices about housing 
and community had to do with fear and addiction. There were several moments where I 
could have stopped the camera or given up the line of questioning, but my familiarity 
with Terry, and our mutual trust, allowed us to go further to the point where he could no 
longer make a reasonable argument in the sense of an argument that actually was a 
critique or indictment of the system; there was no justification from any recognizable 
economy of worth.  His position was a uniquely crafted rationalization based on his 
unique experience and knowledge of what kept him off crack, in good conduct of himself.  
His critique of the proposed housing facility was based on fear, not a rational point of 
view at all.26  Admittedly, this communication is presented as data, but it comes ten years 
into a relationship where we had long since established a certain friendship. In this 
approach, it is the human actor faced with decisions in his daily life that provides the 
critical inertia rather than the social researcher, but the way I practice it, pragmatic 
ethnography of critique does not exclude the researcher from participating in critical 
revelations. 
  Furthermore, critique does not have to be directed to big and socially important 
issues. Critique does not have to align actors in concerted mass efforts.  Critique operates 
at various levels of action, from thought, to deliberation, in the home, at work, between 
friends, enemies and in the social arena.  Pragmatic sociology of critique, therefore looks 
the “social world as a scene of trial” (Boltanski 2011:25). And to this degree at least, my 
 341 
own work, the work of Margaret Archer and other critical realists find alignment with a 
pragmatic sociology. The above dialogue is a simple indication of how knowledge about 
poverty and strategies of housing imbricates with micro-social, personal experience of 
materials like marijuana within the private deliberations of a critical actor. This difficult 
to comprehend space, sometimes needs to be finessed by a powerful, but sympathetic 
voice in order to get at the critical identities formed in deliberation about the value of 
some thing or action, an institution, or mode of self-government. 
 So it is fair to say that within the context of a state, regimes of governance and 
strategies for organizing society create structural conditions in which situations arise for 
actors, but understanding the action, that is those choices and subsequent behaviours 
towards these ends, is possible only from within the perspective of actors’ themselves, 
whereas understanding the structures has come to be the domain of sociologists.  It is 
because of this staking of a territory of analytical exclusion as I call it, (separating the 
participants in terms of who gets to analyze the information after it is received) that an 
asymmetry appears between the sociologist as an “expert” and the actors about whom she 
writes, and who experience the critical moment within the context of relations of power 
and or domination.  The alignment of a pragmatic ethnography of critique should be 
towards analytical inclusion, in ethnographies directed towards social justice. As 
Boltanski concludes in his final point of criticism of critical sociology, “a third 
consequence is to increase the asymmetry between deceived actors and a sociologist 
capable – and, it would appear from some formulations, the only one capable – of 
revealing the truth of their social condition to them” (20).  It is this posturing of sociology 
that has led to a tendency amongst most critical positions to silence the voice of those for 
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whom critique is most salient, the actor, and to give the chords to those who would 
impose yet another version of truth upon them, in the name of critical truth.   
 It follows from this, that one of the examples of the impossibility of the 
ubiquitous deception of actors, or of the omnipotence of structural forms of power and 
knowledge is the very real, very actual occurrence of dispute in society; confrontations 
between groups over perceptions about how to do things, between actors over choices to 
make and between actors and institutions over rules and liberties, especially in matters of 
social justice.  If critical paradigms don’t articulate the mechanisms by which action is 
interpreted on an individual basis, even in the context of forces greater than themselves, 
than how Boltanski asks, can one understand the disputes in which people engage?  
 Boltanski in (Boltanski 2011 and also - Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, 2006; 
Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) discusses specific moments of social life that require the 
justification of action.   In situations of dispute, the need arises to examine the grounds of 
a complaint, to assign blame, or to address competencies,  out of which new agreements 
are reached (1999:359).  The dispute hinges on the system of justifications that underlies 
this approach, and it is this moment that represents moments critiques, or critical 
moments (ibid).  The moment is defined by the critical activity  of persons in unusual 
moments of crisis.   The crisis might emerge as a shift in  a traditional occupational 
relationship, such as when a union and an employer begin to diverge on employment 
policies,  or when a homeless community comes to realize that the promises of housing 
authorities will never be met. It is this process of realizing that most critiques, perched on 
foundational premises, have difficulty understanding.  They tend to insert the 
proclamation, the fiscal measure, the statistic, or the value of reciprocity for example, 
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into the world of normative truths, and expect a critical reaction, but fail to disclose in a 
meaningful rendition, how this critical imperative in the mind of an actor turns into the 
critical action by a group of actors.    
 Boltanski and Thévenot argued correctly that this is a very reflexive moment in 
which the actor, or group of actors but acting independently in terms of the reflexive 
process, engage antecedent narratives about the way things are done, or should be 
accomplished, and in this way provides a story that links past and present, with a sense of 
the future that makes sense (1999:360).  The critical moment where the critique becomes 
a critical action depends on when and how successfully the actor shares this discontent or 
fear with other actors who then, in an unanticipated result, in the sense that we have no 
way of predicting from outside how it might take effect, join within that narrative and a 
“scene” results (ibid). While it is understood that socialization, schools, experts, media 
and other agents of informing and nurturing are efficacious in creating the antecedent 
narratives, it is also understood that the distribution and range of such narratives is so 
diversely distributed across actors, that the potential for conflict, and for critique is high. 
Such conflictual scenarios invoke various systems of justification,  that is, that accusers, 
critics and defendants each have to reproduce acceptable narratives of justification, by 
which the critical claim is either refuted or recognized as legitimate by other actors.   
 These situations are transitory because they represent a break in ordinary courses 
of action.  However, the outcome is never predetermined so in order to analyze such 
moments, one must invoke a frame that anticipates agreement and disagreement – one 
cannot weight the tendency of power for example to create an acquiescent self-governed 
claimant who gives up in the face of a stronger argument, to collapse two positions, 
 344 
Foucault and Habermas, into this simple scenario.  This is partly because disputes are not 
just about the language and the knowledge, or the skill of representing knowledge that 
both those positions suggest.  It is because situations involve human persons and a “large 
number” of objects, including material resources like money, technological resources like 
computers, land, titles, copyrights and many others. “The frame must be designed to deal 
with disputes in the real world, that is, it must be able to describe the way disputes link 
together persons and things” (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999:361). 
 The dispute is a tricky situation to unravel. Boltanski argues that in the dispute, to 
avoid violence or worse, as a sort of worst case scenario, reference must be made to 
principles of equivalence that conjoin claimants in other narratives outside of the 
immediate dispute – in a car accident, drivers must appeal to codes and rules of driving, 
insurance procedures and so on, in order to avoid becoming embroiled in the personal 
dramas that at the time of the rupture might be fuelling aggravation or passions in general. 
It is this regime of equivalence, that this approach calls the regime of justification, or a 
regime of justice (361).  There are other regimes of justification, but the need for 
justification is central to the approach.   
 There is an underlying urgency in this approach to demonstrate the legitimacy of 
claims, that is, to reconcile the veracity of critique with the perception of legitimacy by 
actors of the claim that represent the undercurrent of acceptable justifiable narratives.   
Justification, rather than force (power) or deceit (domination) invokes a sense of agency 
within the claim that critical sociology and critical theories have difficulty imagining. 
One of the reasons for this failing is that these positions rarely consider the competence 
of actors in defining what is legitimate and illegitimate because they are perceived of as 
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shaped into their relative competence by regimes of practice, or tricked into choosing 
certain actions by insidious  regimes of domination.  That actors in the real world  have to 
rely on this competence to address lived confrontations and conflicts at the personal, 
professional and political level, suggests that they have the capacity to truly act when 
they denounce social injustice or reveal their “foes” hidden motives”(364).  
 For Boltanski there is no single measure of equivalence nor a universal basis on 
which to gauge justification.  There is no external truth that can be imposed into every 
situation, nor a universal series of justifications that must be employed by groups 
produced in critiques of domination.  Such universal explanations amount to nothing 
more than Utopias (365).   As a bridge between universal formalism and unlimited 
pluralism, Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) offer the “possibility of  a limited plurality of 
principles of equivalence.”  Instead of attributing the different systems of justifications to 
different groups, the way traditional sociology would do it, Boltanski and Thévenot 
attribute the plurality to varied situations. The implication for the actor is that one must 
be able to shift from situation to situation at various points during one’s, day, week, year, 
lifetime, career and so on. Similarly, it means one must have the skills or knowledge of 
what types of justification are relevant in different situations and to not impose 
justifications from one situation on another.  Being legitimate in one situation means 
applying the relevant knowledge and actions to that experience, and in the case of dispute 
or negotiation, to invoke the logic of that regime of justice.     
 Boltanski and Thévenot ([1991] 2006) reviewed a spate of classical political 
philosophical texts to understand how notions of equivalence and humanity were 
incorporated over time into the practices of organizations, cities, people, and the like.  
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They identified different principles of equivalence and suggested a model by which they 
can be said to support justifiable claims. In sum they found that in cases of dispute (non-
violent), there were common constraints that shape the behaviour of people involved; 
arguments must be based on strong evidence and demonstrate a serious desire to 
converge on resolution of the dispute (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999:366).  The majority 
of the sources they reviewed were less concerned with force or power, than with 
understanding political and social equilibrium.  Hence they found an important theme; 
that human beings are perceived of as unique and separated beings, but united by the 
fundamental quality of equality. Boltanski and Thévenot regard persons as essentially 
equal, but principles of order of equivalence and worth about persons or things and of 
occupations and so on, do exist that tend to separate out exceptional persons and desires 
from the ordinary, while providing a common basis by which to provide actors with a 
sense of place in different situations.  While the qualities that might define these 
standards shift, it is suggested that these qualitative measures of worth play a role in the 
justifications people employ in daily life.  The critical moment is exactly the moment 
when these standards of worth are called into question (367).   As such the quality of a 
thing, a computer for example, or of a person, the programmer’s skills, might be called 
into question.   Into these disputes enter reality tests, which enable judgments based on 
grounded and legitimate agreement and offer a resolution to disputes. 
 The justifications that one might need to call up in the process of a day are 
summed up as estimations of worth peculiar to “Common Worlds” or cités (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, [1999] 2005; Boltanski and Thévenot [1991] 2006).   It is from the roles 
and narratives that each of these worlds prescribes or creates that individuals passing 
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though these worldly identities at any given time can find recourse to justification 
arguments.  While these worlds are based on the descriptions contained in handbooks and 
guides, texts that is, that tell people how to do or be certain things, such organizing 
principles find their way into human actors though social interactions, learning situations 
as it were, as well. Boltanski issues the proviso that some of these “ideal” worlds are 
more developed in reality than others and that some are simply emerging—further that 
other worlds concomitant with new worths, the (environmentalist) green worth or a 
(high-tech) communicative worth,” are being devised given the growth of 
communications and media and environmental crises around the globe (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 1999:368). 
 The first world is the world of Inspiration, based on St. Augustine’s, City of God. 
Worth is based on one’s relationship to the external source from which all worth is 
determined. It is a worth marked by Grace. It neither asks for rewards or recognition, nor 
requires such to provide worth. Recognition of others is completely unnecessary. Worth 
is measured by a sense of calm, transcendence, grace, and emotional stability. There is a 
sense that this world is governed by a universal sense of transcendent immaterialism, 
however, it is not dogmatic, nor foundational on other aspects of the lived world. 
 The second world is the Domestic world. Worth is determined based on kinship, 
lineage, and estate.  Having a family, and being recognized within that structure as 
fulfilling the duties of one’s respective role is vital. One is a good leader, a good 
reciprocator, delegator, or distinguished, and straightforward (371). The third world is the 
world of Renown, which is based on Hobbe’s Leviathan ((371).  In a domestic world, 
worth is based on one’s value in a hierarchical chain of highly regarded commitments, 
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but in the world of Renown, worth is determined solely by other peoples’ opinions. 
Conventional signs of public esteem secure stability, their absence or rejection become 
points of personal conflict.  Based on Rousseau’s The Social Contract, in the fourth, the 
Civic world, people have worth to the degree that they are participant in the activities of 
membership in society. One is a good labourer, a good citizen, and a contributor to the 
general well being of the group.  Beings are perceived of here not in their role as 
individual beings, but as collective beings.  Important persons are federations, delegates, 
public communities, volunteers and the like (372).  The fifth world is the Market world, it 
is loosely based on Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Important persons here are buyers 
and sellers. They are worthy when they are rich, and connect to one another in 
competitive relationships aligned with the market (372). Lastly is the Industrial world 
where worth is measured by efficiency. Great persons are experts.  Lowly persons are 
unskilled, poor or homeless folks.  Worth is productive, efficient, calculating, effective 
and so on. Relationships are said to be harmonious when they are in sync, measurable, 
harmonious, and stabilized (Basaure 2011:373). 
 Because persons move in and out of these worlds, criticism can result from their 
participation in one world but importing reality tests from another.  In other words, in the 
case of the shantytown, no longer content with the tidbits tossed their way, the homeless 
strike and campaign and make an appeal to justice contained in the constitutional laws 
that govern poverty.  Emergency campground laws also exist in the civic world, and 
afford the poor an opportunity to justify their critique.  Similarly, the same poor person 
cannot enter a business and demand money or support on the basis of being deserving 
under a civic sense of justification, because in the industrial world, they have no such 
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claim. “The situation is then criticized as unfair because a kind of worth relevant inside 
one world has been carried into another” (373).  The underlying principle on which the 
test is based remains unchallenged, and denunciation of the other, the critique, or its 
rejoinder is that the worth test has been inappropriately applied to conditions where it has 
no merit.  So one source of conflict, that is critical to understanding conflict, is when one 
tries to assume justification in one world based on the narrative of justice from another, 
where it can be said the opposing narratives are not interchangeable.  Hence resistance to 
the shantytown comes not from within, but from other actors who see it as an argument 
whose justifications in the civic world are outdated or incorrect altogether.  Furthermore, 
they see the village as a microcosm of all the worlds, and in this sense it fails to justify 
itself on economic, domestic and other worths.  The critique of which the shantytown is a 
part is very much one of proving its worth in these various worlds, but on the basis of 
new justifications it is fighting to implant into them.  For conventional justification 
arguments, the village seems radical or worse, ambiguous. Ambiguity is more frightening 
and problematic to external critique because it is not clear what criteria are to be used.  At 
least a radical lawless den of iniquity can be criticized and shuttered on the basis that it 
breaks laws or is a threat, but a place that is poorly defined, and therefore open to many 
positions is harder to place. 
 A more crucial and radical critique occurs when from within the world, one 
attempts to change the narrative on which justification based.   In this case, the critique 
emerges as a critical action where the aim is to replace a test with an altogether new idea, 
or one from another world. So for example, environmentalists enter the Industrial world 
and fight for greener industrial practices; the homeless claim land and build housing 
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regardless of civic codes forbidding such use.   One of the very positive notions in this 
approach is that though they posit 6 ideal types, they also suggest that the types are rarely 
as pure as they seem.  That the question of purity is important, for the more impure a 
world, or a situation is, defined by elements of different worlds, the more likely there is 
to be conflicts between reality tests and worth. There is a veritable degree of ambiguity in 
these situations, or what they call situations troubles.   In the case of homeless persons 
making claims on housing space, a claim within the Civic world, one might see homeless 
people with tents, placards, shopping carts, facing off against  police with barricades, 
loud horns and city bylaw codes.  The more objects from differing worlds enter a 
situation, the more likely there is to be conflict of some kind. Space is an important object 
in this sense, and it will be discussed in the next chapter. In the sense that Boltanski et al 
present objects, the shantytown as a bounded parcel, a container of questionable social 
relations and a physical “eyesore”, creates the likelihood of conflict with other worlds.  
The way I am trying to shape it, the village is an ambiguous world of worlds, where 
liminality defines the justifications created by actors, caught up in the pragmatic 
navigation of extreme poverty. This concentrated spatialization of liminality that is the 
village, therefore, provokes critique of various kinds.  
 By way of indexing the intermixing of worlds and worth and tests, pragmatic  
sociology of critique suggests that by overlapping the six worlds, one can see probable 
loci of conflict and critique.  For example, the Domestic world where personal 
relationships and strong character are the keys to worth, finds as problematic the juridical 
and arbitrary nature of the civic world where character and lineage are usurped by 
universalized laws and codes.  The world of Inspiration is going to have difficulty with 
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the Industrial since the latter is destructive and self-serving, mundane and material, and 
the former measures worth on the absence of such materialism.   
 More importantly for the task at hand in this dissertation, I would want to ask, to 
what degree the world of the homeless, which integrates sufficient material and 
behavioral diversity so as to constitute its own world, a between-world not proposed by 
Boltanski and Thévenot, might fit into this framework.  I am suggesting that the 
Shantytown is a liminal world, much as homelessness is, and in so much as it is emerging, 
it is in the process of creating its own justifications.  It is towards framing these 
justifications that a pragmatic and critical ethnography of Dignity Village is directed.    
 Boltanski suggests that the outcome of disputes is not always the displacement of 
one justification over another. There can be compromise.  Boltanski points out that 
compromises are often ridiculed because what they really do is subordinate the claim of 
each narrative to the power of an unseen external value that suggests the negotiation of 
positions. Hence, the homeless will feel vindicated if the city chooses not to evict them 
from a park one night, in the name of a struggle for “justice”, even if it means their rights 
to housing have not fully been met.  Workers will accept a 2% pay increase, as a 
compromise with the industrial powers that be, in a confrontation between the civic world 
where citizens have rights, and the industrial world, where labour is a mere cost of 
production. Where the radical criticism challenges a principle, the dispute becomes a 
competition between two reality tests (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999:374).   Closure can 
come in the form of choosing one test over another.  Or in the case of Dignity Village, 
closure will follow the period of justification creation in which it is engaged. I am 
arguing that the justifications in which it is imbricated is primarily dictated by a  
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neoliberal sense of conduct, and it is here that pragmatic sociology of critique and 
governmentality join  PEOC to interrogate the liminal world of the village. The village 
must constantly justify itself to city and state governance that it complies with two 
essential reality tests.  The first is the strictly codified rationalization of the village 
imposed by the city; the other is its ability to regenerate self-conducting citizens, and 
regardless of worlds or justifications, this is primarily case of governmentality – that is a 
case where the justification is to a discourse on what government means in the classic 
sense of self-conduct, and of  conduct towards others. 
 Where pragmatic critique of sociology is strongest is in creating a series of 
interconnected worlds that correspond to the life events of actors, and out of which 
emerge the potential for disputes, that is for critical action from the position of an actor 
faced with a conundrum.  Critique in the form of accusations and disputes are based on 
the description of the situation in terms of understandings of common good.  Where the 
approach had suffered, in earlier forms, was from a lack of any critical mechanism to 
adjudicate the link between worlds and their worths, and the subtle nuanced behaviour of 
actors that could account for the substrate by which narratives and reality tests are forced 
to collide. That is; if critical action is real, and lived, that does not mean all action is 
critical; in fact it could not be so (Boltanski 2011:51).  “The critical activity stands out 
against a background which, far from being critical, can on the contrary be characterized 
by a sort of tacit adherence to reality as it presents itself in the course of ordinary 
activities; or by a taken-for-granted world…to account for the pregnancy of this 
background, we must return to the sociology of institutions”(51).   
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 For Boltanski institutions are foundational, operating within the worlds of worths, 
and in a sense presenting a structured means by which to suggest unbiased accounts of 
the world.  Unlike actors who are grounded and embodied, the perception of an 
institution is largely that of an ethereal nexus for the locating of narratives in a bodiless 
state.  Though they work through spokespersons, institutions present themselves as 
exterior proof of “whatness of what is” (55).  They produce knowledge that might be 
called common sense, but Boltanski  argues there is nothing benevolent or gracious about 
their role; they frame orders and narratives of justification that are almost  always those 
of domination and exploitation.  Still, much of sociology has looked towards these 
common sense constructions, ideology, conventional wisdom, symbolic imaginaries, 
“mainstream” attitudes, as a sort of equalizing mechanism in society, rather than at the 
points of discord that Boltanski, and Thévenot have examined.  Surely it can be argued 
that the common sense produced by institutions has a moderating effect, but it is the 
often-rapid shifts from common sense to moments of rupture that call up narratives of 
justice and therefore are crucial for understanding critique (56).  Reality then, is an 
insufficient premise on which to base critique.  It is necessary to study the imbrication of 
“what hangs together and what is stamped with uncertainty,” if one is to understand 
critique.   Dignity Village and homelessness in general, is liminality; liminality is 
uncertainty.  So, critique is a process of discerning means to address uncertainty and is in 
pragmatic terms, a liminal event (Boland 2013; Szakolczai 2000). 
 Some of this is difficult to me. Even if reality is socially constructed, it in no way 
implies a stable set of affairs.  Furthermore, the idea of the real world is not only 
simplistic and convenient; it misses the point entirely.  Even with the tendency of some 
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institutions charged with creating numbers to map society according to risk probabilities, 
a common feature if not the raison d’etre of neoliberal governance, probability is a 
concept designed to measure and integrate the radical or non-common experience into 
common experience. So there can be no understanding of a real reality without 
understanding what the points of departure are; that is where the axis for critiques of the 
common sense resides.  In a world absent of institutions that render the unknowable, 
knowable and manage the narratives that might enter critique, the result would be social 
chaos and constant instability. A society in which either institutions or critique was a 
totalizing feature, would be undesirable and impossible (58-60).   
 Yet institutions and critique are set off against one another in this model; critique 
as a sort of countervailing force to the stabilizing role of institutions, which implies that 
their imbrication is a tantalization, a necessary codependence on which modern society is 
understood.   Still, one must be able to address social change.  Since critique and critical 
action are directed towards revealing or resolving conflicts in opposed ways of seeing 
and doing, then how does a pragmatic sociology of critique anticipate social change? If 
institutions do not have the totalizing effect of renewing and repeating systems of 
domination, or maintaining the status quo, how does social change happen?  Where most 
sociologies have attempted to understand how societies and cultures tend to reproduce 
themselves, they have looked at the stabilizing functions of social things like institutions.  
Boltanski’s position is classical, but with a twist. 
 Change is the constant in the world, and it is against this fundamental dynamic 
that institutions struggle. It is not the problem of stability that institutions must face; that 
would not be problematic; it is instability and change that defines the real force behind 
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worth worlds, institutions and actors.   Assuming that all the worlds can be collapsed into 
hermeneutically simplified “world’ where under capitalism, political regimes can be said 
to be the designers and implementers of systems of domination, it would be possible to 
distinguish types of domination and the possibility for critique (change) they anticipate 
(125-7).   
 Domination changes, everything changes; simple domination is total, violent and 
constitutes oppression. Boltanski cites slavery as an example, but one could argue the 
case that poor houses and workfare (under neoliberalism) were equally oppressive. In any 
event, such extreme domination renders critique difficult or impossible. There are other 
kinds of simple domination, such as the tests used by officials, to award merit or more 
currently, and pertinent to this dissertation, the use of fundamental concepts of freedom 
and rights contained in constitutional frames to define the legal boundaries that housing 
critique and their manifestations in critical actions might take. Where simple domination 
seeks to control the world by use of police and force, modern neoliberalism seeks to do 
so though a system of complex, managerial capitalism, where experts are looked upon as 
avatars of authority and understanding (2011:136).  Under the neologism, wol&real, 
dominant institutions create the illusion that circumstance beyond their control explain 
the necessity of their actions, however dominating or liberating they might be constructed 
to appear (137).   Disguised within this existential shill, institutions are occupied by 
groups of powerful people, not ideas or physical circumstances that,  so hidden, are hard 
to identify within the critiques that would expose them. Hence, once again, Boltanski 
returns to a turn away from looking at structures and institutions as “building blocks” on 
which to place the mantle of responsibility for stability and injustice, but to the people 
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behind them who perpetuate in their own (capitalist) interests and justifications,  the 
injustices that confront people, and align worth worlds in a struggle with matters of 
humanity.  Institutions are not bad.  Structure is not bad, it is actual, but the people that 
can be said to occupy these constructs need to be understood and held responsible for the 
injustices so often blamed on the institution or the structural condition.  Critique therefore, 
is not an opposition to institutions or to structure, but as a form of narrative and action 
that co-exists as a system of checks and balances that reveals the contradictions, 
injustices and other ways of doing established practices that might transcend the 
dominating and exploitative route of capitalism.  Critique is the other side of the coin.  As 
one activist in Portland remarked, “we are the remoras, picking off the parasites, keeping 
it all clean.”  
 Clearly people living in the same community, experiencing the same ‘domination’ 
or relative empowerment, can see the world in different ways or employ various manners 
of action or inaction by which to address these senses. Dignity Village is a faulty 
microcosm of life “outside.”  There are political structures, laws, rules, village sections 
that act as neighborhoods, a class system based on degrees of citizenship, religious 
factions, economic structures and micro businesses.  All the worlds that unite or divide 
people in broader economies of worth exist here as a sort of experiment – a transitional 
world; Is there room for a between-world in Boltanski’s model? Where pragmatic 
critique of sociology is strongest is in creating a series of interconnected complete worlds 
that correspond to the life events of actors, and out of which emerge the potential for 
disputes, that is for critical action from the position of an actor faced with a conundrum.   
A weakness is understanding incomplete worlds, or worlds one might define as 
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composed of many other worlds; the fractured world of liminality, like Dignity Village.27
 I find Boltanski’s work useful at many levels and very problematic.  The ideas of 
interconnected worlds of worth and the justifications used in these are very intriguing.  
The idea that the dynamic concern for society is conflict and  resolution, rather than 
peace and stability is also I would argue empirically valid.  However, there are limits to 
his pragmatic sociology of critique. He imposes limits on the potential for change 
because of the strength of institutions which he says are dominant, but suggests that 
critique of justifications has the effect in cases, of influencing shifts in how things are 
dominated. If one is suggesting that domination can be changed – the way domination 
happens can be changed – then one is arguing the material of domination (power) can be 
shifted, and so we are once again talking about power in a Foucauldian sense. What is the 
point of critique, if it is pointless - that is if it denies power just as it relies on it?  Actors 
engage in critique and act critically because they have the power to do so. Is domination a 
simple situation of a person or groups of persons having more power? If so, critique and 
power are just two sides of one coin, and to be successful one must displace the other, but 
this by no means suggests a closed state of affairs. Boltanski’s emancipation premise is 
weak in the sense that it suggests a shift in which a group’s justification become more 
important through critical action, which suggest that domination is really just a particular 
configuration of power, a measurable if not mappable thing, that is constantly shifting.  
There is also the question of what happens when critique is successful and displaces 
extant power. Ibrahim suggested earlier, freedom under certain circumstances is 
understood as a dominating concept as well.  So does domination have to be a bad or 
unjust thing to be avoided?  If one must work to keep their freedom, if they must organize 
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and lead and teach and do all the things that freedom fighters like Ibrahim suggest, are 
freedom and domination in this context, the same thing?  
 Boltanski has left undeveloped the transitional capacities of actors moving in and 
out of worlds and what that space looks like. The idea that his economies of worth are 
reducible to certain qualities, is misleading, since I would argue they each inhere liminal 
and therefore unknown qualities and experiences; the world of the homeless is an 
altogether liminal between-world we will discuss later as sort of heterotopic third space 
where all these worlds collide and are fragmented, remain unachievable, and there is no 
way to understand the psychology or sociology of liminal mental and social space 
without participating in it.   
 
5.13 Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, I answered Latour’s challenge to critique by arguing that by 
following actors’ ideas and visions of alternative reality, we can get a sense of what they 
say reality looks like, as well as an idea of what the critical actors’ assemblages look like.  
I am not worried that we have never been modern, or that my computer has influence; I 
recognize these statements might be true, and I argued that there is room in PEOC for 
understanding how actors attach meaning to these things, and thereby to know what role 
they play in reassembling the social.    
 I then discussed how three classic philosophical approaches categorize critique on 
the basis of applying a foundational principle that makes social contexts or issues just 
(critical dogmatism); creating communities of debate over the applicability of competing 
normative ideals (transcendental critique) and finally I presented Derrida’s 
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deconstructionism, which argues for exposing the system that makes a certain matter of 
justice recognizable.  It is towards this position that my interpretive work tends to point, 
and it is why I earlier suggested the link between reflexive, critical and pragmatic 
traditions in a pragmatic ethnography of critique.  I then discussed and briefly critiqued 
critical theory, critical sociology and critical realism.  There are elements of each that 
seem of value.   
 From critical theory, the idea that capital works to reproduce the conditions of its 
existence by duping people is intriguing, but short sighted; the world is full of resistance 
to capital so a false consciousness cannot really exist. There must be other reasons why 
people accept domination. Critical sociology is regaining popularity, even by Boltanski 
who rejoined Bourdieu in On Critique. This renewed popularity is precisely because 
despite our awareness of domination, we generally are doing less to effectively change it, 
and Bourdieu had argued that it was the researcher’s moral obligation to inform 
transformative capacities. His work does tend to limit the freedom of actors through the 
performance of habitus, but he too cannot or does not recognize how periods of extended 
liminality might result from failed habitus.  Instead, even if the force of habitus might 
hold them back, liminal personae like junkies or homeless people are understood in 
critical sociology as victims of structural violence (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009).  The 
capacity for Bourdieu’s framing in current experiences of massive poverty and 
displacement of people into homelessness suggests the inter-structural position they 
inhabit needs to be more fully theorized. Critical realism asks us to accept the existence 
of objective structure, but to agree to not see it. I find this blind faith in an objective 
reality dubious, simply because the root to discerning it, the actor’s ideas and style of 
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presenting them, is more unstable than Archer concludes, and so what then is an objective 
reality?  However, I find the idea of an inner conversation very useful as the location of 
pragmatic critique, useful that is, so long as we abandon the possibility of conversation 
“types,” in favour of the possibility that each actor has multiple conversational 
propensities that change over time, and therefore require a long term and systematic 
interrogation.  If this is true, then objective realities cannot be known, even if they do 
exist, because the actors’ understandings or critique of the events they generate is 
unstable, so the link to reality is unstable too – like looking through the “snow” on an 
analogue TV screen, I might imagine. 
 I then discussed Foucault and Boltanski.  Foucault is interesting to me for the way 
he argues that all actors are inherently critical and powerful, and that freedom is to be 
understood as the range of choices a person might make towards self-conduct.  The idea 
that resistance is built into neoliberal governmentality and has spaces for it is also 
interesting. Foucault’s work on space is very limited as we will discuss in the next 
chapters. Beyond this, Foucault, and Boltanski each dismiss grand normative narratives, 
and so they don’t show how such grand foundational beliefs might under current regimes 
of power be efficacious in determining struggle. In cases where normative struggles arise, 
they are the result of discourses in epistemes or in worlds of worth, but rarely transcend 
this constructed nature.  In fact, there is little room for struggle in Foucault except in 
extreme cases, rare cases, of domination.  Furthermore, governmentality cannot account 
for the random acts of people, and is completely incapable of understanding liminal 
experiences, since they are for Foucault, aspects of the self-transformative process, or of 
temporary autonomous zones, counter-conducts, rather than intact frames of existence. I 
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am arguing the village is that, an intact, perpetually liminal frame of existence reinforced 
by the spatial and temporal conditions that determine its legal sanction.  
 For governmentality studies, failed conduct and unusual acts are not a sign of an 
act in the sense of “acts of citizenship”, but an indication of how governing is faulty – the 
ability of the governor, whether it be the city, the village council or the villager, is not 
doing it right.  There is little room for the actor to choose a completely different mode of 
doing something.  Lastly, Foucault by locating power in actors and in regimes of power, 
and Boltanski by endowing actors with innate critical ability through justifications, have 
a hard time anticipating life in a world like the village.  As I mentioned, Delanty points 
out an important weakness in Foucault, namely that his approach fails to reconcile 
subjectivities that are not explainable by recourse to notions of disciplinary power 
(2011:84). I am also very confused by the way by Boltanski disguises power as 
domination. As I mentioned, it is still a question of the substance of domination, which is 
power, and this invites contests at the individual and social level, which is in fact an 
expression of freedom through the exercise of power.  Without power struggles and the 
instances where they present senses of being dominated, actors tend to lose sight of the 
need to fight for freedom; they forget they have or need to pursue their political power. 
This is what Ibrahim had said earlier, and it is exactly what I am going to argue is wrong 
with the village now.  At least in Foucault, we get a sense that subjects are always 
exercising power in the face of decisions they must make to be free. I also don’t see the 
justification premise of Boltanski as liberating or critical in the important sense that 
actors need to transcend mundane critical action to arrive at participation in critiques of 
social justice like homelessness.  Thus far the transcripts from the village all confirm that 
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mundane justification in the form of argumentation about petty and material elements of 
life in the village is what has strangled its potential towards social critique. My last 
observation of pragmatic sociology of critique is that economies of worth are seen as 
complete worlds, and though they overlap, the liminal space of homelessness is absorbed 
into the internal systems by which actors should become established in unique domains 
of, for example, civic, political and religious worlds.  A world of liminal potential of its 
own makes little sense in a model where established institutions and reality tests exist, 
because neither can be in a “cite” of perpetually liminal experience.   I am going to 
propose that the village is such a between-world, if only to get at how hard it is for 
critique to take hold there.  
 Each of these five approaches contributes to my understanding of how to critique 
the village, and to understand the critique produced in the village.  I think a major 
weakness of modern social critique is that it has hard time testing its criteria and methods 
in spaces that are hard to define. Liminal or transitional subjectivities are seen as 
temporary and usually as epiphenomenon of the critical action or the critique as it 
emerges over time. Rarely is the idea of perpetual liminality understood as a human 
condition that produces and is understandable by various forms of critique, because it is 
ambiguous and not wholly formed in a manner that is subject to external critiques.  Even 
deconstruction has difficulty in deconstructing what is not wholly present,  but it offers 
the best shot. When we meet people with mental health issues, addictions and alternative 
lifestyles, we find it difficult to think of them as legitimate critical actors and this 
becomes even more of a conundrum when we find ourselves in communities defined by 
these ambiguous states of being.  
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 In the next chapter it will become clear that the irony is that as western economies 
shrink, as traditional rituals and practices for transitioning through life fail, conventional 
mental and physical spaces are starting to be displaced by liminal experiences. The 
liminal homeless person is no longer scattered to a space reserved for her by history - the 
streets, shelters, mental wards and prisons, they are becoming increasingly concentrated, 
creating new mental and physical spaces where life in the liminal realm challenges our 
conventional ways of understanding homelessness.   Before going to the next chapter, I 
want to share an illustrative passage from Dignity in Exile.   
 In the following long excerpt, villager Dave Samson speaks to a number of critiques 
to which some of the villagers are attached.  I had this conversation with him just after a 
regime change in which Mitch Grubic, a progressive member of the village had taken 
control of the village in the annual election.  In this transcript Dave speaks clearly about 
what’s wrong, possible solutions and certain goals.  The way he describes things, 
activism was on the rise, morale was high and people were optimistic.  He was optimistic. 
By the end of this dissertation, two years hence, all of these problems and all of these 
possible solutions will remain intact, but unchanged, even though the critique remains 
salient.  We are going to understand that this is because of the way the village democracy 
works against progressive critiques in their liminal stages, by producing factions that 
suppress the action. This tendency we will discover is about power.  People who have 
found personal power in the village, doubt they could feel that way outside of it, so I 
argue this is why they resist the progressive changes proposed by Dave and others. The 
kinds of changes David and other activist members propose would rout the power base of 
villagers who have a certain control over the village because of their leadership in 
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factions.  Rather than move into directions that could help the villagers get sober and 
skilled, and move beyond the current limits of the village, towards its sustainable and 
democratic vision, these factions prefer this empowerment because it is immediately 
gratifying to them.  And because of this state of affairs,  people are dying.  Villagers who 
are intimidated by the factions tow the line, and the result is this stagnant liminal space. 
Justifications maybe, monsieur Boltanski, but power, and domination, surely. 
Dignity in Exile (2012: 124-32) 
 (January 2012). In the last few months Dave has sounded far more optimistic about 
the village. His own depression and anxiety has been somewhat alleviated by his 
participation in the civic life of the village. With unusual faith in the leadership, he has 
become the village chef and prepares communal meals for the village. And he has also 
become the donations officer. The distribution of food and material goods in the village 
had been a source of corruption and faction building in the village. I asked him why he 
had so dramatically changed his opinion about things.  
 “Well, the strategy that Mitch, Ptery and me and others had was that one of the best 
ways to alleviate tension in the village was to just start and provide more community 
meals for them, and we figured if we alleviated that anxiety for them they would start 
being more better behaved with one another and more civil. It’s taken us three months. 
Remember how when food donations would come in, people would just stockpile it up 
and stack it up on their plates like it was free for all without thinking about anyone else? 
Well, now they actually wait politely in line because they know I’m making sure 
everyone gets their share. So we alleviated that anxiety and that has put less pressure on 
the council ’cause now they don’t complain to council so much about things. And, you 
know, I have taken over donations, and the villagers have turned to me with a sense of 
trust because they know I am going to give them what they’re fairly entitled to.” 
 “How do you decide what fairly distributed is?”  
 “Well, like making sure that everyone gets fed before people start taking more than 
they need.” 
 “But donations isn’t just about food. It’s about clothing and material things that have 
meaning too.”  
 “Yeah, yup, yup, and that I am working on now too. By basically being casual and 
friendly about it, the villagers are beginning to trust me and my judgment about what’s 
fair and not fair. ” 
 “But it can’t all rely on you, David. There has to be…” 
 “Oh, I know, I know. My strategy has been pretty much staying out of the political 
aspect of it, and all I been doing, I figured if they weren’t listening to my political ideas, 
then what I could do is just lead by example and provide a good steady consistent attitude 
and application of principle.” 
 “And what’s the principle?” 
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 “And it’s starting to help.” He didn’t hear me, his earpiece on the brink again. 
 “What’s the principle?” I asked again louder. 
 “Ah, fair distribution. Helping them understand finally that, look, you’re going to get 
what you need – you might not get what you want – but we will make sure you will get 
what you need. And that’s starting to put a lot of the conflict to bed because donations 
and access to things is one of the great tension spots.” 
 “And what are the other tension spots?”  
 “Ah, right now, communications.” 
 “Between people?” 
 “Between council. Between membership.” 
 “But why is that? How is the council functioning if there are still communication 
issues?”  
 “Ah, it’s functioning well. We had a membership meeting today and it went smooth 
as punch. We talked about a lot of things we wouldn’t talk about before. We were voting 
on a couple of VIC members, issues, and we were discussing the activist activities we 
have been engaging in.” 
 “So, who’s participating in the activist activities?” I wanted to know because, based 
on their stories, I have had the sense that if more people got involved that the village will 
start to breathe life again. 
 “Ah, me, Larry – he’s a new guy – Ptery, Mitch, Michelle, Brad, Chuck. About eight 
of us, more than double when you were here. We’ve been involved with the VBC, the 
village building convergence here in Portland.” 
 “What does that mean?” 
 “Well, it develops community centers that work for people. We work with other 
activists who want to provide housing for people. We work with people, for example, 
who want to downsize their homes into smaller places, who want to live in sane living 
spaces, living in comfortable living spaces without leaving a huge carbon footprint.” 
 “And how realistic is this?” 
  “It’s very realistic. Right now the village is connecting with thousands of people. We 
go to the meetings and make connections. We are establishing new lines of 
communications with other groups and re-establishing lines of communications that were 
lost here over the years with other groups, and with emerging groups.” 
 “What are the emerging groups?” 
 “Well, one is Rethinking Psychiatry, which is the anti-medication group which is, 
like, the answer for human psychiatric needs is not medication to control, it’s cognitive 
therapy and helping people re-establish communication and their sense of place. And 
then there is the VBC, which we talked about, and then we are working with Paint the 
Pavement, that creates beautiful painted spaces for people to gather in. And then we are 
working with the Depave group, which is active in taking over abandoned lots and 
properties and removing the concrete and asphalt and replanting it with earth and trees 
and plants and gardens, and we are involved with R2DTOO. In fact, this weekend we are 
having a big barbeque and they are invited and we painted a big flower box for them.” 
 “How are they doing down there at R2DTOO?” 
 “Not too bad. Of course, when I was down there two weeks ago to paint one of the 
doors, you know, that make up the fence, while I was painting the Dignity Village door, I 
saw two of the guys from there go down the street a few hundred feet and buy crack and 
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then just waltz back into the site with crack rocks the size of marbles. That less than 
impressed me.” 
 “But that goes on in your own village, dude. What are you guys going to do about 
that in the village?” 
 “Well, we’re starting to have dialogues about that. And, you know, I have been one 
of the leaders in talking about that and admitting my own problem. And my own 
culpability with that problem. You know, like Steve-O’s death. We allowed that man to 
drink himself to death by turning a blind eye. And, as a community, we can no longer do 
that.” 
 “And how in the world are you culpable in all this?”  
 “Well, in the past, I participated in drugs and alcohol at the village. So I am owning 
up to my responsibility and saying, ‘Look, I know where you’re at, I have been there, but 
there is a better way. We can fix this.’ And by alleviating the tension over resources and 
food we’re lessening their anxiety, which, you know, eventually will hopefully lessen 
their need for self-medication. You know, so that days are worth having rather than 
obliterating.” Dave sounds completely convinced that this will work.  
 “So, the drugs don’t necessarily have to be part of the picture?” A pause. Maybe, he 
didn’t hear me again. I went on. “Well, you know, I have been arguing in my book that 
the drugs really aren’t the big defining feature of the village. The drugs are there because 
people were beaten up, they went to jail, they were raped, they lost their jobs and homes, 
they were on the streets and that fucks you up really bad.” 
 “Yeah, yeah,” he agreed. 
 I added: “But the system doesn’t afford them psychiatrists and doctors and barring 
that, since that is just another way of controlling them, the system doesn’t really allow 
them places to live their lives independently, or to find ways to excel, so they are left 
haunted by all these memories with no choice but to get a quick fix. To get high. Right? 
Is that accurate?”  
 “Yeah, and then there is the fact that the drugs addict them. Once they are there. I 
mean, you tried kicking hard drugs. You know what it’s like.” 
 “I did.”  
 “Yeah, right.” 
 “It wasn’t easy. I had supports. And so, so you’re saying that if it became more of a 
community, then people might be more willing to address their drug use?” 
 “Absolutely. Absolutely, and we have seen people in the village start to turn away 
from that. You know like Melissa and TC? I was really impressed a few weeks ago when 
I heard they approached Outside In [a non-profit street health group] and said, ‘Look, we 
have a methamphetamine problem and we would like some help with that.’ And as more 
of us are doing that for ourselves, and self-directing, we are encouraging and empowering 
others to do the same. At their own pace. You know, ideas happen, someone acts, and 
then they stick to other people.” 
 Since Dave has been so forthcoming, I decided to put it out there. “Look, you’ve 
been there twice now, and I was there. And you and I both recognize that when I was 
there it was in the shits, correct?” 
 “Right. Absolutely, absolutely.” 
 “And why was it in the shits?” 
 “Well, because of the entropy that had set in,” he said, as if it was crystal clear. 
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  “So, do I have this correct? The entropy had set in because people had been 
impeached and the people who knew how to do things were long gone, had moved on to 
other things, and so it was basically—” 
  “Basically they voted in incompetent people. Like, well, you saw Jon Boy. You 
know he was the one who invited you there and he wasn’t able to carry on with what he 
promised because his violence and drug problems got him kicked out of the village 
because he got violent with somebody.” 
 “But once again, Dave, we are coming back to drugs and alcohol and I am really 
trying to stay away from it. Are you telling me I can’t tell the story of this village without 
talking about drugs and alcohol?” 
 “I don’t think you can tell the story about homelessness at all without talking about 
the truth about drugs and alcohol. And, you know, that’s one thing I have been telling the 
villagers – you know I am going to tell the truth ’bout the situation whether you find it 
painful and uncomfortable or not – it has to be discussed. I tell them that. You know, 
because even though drugs and alcohol aren’t the cause of most of their problems, they’re 
the major symptoms. As much as I want to say it isn’t a big deal, it is a big deal. I mean, 
you were there. Geez, you heard a heroin deal going on behind your own house.” 
 “And two ODs,” I added. 
 “And the ODs, too.”  
 “But I see heroin deals and other drug shit where I live here in Montreal too. So what 
does that mean?”  
 “I dunno. What does that mean? Maybe those folks aren’t too happy either. And not 
everyone here does drugs; Ptery, Mitch, me, and a bunch of others don’t do it. So it 
doesn’t have to be. You know pot and beer. That’s not the issue really. And when you got 
there, I was in a very low state and just starting in a very difficult transition out of the fog 
and into my own path of recovery and you got to see just the beginning of me waking up. 
You know, and people see me now walking and laughing and getting things done, and I 
think for some of those I was in the same boat with, it says they can do it too. It gives 
people some hope that they can get themselves out of the shit. I mean, I am way more 
confident, and for the first time in years I am operating on all eight cylinders.” 
 And it was true that the times when I had seen Dave smoking up with Brad P., or 
when he had disappeared with his close friend Jay to drink, had been disappointing. He’d 
always returned looking worse for the wear and had sounded regretful. He’d also sounded 
defeated and often he had remarked that it was “hard not to get too high when things 
were so low in the village.” The most recent shakeup of the village leadership had really 
inspired Dave. With faith in them, he had started having faith that his own efforts at the 
village might bear fruit.  
 I had to yell again. “What other positive things are happening?” 
  “Well, the greenhouse is up and running, and the store is getting people motivated. 
But I think the activating that people like Ptery, Michelle, Larry, new Larry, and Chuck 
and Brad G. are doing, it really helps. They might not comprehend what we say about 
meetings and activist stuff, but people see the change in us and it really helps. You know, 
they are seeing our behavior and our action, you know, like, we are having a little 
meeting discussing what we are doing and we’re laughing our asses off. And they are 
attracted to that, they want that happiness. People are willing to enter that conversation. 
And one conversation leads to others and…” 
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 “So, how do you get the village back in stride?”  
 “Well, we have to bring other voices from the outside into the conversation. You 
know, we aren’t really good bookkeepers or nutritionists. But there are others who are.”  
 “From the city offices you mean?” 
 “From wherever. You know, a lot of other people have been homeless, too. And 
some who haven’t can help with the problems we have. Activists and non-activists, 
doctors, lawyers, artists, whoever…” 
 “So, you have to bring outside help into the village?”  
 “Absolutely. And we are sort of doing that already. By reaching out to other groups, 
they are reaching back in.”  
 “So, should there be other Dignity Villages, or should the government give people 
housing?” I asked him. 
 “Yes, I think yes – but I think that the activist community has to make sure that the 
infrastructures are set up and firmly in place. Not just leave after the place is set up. Make 
sure there is a transitional process for leadership set so that there is consistency in 
application of programs – inconsistency is one of the biggest problems for the village. 
People have to know how to do things before others leave.” 
 “So, in other words, you are saying that systems of learning have to be in place so 
that people can learn the required behaviors and skills, so they can learn how to run the 
village? So, you need advocates and teachers to introduce informal processes for learning 
these things?”  
 “Yeah, yeah. That’s it.” 
 I had to ask: “So, the other question is, should the government be building more Bud 
Clark Commons or should it give people money to build Dignity Villages?” 
 “Ah, yeah, well… you know, there have been numerous ODs at the Bud Clark 
Commons, the police are there frequently, so I would have to say, 47 million dollars to 
build the Bud Clark Commons to have people go there, get arrested, die, is a bad 
investment. Ah… The village model offers the cheapest alternative. In an era when 
everyone argues about cost, they can’t touch what we do. And rather than invest 47 
million in a single joint in one area, why not do what the village does, you know – 
$200,000 start-up money. I think the point of your work as an anthropologist, as a social 
scientist, is to tell the story, to understand the problem, show the dialogue and to show 
how people communicate, where the problem is and how we can improve ourselves as 
people. There, did I get it? Doesn’t that sound accurate?” 
 “I dunno, dude. I’m just trying to write this story and it’s funny, you know, but I start 
off this book saying I don’t want to focus on drugs and alcohol, but everybody, almost 
everybody ends up talking about drugs and alcohol – and I don’t show any images of it, 
but we talk about it. It’s in the writing and it’s in the stories and I try not to show pictures 
of it, but what you were kind of saying is that in a way I am showing images of drug and 
alcohol because the village I saw and the people I met were all there, were symptomatic 
in some way of the drug problem. Most of them. But even the ones who don’t use, 
because they live with those who did use and they lived in a village that was fucking 
suffering, were kind of reflections of the drug and alcohol use around them.” 
 “Yeah, I mean, it shouldn’t be a focus. But it is a part of the conversation. I look at 
the bigger picture. Your denying any aspects of the problem really doesn’t help people 
dealing with the problems. And if the villagers and the community and the homeless 
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community aren’t going to have an honest conversation about the drugs and alcohol, then, 
basically, the discussions are moot.” 
 “Okay, Dave. Final question. The village was formed as a site of housing activism. 
And it was to carry the message that you seem to have finally now started to carry again. 
Part of this design was to ensure the villager’s right to freedom of expression, shelter, and 
also their duties and obligations to the community and so on. And villagers were 
supposed to get out of the village and carry the message, correct?” 
 “Right!” 
 “So, how vital is it for its survival, for the people who live there, to become activists 
like you few have done again?” 
 “I think it is vitally important. But even if it is a tacit role, it should be a supporting 
role. Because not everyone is going to want to go and charge into the lion’s den.” 
 I generally see activism as an outward engagement with issues, but this puts a bit of a 
subtle twist on what an activist is. “So how do they support without being active?”  
 “By not tearing it down. By cooperating with the people that are trying to help them. 
You know, this place has short-term and long-term residents. Some people are here long 
enough to make a difference to the “cause” and others just are not. It has to be both 
transitional and permanent. Those who have the courage and strength to move on and 
find it out there should be encouraged to do so, but those that are so damaged and ruined, 
and just need a safe place to live out what they have left, should be encouraged to stay. I 
mean, we are working with other housing activists now to set up villages like this one 
that have different goals – some are transitional, some are migratory like camp hostels, 
and some would be permanent. A single village can’t meet all the unique needs of 
everyone. You know, some of the camps could have rehab or mental health treatments in 
them. I can tell you none of them would cost 47 million dollars. Did you know that the 
safest place to be in Portland is in the village? You are 97 times more likely to be mugged, 
raped, broken into or injured outside of the village than anywhere else. Just saying.” 
 “So, what’s in the future for Dave?” 
 “Well, at this time I am very optimistic, but you know the best laid plans of mice and 
men. You know, at the VBC – you know, it’s a group of people concerned with bringing 
a sense of dignity and communal living back to inner city living places, and that kind of 
thing, and the other night, Starhawk was speaking and she wanted to know why is it that 
activist communities come together, build up enthusiasm, come up with a plan, and six 
months to a year down the road they can’t stand each other and the plan has fallen apart. 
And that’s just from my perspective about keeping the dialogue open and then being 
willing to keep the conversation open because even if we don’t agree on certain things we 
all agree on the endgame. The endgame is more camps, more alternative forms, you 
know like sanctuaries and healing centers and for the people who are broken down and 
old, just creating a little space where they can live with dignity and freedom without 




Fig. 18. Dave Samson. July 2011. (N. Dickson). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Endnotes  - Chapter Five: Pages 258-370. 
 
 
1  Central to actor-network theory as the locus of mediation. 
 
2  Though Biesta and Stams (2001) find nothing objectionable in critical dogmatism, 
once the dogmatic position is clarified, dogmatic positions, are troubling for social justice 
where the power to assert and transform them into practice or law is asymmetrically 
distributed. That is to say that critique is not just something done by the less fortunate, or 
the social scientist/activist in the name of underrepresented principles of justice; the state, 
governments, educators and scientific experts for example, are also engaged in critique 
insomuch as their duties require assessing, evaluating and planning strategies for the care 
of society.  As such, critical dogmatism, as a philosophical position might be valid 
enough; that is, one might be able to define certain positions as dogmatic, but as the 
application of criteria of evaluation by powerful groups over the less powerful, it is what 
lies at the heart of social injustice because it places oppositional critical positions of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Albert (1985) argues that this dogmatism is unavoidable, largely because 
identifying a problem to be addressed, such as housing, for example, presumes the 
necessity of that address, and therein lies a dogma of sorts; the process of being critical 
suggests a “logical circle” in that one has “resort to statements that have already shown 
themselves to be in need of justification” (Biesta and Stams 2001: 61).  
 
4  In this sense, the individual’s freedom and autonomy are to be found in the liberty 
to act morally, that is; to satisfy the expectations of a moral maxim perceived as a 
universal law (Paton, 1948: intro). Kant’s Enlightenment project’s goal of rationalizing 
democracy as a step over the bloodied and oppressive era of monarchies, therefore, gave 
political weight to the moral proposition that to respect one’s self, means to respect 
others; to treat others as ends in themselves, rather than as means to an end.  Once again, 
all men, the poor, the wealthy and all others are deserving insomuch as “I” am also 
deserving.  Democracy is seen as a moral configuration of the right disposition of consent 
freely offered by the governed, to those who govern (1948: ii, 31).   
 Where Kant saw morality as the route to freedom, Nietzsche (2006) in particular 
reviled against this notion, and instead invoked a genealogy of morality, in order to 
understand how such dictums might come to be, and further how the freedom of some 
might be earned by the creation of an entire class of individuals to whom such noble 
morals were unattainable (I: 26-7).  The point of this illustration is to show how concepts 
like morality, freedom and autonomy might reveal more about the process of knowing, of 
critique, than the concept itself in question.  For Kant, knowledge “stands in the service 
of faith…faith is both metaphysical and moral, perhaps even religious: that we live in an 
ordered universe which our senses and our reason are fitted to investigate” (Williams, 
1999:203). Hence he saw the French Revolution as an example of enlightened human 
spirit of awareness, in a wave of moral sympathy towards the end of absolutism. Kant 
was quite secure in the progressive and emancipatory trajectory of his Enlightenment 
project.  Nietzsche, though he wrote much later, looked at events in Europe and was 
dubious of these progressive and critical changes. For Nietzsche the moral collapse of 
Europe was made “all the more ominous by the progress of scientific knowledge” ( ibid; 
Nietzsche, 2006 I:33:   Nietzsche, (1996).  On the Genealogy of Morals - a Polemic. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
5  Critique in the Frankfurt School is a means of exposing, unearthing and  
disclosing the possibility of other forms of reality. Hence, it is not about whether “truth” 
is possible, it is that the truth about where normative beliefs come from should be 
understood and this means looking at a person in the entirety of their specific cultural 
experience.  Hence critical theory is essentially dogmatic even while it speaks of 
transcendence; its concern is with revealing and unbalancing embedded universal 
mechanisms of capitalist domination that produce truths that oppress and restrain the 
formation of political subjectivities under an “ultimate” truth.  Honneth (2000 in Delanty, 
2008) has referred to it as “disclosing critique.” This new information cannot merely be 
supported by argumentative justification, but must have empirical derivations and 
productions to induce a shift in how the normative truth is understood in society 
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6   In Of Grammatology (1967), Jacques Derrida introduces his idea of 
deconstructionism.  Deconstructionism does not seek transcendence out of the reflexive 
paradox. Instead, he submits, that we remain within the “paradoxical terrain in order to 
explore its critical potential” (Biesta and Stams 2001: 66; Derrida 1973:   3-6). 
Deconstruction is a condemnation of transcendental critique because it instructs that one 
can never escape the ambiguity that description, explanation or even the most openly 
reflexive style of ethnographic storytelling as an example might proffer. Furthermore, 
Derrida suggest that all knowledge is to some degree metaphysical since it inheres 
presumption of the existence of “terms” in some manner, somewhere; his 
deconstructionism, therefore is not a critique in the Kantian sense that is as an opposite of 
dogmatism. Since it relies on language, and language relies on signifieds finding meaning 
through superior signifiers, then knowledge is fundamentally metaphysical; facticity is 
meaningful as things relate to superior external modes of reference ( Derrida 1995: 54; 
1996:87) . 
 
7  In his concept of différence, Derrida builds on Saussure’s (1993) seminal work on 
language and argues that the elements of language are meaningless on their own and find 
relevance only in so much that they make reference to one another in the structure of 
language.  For Derrida then, presence, is not determined by a term (or a person’s) merely 
existing somewhere, but by its ( her ) relation to others of its kind in a sort of structure.   
The present therefore is not a positive value, measured in concreteness, but something 
determined by a relationship of terms without positive value in themselves.  
 Without exploring the complicated logic that it entails, let me argue simply that 
this relationship of elements, if we can understand ideas, expressed values and persons as 
types of elements in corresponding structures of kind, has implications for understanding 
social justice.  The reason this is so, is that from the point of view of deconstruction, no 
element has meaning except in the way it distinguishes itself in the relationship of 
différrance to another—that is by only finding meaning though the relationship of its 
form, or its potential meaning, only though imbrication with other elements that confirm 
that value and thereby confirmed in their role as superior and exterior to the signified 
element. The injustice suffered by one element must in some way result from its 
correlation with another element that makes that injustice, makes it knowable.   In the 
sense that an element must present itself in a dualistic nature, as a non-present object, and 
as an “other” in reference to other “non-present elements” it can only substantiate the 
present by asserting its exclusion from it, other than through the “act of signing” that 
confirms its own exclusion. “What is excluded thereby, returns to sign the act of its own 
exclusion” (Biesta and Stams 2001:  66).  Deconstruction affirms what is excluded and 
forgotten. 
 
8  I speak to this in chapter six. 
 
9  Mistrovic (2005) offers a good rendition of Bourdieu’s critique of neoliberalism.  
 
10  Under the seminal work and influence of Roy Bhaskar (1975, 1993), critical 
realism links to Marxism by aligning the idea of reality within two dimensions: an 
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intransitive form that exists beyond one’s knowledge of it, and a socially constructed 
world known through, work, science, education and observable experience.  Marxist 
theories of domination, critical theory as an example, tend to isolate critique in the 
ideological discrepancies this dualism creates for dominant and alienated classes (Sayer, 
2000). 
 11	  	   Because perception is a weak guide, both the actual and the empirical are doubtful 
sources of information about reality because seeing products does little to explain the 
mechanisms that produce them.  It is through mechanisms that things have effect and 
empirical quality.  To put it another way, the only universal knowledge one can presume 
about mechanisms as aspects of social structure is that they are never universal; social 
structures unlike natural structures do not exist outside of the activities they govern. 
Social structures unlike natural structures only exist insomuch as they are perceived of by 
agents as part of an activity.  Social structures are often temporary, and the activities they 
support time limited, so they cannot be presumed to be universal or enduring, or 
objectively true at all times (Sayer 2000:11-16; Bhaskar 1998; Archer 1998).  This 
framing gives structures efficacy, but does not establish a hierarchy of structures nor does 
it priorize the role of specific structures in having universal effects on populations, at 
least not in theoretically presumed manners; ideological structures do not always exploit 
people; communicative structures do not always express or revolve in normative axes. 
 In linking the three spheres of the social world, critical realism affords the 
interiority of the agent a certain primacy in an ontological computing of what the 
consequences of a proposed action might be.  As such, the linking of one mechanism to 
another is difficult to predict, but the linkages are presumed to exist between mechanisms.  
At a general level then, critical realism differs from the critical theory of the Frankfurt 
school because it is less concerned with a moral-normative theory of society. Critical 
realism looks for explanations that exist or emerge out of the relationship between layers 
of reality that are polymorphic and fluid, because they are based on a variable set of 
mechanisms that link people in effective ways. The key to realist critique then is its 
capacity to demonstrate the mechanisms that give these links their consequential value 
for actors.     
 
12  Despite Latour’s rejection of a basic objective structure, which I too find 
problematic with CR, the interconnectedness of persons and things is especially strong in 
both approaches.  
 13	  	   Archer did this by analyzing over 500 conversations with respondents, where she 
identified classes of conversation that indicated degrees of reflexive engagement with 
structural experiences and sense of being.  These modes of reflexivity are found in four 
types of internal conversation that are very important for the work at hand: 
1. Communicative reflexives: people whose narratives or ideas need to be rejoined 
or completed by others before they turn into action. 
2. Autonomous reflexives – people act on their own ideas without confirmation. 
3. Meta-reflexives – people who are reflexively critical of their own ideas, and 
socially critical about effective action 
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4. Fractured-reflexives – people who cannot conduct purposeful internal 
conversations and go around in ever-increasing circles of disorientation. 




14  Delanty (2011:81) It is not my intention to defend deconstruction against 
genealogy except to say that Schrift does a good job of showing how the methods of 
Derrida, Nietzsche and Foucault deconstruct binary assumption by way to rethink the 
way truth is manufactured in language, discourse and text. 
 
15 Gutting, G. (2011) some of this is obvious, each working with and then against 
structuralist issues, each unraveling language and meaning in signifiers and signifieds, or 
in discursive strategies’ archeology as a form of deconstructive exercise, and so on. For 
my purposes that they each want to expose or understand that truth is not immanent but 
produced by relations of subjects or ideas to one another, and is therefore about effect, 
différrance or power is what maters. 
 
16  Foucault first uses genealogy in Discipline and Punish (1975) as a means of 
overcoming this analytic incapacity. Genealogy is intended to overcome the allegedly 
causal or rationally inevitable outcomes of historical orders of events, and instead reveal 
the highly historically contingent nature of systems of thought.  
 
17  Foucault’s neoliberalism differs from traditional uses; it is more than what 
economists look at as reactivation of old classical theories; more than sociology’s way of 
explaining how market relations take prominence in society; and more than political 
science’s tendency to view the extending of the administrative acumen of the state 
(Foucault 2008:130).   
 
18  Hence in the parlance of economics and political debate, workers become defined 
not only by the value of their labour, but by the knowledge that they increase their value 
through hard work, education, training and developing economic capital. A new conduct 
of conduct becomes infused with the values of the economy above other moral 
considerations.  
 
19  Based on Foucault’s 1978-79 lectures at the College de France, and published 
later in Birth of Biopolitics (2008) governmentality is revisited, as part of his ongoing 
corpus of analysis about relationships of power, political economy and systems of 
governance.  As such, it is possible to link this and his later work (1991) on 
governmentality to the 1975-6 lectures series published as Society Must BE Defended 
(2003[1975]) in which he demonstrates power in terms of myriad relations of force, 
which are encoded and reconstituted as biopolitics. Important themes run throughout his 
work that have implications for understanding homelessness and shantytowns; among 
these power, knowledge, freedom, autonomy and subject are most relevant.  
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 In Discipline and Punish, The Birth of The Prison,  (1977), Foucault extrapolates 
largely from French case-history into broader ranges of global experience with crime and 
the penal system. This seminal work examines how the primary problem for pre-capitalist 
monarchies was to legitimize territorial and moral sovereignty through violence or its 
promise. The apparatus of governance that evolve around this new economic society sees 
the separation of the monarchy from the state, and, also, of religion from the state; the 
care of the population and its discipline increasingly became the ground of rationalization 
within states and governments whose emphasis was to undergird economic systems by 
creating knowledge about and systems for managing populations.   No longer wrapped up 
in the preservation of the sovereign, the state’s sole purpose was to develop and execute 
expertise in ascertaining the dimensions of its territorial populations, and methods for 
insuring the health of the economy. Matters of justice and discipline become rationalized 
along with all other areas of private and civic life as matters pertaining to economic 
function and the general well being of society. 
 
20  Under sovereign power, however, economic and demographic growth occurs. 
That disciplinary power should emerge from within the frame of sovereignty is therefore 
understandable in the sense that the problem of discipline remains, even if it is now a 
specialized function of the state. 
 
21  One can see immediate linkages with the work of Mead (1934), Berger and 
Luckmann (1966), in the sense that governmentality sets out certain possibilities for 
social realities and relations with them, though which individuals can determine their 
worth and their normalcy in terms of having good government. Less a psychological 
impulse than a social response, enacted through behaviours, conduct suggests something 
essential to relations rather than merely awareness. 
 
22  This manipulation of freedom to disguise domination and “unfairness” is 
precisely why I have called the villagers’ choice to self-govern in poverty a certain kind 
of evil. It is the kind of duping, or chicanery that neoliberalism must produce in order to 
sustain a political and economic system that is riddled with contradiction.  I cannot argue 
what a better state of affairs would be in the general sense, but I can argue that fighting 
for poor spaces on which to survive, seems to me at least, to be testimony to the success 
of governmentality to reproduce rather than challenge fundamental flaws in neoliberal 
society. 
 
23  See item 16. 
 
24  Rose further suggests taking the Foucauldian project as a guide only,  that a 
genealogy of freedom, rather than of politics or of government would be an auspicious 
undertaking, for in the measure of freedom, there is truth about the discourses and 
agency, and about the ideologies and structures and institutions that produce it.  
Understanding what freedom means, might lead one to an archeology of its conditions, 
and further to an understanding of what people do in the name of that freedom. 
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25 It is essentially the question of what constitutes an activist versus an active citizen. 
 
26  It should be noted that First Step To Homes, the program in question, does not 
restrict any personal liberties in the housing units.  They are self-contained apartments 
and governed by the broader tenancy by-laws of Metro Toronto. 
 
27 	  Critique in the form of accusations and disputes are based on the description of 
the situation in terms of understandings of common good.  The Dignity homeless and the 
street activists share an understanding that homelessness is bad, but the Dignity poor are 
increasingly understanding their “commonness” as conventional, not street, and this is 
hard to see from the pragmatic lens alone.	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Chapter Six: Framing Deserving and Undeserving Spaces. 
6.1 Introduction 
 There simply are too many people on the streets of all major North American cities; 
the criminalization of squatting and camping does nothing to remedy the need for shelter 
(National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2009, 2011).1 According to the 
Western Regional Advocacy Project or WRAP, current recognition of the negative 
function of the assault on urban homelessness is due in part to the inertia of attitudes 
expressed and formalized by UNESCO and UN-HABITAT conventions on “The Right 
To The City” that draw on Lefebvre’s (1968) call towards “a transformed and renewed 
access to urban life” (WRAP [Roy] 2008; Lefebvre 1974:158). Accordingly, the 
dominant lens sported by social justice critiques for looking at issues of homelessness 
sees the claims of homeless activists as not just based on the very real need for physical 
spaces to house poor people, but as an indictment of capitalist tendencies to appraise the 
value of city space as a commodity more precious than the well-being of the worst off.  
As David Harvey suggests, “We live in a world in which the rights of private property 
and the profit rate trump all other notions of rights” (2008:13).  In conveying an 
epistemic and moral shift in disposition from civil to human rights governing space, 
accumulation and transformative social processes, he argues: 
 
 The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is 
a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an 
individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a 
collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and 
remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most 
neglected of our human rights” (ibid). 
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 Shifting public and state attitudes towards tent camps and shanty communities in a 
few cities are in this sense a sort of recognition that shelter is a human right, even if laws 
and regulations that constrain civil action, and the harsh inequalities endemic to late 
capitalism, might place impossible limits on securing this basic need for the poorest 
among us. Combined with the dictums for a shift from rights-based approaches to basic 
needs-based approaches in international, national and local grass roots activist 
communities like WRAP, is the expectation that the state understands the very dangerous 
and unstable systemic effects of having large populations living in a psychological state 
of social and cultural marginality - “an absence of belonging” (Hopper and Baumhol 
1996:3). 
 Urban value systems have come to imagine homelessness differently – we now 
understand that the system, not people are broken and in this chapter I will explain why 
this is so.  Yet, the transcripts I present here, and the many hours of conversations I had 
with villagers suggest that villagers understand themselves in various measures of 
deserving and undeserving, and that these critiques of the self, originate in broader 
experiences of meaning.  If we can theorize deserving and undeserving as a certain 
measure of a citizen worthy of membership, and one not yet “deserving” of such rights 
and freedoms, then the Dignity villagers represent a certain impossibility in the sense that 
while in the village they have some relevance, some sense of whom they are in relation to 
others, but outside of the gate they seem ambiguous and ill-defined.  This is why some of 
the members cling to the power that factions give them in the village, rather than work 
towards a sense of place in conventional communities. If the Dignity homeless reside in a 
liminal experience between the streets and housing, can we think of the village as a 
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liminal kind of space; that is a space designed to manage the anti-structural threat of 
homeless?   In order to answer this, we have to understand the historical way that space 
has become privileged in the US, and the way deserving categories of poverty have come 
to be understood today.    
 In this chapter, the first thing I do is refresh the reader as to why an historical 
frame helps me to understand the village as a liminal critical site. I then offer a very tight 
erudition of the history of homelessness as a major political issue in the US since colonial 
times paying attention to the transfer of early English Poor laws and addressing how 
attitudes towards vagrants were adapted to the colonies.  From that time onward, 
tolerance of the poor tends to increase when economies fail or war displaces warriors and 
families into poverty.  I trace the history of federal state and local responses to poverty to 
the powerful debates that adjoined major displacements of people from the economy. I 
trace current federally sponsored Ten-Year Plans to End Housing that cities like Portland 
must adopt to secure funding, to their roots in Pathways to Housing (1992).  
 Intentional community alternatives to the streets and to overburdened hostels or 
housing programs make sense given that certain criteria are met.   What are these criteria; 
more specifically what were these criteria in the case of Dignity Village? In that case, 
constitutional rights to shelter were granted on the basis that the village would meet the 
criteria laid out in copious agreements and contracts with the city.  I then explain the 
unique constellations of events and actors surrounding the claim made by Dignity 
activists in 2000-2001.  The action itself was as divisive as it was cohesive – radical 
activist elements splintered off while less radical people moved into the village.  The 
critiques and justifications used by claimants, supporters and those opposed to the claim 
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provide a certain subtext for a reunification of this analysis with governmentality, but 
only so as to point out certain limitations.  I introduce Dean’s (2010) analytics of 
government, which is a method for “doing” governmentality studies, as a way of 
interrogating how the city’s rationalization of Firstspace and Secondspace qualities of the 
village provides a certain conjunctural frame that requires other critical approaches to 
make sense of the ethnographic material about the village. Life on paper and in plans, 
even in signed agreements,  is a different experience than life on the grounds. Simply put, 
the extreme lengths undertaken to officially rationalize life in the village reads like a 
technology in the Foucauldian sense, but seems wanting in a place where totally irrational 
and ad hoc actions have led to such a crisis of community.  I use this gap as a segue into 
an interpretive and general discussion of spatial critiques and liminality in chapter seven.  
   
6.2  The  Poor  and Poor Space in Historical Perspective 
 Wright (1997, 2003) has suggested that control over urban space is an highly 
political creation, as a means by which the powerful render the poor invisible.  Out of 
sight, out of mind.  All is good. The system works (1997:40).  A function of municipal 
government is to ensure that those with no regular “home” are installed in shelters, “in 
their place,” a spatial discourse mandated by hegemony, impregnated in the symbolic 
imaginary of the neocapitalist city.  The patriarchal gaze, the framing of the “unhousable” 
as “outcast” is a symbolic mediation of the limits of material wealth with the 
contradictions of the moral that at once underpin and are reproduced by the hegemonic 
social imaginary in the capitalist city. I have discussed the streets and the various other 
“programs” for the poor as the conventional imaginary’s depots for failure. 
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 Castoriadis (1987) suggests that the symbolic value of, for example, outcasting the 
poor, or sending the police in to evict squatters has some value for the “city” as a “system 
of signifieds”.  The meaning of these actions, the symbolic value is rarely arbitrary, “but 
“fixed” through social practice which serves to reinforce economic, political and cultural 
power operating through daily life” (in Wright 1997:43). Given that various symbolic and 
value systems condition the points of views that underpin relationships and social 
practices, it is still difficult to understand how relationships that generate domination and 
submission of the homeless person come to be tolerated, if not normalized, in current 
neoliberal cities. Tolerance, following Wendy Brown (2009) is something learned; the 
tolerance expressed under neoliberalism results from clear mediations over time of  
religious moral and ethical considerations anchored in western patriarchal anticipation of 
the problem of the “other.” As such tolerance, and other guiding civic principles are 
implanted in symbolic imaginaries through regimes of knowledge and power over time. 
Where many urbanites look at tolerance as a gift, as a sign of “progress” and civilized 
society, Brown has shown that tolerance falls short of embracing the difference of the 
other, because the fundamental  categorization between “us” and them remains. 2 
 Wright has argued: 
Therefore the organization of societies, of race, ethnic, gender, and class configurations, 
of social-physical space and temporal organization, is not conducted strictly along 
biological or chemical lines, or by the logic of reason, or by the materialist logic of 
capital development, but are the by products of the organization of fantasies, of the 
working of the social imaginary in a dialectical relationship with the material world.  A 
social world comprised of vast social inequalities will produce different fantasies of 
“normality”, struggle, resistance, and domination than a world in which social inequality 
is abolished” (1997:44). 
 
 The historical record will show that an important part of the social world of the 
homeless is that their world is linked within systems of signification within “ideological” 
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and actual spaces that according to the rules of neoliberalism and hegemony, discredits 
and marginalizes them. Wright suggests that it is the operation of the dominant social 
imaginary on usually unknowing participants, (citizens, members of the mainstream and 
so on, even the homeless) that questions like “who are we?” arise, and also that 
identification of the other takes place. The formation of imaginary categories of 
deserving and undeserving, such as the undeserving poor, must be understood as resulting 
from social practices within a social and physical space. This social space to draw on 
Bourdieu (1958, 1972) is the lived field into which policy and law work to shape the 
conduct of individuals through culturally and scientifically approved modes of behaviour 
or habitus, that manifest in the somatic experience of social practices and cultural 
symbols. 
 While capitalist urban economies have been in decline, the homeless poor, no 
longer fit into the economy as cheap day labour, and their primary problem has been 
reframed as one of an inability to self-govern, rather than as a reflection of economic 
dysfunction. In a Lefebvrian city, hegemony, or one might argue “the state”, under 
neoliberalism, intentionally creates spaces for failed classes as well.  Such space has been 
looked at in the sense of a negative “place.”   Gary McDonogh (1993:13) argues that lots, 
fields left fallow, underdeveloped areas or buildings awaiting use are signs of the 
ambiguous presence of power in the city.  These liminal “no man lands” become ill 
defined as types of space, and the relations they are meant to support do not situate easily 
in the neocapitalist space that Lefebvre discusses. Empty urban space is generally 
presumed to be a negative thing, a source of potential conflict, and so the “places”, the 
laneways, the bridge, the derelict building, all the “points” in this clandestine space, 
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become the sites of negative discourse and so too become their inhabitants, homeless 
people. As negative as such places are, the repetition of this ambiguity through 
successive generations of experience normalizes them for both those who must seek 
shelter there, and to a conventional symbolic imaginary that has come to expect such 
usage by flawed poor people.  Capitalism wants extreme poverty to be understood as 
clandestine and dangerous.  It wants citizens to work, consume and differentiate others 
according to principles that reinforce its domination of space and spatializations. 
 Lefebvre asserts that each regime creates a space of its own, but indeed, it must 
also be true, since inequality is equally universal to capitalism, that analysis of capitalist 
hegemonic space must include the negative places, the rundown ramshackle abodes 
where the poorest and worst off cases live.3  For all their skyscrapers then, a critique of 
cities under hegemony of neoliberalism demands that we look for the negative spaces that 
capital leaves in its wake as a repository for those marginalized. The street being a non-
descript largely un-built place is not finite or bounded in the sense that a room or a 
building might be. Most often the “street” is written about as the unused, discarded and 
unintended places within the city (my definition but see also Bourgois 2002, 2008; 
Weissman 2012; Wagner 1993). The street also has come to include all places that a 
homeless person who has no address might use in the course of their homelessness.4 
When I use the term “the streets” it is with regards to this continuum of impermanent and 
often illegal shelter. 
   The streets are hard to think of as a bounded Cartesian space, or as a 
comprehensible mental space; it remains largely incomprehensible that is until its 
residents begin to claim it for their own.  It is only then that the attenuated ambiguity of 
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street life, its existence as a loosely wrapped parcel with unidentifiable contents, people 
in extreme poverty, can be seen as part of a discourse on citizenship, or as an indictment 
of conventional social relations, one that unites homeless people in a community of 
others, a threatening community in the liminal stage of becoming conventionalized.  One 
of the threats to conventional imaginaries is the idea that there can be anything normal 
about the street life; and beyond that, in a village of homeless people.  Dignity Village 
was constructed out of recovered buildings, on recovered land, and was occupied by 
people recovering from homelessness.  
 To borrow Lefebvre’ language again, the shantytown’s potential to go beyond 
being a mere “parcel with various contents” (1971:27) must be understood as something 
completely different than life on the streets.  The streets are not a parcel with various 
contents, but a different kind of arrangement of places within a spatial discourse. 
Neoliberal  hegemonies tolerate the streets and street life, indeed , they have created this 
space for the failed urban citizen, but they generally do not tolerate the spatialization of 
this negative reality in a bounded, cohesive, non-mediated community like tent camps 
and squats.  Abstract notions of space that impose critical qualities onto a type or 
category of space, eliminate the key factor to understanding what space is, its lived and 
social quality, by taking the actor out of the imagining.  Any negative interpretation of 
the shantytown is really a means of “transferring the etymological sequences” out of the 
hands of people who need and create that space, and delivering them once again into 
abstract ideals about appropriate relations within certain kinds of limited social space (4-
5).   
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 In this sense the “street” one encounters today is part of the historical tradition of 
the capitalist abstraction of idealized space through the implementation of welfare and 
housing policy, and the limits these ideals impose on the marginalized to find a sense of 
place by establishing affiliations. If not explicitly constructed for the purpose of 
warehousing the villains and failures, the street fulfills that role because of a series of 
historical mediations of representational spaces, which go back to the first cities, 
mediations which have confronted the symbolic with the rational (Lefebvre 1991:231). 
Lefebvre says, “even today urban space appears in two lights; on the one hand it is 
replete with places which are holy or damned, devoted to the male principle or the female, 
[the street or the household] rich in fantasies and phantasmagorias; on the other hand it is 
rational and bureaucratic…” (231 [my words added]).  To be very simplistic, living in a 
home, a conventional housing unit, is part of the hegemonic understanding of how 
citizens ought to live; those who fall through the cracks, either live on the streets in 
ambiguity, or in establishments that hegemony maintains as repositories for the 
management of problem populations in the form of shelters, hostels and prisons. 
 Beyond the streets, therefore, hegemony countenances certain constructed spaces; 
hostels, shelters, prisons, and housing programs, for the management of the very poor. In 
creating the myth of an underserving flawed homeless person, the relations of production 
that produce this poverty, or the underlying mental and physical conditions that correlate 
strongly with this, hegemony eschews responsibility, but appears as a reflexive and 
capable way of shaping the social world.  Suspended in marginality, somewhere between 
the streets, a course of spaces notoriously understood as sites of death, disease, and 
starvation, and the impossibility of finding conventional housing, are millions of people 
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in North American cities who struggle with the exigencies of daily life. At times in the 
history of the United States, such people were granted the privilege of living in 
intentional communities of squalor called shantytowns.  
 It is necessary to think of homelessness not only as a lived and performed variable 
experience for actors who had found their own unique ways into homelessness, a unique 
historicity one might say, but also as something that results from spatial and ideological 
detachment from an imaginary centre that tends to confirm this marginality by creating 
the circumstances into which the homeless are routed. In the case of late capitalism, 
under neoliberalism, the politics of shifting economic fortunes create certain acceptable 
imaginings of how poverty should be experienced, where the homeless should endure. As 
we will see, beyond creating economic inequality, power concentrated in ideological and 
knowledge centers creates ideas about spatial imaginaries –  attitudes towards the proper 
space for the performance of poverty, commerce, public events and private life.  This is 
very much how the problem of homelessness has been rationalized and conditioned by 
US states and governments since the American colonies emerged in the 17th century. 
  In all definitional categories of homelessness, “degree” of homelessness is 
measured against two primary measures of “normal” life; how far in terms of actual 
living modes from a secured self-contained and owned home is the homeless individual; 
how have the poor choices and other characterological defects of the individual 
contributed to this loss of housing (Bahr 1973; Marcuse 1983, 1990; Jackson 1985; Caton 
1990; Gans 1991; Wright 2000).  The problem with homelessness is so severe currently 
that even renting an apartment or a home is increasingly understood as more and more 
difficult for urban citizens; a major portion of current housing funding is used to 
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supplement rents, on inadequate structures, rather than to finance owned homes or to 
build transitional housing for the chronically homeless.  Being marginal then implies two 
vectors of differentiation; the first isolates the homeless person in terms of the material 
space they occupy (Firstspace)  (or rather don’t) and the second looks at how the mental 
or psychic space (Secondspace)  of the individual differs from accepted norms.  
 In the Foucauldian sense of it, this difference amounts to an evaluation of the 
degree to which individuals can be said to have good government, or to be a self-
governed citizen.  The condition of homelessness has historically been presented by 
neoliberal regimes of government as a result of the attributes of poor self-government. 
Over the last 100 years or so, the state and poverty care organizations have done a good 
job of linking the former to the latter by creating the image of the marginalized homeless 
defective character.  The avatar of this abject poverty is the “street person,” and the 
human condition of this life is perceived as ambiguous and undesirable. I earlier 
discussed the common perception of poverty as a certain powerlessness.  I have been 
developing the idea that it is precisely the struggle that homeless activists are engaged in, 
as an attempt to secure their intentional community that empowers them, and hems them 
in; their resistance creates resistance in the conventional imaginary.  If they are to be free, 
they will have to be governed; that is how democracy works.  Those villagers who sense 
an opportunity to be powerful in the village, will resort to many lengths to get that.  That 
is the fundamental basis of factions, the empowerment it provides a few, and it is the 
essence of democracies internal logical contradictions. It is in this power struggle that 
Dignity Villagers come to understand the limits to structural and symbolic inequality that 
laws and housing strategies impose on the village, and that the village imposes on its 
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failures and weaker members.  While some villagers see their demise as a sort of limbo, 
others see opportunities to fight for more rights.  Inequality yes, but empowerment as 
well.   
 How can this be? One of the first spatializations of empowerment for homeless 
people is the occupation of urban spaces. The state has done a good job over the last 400 
years in the United States as it has in most of the capitalist world, of diminishing this 
empowerment by doing two key things associated with policy; states have introduced 
laws governing the proper use of livable space by all inhabitants, and they have crafted a 
classic binary between deserving and undeserving poor.  In this general framework, the 
deserving poor receive some kind of charitable or subsidized welfare or housing benefit 
from the community, and the undeserving are cast off into a space created for failure, the 
streets, as a vivid reminder to the mainstream of what failure means. Viewed in terms of a 
perpetually liminal and ambiguous existence, the chronically homeless and street 
engaged are perceived of in their dark and dangerous, perhaps sometimes, pathetic, 
qualities.  I will trace this historically, but in the contemporary neoliberal frame where 
poverty in the United States is incomprehensible without recognizing how global 
processes like outsourcing have led to lost incomes, and how Global Occupy movements 
have called into question the legitimacy of out-casting the poor, the streets of western 
cities and those who live there remain physical and mental spaces that are comprehended 
as failure, abandonment and powerlessness to be avoided at all costs. States and urban 
imaginaries are loathe to deem tent camps, legal or not, to be part of their official 
strategies to end homelessness. Even when they grant such places contracts and tenure as 
transitional camps, these uses remain off the long term planning strategies and 
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rationalized to a dubious public as experiments.  The liminality of these spaces is partly 
categorical in that these places officially exist as a part of governance precisely as 
experiments with undetermined value, and partly circumstantial; the abject poverty of 
such places strains the capacity of democratic self-rule to meet the critical needs of 
residents. 
 Carol Caton (1990) wrote that by the end of the 1980’s, homelessness in America 
had become the subject of numerous articles and books and finally  “gnawed at our 
collective conscience” (preface). Identifying the need for national and local housing 
policies to address homelessness, Caton’s volume brought together the works of various 
scholars, Marcuse, and Hopper’s most notably, in an attempt to outline the grand scale of 
homelessness in the 1980’s so that policy directions might more accurately address the 
problem. Despite a heavy concentration on the problem of homelessness by scholars, 
governments, activists and the homeless themselves over the last 30 years, the situation is 
worse than it was in 1990. I have already established some figures; over 47 million 
people living in poverty, and nearly 1% of these or close to 4 million persons 
experiencing  some form of homelessness (HUD 2010-12; NAEH 2011; Weissman 2012).  
In 2010, President Obama introduced ambitious plans to wipe out family and child 
homelessness within ten years and to eradicate chronic homelessness and homelessness 
among veterans in five (HUD 2010, 2011:12). The measures included in this national 
framework are a response to the recognition that society has failed to prop up those who 
have served, those who deserve better (children and young families), and those who are 
trapped within a perpetual cycle of chronic poverty, often because of mental illness or 
disability, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (ibid). 5 
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 As a shift in attitude of sorts, the latest federal policy is a clear statement that 
according to the Obama administration at least, the poor are increasingly more deserving 
than they have been understood in the past.  Titled “Opening Doors,” the federal plan 
calls for a strategic alliance between federal, state and local service providers to increase 
access to supportive housing facilities and rapid rehousing for the chronically homeless, 
and financial and employment assistance for families in jeopardy of losing their housing. 
It is somewhere within the emerging power and service structures that are being created 
by this challenge that Dignity Village currently must define and prove itself.  The village 
therefore has two important historical dimensions that frame an understanding of how 
people live there.  First, there is the period of national and local housing policies and 
attitudes towards the poor that conditioned the critical action of homeless activists in 
making the claim, Dignity Village, a spatial and social reality in 2001. Second, there are 
the ongoing shifting categories of service and regulatory edicts that trickle from federal to 
local levels of governance and mitigate the legal and practical responsibilities of the 
village and villagers at various times during the period since it was founded, and which 
constitutes the time-span through which this research was undertaken.  
 I flesh out the relationship between some important periodic shifts in mainstream 
and official state attitudes towards the distinction between deserving and undeserving 
poor and towards the proper use of urban space that began with New World colonies, in 
order to link current national housing programs with political and economic structures, 
and mental categories in which homelessness is embedded, and in which the responses by 
the homeless engaged in critical action, such as Dignity Village can be analyzed.  
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 I am particularly concerned here with revealing how deserving and undeserving 
categories of the poor are understood, represented and treated in policies that affect 
welfare, poverty and housing, and how these have created particular urban spaces for the 
worst off poor.  Dignity’s crisis of community when finally deconstructed can be 
understood by the way the village’s critical action fits into these categories -  even if 
activists do not realize it - they organize themselves and their goals on the basis of what 
they think they deserve and what they think is achievable; it’s a pragmatic rather than a 
normative problem, because we know what’s right, but knowing how to get it is 
problematic. 
 
 6.3 History per se 
 Snow and Andersen (1993) have called street poverty, the most visible example 
of chronic homelessness, a sort of historical and cultural universal. Biblical references to 
the beggar and to the poor are common; a search of references to poverty and 
homelessness from the King James, New Testament resulted in over 2000 verses that 
reflect on the condition of poverty and the advocacy of neighbours in the care of the poor 
(LAMPA website; the Official King James Bible Online; Democratic  
Underground.com).6 I take such references to be evidence of the pervasive problem of 
extreme poverty at least in the value systems of early civilizations, if not as a sort of 
empirical evidence of the scope of the problem throughout all recorded time.  More 
importantly these citations give evidence of the linkage between ethical treatment of the 
poor as the essence of charity, public policy and civic morality. Furthermore, one must 
understand that in Europe during the middle ages well into the 19th century, attitudes 
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towards the poor were driven by the central role that churches and parishes played in 
caring for the needy.   
 As Snow and Anderson suggest, English folk traditions steeped in this religious 
ferment, had two mitigating effects on the experience of poverty in pre-industrial Europe. 
First, tradition was to offer assistance to the needy.  Second, was a certain esteem for the 
poor, a sense of noble depravation, in which poverty was idealized and the liminality of 
the poor understood as a morally transcendental experience (1993:10-11).  Under the 
influence of the Franciscans, “It was an age of considerable charity towards the destitute” 
(ibid).  Rather than being devalued on the basis of marginality or failure, the poor were 
reified in ways that rarely distinguished between deserving or undeserving, except in 
cases of criminality or intemperament.  Snow and Anderson suggest that during the 
Renaissance, growing interest amongst humanists in mundane activity and material 
success undermined the valuation of poverty.  The out-casting of the poor was catalyzed 
during the Black Death in 1348, which imposed a sense of urgency to control “floating 
populations” and unhygienic masses of poor people flocking to towns and villages. 
England’s first vagrancy law appears in 1349.  From this time on according to Chambliss 
(1964) and Foote (1956) (in Snow and Anderson 1997), vagrancy would be cross-
associated with homelessness, under the laws, and hence referred to as a lack of housing 
and no means of support; this becomes an important distinction later in our discussion of 
hobos and modern homelessness.  
  In 1388 English Law required that homeless wanderers, meaning unhoused, un-
propertied laborers, scholars and religious figures secure a letter from town officials 
permitting their travel, else they be imprisoned for vagrancy (Wallace 1985:4 in Caton 
 393 
1990:4).  These measures were designed to ensure that feudal enclosures had sufficient 
labor and at sufficiently low cost to remain solvent.  As such the laws were designed 
strictly to control the emigration of the vagabond from one locale to another in search of 
better wages or working conditions (Caton 1990; Snow and Anderson 1997:11).  
DePastino (2003) and Dean (1991) understand this tradition as an essential means of 
controlling the wages of poor laborer to ensure the competitiveness of producers.  
 Tudor Laws towards the homeless were somewhat more vicious by comparison.  
Whereas vagabonds and poverty had previously been associated with a certain 
condonable idleness, under the Tudors, the vagabond is reinvented as a criminal type 
(Snow and Anderson 1993:11).  By 1495, Henry VII imposed the Vagabond Act 
outlawing wandering and loitering in places other than one’s own home village.7 During 
the Protestant reformation, Henry VIII separated from the Catholic Church and formed 
the Church of England.  This action led to the closure of monasteries, the retention of 
church lands by the sovereign for the King’s use, and the loss of that charitable support 
base for the poor (ibid).  At the same time, large numbers of returning soldiers and 
agricultural labor displaced by the enclosures, flocked to the burgeoning cities seeking 
charity and alms no longer available in their home rural communities (Slack 1988)  
 By the mid 1500’s the monarchy and the parliament were aligned over measures 
designed to deter subjects from entering homelessness.  In 1547, Edward VI ordered that 
vagabonds were subject to imprisonment or servitude as slaves, and could be branded 
with the mark of a “V”.   Such undesirables would be taken to a local magistrate and 
placed with a master to work.  Failure to comply resulted in banishment to colonies as 
slave labor or in execution (Caton 1990:4; Snow and Anderson 1997:11-12).8  Though 
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the act was not rigidly enforced, the tendency to mark the poor person in terms of 
deserving and undeserving was by then also a determining factor in whether their 
homelessness was tolerable or not. In this case, the aged, the old and the infirm were 
considered legitimate recipients of alms and charity and tolerance, whereas, all others fell 
into the category of undeserving on the basis of their unwillingness to work.9 By 1572, 
the poor were increasingly categorized by the monarchy, the state and local parish 
authorities on the bases of deserving or undeserving. A problem with poverty then is not 
restricted to advanced capitalism, but it might be argued, has increasingly been associated 
with an ideological shift amongst powerful interest groups concomitant with restrictions 
on land use, agricultural compartmentalization and other socio-economic changes 
associated with a shift towards capitalism that restrict the solvency of the very poor; an 
ideological shift in which the moral virtue of abject poverty is replaced with its civic 
criminality.10 
 It is the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 that most directly impacted the tradition of 
categorizing communities’ responses to the homeless on the basis of deserving and 
undeserving.  By 1601, a legacy of laws that defined the rights and duties of the homeless 
poor increasingly became framed in terms of whether the individual was perceived as 
mentally or physically deprived of the requisite ability to care for themselves, or whether 
they were able, but not willing to participate in the economic functions of the community 
in order to secure food, shelter and clothing for themselves  (Caton 1987; Slack 1988; 
Dean 1991). The Poor Law, which lasted until 1834 in England, downloaded the 
responsibility for caring for deserving poor to local parishes. While the law required the 
taxation of wealthier citizens to pay for this care, it imposed no levy on them for care 
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outside of their own parish.  The law was brought over to the colonies where local 
landowners and businessmen often responded by making it uncomfortable for the 
homeless poor to settle in their communities, or ensured that immigrants were solvent 
before settling (5).  When the first wave of English immigrants came to what is now the 
United States in the early 1600’s, they came with indentured vagrants and criminals 
exiled by the English government. Caton surmises that these indentured persons were 
probably constituents of the first homeless populations in the New World, ill equipped as 
they were to cope with the “harsh demands of Colonial life” (1990:5). In either case, 
communities developed means by which to discern the value of certain individuals based 
on their value to the community, if not in terms of personal solvency, then in terms of 
services they might provide in exchange for lodging and food, or in terms of the status 
they enjoyed as long time members of the community.  Hence the religiously and morally 
inscribed obligation to care for the poor and the old through acts of charity transforms 
into a basic problem of dealing with economic liabilities that is effectively a civic 
problem with members of the community who do not fit in.11 In cases where large 
agricultural or resource projects were under way, such transients became a vital aspect of 
the casual labor force.  Their well-being and care was irregular, dependent on the ebbs 
and tides of production, and while they may have been provided shelter and food in 
exchange for their labor, when production ceased, they were most often left to begging in 
order to survive.  Almost immediately then vagrancy and poverty accompanied the 
commercialization of agriculture, the rise of mercantilism and the high price of 
accommodations in towns and cities, in the New World as had been the case in England, 
and “a cadre of homeless wanderers emerged among the destitute and disabled in the 
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American colonies” (Deutsch 1937:39-54 in Caton 1987:5).  This marks the beginning of 
the first “wave” of homelessness in the United States and the beginning of policies of 
various kinds to control homeless populations and to determine the social worth of the 
poor, understood as deserving or undeserving, on the basis of their capacity to self-
govern. 
 Early colonialists had incorporated English Poor laws, which simultaneously 
created the local parish as the authority for dispensing with care for the poor, and forced 
communities to find discursive and practical means for outcasting the needy.  With the 
growth of cities, increased commercial agriculture and rising industrialism in the late 18th 
century, the poorest once again become disparaged for being ineffective; in larger towns 
and urban centers correctional, work and almshouses begin to appear (Caton 1990).  As 
Dean (1991) points out, it was during the late 1700’s in Europe that debates about 
pauperism become the basis for discussions of the constitution of poverty (1991:7) and 
when also we can see a direct connection between the pauper as constituent of a class of 
labor necessary to emerging capitalism.  Hence, paupers and vagabonds in the new world 
were increasingly jailed for their vagrancy and for trespass, and set to work side by side 
with the disabled, the mentally handicapped and the convicted felon in mills, commercial 
cultivation and other forms of essentially slave labor (Caton 1990:7; Dean 1991).  In 
what seems like a vulgar reflection of present day workfare propositions, at the end of the 
colonial wave, the pauper, the able bodied mentally insane and other dependent persons 
were bid upon at auction and put to work in return for shelter and food (Deutsch 1937 in 
Caton 1987:6). Marshall (1972) argued that the treatment of pauperism inhered the 
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incorrect and usurious belief that poverty was necessary to progress in the economy and 
the state, and that work programs offered emancipation.   
 Dean (1991) suggests that the particular treatment of paupers in a given regime is 
emblematic of the general tendency of liberalism to infuse the economy with the will of a 
strong centralized state that works though individuals and collectives to ensure the health 
of the economy(6). Paupers thereby become the subject of laws governing their freedom 
and their movement.  Hence, from roughly 1800 onward, poverty is increasingly 
constituted in liberal democracies as a central problem for governance and for 
governmentality (Foucault 1991, 1975; Dean 1991, 2010). Poverty emerges out of the 
18th century as a discursive and practical consideration for states, one which ultimately 
rests on the implanting of normatively accepted beliefs about being deserving or 
undeserving in the minds of the poor themselves. While the colonies became independent 
of English rule, the poor were not freed from the Draconian measures that undergirded 
treatment of the homeless in Poor Laws.   
 In 1819 and 1837 economic crises in the U.S. displaced able-bodied men on a 
massive scale.  While soup kitchens and other institutional responses to the poor had been 
developing in New York and other major cities since 1802, it was the combination of 
these two crises and then the massive displacement of men after the Civil War that 
created a widely held notion of a national homeless problem (Caton 1990:7; Leginski 
2007; DePastino 2003). With large numbers of able bodied men who were willing to 
work but had to seek assistance, cities became increasingly intolerant of vagrants who 
became understood as idle and were represented by politicians and newspapers as 
alcoholic, law breakers and troublesome, and hence undeserving. The attack on the 
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homeless character manifested in attacks on the places the homeless would use for refuge, 
doorways, tunnels, forests, and abandoned structures. Many of these unemployed men 
travelled from city to city looking for work.  It is from this tradition that the American 
Hobo is crafted (Anderson 1923; 1975; Ward 1979; DePastino 2003). Unlike vagrants 
and tramps who were penniless and idle wanderers, hobos are understood as a form of 
migrant worker, who very often were poor, and very often intemperate in nature. 
(Anderson 1923, 1975; Ward 1979; DePastino 2003). In the west, they had sought 
employment in the resource industries of Washington and Oregon, and when unemployed 
had occupied Seattle’s Skid Road, a run down section of downtown Seattle where 
lodgings and drink were cheap (Caton 1990; Rossi 1989).  By 1872, the term, “Skid 
Row” had been synthesized from this former usage, and was used extensively in other 
cities, starting with New York City, to define the area of the city, sometimes also referred 
to as the “main stem,” where vagrants and hoboes sought refuge and association (Bahr 
1968, 1973; Rossi 1989). It should be noted that skid rows have been commonly 
associated with densely populated urban cores (Bahr 1968, 1973; Ward 1979; Rossi 
1989; Caton 1990). This is a misconception. Skid rows began as outlying communities, 
established in unused public lands between cities and wealthy estates.12 
  It was the expansion of the city that in most cases brought skid rows into the core 
urban space; as cities expanded, skid rows, flop houses and cheap bars increasingly 
became associated with downtown cores (ibid). In the expanding cities of an 
industrializing America, skid rows become difficult to tolerate within mainstream 
imaginaries.   Isolated by poverty and the need to form alliances with other transient men, 
by 1873 and during yet another economic reversal, tens of thousands of homeless men 
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took up residence in various skid rows, the hub of their social and economic ties (Bahr 
1973; Caton 1990).   If not an actual threat to mainstream citizens, skid rows burgeoning 
with troubled and often-desperate men gave the impression of danger. With 
unemployment as high as 40%, no national homeless policy emerged but the Young 
Men’s Christian Association and the Salvation Army did build hotels for the poor and 
encouraged their repatriation into a growing resource economy in the Western United 
States (Caton 1990).  While police stations were increasingly used as temporary night 
shelters for vagrants, the majority of displaced men found themselves secreted away in 
abandoned or unused buildings, in the flops along skid rows or in the streets, and in the 
various city shelter spaces made available by municipal housing authorities, while many 
more rode the trains in search of casual work (DePastino 2003; Caton 1990; Leginski 
2007; Riis 1902; Anderson 1923, 1975).    
 Whereas the homeless might have ideally looked for work, in its absence often 
they resorted to begging.  In 1877 the New York Board of Charities advocated outlawing 
begging and posited jailing vagrants in work camps (Caton 1990).   The Rhode Island 
Tramps act of 1880 is emblematic of such an official law prohibiting camping, sleeping 
in parks or vagrancy of any kind (ibid).  Such laws opposing the settlement of hobos and 
vagrants were common and underscore the ban on camping in many US cities today.  
Another law, The Kansas Vagrancy Statute of 1889 attacked vagrants on the basis that 
jobs were always available and that vagrancy was tantamount to idleness.  A brief period 
of economic soundness occurred between 1888-1892 only to be dramatically reversed on 
May 5 1893, on what is referred to as Industrial Black Friday or, the Panic of 1893 when 
as many as 3 million men were suddenly unemployed during yet another dramatic failure 
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of the economy (Caton 1990:8).  The US economy therefore is very much linked to the 
numbers of persons displaced from work and therefore who had become homeless.  
 Marcuse (1990) points out that there has always been a difficulty in defining who 
the homeless are, since the definitions vary across local, state and federal jurisdictions 
and across periods of history.  The definitions tend to reflect the difference between: 
those who voluntarily abandon their roles in the economy: those who eschew the virtues 
of the model home, and those who are forced beyond their own will to abandon 
traditional roles either through calamity or illness (141).  Furthermore, there is a tendency 
to define homelessness for the purposes of policy making; shelterless, homeless in 
shelters, housed but imminently shelterless, housed but not in homes and finally, at risk of 
being homeless are categories which Marcuse (1990:140-42) suggests follow a sort of 
continuum where the shelterless is a person living on the streets, and the at risk category 
includes anyone who might be adequately housed but is at risk of losing their residence 
due to illness, financial worries or loss of employment. These “types” continue to 
complicate definitions of homelessness.  The degree to which the definition of homeless 
under examination is inclusive of some or all of these definitions will therefore inflate or 
deflate the numbers.13 Furthermore, there is some sense that the degree to which an 
individual can be said to be to blamed for their poverty justifies their treatment as 
deserving or not. 
 By 1913, a new recession had led to an increase in demands on city shelters, 
church alms houses and had swelled the numbers of men living on skid rows – New 
York’s famous Bowery, had as many as 75,000 men in the first half of 1915 alone (Caton 
1990:9).14  While the majority of the homeless lived in rundown rooms or in shelters, 
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Anderson’s famous study of “hobohemia” revealed the marginal life of the hobo in urban 
“jungles” or shanty camps on the outskirts of town near railway junctions where they 
could hop freight trains and search for work as migrant laborers.  Anderson found that 
these men started out in search of work, often with families to attend to back home, but 
ended up jobless and lost because they were industrially inadequate or had personality 
defects (Caton 1990:10; Anderson 1923, 1975).  With the skids infested with homeless 
men, and with work hard to come by, the social ties and cliques that hobos tended to 
establish were best addressed in their own social organization, and hence Hobo camps 
became fairly common in the outlying regions of cities, even if they were frequently 
routed by the police in the service of expanding city cores. 
 Even though reliable figures of the homeless are hard to come by, it is suggested 
that by the time the Great Depression was mid stride, as many as 5 million Americans 
were homeless (Caton 1990; Reed 2008). The jungles of Hobohemia, as DePastino 
reminds us were not lawless and without order.  Beginning with Nels Anderson's (1923) 
study of the American Hobo, we understand the culture of the hobo as one of ritually 
reinforced rites of passage and camaraderie, invested with symbols and a lexicon and 
regarded with high esteem by those who had come to be defined by that manner of living.   
 While mainstream society had looked upon Hobos as dangerous and ambiguous 
characters, they were cautiously recognized by the state and by industrialists for the 
important migrant and casual labor function they provided.  By the time of the Great 
Depression, the hobo camps that had been seen as dens if iniquity and as ambiguous 
dangerous places by most mainstreamers and politicians were on the decline, but in the 
meantime had become understandable as common expressions of the spatialization of 
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poor labor.   The Depression extended this need to millions of others. With nowhere else 
to live, hundreds of thousands of newly homeless persons slept in cars, abandoned lots, 
under bridges and ad hoc shantytowns frequently referred to as Hoovervilles.15 Under 
such conditions of massive economic decline, federal state governments understood 
shantytowns as a legitimate but temporary response by deserving citizens to the need for 
shelter that had been stripped from them by circumstances beyond their control.  Between 
1927 and 1941, shantytowns were grudgingly embraced as inevitable manifestations of 
massive poverty.16 
  Without a well-endowed housing or welfare sector, tens of thousands of families 
became quite literally homeless, unsheltered with no place to sleep.  For the first time in 
US history, the majority of the homeless were no longer intemperate transient men, but 
included able-bodied and motivated men, women, and children of all ages and from all 
ethnicities.  Whereas most studies of skid row had revealed a population of mostly white 
men, the new poor comprised, Blacks, Whites and families, children, and single women 
(Bahr 1968, 1973; Caton 1990; Snow and Anderson 1993).  The social structure of the 
homeless shifted dramatically from small groups of randomly affiliated men, to mobile 
collectives comprised of families and friends, and in cases, entire communities.17  When 
Hoover left office in 1933, unemployment was at 25%, millions of Americans were 
living outside of the normal housing market, and more than 100,000 businesses had failed 
(Best 1991, 1993; Reed 2008).  
 Shantytowns popped up near Churches and missions and along city access routes 
from which members of families could more easily travel to find handouts of food, 
clothing and fuel, perhaps day labor.  The structures were crude, usually fabricated from 
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any discarded building material, but included items like old car seats, chassis, road 
ductwork and culverts and even cardboard.  Many people were forced to live in their cars, 
the image of which is impeccably recalled in Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath (1939). 
Hoover lost the election of 1933 to the democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt.  In several places 
US States set up large work camps to house workers in the infrastructural work programs 
introduced by F.D.R.18 
 Shelter was only a part of the overall need of the population that included jump 
starting a dead economy, providing jobs and guaranteeing the income and safety of those 
for whom a return into employment or strong family lives was unlikely.  As a result 
Roosevelt introduced two New Deals; the first in 1933 included economic regulatory 
measures and the second in 1935, introduced various measures to stimulate bottom up 
solvency.19.  While some support was offered to help homeowners resist foreclosure, the 
only national policy measure was to create emergency camps and shelters for displaced 
persons.  By the end of World War Two, under a vigorous economy, most of New Deal 
incentives were abandoned.20 Today the securities regulations and social security are all 
that remain of the New Deals, but the Great Depression and the intervention of the state 
in economic and social areas of governance are referred to when looking at current  
issues with homelessness caused by the 2008 crisis. 
 By 1941, the economy had revived and the homeless population declined as many 
unemployed were swept up into service in the army and the laws against the shantytown 
mode that had been ignored in the previous decade, were vigorously executed.  In cases 
where shantytown residents did not disband willingly, the federal government went about 
dismantling the shantytowns with the help of the army.  The attack on shantytowns was 
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especially damaging to the culture of the American Hobo, which was largely eradicated 
as an historical form as a result of the sweeping of shantytowns and the participation of 
their numbers in the war effort (Ward 1979; Rossi 1989; Caton 1990; DePastino 2003).  
 The U.S.  economy had more or less boomed since the end of World War Two.  
This growth would continue until the early 1970’s when oil prices and high inflation once 
again destabilized growth. In the intervening 30 years, suburbia became the norm for 
middle class America, and the outlying regions of towns where shantytowns had once 
rooted were aggressively rezoned and developed into the now familiar suburban 
communities; at the same time, downtown cores increasingly became the targets of urban 
renewal funding, and a chronically homeless population which had tended to remain 
fairly constant and fixed in skid rows and slums had few places to call home (Jackson 
1985:220-225; Rossi 1989:32-44; Gans 1991).  By the mid 1960’s their numbers had 
increased, while their housing options had all but disappeared, and the homeless, 
deserving or not, were painfully visible (Rossi 1989:33-35; Caton 1990; Marcuse 1990).21 
Urban renewal started in the forties, but had reached a certain critical mass by the mid 
60’s. 
 In 1949, President Harry Truman signed the Housing Act, which gave federal, 
state, and local governments ‘unprecedented power to shape residential life’ (Jackson 
1985; Rossi 1989).  Phrased, urban redevelopment in 1949, this act, which gave private 
housing contractors the right to build and manage low-income housing, was rephrased, 
urban renewal in 1954.   An interesting blog sums up the main criticism of urban renewal, 
“One of the Housing Act's main initiatives - "urban renewal" - destroyed about 2,000 
communities in the 1950s and '60’s and forced more than 300,000 families from their 
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homes. Overall, about half of urban renewal's victims were Black, a reality that led to 
James Baldwin's famous quip that "urban renewal means Negro removal" (Jim Rongstad, 
“Preserving Freedom Blog,” October 3 2011).  Jackson (1985) reviews the intent of laws 
and housing policy since the New Deals and concludes that "the result, if not the intent, 
of the public housing program of the United States was to segregate the races, to 
concentrate the disadvantaged in inner cities, and to reinforce the image of suburbia as a 
place of refuge for the problems of race, crime, and poverty” (218-219).   
 Jackson’s (1985) Crabgrass Frontier: the suburbanization of the United States,  
traces the roots of the suburban tradition in the United States back to the 19th century. 
The allocation of a privileged, clean and separate zone for wealthy living had created a 
uniquely American sense of what I refer to as the home myth; the belief that a detached, 
single family dwelling was a step in the right direction, or is normal.22 Emigration of 
middle and upper classes to the outskirts of increasingly run down and congested cities  
left city cores to the poor, blue-collar laborers and the homeless. Where incentives and 
housing policy were directed towards building new homes for single nuclear families and 
expanding suburban areas, creating effective transit and road systems, fixing bridges and 
improving communication systems, affordable housing for the very poor as a policy 
consideration remained mired in the practice of letting charitable organizations and 
communities manage their poor, or relocating the poor into slummed out ghettoes 
sometimes called “projects”. Official housing strategies entering the mid 1960’s 
supported the practice of building high density housing for the poor understood as 
“affordable housing.”23 For the poor, housing projects emerge as a sort of “counter” space 
to the single family suburban home.  As for the homeless themselves, urban renewal  had 
 406 
begun to eliminate the cheap hotel, the rooming houses and the flops where they might 
have crashed; the attack on skid row entered a new phase, as vagrancy laws began to be 
more vigilantly imposed,  and the poor, who were displaced and increasingly without 
recourse to shelter or alms, become far more visible to urban imaginaries.   In the wake of 
redevelopment, under the towering shadows of the projects, homelessness is lost in 
outcries against racism and the Black - White divide.   
 An influential volume was Michael Harrington’s The Other America (1962). This 
book exposed the widespread failure of the American way of life to meet the needs of the 
nation; over 25% of the population was considered poor and this despite great wealth.  
While it is easy to believe this perverse dichotomy today between wealth and epidemic 
poverty, at that time, American society largely operated under the delusion that poverty 
was isolated to the neat little pockets cities had created for it in the mostly black ghettoes.    
Harrington’s work exposed the broader reality of poverty, alluded to the future 
implications of an uneducated and unattended large citizenry, and finally explained that 
the state had to assume a central role in redressing social needs on moral and practical 
economic grounds.  Harrington influenced both Kennedy and Johnson’s concern for 
social welfare, by suggesting a relationship between normative values for housing and 
security and the utter impossibility of either in poor, slummed out neighborhoods.   
 In pointing out that America’s preoccupation with its technological and urban 
mastery had misdirected attention to the 40 or 50 million persons who were living in 
squalor, Harrington shook up the image of a morally and scientifically superior America 
and challenged Americans to explain how it was that the poor who were poor in 1950, 
were still poor: “They were poor.  They still are” (1962:1).  It’s a challenge that could be 
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reiterated today.24 By 1964, poverty in the US was at almost 20%, despite sustained 
economic growth,  civil unrest was growing, and important social research and activist 
actions shed light on an increasingly difficult problem.  If social welfare was not a direct 
boon to economic growth, then it was arguably a preventive measure in so much as it 
addressed the constitutionally guaranteed rights of Americans against their growing 
discontent and by the mid 1960’s the extent to which housing policies had discriminated 
against the very poor became difficult to ignore.  With poverty at 24%, Lyndon Johnson 
examined the role of state intervention through education and improved health care as a 
means to address poverty.  The discussion was never framed in terms of the relationship 
between labor, and exploitative work relations, even though criticism of Johnson’s vision 
of The Great Society from economists like Milton Freidman, expressed these 
interventions as harmful to the economy.25      
 In his 1964 inaugural address, Lyndon Johnson announced an (un)official War on 
Poverty. Johnson’s vision of the Great Society, hinged on poverty reduction strategies 
that required expanding the government's role in education and health care.26 Extension 
of programs aimed at helping the poor, of whom Blacks were disproportionately 
represented, came under fire after the Watts Riots and as the increasingly visible Black 
Power movement gave conservative critics of welfare fuel to argue against what was 
essentialized as a problem of ghettoized Blacks (Moynihan 1966; Liebow 1967).  Support 
for the war on poverty turned to outright rejection in the Congress. As it regards housing 
however, Johnson’s platform was extremely important; in addition to setting up 
extensions of funding to locally based community projects, The Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) was initiated under his watch.  It is within this federal 
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Department that current national strategies are designed and implemented today.  And it 
is within the limitations of this system, that we will understand how Dignity Village and 
other emergency camps find relevance.  
 Opponents to Welfarist positions assumed that the economy should be attended to 
combat poverty.  Influenced by Oscar Lewis (1961, 1962, 1963) Daniel Moynihan’s 
(1965) The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, concentrated on the culture of 
Black poverty that was not unique simply for its lack of real or social capital, but for its 
unique appearance and role within the context of capitalist relations and segregated 
modes of urban development. Colloquially entitled the “Moynihan Report,” the plan 
suggested finding jobs for the male heads of Black households.  Lewis’ famous framing 
of the “culture of poverty” is incorrectly summarized as 70 traits that can be said to be 
true of all the poor.  While he discusses these traits as guidelines, he points out very 
importantly that a difference between poverty and a “subculture of poverty” must be 
understood to include the contextual conditions that define some types of poverty 
differently from others: “the meaning and the consequences of poverty vary considerably 
in different contexts… the subculture of poverty is part of the larger culture of capitalism, 
whose social and economic system channels wealth into the hands of a relatively small 
group and thereby makes for the growth of sharp class distinctions”(1968:20). Despite 
my earlier critique of his work, namely his interventionist-determinist proxy, the 
concentration of wealth he spoke of then, is well understood now. 
 As Lefebvre (1974) had suggested, capitalist cities recreate spaces that reproduce 
the social relations necessary to the dominant mode of production commensurate with 
urban imaginaries on proper use of space.  Bringing the culture of poverty to bear on 
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Lefebvre’s interpretation of the socially created value of space, one might argue that 
urban renewal, the creation of the home myth and suburbia, and stigmatization of poverty 
by the erecting of slummed out monuments to depravation, or projects, are means by 
which the worst off are subjected to domination; their demise, is therefore, not just about 
the choices or problems they might have, but also in the way capitalist urban imaginaries 
choose to construct solutions that include or exclude the very poor from the equation of 
spaces. In the long run, Johnson’s war did little to redress poverty or to restore the Great 
Society.27 Small decreases in the numbers of homeless during the 1960’s were to be 
quickly erased with the economic and state retractions of the 1970’s (Rossi 1989:37). 
 By the 1970’s as Caton (1990) points out, it became impossible to ignore the 
homeless who were increasingly more visible; sleeping in doorways, wandering streets 
aimlessly, dressed in torn and tattered clothes (12).  Rossi (1989) explains that despite a 
short period between 1970-73 when subsidized housing for the elderly actually reduced 
the numbers of homeless, by the mid - 1970’s, downtown cores seemed to be filled with 
homeless people.   Among these were numbers of unemployed, mostly men of various 
colors, who had joined the ranks of the homeless on skid row (Bahr 1968, 1973; Ward 
1979; Cuomo 1983). Skid rows were increasingly in the way of redevelopment projects, 
and so displaced as they were, the homeless became far more visible in parks, lanes, 
scrambling in the night, begging on street corners, or seeking refuge in any public space 
with night time access (Rossi 1989:34). Combined with the sluggish economies and 
rising inflation during the 70’s, with the relaxation of public inebriation and vagrancy 
laws, and with the loss of skid row territories, the homeless seemed to increase, not only 
in real numbers, but in terms of their visibility within the urban mainstream imaginary, 
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proving at the very least, the inadequacy of measures introduced to redress the problem 
introduced by Johnson’s War on Poverty in the late 60’s. Many scholars note that the 
period of the 70’s was noticeably different from the 50’ s and 60’s, when homelessness, 
as distinct from vagrancy or transience, first came to be discussed in the media and the 
sciences as a unique category of the poor (Bahr 1973; Rossi 1989; Caton 1990; 
Hulchanski 2009).  Amongst these differences, the emergence of families and single 
mothers with children on the streets and seeking assistance in greater numbers especially 
caught the attention of the media and the state, a trend that continues today (Rossi 1989).   
As Rossi (1989) suggests, whereas rundown and slummed out housing had sufficed in the 
mainstream imaginary for the very worst off poor in the previous decades, even this 
affordable but decrepit form was disappearing, and a new form, that most disturbing 
today, literal homelessness began to grow and become a highly public event (1989:34; 
Caton 1990). In any event, the presence of women and children on the streets had no 
place in urban symbolic imaginaries under late capitalism (Wright 1997, 2000).  
 A response to this literally homeless population was the emergency shelter system 
that many cities currently employ.  While shelters and almshouses have existed in various 
forms since the mid 19th century, the emergency shelter presents itself as an evolution of 
sorts, and as a response to the very real presence of large numbers of homeless persons 
on city streets.  There are no accurate figures of this national population, but in New York 
city as an a example, Rossi points out that shelter capacity doubled from 3000 to 6000 
units over five years from the end of the 1970’s into early 1984; the number of families 
housed in emergency welfare hotels (hotel rooms secured by federally funded vouchers to 
homeless families) increased from a few hundred to over 3500 per month (37).  The 
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current emergency shelter spaces created for the poor in many cities are rooted in the 
visibility of the landmark court case, Callahan vs. Carey, in New York in 1979.  In this 
case, the director of New York Coalition for the Homeless, successfully sued the city on 
the grounds that the city was constitutionally required to provide emergency shelter for 
those deemed in need. Following an injunction requiring the expansion of the city’s 
shelter system, the city settled the suit with a promise to increase shelter space as 
demanded. Since then, emergency shelter systems have emerged from city to city, on the 
premise that the worst off deserve emergency protection under the law, but as discussed 
several times in this dissertation, the conditions therein are often worse than on the streets, 
and as Rossi points out, were even in the beginning, not much better than the cubicle 
rooms found on skid row (35). Rossi cites a study by Crystal and Goldstein (1982) in 
which shelter clients rate prisons above shelters in terms of safety cleanliness and food 
quality” (35). 28  In any event, emergency shelters are designed to offer temporary relief 
from the exigencies of street life and are not permanent solutions to one’s homelessness.  
The requirements for getting into shelter often include lining up early, curfews,  day-time 
closures, regulations on inebriation, limits on goods and belongings, and thereby restrict 
the homeless person from seeking work, taking on part-time or shift work,  or gathering 
resources that might otherwise be useful (Crystal and Goldstein 1984; Rossi 1989; 
Weissman, “Subtext” 2005, 2009). 
 While the previous discussion suggests that homelessness has been a recognized 
issue for scholars and government for over three centuries in the U.S., it is only since the 
1980’s that a the bulk of work has been done in scholarly activist circles. Interestingly, 
Hulchanski’s (2009) study showed that of the 4,744 articles found between 1851 to 2005 
 412 
that contained the word, homelessness, 87% of this usage was in the 20 years between 
1985 and 2005 (2009:1).  The 1980’s represent a particularly difficult time for the poor in 
North American cities.  In terms of actual numbers, taking New York once again as an 
example29, because reliable national stats are hard to come by, the number of persons 
accessing shelter beds per night was conservatively estimated to have increased from 
5000 in 1983 to 9000 in 1988 (Caton 1990:12).  Part of the rise in numbers is related to 
economic recession that had in due course led to the highest national unemployment 
since the Great Depression; reaching 10.7% in 1982 before settling at around six per cent 
in late 1988 (ibid – The current rate is close to 7.5% according to HUD 2013).   
  Many accounts of the Reagan years, look upon his reign as one of the most 
dismal periods in American history as it regards the underclass and the working man. 
Regan’s Presidency is often placed side by side with Thatcher’s as emblematic of 
conservative neoliberalism (Rose 1999; Dean 1999, 2010; Gordon 1991).  The mandate 
of government under neoliberalism was to reduce government expenditure.  Under 
Reagan, this reduced spending occurred concomitant with increases in military and 
defense budgets at the expense of national welfare and housing programs.  In the online 
journal, Shelterforce, Peter Dreier (2004#135) makes many interesting observations that 
correlate the Reagan administration with rising numbers of homeless in the 1980’s.  
While economic stability was regained during his term,  the gap between the wealthy and 
the poor continued to widen, as it does today. As it regards the phenomenon of the 
shantytown, the withdrawal of funding to cities was perhaps most dramatic. Other than 
maintaining high amounts of funding for the highways that connected suburbs to cities, 
federal funding of urban centers declined; previously to 1980, federal dollars were 22% 
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of city budgets, and after, only 6%. On a national scale, this led to closure of fire stations, 
hospitals, outpatient psychiatric services, schools and various programs for the needy, 
many of which were homeless. In this environment of retracted spending, in which cities 
and communities were increasingly expected to bear the weight for social programs, it 
seems understandable that the visibility of the poor would increase, and it did. At the 
same time, the urban spaces set aside for the homeless declined in number due to 
incentive driven urban renewal projects by private contractors, or were converted into 
undesirable shelters. To his critics, Reagan was robbing from the poor to give to the rich.    
 Boltanski (2010) has instructed that while institutions such as the government, 
bureaucracies, religious organizations, educational or employment sites are 
administrative and policy driven, they are also comprised of individuals with particular 
values and abilities that contribute to the creation of knowledge and decision making 
inside the institution.30  The critique of institutions must, therefore, include the critique of 
individuals.  In cases, such as Roosevelt’s regime, the critique is framed often within the 
debate between liberalism and merging neoliberalism in the US, something I have done. 
In Reagan’s case, critique has to be leveled not only to his political conservatism, but also 
to his uncanny ability to convert ignorance into policy. 
 As a gifted communicator, however, Reagan had managed to convince much of 
the nation that what was good for the economy and for business was good for America.  
Under the rubric of economic recovery, slashing social welfare programs seemed 
necessary.  Reagan and his pundits employed a deceptive form of communication to paint 
the homeless in the terms of negativity that neo-conservative neoliberal governance 
construes for the poor and the failed citizen. “In early 1984 on Good Morning America, 
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Reagan defended himself against charges of callousness toward the poor in a classic 
blaming-the-victim statement saying that “people who are sleeping on the grates…the 
homeless…are homeless, you might say, by choice” (Dreier 2004).  
 According to the Salem eBook, three-volume set, The Eighties in America, (2005:  
“Homelessness”), the actual number of homeless in the early 80’s ranged from 250, 000 
according to HUD, or 3, 000, 000 according to activists.  The discrepancy is indicative of 
the tendency of the former to deflate the extensive failure of the state to redress poverty, 
and to dramatize big problems with big numbers in the latter.  While Reagan’s critique 
reflected an historically carved sentiment towards undeserving poor, a great deal of 
attention began to be paid to revealing the actual causes of homelessness.  The theories of 
causation rotated on two axes; the characteristics of homeless individuals, and the 
structural conditions that contributed to homelessness.   With some variation, most 
studies noted the dramatic increase in families increasingly falling into chronic 
homelessness and that many homeless people had jobs but could not afford to live in 
shelter.  Simply put, when compared to the homeless of previous decades, the new 
homeless were younger, more racially diverse, and despite continuing trends of addiction 
and mental incapacitation, they were notably able-bodied and willing to work (ibid).31 
 Amongst researchers, it was concluded that no single axis, or any single category 
of infliction or experience was responsible for what was emerging as an increasingly 
diverse expression of homelessness.  Amongst structural variables, research looked at: 
1. closure of mental hospitals – since almost 33% of the homeless were determined 
to have mental illness, a reduction in total psychiatric beds from 550,000 in 1955, 
to 120, 000 in 1984 had some effect but could not be wholly to blame for the 
dramatic increases, nor the range of types of homelessness. 
2. The introduction of crack cocaine, (similarly to meth-amphetamine today) – drug 
testing in some New York Shelters suggested that over 83% of homeless tested 
 415 
positive for cocaine use.  While cocaine use did increase, the overall measure of 
drug use in the homeless population did not change in the 1980’s so, cocaine 
could not be the cause of the increase, nor drug use. 
3. Structural - policy level changes occurred just before the spike in numbers. These 
are associated with Reagan’s policy towards the undeserving poor. Cutbacks to 
low income housing, long term care facilities and other programs for the very 
poor must have had  a contributing value to the rise of homelessness. 
4. The eradication of low income housing was made worse by the gentrification of 
city centers which hinged on the elimination of Single Room Occupancy units and 
overcrowding in cheap motels which were increasingly becoming occupied by 
families forced out of the housing market. 
5. Faced with the choice of food and clothing or shelter for their children, many 
families chose the former and were forced into shelters or the streets in order to 
satisfy the latter.32 	  	   	  
 The implication of these general observations is that in some cases of chronic 
street homelessness, some people are rendered incapable of working and caring for 
themselves because of addiction or mental health issues.  It also suggests that many 
others are willing to work, but cannot find the type of employment that pays well enough 
to support a family.  Hence homelessness is a manifestation of working poverty; jobs 
simply did not pay enough for a family to survive.  By the late 1980’s, Reagan’s 
ridiculous comments about poor people choosing to be homeless had been exposed for 
their fallacy, and as the economy showed signs of recovery, the persistence of advocates 
such as the National Alliance to End Homelessness33, the media representation of 
homeless children and parents on the streets, and the academic attention paid to urban 
social problems,  pressured the federal Government to introduce the first large scale 
program for housing.  
 Under Reagan, The federal McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (1987) 
was passed with much ceremony that included a sleep-in on Capitol Hill in which 
congressmen, advocates and the homeless demonstrated their unity over the issue.  The 
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act placed close to 2 billion dollars spread over two years into housing programs, 
subsidies for existing emergency shelters, rehabs and other medical services (Rossi 
1989:37 also USICH 2010). When added up with the existing social programs for the 
poor at federal, state and local levels, it was expected that these monies would buttress 
efforts to stem new cases of homelessness, and also that they would extend services 
beyond their normal reach to existing homeless clients.  It is understood today that the 
monies were too few and spread out too widely, (A “drop in the bucket”)  and were often 
too misused, to effect meaningful change.34 Since then, the Act had been re-written and 
invigilated by the United States Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH), which 
was created in the same act.   
 The purpose of USICH is to “coordinate the federal response to homelessness and 
to create a national partnership at every level of government and with the private sector to 
reduce and end homelessness in the nation while maximizing the effectiveness of the 
federal Government in contributing to the end of homelessness” (USICH 2010). By the 
beginning of the 1990’s the failure of this spending to effect real change had created a 
strong conservative opposition to the program (Rossi 1989). Summing up the 1980’s, 
Caton suggests that entering the 1990’s, the following factors contributed to higher 
numbers of homeless: 
1. Economic recession coupled with high inflation and lowered benefits for the 
unemployed. 
2.  Lack of affordable housing based on the gentrification of city cores and money 
spent on temporary shelter measures. 
3. Reforms in social security that steered funding away from able bodied persons to 
those with known disabilities. 
4.  Deinstitutionalization of mental health, health and welfare services which had 
seen the increased downloading of services once provided by state and federal 
hospitals and agencies to local providers to none at all.  This is especially true of 
state mental institutions, state child welfare services and prison systems (15-17). 
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The result was the beginning of the exposure of a massive problem of widely 
distributed homelessness “ ripped from its customary habitat” (Hopper 2003: 
176). 
 
 As Rossi pointed out in 1989, the actual numbers of the homeless are difficult to 
ascertain and really unimportant in the sense that homelessness is obviously a major 
social problem (38). Of the forty or so “reasonably well-conducted” studies on the 
homeless during the first half of the 1980’s Rossi suggests that information has been 
collected with a particular eye to influence policy directions. Out of this research came 
some substantive information, which was useful.  First it was clear that the old versions 
of the “homeless” (prior to 1980) were able to find shelter either legally or by trespassing 
indoors and this had become far more difficult to do by the end of the 1980’s.  
 Early studies had also shown that the institutional solution, the shelter, proved less 
hospitable than squats or the street or the run down motels of skid row (Levinson 2004).  
Perhaps most importantly, these factors had combined to make homelessness extremely 
visible in cities.  Within this transparency the presence of women and children on the 
streets became alarming. Between 1976 and 1986 the number of women on the streets 
rose from less than 3% to over 25% of the street population (this number is a composite 
based on partial data from New York and Chicago in Rossi 1989:39). An interesting 
change had been that old age pensioners were largely underrepresented in street counts 
during the 80’s, whereas the mean age of the homeless in 1989 was 39 (40).  Social 
Security and affordable senior residences had served that demographic well. Rossi also 
points out that while 25% of respondents in Bogue’s well known 1963 study of skid rows 
were employed at some point during the week, in 1989, a survey in Chicago 
demonstrated that only 3% worked.  Rossi calculated that in terms of absolute poverty, 
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the homeless in 1989, were worse off than their 1958 counterparts; the actual spending 
power of the average street person in 1989 was less than 1/3 that of those in 1958 (ibid).  
 The final contrast is something we today find unsurprising.  In  1958, Chicago’s 
skid row and New Yorks’ Bowery were primarily White, 82% and 70% respectively.  By 
1989, the ethnic composition had shifted negatively in favour of Black Americans; 54% 
and 74% respectively.  These rates started increasing in the 1980’s and as discussed in 
chapter two, homelessness like poverty is now more likely if you are Black (Rossi 1989;  
Caton 1990; Marcuse 1990; Wright 2000; State Of Oregon 2011). Rossi adds that 
disabilities, alcoholism and drug abuse are still significant factors amongst the homeless.  
However, it is cautioned that all these variables are additive and conditioning (42-43).  It 
is unlikely that any single factor can explain the kind of abject poverty and street-engaged 
homelessness on which these observations were based.  
  Yet despite the various studies and programs, The US is left with a growing and 
increasingly more entrenched form of homelessness in 2012.  The current dilemma with 
homelessness in the US is in part due to a similar underfunding of programs that 
hampered the McKinney Act; a loosely structured largely uncoordinated housing services 
and care sector (Leginski 2007); and spread of homelessness into new categories of 
deserving poor, such as middle class families struck by illness or unemployment.   That 
is; that homelessness since the 1980’s has mutated into a different creature than in earlier 
forms.  
 One of the main differences noted by Wright (2000) is that by 1990, homelessness 
had become understood as episodic and therefore it was difficult to understand because it 
varied widely in terms of how long a poor person might be without shelter, or why.  
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Whereas hobos and vagabonds had come to define a sort of lifestyle, the new poverty was 
indicative of a type of extreme poverty where individuals fell in and out of housing with 
the ebbs and tides of their irregular work opportunities (2000:28).  It was not so much 
that homelessness “was you might say a choice…”  -  many homeless worked or sought 
gainful employment, but the experience of employment and relative value of wages had 
changed.  They were insufficient relative to the cost of living.  And then there were those 
too, who were mentally or physically ill and uncared for, those who were incarcerated 
frequently, and those addicts who had nowhere else to go.  This diverse composition 
makes it difficult to ascertain the actual numbers of homeless people because they are 
hard to locate and harder still to define.    
 Wright looks at shelter usage as an indicator of the dimension of the problem, a 
practice carried out by most agencies today looking for street counts of the homeless.35 
Between 1985 to 1991 he estimated that 5.7 million Americans had experienced episodes 
of homelessness (28).  The number increased annually, by as much as 11% between 1997 
and 1998 alone.  In 1999 participants at the U.S. Conference of Mayors identified a lack 
of affordable housing as the major cause of homelessness in their jurisdictions (ibid).  
Wright makes an interesting survey of several countries arguing that increases in the 
number of people who were literally homeless or inadequately sheltered increased 
globally between 1980 and 1996 due to the increasingly neoliberal policies in the west 
which promoted devolution, and in the case of the former Soviet Union, because the rise 
of the market economy had made housing unaffordable.    
 Based on figures released at the Habitat II Conference in Istanbul Turkey, by 
1996 the number of people living in inadequate shelter had reached 1 billion (ibid).   
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While the US followed the model of other countries, including Canada for quick and 
temporary fixes to dire circumstances, and increased spending on emergency shelters and 
food banks, the numbers of homeless continued to rise and policy began to reflect more 
punitive attitudes.  I have discussed Wright’s discussion of enforcement earlier, but it 
should be noted that many of the laws and regulations criminalizing homelessness are 
articulated by The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (1999).  Mitchell, 
(1991) and others including Stoner (1995) and Barak (1992) sketch some of these general 
measures; anti-camping, anti-sitting and staying laws, anti-pan-handling and loitering, 
sexual indecency (such as urinating in public).  Wright has discussed these as attempts to 
isolate the very poor in institutional spaces created by capital such as shelters and prisons, 
or to discard them into the invisible margins, the dark places, I have referred to as 
negative space (Wright 1997, 2000; Weissman 2012).   For Wright, such policies are very 
much directed towards the attitudes of mainstream imaginaries and tourists; sweeping the 
streets and parks is just that; an attempt to present a cleaned up version of the city to the 
opinion of the world. 
 In this light, and on the basis of the inadequacy of the state to house the homeless, 
in addition to the streets, shelters and slums, Wright follows Headley (1990-91) in 
framing the modern penal system as a branch of the housing policy towards economically 
redundant persons under neoliberalism since the 90’s.  With as many as 1.63 million 
people incarcerated in 1996, and 54% of them poor and Black, Wright frames the lack of 
real effort in the realm of housing as indicative of the disinterest of neoliberal regimes to 
effect programs that would cost money to benefit people of no use to capital which was 
engaged in a process of relocating to cheaper low wage regions of the world (2000:29).   
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Implicit in his statement is the widely held belief that deserving and underserving 
categories of poor, or of the homeless, inhere the traditional expectation of personal 
solvency or of a usefulness to others in economic performance.  I mentioned this as an 
early condition of residency in the colonies, an attribute carried over from England, and 
iterated in poor laws, but remaining essential to neoliberal constructions of “deserving” 
moral character.   
 Under neoliberal policies, there is some recognition that people have rights to 
shelter and food, but little recognition of the state’s direct and explicit role in providing 
these measures.  Underlying this difficulty is the inherent complexity of the types of 
homelessness one encounters.  As Wright suggests, there is a tendency to look at 
homelessness in terms of fanciful causal narratives about personal limitations (Baumhol 
1996 in Wright 2000:30). Conservatives tend to view the homeless within a 
religious/moral framework, “to invite homeless people to repent for their sins.” They 
react to homeless people as crazy dangerous persons, in need of social control (30). On 
the other hand, there is a tendency amongst Liberals, to look at the individual as flawed 
or incapable of any economic or normal function and, therefore, as either useless in the 
context of capitalism, undeserving of any real measures to improve their life style, unless 
they are willing to enter a rehab program of some sort, and better themselves. This 
Liberal position assumes that people can be fixed through rehabs and other programs, 
supported housing and medical interventions (30).  The push is for more shelters, more 
rehabs, more money to “fix” people and their social condition of despair.  It is within the 
context of this governmentality that much research on the homeless has been done in 
shelters, rehabs and treatment centers, and hence my earlier interrogation of the limits of 
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governmentality.  It is within this latter context that categories of deserving and 
undeserving, such as looking for work in order to get welfare or unemployment, imposes 
conditional worth on individuals, and the allotment of services and funds can be said to 
follow discrimination on the basis of worth that resides outside of basic human dignity.     
 Both positions are misguided; they perceive of the homeless as immoral 
characters in need of a spiritual awakening, or as constitutionally flawed and in need of 
“treatment”, and fail to locate these possibilities in broader political and economic 
contexts. Wright therefore suggests looking at the imbrication of so-called “causes”; 
social-structural, individual, causes within the wider politico-economic struggle for 
capital accumulation and racial privilege (ibid).  The major problem with poverty and 
housing policies under the neoliberalism of the 90’s was that they reflected an 
overemphasis on addressing the symptoms of troubled or “addicted” individuals in order 
to get them into shelter without addressing the basic issues of social structural poverty; 
housing and income are not (sufficiently) addressed. The way that the homeless had been 
studied by academics, researchers, foundations and the media tended to support a 
taxonomic representation of the poor by identifying special needs, such as homeless, 
veterans, HIV drug users, single mothers, teenagers, mentally-ill and so on.  In espousing 
the prevalence of special needs, a new category of deserving poor people emerged. (31). 
Wright points out that out of 354 articles on homelessness studied by Blasi (1994) 2/3 
were in journals devoted to psychiatry, medicine and psychology (Wright 2000:3;  Blasi 
1995: 580).  The implication of this finding, according to Blasi,  was that the way 
American social science looked at social life, especially as it related to poverty, was 
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through the highly individualized personalities and life choices made by individuals (581, 
in Wright 2000, ibid).   
 Without addressing all the laws and policies of the federal government, one area, 
Welfare Reform is important to mention before going onto the decade of the shantytown.  
All studies attest to the fact that the numbers of homeless had steadily increased between 
1980 and 2000 (Caton 1990; Marcuse 1990; Wright, Rubin and Devine 1998; Wright 
2000; Leginski 2007).  Wright marks that attention to poverty rates tell us very little 
about real numbers of those experiencing poverty; between 1980 and 1996, the number of 
Americans entering poverty increased by over 7% or 7.3 million people, while poverty 
rates fluctuated.  At the same time, despite short periods of economic decline, the overall 
economy grew faster and larger than it had ever done, and the top 1/5 of the population 
became wealthier than it had ever been; a trend that continues today. This great wealth 
occurred at a time when the incomes of the other 4/5 of the country began to decline.  
The bottom fifth of the population saw its share of wealth decline from 5.4% to 4.7% as a 
result of declining incomes and the loss of low paying jobs (Wright 2000:31).   It is into 
this steady decline of the worst off that the retraction of welfare placed the unrealistic 
burden of maintaining housing.   
 It is important to note as well, that during the 90’s a number of BIDS were 
introduced in US cities. I mentioned earlier that such districts of capitalization used the 
press, sit and stay laws enforced by the police and other means to discourage homeless 
people from city cores.  With urban economies thirsty for recovery, capital enjoyed a 
certain freedom in effecting policy towards the homeless in most cities.  Under this “rule,” 
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shelters, hostels and rehabs are understood as well organized, disciplinary and geared 
towards restoring homeless people to some useful capacity  (for capital) . 
 Wright and Leginski share a certain contempt for the intake policies of municipal 
shelters and the ethos of The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.  
TANF36 was an essential element of the 1996 welfare reform law. It shifted cash 
assistance away from aid to children in low-income families to temporary aid conditional 
on work. The effectiveness of this program is disputed. TANF caseloads have dropped by 
as much as 60%, which has prompted claims that many welfare moms have made their 
way into the labor market (Leginski 2007:23). There is little data on what these jobs 
might be or how satisfactory their housing is as a result. Furthermore, other studies, 
suggest that in the first ten years since its inception many former TANF recipients failed 
to pay their rent and entered homelessness. The number, inaccurate as usual, is between 7 
to 44 per cent (Leginski 2007).  Wright (2000) finds the assessment, sanctions and 
punitive structures and practices of the shelter system equally troubling and self-serving.   
Where HUD tends to represent the rules of TANF in a progressive policy frame, and 
asserts that its weaknesses have been addressed by more flexible language in subsequent 
versions (2005), critics see the rules as setting restrictions on people in need, especially 
regarding housing (Leginski 2007:23).  For Wright such policies serve only to accentuate 
the bias of the federal government to seek solutions that benefit policy makers and 
institutions before those they serve 
 Taking TANF as an example, policy in the late 1990’s was designed to instill a 
sense of purpose for single mothers that non-poor single mothers were presumed to 
enjoy; similarly, homeless men were expected to pursue the activities and freedoms of a 
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“normalized” population.   Work was worth.  This sentiment is 400 years old.  But what 
work was there?  It is hard to separate the ethos of this policy from the debates over 
worth couched in the “deserving” - “undeserving” continuum that I have eluded to many 
times.  In this case, the distinction excludes all able-bodied persons without dependents, 
and casts those worst off poor, the street engaged homeless, into an un-serviced category 
of undeserving poor, whose only recourse is to occupy physically accessible but usually 
legally prohibited space, beg, become jailed, institutionalized or die.  
 By the end of the 1990’s leading into the 2000’s Wright suggests: 
“The dominant cultural ideology now shared by both major political parties in the United 
States relies upon the assumptions that spending on social welfare increases dependency 
and that "excessive" government intervention in markets and state regulation makes it 
difficult for businesses to stay competitive in a global market-place. This ideology, 
strengthened by the "no new taxes" rebellion of the 1980’s, undercut attempts to use 
government for social good. The "no new taxes "rebellion started in California with the 
passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 (Schrag 1999), and spread to other states in the 1980’s. 
Coupled with the twin ideological concepts of deficit reduction and privatization of 
public services, the reduction of government services increased the misery of the poor 
while advancing the economy for the benefit of upper middle-class professionals and 
wealthy investors” (34).  
 
And later,   
 
“Simply put, my argument is as follows: At the level of appearance, homelessness is 
about poverty and ill health. However, these conditions are created by the normal 
capitalist production of low-wage jobs, high housing costs, coupled with a reduction in 
social welfare benefits from states attempting to compete with one another over the price 
of labor and the costs of benefits… According to Devine (see Barak 1992: 58), who 
operationalized the links between political economy and homelessness, economic 
development under neoliberalist policies lowers elite interest in helping the poor. Locally, 
cities are invested with "entrepreneurial" functions acting  as an independent player in 
private-public partnerships (Mayer 1994; Wright 1997) . These policy shifts have 
increased the vulnerability of the poor, with the abolishment of the safety net, 
medicalization and criminalization of the homeless, and the shifting of funds from the 
civil welfare state to the corporate welfare state. Citizen rights and capital responsibility 
via progressive taxation and an expanded social wage have been reversed to capital rights 
and citizen responsibility via regressive taxation and a shrinking social wage. Hence, we 
have both increased numbers of people without shelter combined with a reduced 
commitment to solve the root causes” (34-35). 
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 I hope you will excuse the lengthy quote.  It is my opinion that this passage sums 
up the ideological undercurrents of American neoliberalism as it regards homelessness.  
However, I think it should be noted, that even Wright discusses homelessness in this 
passage as fairly uniform experience.   The people discussed in my field work are of a 
special type; having experienced periodic episodes of homelessness, but coming from 
diverse socio-economic backgrounds, they come to be associated with various categories 
that reflect the mandates of various acts and plans at different times.  What unites these 
people is their co-residence in a modern shantytown.  As a measure not discussed in 
official plans to end homelessness, nor as a model of alternative housing that meets the 
expectations of capital in a privatized service sector, the shantytown then must be 
understood as related to, but not resulting from this legacy of plans and attitudes towards 
deserving and undeserving poor.  In fact, this history set the official competition between 
Supportive Housing Models and Shelter models, while recognizing that many persons 
would be left to the streets.  While tent camps and squats were understood as temporary 
expressions of the street, they are not recognized nor mentioned as valid spatializations of 
a solution to chronic homelessness, not until Dignity Village.  I need to backtrack a little 
so we can understand how the current Housing First model praised by HUD and USICH 
came to be a certain counter-critique to the village. 
 
6.4 Pathways to Housing,  Housing First and Continuum of Care 
  In 1992, a new program called Pathways to Housing had emerged as a local 
response to street homelessness in New York.   Though limited in scope, this model 
recognized that the influence of variables on homelessness were additive and often co-
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dependent especially amongst the chronically homeless.  As an evidence based model, it 
identified that among the street population, it was a combination of psychiatric disorder 
and addiction that had confounded responses to chronic street engaged homelessness, and 
that periods of incarceration or other traumas contributed to the difficulty of remaining 
housed (Koegel and Beck 2004:284; Tsemberis 2004:277).  Prior to this recognition, 
shelters, housing programs and rehabilitation models had demanded sobriety as a 
condition of housing as part of the continuum of housing model.37  Under the continuum 
of housing, potential recipients of housing were expected to get sober, learn how to 
maintain housing in transitional or sheltered spaces while maintaining sobriety, and then 
would be placed into housing, if it were available (279). Advocates of Pathways, 
recognized that not only was sobriety unlikely or sustainable for most people who 
suffered addictions, but when presented with other symptoms such as mental illness, the 
idea that “only through treatment could a consumer become “housing ready” was as 
likely as a phoenix rising from the ashes, literally (278). The Pathways to Housing model 
views housing as a right for all people, and that housing and treatment are not inherently 
linked domains.   
 Beric German (2005) of the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee said that we must 
think of housing as health care38, suggesting a link between stable shelter and the 
ancillary likelihood of dealing with mental health and addictions subsequent to this.  This 
is the position that grew out of the Pathways initiative. The Emergency Housing and 
Homelessness Pilot Project that housed ex residents of Tent City in 2003, also used rent 
supplement programs to rapidly re-house homeless folks. Initial reports in 2005 cited 
improved physical health as one of the benefits of the housing, while my film Subtext, 
 428 
used ethnography to show that the transition to housing from the streets, was very 
difficult for some recipients (WoodGreen 2005; Weissman 2005). Hence, the argument is 
that housing ought to be provided and that the choice to pursue treatment of substance or 
other issues should rest in the individual. Tsemberis (2004:277-281) citing Rowe 
(1999:85), argues that denying the individual this voice is tantamount to oppression.  
Within the Pathways model, homeless persons are placed in self-contained apartments, 
usually found in the regular housing market. Assertive Community Treatment or ACT 
teams, comprised of social workers, housing workers and medical officers provide the 
necessary social and other supports as requested by individuals in rental units and on the 
streets, and as yet unhoused.  By the late 1990’s, the model was successful in New York, 
Philadelphia and Burlington, Vermont. Success in this case is understood as most 
recipients of assistance maintaining their housing and in cases, achieving goals to 
overcome addiction and other complicating issues. In the Pathways model, residents 
spent more time in stable housing than control groups in continuum of care models 
(Tsemberis 2004:282).  Entering the 2000’s, a Pathways to Housing paradigm was being 
more widely experienced and was incorporated into Housing First, a national scale model 
of supportive housing.  While it seemed as if housing was finally receiving the attention it 
deserved, the extension of supportive housing was slow moving.  Shelters continued to 
overflow, families increased on the streets and in shelters, and tents were going up, as the 





Fig. 19. Early Imaginings of the Village. Ca. 2004 (E. Weissman). 
 
 
6.5 Enter the Shantytown 
“Tent Cities are America’s de facto waiting room for affordable and accessible housing. 
The idea of someone living  in a tent (or other encampment) in this country says little 
about the decisions made by those who dwell within and so much more about our 
nation’s inability to adequately respond to those in need” (Neil Donovan, Director of the 
National Coalition of the Homeless  2010). 
 
 Tent camps, temporary squats and overnight sleeping in parks and empty 
buildings  remain fairly constant spatializations of the need for shelter in American cities.  
I want to distinguish between these places and Dignity Village on the grounds that the 
former are regarded as impermanent, and in cities where they are found, are usually 
tolerated on the basis of this impermanence.  However, squatting and camping remains a 
crapshoot for most homeless people. All cities in the US maintain anti-panhandling, ant-
sleeping, anti-camping laws that are exercised at the discretion of the police (NCH 2006 
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2010; Conner 2006).   Whereas the squatting or occupation of vacant buildings usually 
results in the eviction and arrest of homeless trespassers, camping in parks or setting up 
tents tends to become a legal and political statement that draws activists and  opponents 
into legal discourses that play out in courts,  or in council chambers.  By 2000, all over 
the US, this contest between the will of homeless people and city governments had led to 
a more or less consistent response by cities to move illegal homeless campers from site to 
site commensurate with laws governing trespass, loitering and public mischief  (NCH 
2010: National Center for Law and Economic Justice, National Law Center on Poverty 
and Homelessness).39 
 In Seattle, Washington, Tent City 3 was moved as many as 134 times in less than 
five years.40  Still the camps and occupations were a consistent response to a ubiquitous 
lack of shelter beds or affordable housing.  In 2000, Dignity Village was a group of 8 
homeless folks who had banded together on the streets of Portland Oregon and who were 
subsequently evicted according to the law with 72 hours notice from park to park, bridge 
under pass to bridge under pass.  They were moved seven times in one year. The numbers 
of poor on the streets of Portland were swelling because almost every other region of 
Oregon was suffering from economic decline and Portland had social services and a 
supportive homeless community. By the middle of 2000, the 8 members of “Camp 
Dignity became close to 100 and this routine of eviction and emigration became 
ritualized by them through a campaign of marches using shopping carts that contained 
each “villagers’” belongings.  The group would ceremoniously parade, carts in tow, on 
scooters, wheelchairs or by foot,  along city sidewalks, usually accompanied by police 
and press.  Between December of 2000 until September of 2001, their occupations and 
 431 
subsequent evictions created a pattern that implied a temporary nature, but over the span 
of the two years it took to change public opinion, the action must be understood as a 
series of linked and critical moments aimed at social change, and as a very clear example 
of critique growing, changing, morphing and becoming – powerful. With each 
humiliating and arduous parade of wheelchairs, shopping carts and bicycles the nomadic 
community organized further; first as a handful of radical housing warriors known as the 
Housing Liberation Front (HLF). As Jack Tafari an early member recounted recently, 
“ We were soldiers, soldiers, and that was their front, the streets” (see also Mosher 2010: 
DS DISC 1 part 1-“Kwamba” at 00:09:30). When they started gathering new members 
and squatting in parks, they became  “Out of the Doorways,” and then a few stops later, 
as a nomadic tent squat called Camp Dignity.  
 They had come to a final squat under the Fremont Bridge, their number, perhaps 
as high as 150 souls by some personal accounts. Eventually inspired by the savvy of 
activists and professional legal council, these homeless activists challenged the city ban 
on emergency campgrounds on the grounds that it violated the Oregon State Constitution, 
which provided municipalities the right to two emergency camps.  Local environmental 
activists, such as Jack Tafari, celebrated the shopping cart parades, as a critique of 
capitalism and an indictment the violence enacted towards the poor (Mosher 2010). The 
cart migrations became the mobile discursive site for “good old fashioned” politicking. 
According to Tafari and later Ibrahim Mubarak, another founder of the village, the media 
loved the image of the homeless frontiersmen, defiant in the face of oppression, standing 
up for their rights because it made sense in Oregon. I argued earlier that Oregon has a 
history of rough camping and sleeping owing to its rugged terrain, the resource economy 
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and the history of hobos and adventurers in local folklore.   Even the police recognized 
the group was involved in complex constitutional matters of “redress of grievance and 
deferred the political issue to the local political authority” (NCH 2010:11). The position 
of the police, the romantic nostalgia of the activists’ links with a very simple argument 
steeped in local history, the use of signs, placards, t-shirts, and news media, were specific 
conditions that served the emerging claim.  Recall Boltanski’s suggestion that the more 
presence a critique has the more likely it is to succeed, or Latour, telling us to give 
agency to the things in our assemblages.  
 One of the most impactful conditions, however, was that the claim emerged 
within a symbolic imaginary that had room for alternative notions about space.   Portland 
itself is rather unique for despite the wealthy and the conservative elements of the 
population, it fosters a variety of environmentally friendly and community oriented 
groups such as, “City Repair,”  “The Village Building Convergence,”41 Columbia Eco 
Village42 and other alternative housing groups that lend credence to the self-housing 
actions of the very poor.   
 Starting in 1996, City Repair43 has inspired many Portland neighbourhoods to 
claim their community streets and to occupy them with their own interpretation of safety 
and utility, converting unused lots into parks and play grounds, closing intersections with 
creative sculpted and painted installations that slowed or inhibited vehicles to produce 
safety zones for children. Embedded in this movement was a desire to provide an 
ideological, behavioral and experiential buffer between the urban complex and the 
peaceful community; these zones represent thresholds between the two vectors of city 
space, as means of creating a safe liminal passage from one to the other; cars are forced 
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to slow or not enter; people are offered free tea from communal tea stands that stand 
unattended, wild flowers and interactive sculptures invite passersby to take  a break and 
relax - you can pick a flower if you want.  These are heterotopias, if you want to look at 
those features; the painted sidewalks, the free tea, the no car zone despite being built on 
an intersection. These places are once again, legalized, so they are not outside of the 
purview of the state.  Portland City Council passed ordinance #172207, an “Intersection 
Repair” ordinance, allowing neighborhoods to develop public gathering places in certain 
street intersections in 2000. In such places, such as the one I visited in 2011, there are 
passive solar greenhouses, rain recycling systems that conserve water, completely organic 
composting – in fact neighbours are encouraged to bring their organic waste to the site – 
neighbours dress up in costumes, children play out fantasies, people share resources and 
help each other out.  In understanding these spaces as thresholds between urban and 
communitarian values, one must appreciate that they are as Van Gennep (1908) 
suggested, symbolic of rites of actual passage, that is in a territorial sense; they are 
markers and liminal spaces that define and separate the activities of city governance and 
ludic activity from one area to another.  In this sense, the annual ten-day VBC celebration 
and festival ritualizes the liminal mental space of alternatives to urban space.   
 Recall that Turner (1964) offers a second critical mental space for human social 
relations that occurs in rituals and festivals and affords access to and expression of 
critiques of extant processes, a ritualized liminal space called communitas. Since society 
is constantly in a state of becoming, he would argue, its moving forward intact, in a 
structural sense, required places for the periodic playing out of shifting categories of 
experience.44  Turner sees beings in this ludic, second model, communitas, as apolitical, 
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or at best, ineffective politically since the purpose or function of communitas is to 
provide this cohesion through often festive and not insurgent events.  And so at this 
important juncture, it is not reasonable to understand these places as evidence of 
communitas, even as they are evidence of a certain symbolic and ludic frivolity being 
managed through spatial practice. These were (are) evidence or manifestations of the 
political actions of communities out of which city ordinances were challenged and 
changed; they in fact are politically motivating for actors, and effective in changing 
extant practices in a permanent and symbolic sense.  The alteration of city space for 
grassroots and permanent uses is common to Portland. 
 By 2000, the VBC had emerged as an ongoing competitive urban imaginary and 
as a ten-day festival celebration of these alternatives, so the VBC is heterotopic in the 
classic sense. These zones, are regarded hence, as symbolic and functional representation 
of this alternative way of approaching community. In general between 1996 and 2000, 
the idea that urban space, was public space and its use could be interpreted in myriad 
ways by local groups had won over the city council and in January of 2000, the city 
passed an ordinance allowing neighbourhoods to interpret these spaces for themselves.  
In many ways it was the manipulation of symbolic imagining of the use of space that 
preconditioned the representational possibilities of Dignity Village.  
 In 2000 Dignity Village amounted to little more than a few dozen tents under a 
bridge in downtown Portland. In the process of  successfully claiming urban space, they 
used a variety of tactics including occupations of city spaces, media events, press 
coverage and appeals to constitutional law.  While the right to make a claim for an 
emergency camp ultimately came to be understood as legitimate, the spatialization of the 
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claim at that time, occupation of the land under the bridge in the city, was deemed illegal, 
because it was on state land, not municipal property, and the state itself provided no 
inclusion of campgrounds within its legal code – the state code afforded cities the right to 
emergency camps, but only on city land.  Furthermore, the occupation had grown in size, 
was no longer festive or communitarian in spirit like the VBC properties, and most 
importantly was presented to the public by opponents as a threatening and unstable 
liminal (in this case as inter-structural, even anti-structural) population. As with all power 
struggles, parties so engaged use the legal and other resources they have to effect a 
response in opponents and competitors.  In this case, the city used a 48 hour eviction 
order placed by the state on the camp, to force the campers to accept a proposed move to 
Sunderland Yard, a swept off municipal leaf composting facility near the airport, about 9 
miles from downtown.   
 While the city was bound by a state supreme court decision to provide for 
emergency campgrounds, it had the discretion to decide where on city property to allow 
such places.  While some of the city’s population supported the intentional community, 
there was still a large entrenched conservative element, especially developers of the city 
core, near the bridge occupation, who were solidly against homeless camps.   However, 
as Mosher (2010) points out, as the community gained support among the public, 
activists and other supporters, they gained power within the regional political structure.  
Mosher’s argument and the one I entertain in this dissertation, is that the involvement of 
the homeless, or perhaps of all exploited and underrepresented people under neoliberal 
governmentality, even in resistance, elucidates one’s place and role within the power 
structure and suggests the viability of choices one can make to redress the situation or to 
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make claims.   De Certeau has suggested such choices appear as tactics and strategies that 
are essential to making the ‘practice of everyday life” possible, even desirable (1984).45 
Always understood as a means to redress the domination of people by powerful interest 
groups and regimes, the practice of resistance amounts to a way to see one’s own 
performance in the shadow of these powerful strategies (ibid). And to me, this links the 
cause with pragmatic deliberations of actors. 
 Jim Francisconi, a wealthy Portlander and council member most vocally delivered 
opposition to the claim from within the council. 
You need professional help. That’s my opinion, you can agree or disagree. What if I had 
come to that camp in November or December? Now I could go, that could be or that 
could be my kids.  That’s never going to be me  - That’s never going to be my kids! 
Because I’ve got money! (The crowd of activists heckles)…”I’ve got assets,” he says 
over the noise. (Mosher 2010: DS DISC 1, part 1). 
 
Far from stemming the action, such vulgar acclamations galvanized support amongst the 
housing activists. As part of the claim process, local environmental activist Mark 
Lakeman, said, 
For these people their highest need has to do with not just shelter, but dignity. Who even 
knows what that really consists of when you don’t really know what its like not to have 
it?” (Mosher 2010 DS DISC 1, “Kwamba” at 00:18:24). 
 
 Claimants became critically aware of themselves and envisioned the action and 
the direction this might have taken.  This direction expressed in critical communicative 
action, takes fundamental values such as dignity and freedom, which are indescribable in 
themselves and gives them meaning in a transcendent context of critical action.  It is 
essential to remember that city governance plays a role in the outcome. Whereas 
Habermas (1971, 1987) had suggested that this transcendent communicative action 
employs a fairly stable vision of an ultimate truth onto an ethical debate about  the course 
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of moral action, there is some question about how this claim should have manifested, and 
the answer was clearly not understood by each party in the same way. Villagers wanted to 
stay put near the downtown world that was vital to them socially.    The city wanted to 
contain a hazardous liminal population and to find a place where their poverty could be 
managed without damaging other conventional values, such as the prosperity of the 
downtown core and urban redevelopment. The activists themselves were divided on what 
they would accept as a dignified response.   
  In the case of claims making by Dignity Village, there was little consensus about 
what dignity and freedom really meant amongst the homeless claims makers, nor the 
politicians who sat in their case.  Divisions within each group destabilized the force of 
resistance exerted by city councilors opposed to the village, and also threatened to 
weaken the village’s claim to be competent enough to be self-managed. Activists such as 
Mosher, and the homeless people who started the village, sought a structural reformation 
that saw “truly equal access to jobs and housing” as a result of the critical action, at least 
down the road (Mosher 2010: DS DISC, part 1 - “Kwamba” - various).  This did little to 
solidify divergent versions of the “truth” within the activist collective. 
 In open-air protests leading up to the settlement with the city, an Out of the 
Doorways spokesperson (recall that the hard core activists who started the Dignity 
movement were called the Housing Liberation Front,  HLF and then Out of the 
Doorways) said, 
Americans are willing to embrace the fact that racism is wrong, Americans are willing to 
embrace the fact that homophobia is wrong, that sexism is wrong – it’s time to embrace 
the fact that classism is wrong.  It’s discrimination. We will not stand for it. We will 
stand united and we will die with dignity. If you will try and sweep us I promise on my 
grave that there will be more tent cities, if you sweep us we will come back,  if you 
 438 
sweep us we will come back, and back and back (the crowd joins in and..) and back and 
back…”  
 
 It is difficult to understand what equality means in the context of the culture of 
chronically homeless that while pursuing freedom and equality, has been shown to be 
competitive, meritocratic and often riddled with physical and mental challenges not faced 
by the mainstream.46 If there is no observable truth, if reality is constantly shifting, how 
could communicative action ever be directed towards a stable notion of truth? While both 
groups claimed the right to democracy and freedoms guaranteed by state constitutional 
law, they differed on what ideal spatializations of these shared beliefs might entail.  
Ultimately this power struggle would play out in city council chambers, and within the 
internal structure of the activist movement. 
 At the city-council meeting in 2001 where the decision to place Dignity activists 
on a piece of city land was announced, the mayor said that the decision to try this 
intentional community was an appeal to the desire to, “provide a sense of place that we 
always talk about, and a sense of community to residents of our community that never 
experienced it before” (ibid). With the conditions of the claim understood, following 
Dean (1991) as an eventalization of the discursive normalization of a liminal space within 
poverty governance, the lives of Dignity Villagers and their stories are to be understood 
as expressions of this liminality in a culture of poverty peculiar to a certain neoliberal 
governmentality, that unites a sense of place with legitimacy within the broader 
community. In the 5 member city-council executive, a division had emerged between 
those who understood the claim as fundamental to the rights of all citizens to make 
shelter; that they were deserving on the basis of that basic citizenship to this right, and 
others who felt that the drugs, characterlogical defects and appearance of idleness 
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rendered them undeserving.  Beyond this basic debate, there was too the problem of scale 
and the willingness to adopt such a space to accommodate the vastly larger representation 
of chronically homeless people. Boltanski (2010) has suggested that in the justifications 
produced by coterminous worth economies or worlds  that tend to structure modern social 
life, there reside both the possibility for arguments to resolve or to append conflict.   The 
moral claim made by village activists on the grounds of a greater sense of dignity and 
justice, a greater good, one might say did not resonate well with the standard cost 
effective, deserving/undeserving arguments presented by some of the opponents. 
 In a city hall hearing to adjudicate the lease for Dignity Village on August, 30 
2001, Portland city commissioner, Jim Francisconi said: 
My own prior experience, which is not in the area of homelessness, but based on 
conversations with people I truly respect, based on some of the testimony here today, 
based on my own experience in community organizing – Folks! You need some 
professional help to crack the issue of homelessness ( someone heckles in the audience, a 
homeless spectator – and you can disagree with me, and that is fine, that is my belief, and 
I have that strong belief. So for the reasons, and the last one let me tell you, just the 
practicalities - we have such a homeless issue in this city – we’re talking about 60 people. 
So are we providing campsites for 2000 people?  We’re not folks.  It isn’t going to 
happen.  
 
 Portland city commissioner Dan Saltzman echoed the sentiment: 
 
I am not prepared to accept the idea of camping as a permanent element of our homeless 
shelter system. We need housing. We need roofs over people’s heads, and while I think 
that a particular constellation of people have aligned themselves with Dignity Village -
you’ve sort of enamored a lot of people…and it may work… for Dignity Village. But I 
am not prepared to take the next step and say the next camp that comes along no matter 
how well organized should become a permanent fixture of the system. That is to me, not 





Fig 20. Mitch, Samson and the “barking” dog. July 2011. The Look of Liminality.  
(E. Weissman). 
   
Other members of the council, buoyed by the positive spin in some of the Press and by 
the support of local politicians and religious groups, took another path. A year after it 
opened, Erik Sten, Portland City Commissioner, (interviewed in 2002 for Doorways to 
Dignity, Mosher 2010 - DS DISC 1) said of the emergence of Dignity Village, 
 
 “It’s a hundred percent driven by the individuals that made it happen.. and to my opinion, 
zero percent driven by the city…You can say we did a little to make it possible: probably 
better, you can say, “we didn’t stop it”… is a better description of what we did.”    
 
Later he added: 
“We have an immense amount of activists, in this community who have supported 
Dignity Village.  There’s a lot of churches, individuals, businesses that have been helping 
Dignity for years …and then we tend to have, you know,  very independent activists – the 
people who live at Dignity Village, I mean, so I don’t know if its unique for Portland, but 
I mean,  you’ve got  a tolerant government, you know, we’re a supportive government,  a 
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very active community that was willing to lend a hand, and then you’ve got the right kind 
of activists. And those seem to me to be the three things that have to be in place. And I 
don’t think those things are unique to Portland, but if you were lacking any one of those 
three things, I don’t think Dignity would have survived - without all the volunteer support 
it got; obviously the people drove it and if the city wanted to shut it down,  we would of. I 
mean, yeah, it would get some bad press for two or three days, but it would be over.” 
(From, Mosher, H. 2011 Doorways to Dignity”). 
 
   In the case of the Village, Boltanski would say that a “compromise” was reached 
that bridged two worlds, one I am trying to develop as the emerging liminal world of 
homeless activists and the other a political world of governance. However, he would also 
argue that compromises are rarely as powerful as the principles that comprise them, and 
often lead to conflict down the road as they unravel and their contradictions become 
apparent. The point behind a pragmatic and critical ethnography is to make these 
contradictions apparent, but also to unravel existing knowledge so as to understand ways 
out of the aporia such contradictions represent.  
 One such aporia appeared even before the official site was settled.  The 
impossibility of transcendental and stable truths is the aporia that lies at the heart of their 
deconstruction. The hard core activists from Out of the Doorways, “the homeless front” 
(or HLF) who were the original movers in this claim processes, rejected the city’s offer, 
which they recognized correctly as a sort of coopting of the claim within the power of the 
city.   It was an emotional split. People who had been battling for years on the streets for 
the right to land on which to build a community became divided on the very issue that 
united them.  In seeking the sanction of the city, some activists had invited the 
rationalization techniques of housing and urban governance to dictate some of the terms; 
at least in so far as the space of the settlement was concerned.  HLF radicals recognized 
the impossibility of being truly self-determined or self-governing if the ultimate authority 
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over village life was the city through its codes, inspectors and laws. They fragmented 
from the larger collective action and occupied a field near downtown, called 
affectionately at the time, Field of Dreams (comments by Jack Tafari, from Mosher 2010: 
DS DISC 1, “Kwamba” at 00:19:00).  In short order, even dreams fade; they were evicted 
and scattered to the streets again. For them, understanding the claim meant understanding 
that the right of the individual to pursue their freedom was the essence of dignity and no 
other body or institution should have a say in that definition or where that freedom should 
take place, literally understood as the space of freedom; they felt freedom and dignity 
meant the right to choose where and how to live.   It was not a question of democracy, 
they skipped right past the yet to come and were looking for an altogether other type of 
government. 
 They were the radical faction, even if the conventional Portlanders saw the whole 
group as one big problem. Another way of seeing this process is that freedom and rights 
deconstructed as they were in the compromise led to a discursive and moral split between 
the hard core activists, who embraced the aporietic value of freedom as a chance to 
embrace a new model of community, and the other activists whose idea of freedom meant 
the chance to regain their vision of the American dream, by being housed again and 
participating in democracy, because they understood democracy to mean freedom.   They 
understood freedom as an attachment to the right to pursue your dreams and to have 
stable housing – they wanted a base on which to live and from which to carry the rights to 
housing for other homeless people.  It is in this sense that I have always found resistance 
to these communities troubling because at the heart of this action is the desire to conform, 
not to reject conventional attitudes and principles.  The villagers who built the village and 
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continue to live there, want to embrace the law, not because the law is just, but because 
their claims are just because there is law (Derrida 1996). This less radical group led by 
Tafari and Ibrahim Mubarak, went along with the city proposal to relocate the  protesters 
to a site of the city’s choosing because, after all is said and done, people die on the streets 
more easily than under shelter. And that was Dignity Village; 9401 NE Sunderland Ave. 
Portland, next to a prison, a composting facility and an airport. 
 Hence, the proviso by Saltzman is noteworthy, as more than a footnote to the 
scenario.  The proviso that no other camps be investigated made the claim more precious 
and rare, and compelled those who were offered a chance to live there, a sense of urgency 
to comply with the city, since, there was this proviso that symbolized the city’s ultimate 
authority over the claim.  It is noteworthy as well, since it laid a certain precondition as 
part of the compromise that limited the actions of activists from Dignity Village who 
were fighting for the village and for new camps in 2010-2011 when I was there. Much as 
the movement by VBC and other members of the “constellation” around Dignity had 
conditioned its possibility in 2000, this proviso by Saltzman, that no further camps should 
be allowed, echoes within current debates about the rights of homeless activists who 
struggle to open camps in Portland in the age of Housing First models announced first by 
Bush in 2003, and reiterated with changes by the Obama administration.  It is in the 
debate between the city of Portland and Right to Dream 2, and it is implicit in the 
negotiations that other cities are making with current activists. They want to support the 
experimentation because it looks like they are being progressive, but they are doubtful of 
long-term or widespread benefits. There is some understanding too, that the growing 
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privatized supportive housing model had some ground to lose, should these alternatives 
become widely sanctioned.    
 In 2001, part of the compromise that is proving difficult for the village today, was 
the decision made within council to move the camp out of the city core, away from the 
view of good citizens, a move that gave the appearance of supporting the representational 
claim on space, but in reality was designed to limit the functionality of the activists by 
removing them from social supports and to limit their purview to a critical gentry in 
downtown. They had been moved seven times previously.  Accepting this ‘temporary-
permanent’ site as a compromise for the city’s legal recognition of their claim to space, 
60 people, the maximum number allowed on the land, moved to Sunderland yard.  The 
first city-sanctioned, legal homeless community in the US, since the Great Depression, 
was in place. The city was doing something to be reasonable and law-abiding, but it was 
in no way ready to embrace the model as a permanent or featured spatialization of 
housing strategies. 
  I want to explain one more important facet that contributes to the analytics of 
space that conditions life in the present (2012-13) Dignity Village. The first decade of the 
21st century was the decade of ten year plans to end homelessness. When George Bush 
became President in 2000, homelessness had come to be understood as pervasive and of 
myriad kinds. Among these, the problem of chronic homelessness, associated with street 
persons, and often with the undeserving poor, had come to be understood as the most 
troublesome and expensive form of homelessness.47  The National Alliance to End 
Homelessness, which had grown from a group of 2000 or so community based providers 
to over 10,000, promoted the idea of a ten year plan to end homelessness in 2000.48 The 
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director of HUD, looked at this initiative favorably, and in Bush’s 2003 Budget, the plan 
was officially sanctioned and embraced as a major policy directive to encourage local 
communities and municipalities to find creative ways of addressing homelessness, 
especially chronic homelessness, and to end it, finally.  
  Under the new directive by Bush, USICH was re-endowed with significant 
discretionary power in allotting funds and incentives based on their adjudication of local 
ten year plans.  Part of the plan was to encourage a better structural arrangement between 
different agencies.  Hence, ten year plans appear in the form of federal, state, county and 
municipal packages, each of which defines a certain level of potential HUD funding and 
other incentives.  By 2005, 50 of 54 states had adopted the plans.  Close to 40 million 
dollars were slated for the new programs, while HUD financing of other homelessness 
projects remained at close to 1.3 billion dollars.   USICH encouraged the participation of 
many groups in the process of developing these plans. These include, municipal/agency 
heads, charitable foundations, non-profits, hospital administrators, chronically homeless 
persons, the general public, developers and industry specialists and researchers. Since the 
turn of the millennium then, a sense that some of the worst off homeless were deserving 
of assistance appears to have been important to governments at all levels.  One must ask, 
how far this recognition really went?  In the simple mathematical sense, the United States 
has enough money to build the 250, 000 to 400,000 units of new housing (including 
family dwellings) that it is conservatively argued the US requires to satisfy the National 
need. 49  Unfortunately, it has not reached its goals. Within the context of local 
governments struggling to manage growing populations of homeless persons, a variety of 
institutional models play off against one another.   
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 In the mid 2000’s, Pathways to Home, understood commonly as  Housing First 
stood off against treatment based continuum of care practices.  With less than 50 million 
dollars available nationwide for inventive plans to help the chronically homeless, cities 
such as Portland were unlikely to resolve the problem of chronic street engaged 
homelessness through government funding or official housing models.   The housing 
strategies under various neoliberal regimes, therefore, identify a problem, chronic 
homelessness, amongst various other types, and suggest the implementation of policies 
interpreted and executed at local levels in order to be effective. However, Leginski 
(2007) points out that despite such goals, a diverse and decentralized system existed 
whereby the competitive framing of granting programs, tended to perpetuate the 
disjointed efforts of myriad service providers and it is within this “de facto” system of 
service and programs that current efforts and programs are invigilated.   There was so 
much overlap, repetition and competition between different models of housing strategy, 
that while cities scrambled to design and implement ten-year plans in order to avail 
themselves of HUD and USICH dollars, the next wave of new poor cast into the streets 
by the 2007-2008 recession, proved once again that homelessness was at its simplest 
most symptomatic expression, a problem with space; that is, cities did not provide 
adequate space for poor people to live.  They needed affordable housing.  
 Since HUD distributes funds on a competitive basis between jurisdictions, the 
articulation of ten-year plans is vital to getting money, and seeks standardization across 
the various service providers.  As a self-governing and incalculable resource, 
shantytowns have not been included in any of these ten-year plans.  Yet, the city of 
Portland is to be commended for allowing this experimentation with space.  When we 
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review the language of the contract in the next section, we will see how this 
experimentation has always been controlled by the city and mitigated by the logical 
tensions inherent to democracy. 
 While Dignity Village was being built out on Sunderland yard between 2002 – 
2004, municipalities in Oregon were studying the ten-year plan model.  The first of these 
studies was published in 2004 (PHA(B) 2004). In 2006, Oregon’s first ten-year plan 
deliberations created The Ending Homelessness Advisory Council or EHAC, to inform 
and implement measures  included in the ten year plan (Exec Order: 06-05).  EHAC’s 
2009 report on the first year of implementation (2008) showed that homelessness in 
Oregon had increased by 37% over the year previous.  This was blamed on the economic 
crisis, foreclosures and other economy related malfunctions. EHAC reported that Oregon 
had the highest number of homelessness per capita in the nation between 2008-9.   More 
than 17,000 people, 43% of whom were in families with children, of whom more than 
4300 were younger than 18 (ibid).   The number of veterans in homelessness had doubled. 
59% of the households enumerated had family members suffering from mental health or 
addiction issues. The report is somewhat vague, but it claims that despite these horrifying 
numbers, it had managed to create 200 units of permanent supportive housing and to have 
preserved housing for very low-income earners though no number is offered. Framed as 
“progress” in the direction of solving homelessness, these measures are touted as 
evidence of the capacity to “end and prevent the cycle of homelessness affecting families, 
children and youth, and single adults” (Oregon, EHAC 2009:3). This result was laughed 
at when I showed it to the members of the village.  One villager said, “Well then, they 
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only need to provide 16, 800 or so more spaces. I guess.  At this rate. Let’s see, that’ll be 
17,000 divided by 200… well you see where I am going with this” (David Samson 2012). 
 
6.6 An Analytics of Government 
 In this section I am going to look at how Dean’s (1999, 2010) analytics of 
government addresses the “how” questions posed by governmentality studies. I am going 
to show you some of the many pages that accompanied the “claim,” or rather that 
encoded the claim into the language of conventional governance.  Some of the dates are 
askew of actual events as items were dated retroactively and inaccurately.  The forms 
themselves were difficult to reproduce, and so they contain unusual typos and glitches 
that I could not control. The point behind this section is to show that at least from the 
point of view of those who govern, governmentality is a desirable state of affairs.   Just as 
the village is governed by rules and codes, villagers are required to act according to the 
self-directed governing principles of the village.  Much of what is written is idealistic and 
never happens, nor did it ever happen.  The problem with governmentality studies, such 
as Dean’s analytics and also with Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology, is that they each use 
such codes and manuals as guides from which rational results are expected to occur or by 
which the failure of consignees is measured.  I argue that even as the documents tied the 
critique that led to the village to extant regimes of power, the codes themselves are 
merely rituals of this broader agreement. They are rarely enforced, but serve as a sacred if 
not ultimate authority over the village that establishes their ultimate domination. They are 
witness to democracy’s sovereign, in this case the city over the village, and the village 
council over its peers.    The implication of this is that to rest itself of this encapsulation, 
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the village needs to push back – to find ways of putting pressure on the city so that the 
village can achieve some of the stated goals that require the city’s help, but which have 
never been provided.  This latter problem is the focus of the conclusion of this chapter. 
So here I start by showing some of the documentation and then suggesting how they 
might be understood within an analytics of government.  
 In his two versions of Governmentality, Power and Rule in Modern Society, (1999, 
2010) Mitchell Dean introduces a formal analytics of power in order to bridge the gap 
between Foucault and methods.  “An analytics of government thus views practices of 
government in their complex and variable relations to the different ways in which ‘truth’ 
is produced in social, cultural and political practices” (Dean 2010:27).  The implications 
of this for understanding how actors act is that action is a reflection of governing; we do 
things according to what we take to be true of ourselves, and about whom we are, about 
who are others and what areas of the our world need improvement.50 
 The first step in an analytics of government is to identify the specific conditions 
under which the activity of governing becomes called into question.  “Problematizations” 
of this nature are relatively rare (39), and are circumstance specific.  So it is necessary to 
avoid looking at broad or global expressions of the “ same” problem.   An analytics of 
government looks at very specific situations where the “conduct of conduct” becomes 
difficult.  The problematization often unites both the governor and the governed in 
questions about how each conducts itself.  Hence, the Village Intake Committee (VIC). 




Fig. 21.     AGREEMENT FOR 
SERVICES CONTRACT NO. 5 3 0 1 5 
This Agreement is between the City of Portland, acting by and through the 
City Council, (the City), and Dignity Village, an Oregon non-profit 
corporation (the Contractor). 
RECITALS: 
1. Homelessness is an ongoing national dilemma with an estimated three 
million people sleeping outside at some time during any given year. Portland's 
publicly funded year round homeless shelters have permanent waiting lists. 
Due to limited shelter space and a lack of affordable housing, many people in 
Portland have no practical alternative to homelessness. Despite on-going 
January. 2007, a study of the homeless within Portland counted over 1400 
homeless people in Portland sleeping outside on one night. 
2.  In Resolution No. 36200, passed February 26, 2004, the Portland City 
Council designated a specific portion of property owned by the City, 
commonly known as Sunderland Recycling Facility, located at 9325 NE 
Sunderland Road, Tax Lot 100 1N1E12B (Tax Account R-315196), as a 
campground under the terms of ORS 446.265 (the "Designated 
Campground"). The intent of the City of Portland in contracting with Dignity 
Village is for the contractor to provide temporary housing for otherwise 
homeless individuals and to help its temporary residents find permanent 
housing. 
3. Dignity Village is incorporated in Oregon as a non-profit corporation. 
Dignity Village has independently developed a proposal to provide an 
alternative to sleeping outside for the homeless within Portland. Local 
religious organizations, schools, philanthropists, architects, and others have 
combined to help Dignity Village develop a community approach to 
addressing homelessness. Due to on-going shortages of adequate shelter 
space and affordable permanent housing, the transitional housing 
accommodations provided by Dignity Village would be used by persons who 
lack permanent shelter, and who have not been placed into low-income 
housing. 
4. The model for Dignity Village functions upon a· democratically 
elected governance model for the administration of day-to-day operations 
and regulation. Dignity Village strives to generally provide some group 
services such as a kitchen, bathrooms and community telephones. Dignity 
Village, with the assistance of donated materials, equipment and labor, 
builds transitional housing structures that are capable of being transported 
from location to location. Dignity Village is the owner of these structures. 
Representatives from Dignity Village, including architects, have worked 
with the Bureau of Development Services in developing plans for 
transitional housing structures 
that will comply with the requirements of ORS 446.265. Dignity Village 
provides residents with job 
training opportunities, continuing education opportunities, healthcare, and 
access to housing placement assistance and a supportive environment in 
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which homeless people are able to address the issues that led to them 
becoming homeless. 
5. The City of Portland desires to have someone serve as manager for 
the Designated Campground. Dignity Village is willing to provide this 
management service as a steward of the property. Dignity Village will 
provide a unique and coordinated services program developed by Dignity 
Village. There is no other potential provider of the services with the 
experience, expertise, 
 
 By 2002, Dignity Village was under a construction boom, and proving itself 
capable of growth and government. While the village abandoned any grandiose 
community structural goals such as the large archway and the decorative flower gardens 
that the VBC had envisioned for them, they were organizing and building and creating a 
physical and social community. They had no permanent contract yet, but they were 
complying with codes and local laws, and defending themselves against opposition in the 
Oregonian Newspaper and most importantly their articles of incorporation were 
commensurate with the original operating agreement they had with the city. Between 
2002 and 2005,  the village’s reputation grew widely and globally.  Their list of 
supporters grew, including local business people, religious orders and scores of 
Portlanders who came to the village to build, paint and purchase recycled donations.   
The following item from the village is the intake committee’s mandate. This is a 
document that lists the obligations and duties of a small group of village residents who 
will adjudicate who gets into the village or not.  This is not like getting into a condo. The 
opposite of not getting into the village is a return to the streets. So the stakes are 
considerably higher, and in that sense the role of VIC is more important to social justice, 
than a condo board.  Being on the committee gives one considerable power and influence 
in the village and it often places committee members in heated arguments with other 
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villagers.  Often these are over whom to let in or not. I was surprised by how homeless 
people, villagers that is, would say anything to anyone to get in the way of another 
homeless person getting into the village, but they did it frequently.  Villagers had in mind 
what the ideal villager-neighbor looked like, how they would act, and what they would 
bring to the village.  This intake process is the would-be villagers first experience with 
the village governmentality. 
Fig. 22.  Sample of  Village Intake Committee codes, Dignity Village. 
The purpose of the Village Intake Committee (VIC)- is to review 
potential residents, to see if the Village can  fit an individual in 
questions needs or if they may, perhaps, be better served by other 
options. VIC also works to meld individuals in question to the 
general  planning needs and mission statement of Dignity Village 
Inc., as well as to assign  and coordinate space allotment and 
monitor new additions to Dignity Village Inc., for a period of 30 
days. 
 
VIC is a formally recognized  standing 
committee of Dignity Village, Inc., that  comes 
under the auspices of the Secretary of the 
Board of Dignity Village. The committee shall  
consist of not less than 4 or more than 7 
Villagers. All such Villagers shall  be 
members in good standing for not less than 
90 days. 
 
The Chairman of the Board shall  appoint the 
Chairman of the VIC committee the  first two 
weeks after his/her election and work with the 
Chairman of VIC to appoint the balance of the 
committee. This committee shall need to be 
ratified  by the Council  of Dignity Village. In 
the event new members  are needed or existing 
members either drop out or are not fulfilling 
their obligations, all additional members shall 
be voted on to the committee by the existing 
members, presented to the Council, and ratified 
at that  time.  If the VIC committee  feels that 
one of its members is not fulfilling his/her 
obligations to the rest of the committee they 
 453 
may decide to remove that  person or persons by 
a majority vote of the committee. No one person 
shall  have more input or 'power" than any 
other member of the committee 
E). Inspector...shall faithfully attend  all weekly held VIC 
meetings to the best of their  abilities 
 
Inspect  all structures before and after all individual's leave 
and provide a written report to the VIC committee. A copy of 
this report is to go to the Secretary of Dignity Village Inc. for 
their  personal  file, and a copy to the Secretary of the VIC 
committee. 
 
Identify and inventory all property  left behind  by former 
residents and guests, as well as protecting and coordinating 
its storage on an extremely short-term basis on '4t. The 
Inspector will ensure that all property is removed within 30 
days of a written statement being issued not less than 14 days 
unless an individual in question contacts the Inspector or 
any member of the VIC Committee. A list of inventory shall  be 
kept in the individual's personal  file and a copy with the 
Secretary of VIC. 
 
 
 The second priority is to examine as best as one might, all the conditions of 
possibility for a regime of practice of government.  For understanding of the government 
of homeless persons this might include: income support, housing programs, rehabilitation 
programs, food banks, training programs, health and welfare organizations, experts, data 
collection by the state, debates amongst policy makers, laws and regulations, and many 
more.  The problematization requires going beyond merely listing all the ‘actors’ and all 
the programs.  “It is an attempt to understand how (such things) has to be thought” (39).  
Of special interest is how for example, political parties, ideological groups and activist 
organizations, bundle elements of such things into policy, or into “mission statements,” 
that is; how a set of guiding principles can come to be associated with a particular party, 
interest group, and indeed within an individual subject. 
 This is an excerpt from the mission statement and proposal from 2001.  This is 
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just one of 20 plus pages of how it ought to be thought.  (Fig. 23.) 
OVERVIEW: OUR VISION FOR DIGNITY VILLAGE 
 
At a May 16, 2001 meeting with staff from City Commissioner Eric Sten's office and the Bureau of 
Housing and Community Development, Dignity Village representatives presented a letter of concern 
to City Co. missioner Eric Sten about their current situation In response, city officials asked the 
Dignity contingent to assemble a comprehensive outline for "taking Dignity to its next level of 
development." This is a working document prepared in response to that request, developed over 
several weeks, which will continue to be further developed over time. We feel the innovative 
collaboration outlined here represents a truly win/win strategy that, given a chance, will provide 
important benefits both to homeless residents and to the City of Portland. 
 
Dignity Village has evolved and thrived over the past 6 months due in large part to its uniquely 
organic process. In this manner, we have efficiently implemented programs (such as the self-
management structure and cooperative farm) that more rigid organizations might have taken years to 
get off the ground. This creative energy, motivated by basic human needs for shelter, food and water, 
is a key ingredient to our success thus far. As we plan for the future, it is imperative to retain this 
organic organizational dynamic, in order to insure that such creativity is allowed to flourish into the 
future. 
 
Any organization - including Dignity Village - requires a structure, a clear vision, and detailed plans in 
order to navigate confidently into the future. This proposal assembles the shared ideas and dreams of 
our current residents and supporters into an organized planning document. In preparing this document, 
particular attention is given to addressing the kinds of "due diligence" issues that the City of Portland 
routinely poses to emerging organizations or new programs. Beyond such basic threshold 
requirements, however, this also provides narrative, site design, architectural, social and 
organizational components reflecting what Dignity Village has already achieved and can become in 
the future. 
 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE DIGNITY MODEL 
 
Why Dignity Village Works: 
 
A self-governed tent-village model has a number of advantages for everyone, particularly for 
homeless people, but also for taxpayers and businesses. In Portland, unless and until a homeless 
person becomes conventionally housed, there are basically only two options: (1) stay at a relatively 
conventional shelter (with curfews, early a.m. wakeups, close quarters, lack of privacy, lack of 
provisions for pets or couples to stay together, etc.), or (2) push a shopping cart around with your 
belongings all day and sleep in doorways or under 
bridges at night to be subject to harassment by police or be victimized by street thugs. To 
many homeless people, for whatever reasons, neither of these options is experienced as very attractive 
or helpful. 
 
An urban tented village offers a third alternative that is preferable to many homeless people 
and is beneficial for the broader community as well, offering the following advantages: 
Villagers gain a sense of community and human connection 
Villagers enjoy a much safer environment, especially women, older people and people 
with disabilities or special needs 
Villagers are able to form stable affinity groups and longer-term relationships 
Villagers get to have pets 
Villagers gain the ability to cohabitate with spouses or intimate partners 
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Villagers find a sense of place, privacy, and personal space 
Villagers recover from institutional dependency 
Villagers enjoy a community-supported sanctuary from being criminalized due to very low 
economic status 
Villagers work together to maintain a drug and alcohol free environment 
Villagers use their skills, are enterprising and industrious 
Villagers develop communication and leadership skills through involvement in the 
Village’s self-governance 
Business owners find less homeless people (not to mention their leavings) in their 
doorways 
Taxpayers sleep better nights knowing that a very cost-effective and humane strategy for 
addressing homelessness was at least given a reasonable chance to prove itself, without 
being shut down prematurely by public officials 
Even the police benefit by getting some positive press for a change, by cooperating with 
Village security to maintain a safe site 
Precedents: Seattle and Los Angeles: 
 
The Dignity Village model is not without precedent. On the West Coast alone, at least two other 
tent cities have moved to more advanced stages of development( DV 2001- as of 203 both are 
gone.). 
 
 Dean suggests that a an analytics of government stands out from other theories of 
government by paying less attention to questions such as; “who” governs, on what 
legitimate grounds, and what form does that rule manifest? Rather an analytics is 
conditioned by a desire to understand how unique locales, authorities and actors are 
constructed, and interrelated, and how governable domains are constructed and 
administered. (40).  It is essentially an ethnographic approach, in the sense of writing 
culture. An analytics of power benefits from the destabilization of the locus of power at 
the apex of political and civic relationships, and therefore anticipates the shifting, 
rhizomatic and unpredictable actual networks, connections and assemblages that unite 
regimes of practice and subjects in social and material ways.  The articles of 
incorporation and the mission statement of the village, the contract from the city and 
various legal notices between both parties, provide a mapping of the ideas and the 
agencies responsible for negotiating their outcome.   In effect, Dean suggests, an 
analytics asks, “what happens” when we are governed or govern? What does it look like 
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when we try to imagine the relations of influence and tension that governing produces? 
The question of how agents with particular abilities and identities are formed, leads one 
to ask, how practices and techniques, rationalities and knowledge contribute to 
governing.51 
 Within an analytics of government, there are four basic dimensions to the “how 
questions.” The first element of this suggests looking at how regimes of practice encode 
and visualize the tasks and subjects of their tasks.  I argue that these are best understood 
as the housing policies and ten-year plans that currently shape the dominant strategies.  In 
Dignity Village, this includes such artifacts as, conceptual planning drawings, flow charts, 
blueprints, contracts, which are ways of visualizing the “fields” to be managed, making it 
possible to see “who and what is to be governed”(41).52  
(Sample of original city contract with Dignity Village – Note that transitional and a time 
frame are not specified in the early contract.  (Fig. 24) 
I. Scope of Services 
 The Subrecipient shall provide the following services: 
 
1. Transitional campground 
Subrecipient shall provide management services for the Designated Campground at 
Sunderland Recycling Facility. 
 
Subrecipient will, under the Agreement, have authority to administer, manage, and operate the 
Designated Campground, and to control the use, maintenance, services or other matters 
relating to the Designated Campground, subject to the provisions and limitations of the 
Agreement. Specifically, Subrecipient shall: 
2. Operate the campground for the specific and sole purpose of providing temporary shelter to 
persons who cannot locate safe, decent affordable permanent housing and are otherwise homeless.  
3. To the extent practicable, assist residents of the campground with locating and transitioning to safe, 
decent, affordable permanent housing. Assistance shall include, but not be limited to, permitting 
access to the campground by programs that assist homeless persons with locating and accessing 
permanent affordable housing.  
4. Accommodate up to 60 persons for short-term emergency housing with sleeping areas, adjoining 
bathrooms, showers, kitchen, computer room and a separate but adjoining lounge area.  
5. Adopt reasonable and low-barrier admission criteria. Subrecipient will provide a current copy of 
these criteria to the City Contract Manager.  
6. Keep the Designated Campground open at all reasonable times to:  
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7. On-going, routine and frequent site visits by the Portland Fire Bureau and the Bureau of 
Development Services. These Bureaus will use Exhibit C in their evaluation; 
8. Site visits by the Portland Police Bureau;  
9. Entry onto the site by the City’s Bureau of Maintenance for on-going, routine and frequent 
maintenance of the City’s infrastructure at the site.  Subrecipient will cooperate with these bureaus’ 
in their performance of these duties. 
10. Maintain the Designated Campground in a safe and sanitary condition, including providing routine 
and on-going cleaning of the grounds after any pets and undertaking all necessary repairs and 
maintenance. All maintenance … 
 
 From the perspective of government, visualizing and mapping a field are 
connected practices  (Dean 20120:41);  clinical medial practices visualize the body as the 
site of a disease model for addictions; it is healthcare services that isolate the infected, the 
street homeless, the junkies, in political and special spaces by discerning who they are 
and keeping track of their whereabouts (41). Hence a key component of governmentality 
studies are to discern the way objects of governance are imagined, visualized as good, 
bad, deserving or undeserving and placed within the strategies of government. In this 
sense, we need to understand how the spatialization of the village represents power 
values that are part of the rational practices of government. The following excerpt from 
the original contract indicates some of these concerns (Fig 25):  
1. Minors shall not be allowed to remain as residents at the Designated Campground, but minors may 
enter as guests for periods of not longer than twelve (12) hours and 
a. Minor children must be supervised at all times by a designated parent/guardian or 
caregiver. 
b. If minor children are staying with parent/guardian, there may be no other guests staying 
within the household’s structure when children are present 
c. Parents/guardians must show proof of guardianship (i.e. this does not apply to “street 
families”) 
d. Dignity Village will ensure that there is a current background check on designated 
parent/guardian or caregiver. 
e. Minor children may not stay with parent/guardian for more than 3 nights within a 30 day 
period (month to month) 
f. Parent/guardian and caregiver must be members in good standing for 90 days. 
1. Dignity Village may impose additional rules and requirements that are 
not within the scope of the Management Agreement with the City of 
Portland. 
ii. All residents shall be given on-going training on fire safety, with assistance from 
the Portland Fire Marshall’s Office. At least twice yearly, Subrecipient shall 
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hold a fire drill in which all residents will participate. Upon request, 
Subrecipient must display proof of twice yearly fire drills. New residents shall 
be given a fire safety orientation as they arrive.    
2. Subrecipient shall immediately notify the Bureau of Transportation of any unsafe or threatening 
person or situation at the campground that could potentially harm the Sunderland Recycling 
Facility’s property, operation, employees or visitors. In such instances, Subrecipient shall call the 
Bureau’s Maintenance Dispatch Center at 503-823-1700, or such other phone number as the 
bureau may later designate. 
  
   A second element concerns the technical aspect of government (42). Dean refers 
to this as the techne. This requires looking at “the mechanisms, procedures, instruments, 
tactics, techniques, technologies, and vocabularies” that constitute the authority and the 
means by which rule is achieved (42).  Here is  the first page of the Articles of 
Incorporation (Fig 26). 
 Articles of Incorporation 
NONPROFIT ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION  
OF DIGNITY VILLAGE, INC. 
 
The undersigned natural persons of the age of eighteen years or more, acting as an Incorporate under 
the Oregon Nonprofit Corporation Law, adopt the following Articles of Incorporation: 
The name of this corporation is Dignity Village, Inc. and its duration shall be perpetual. 
The purposes for which this Corporation is organized are exclusively charitable and educational and 
consist of the following: 
(A) The specific and primary purposes are: 
(1) To create a safe, clean, self-governed community environment for economically distressed residents of 
the State of Oregon, through establishment of an open-air place where people living on the streets can 
have their basic needs met in a stable, sanitary environment, until they are able to access another form of 
housing more in keeping with said resident's personal goals and 
aspirations. 
(2) To promote community wide interest and concern for homeless and other economically 
distressed residents of the State of Oregon, to the end that: 
 
(a) their quality of life may be improved,(b) their educational and economic opportunities may be 
improved, (c) sickness, poverty and crime may be lessened,(d) all constitutional and human rights of all 
people are respected and protected,(e) mutual interdependence of all people may be recognized, and(f) 
the mutual aid among, by and for poor people may be facilitated. 
  
 The third element is what he refers to as the episteme or the forms of knowledge 
that inform the activity of government (42).   In this, governmentality studies ask how 
truth is produced by the creation of knowledge by government.  The means by which 
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statistics contribute to measuring a distribution of populations, the debates between 
experts and politicians, all forms of rationalizing the conditions said to be true of given 
governable task or population relate to the episteme.  Such knowledge is concrete; it 
appears in graphs, maps, contracts, assessments and the like.  
 Newspaper articles, chat forums about poverty, public protests, research papers 
and self-reporting requirements from the village are ways that governance “understands” 
Dignity Village, and also how it comes to understand itself. It is also fixed in time - it is 
exists as a record of thought at a given time, and provides the link between “govern” and 
“mentality’ mentioned earlier; it produces the “hybrid’ governmentality. Below is an 
excerpt from the contract that indicates the reporting requirements of the village to the 
city.  Even though these records were rarely filled out adequately in the past, they reflect 
the obvious role the village plays in keeping tabs on Portland’s homeless.  Since the latest 
Assessment in 2010, the city has demanded these forms be filled out each month and 
submitted, reflecting the growing desire of the city to rationalize the effectiveness of the 
village within its informal strategies that might at some point append ten-year plans to 
end homelessness, or to use the data to close it down at some point.  The fear amongst 
village leadership is that the data is rarely good. As Brad Gibson, CEO in 2012-2013 
suggests. “It can’t look good that every month we lose people back to the streets.”  The 
2010 assessment discussed later, shows that in fact, of the people who leave there, only 
about 18% find housing of some kind. 
Fig. 27. Excerpt -Quarterly report.  The village usually fails to submit them. 
 
6. Reasons for leaving. Of those residents who left during the quarter, how many left for the following 
reasons? If a person left for multiple reasons, include only the primary reason.  








Total # of individuals who      
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departed in quarter 
# who departed 
voluntarily 6     
# who departed for rules 
violations 1     
# who departed – 
unknown reason 7     
 
7a. Length of stay. For those residents who left during the quarter, how many were there for the following 









Less than 1 month 1     
1 to 2 months 1     
3 – 6 months      
7 months – 12 months 1     
13 months – 24 months 2     
25 months – 3 years      
4 years – 5 years 1     
6 – 7 years 1     
8 – 10 years      
 
7b. Length of stay. For those residents living at the Village on the last day of the quarter, how long have 









Total # of individuals 
on the last day of the qtr 50    
Less than 1 month 3    
1 to 2 months 1    
3 – 6 months 4    
7 months – 12 months 3    
13 months – 24 months 12    
25 months – 3 years 17    
4 years – 5 years 7    
6 – 7 years 1    
8 – 10 years 2    
  
Dean points out, that the ‘welfare state’ was less a concrete arrangement of institutions, 
than it was the reflection of thought about how to arrange certain institutions, personnel 
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and incentives around an ideal of government.  The ideal of government we are 
confronted with in the current context of Dignity Village is rapid rehousing.  
Neoliberalism, too, is less an attack  on specific institutions than it is a “problematization 
of certain ideals of government, diagrams of citizenship, and the formulas of rule they 
generate” (43).  An important part of episteme is the intentional organization of 
institutional spaces, the rituals and routines associated with them, and the conduct of 
actors in specific ways to produce programmes of conduct, which are in short, attempts to 
regulate and improve what occurs in specific regimes of practice.  
 
 
Fig. 28. Village Site Map Above Current as of 2011 and Schematic (2001). 
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 Above, (Fig. 29.) the original aerial site plan, and site map from contract.  Any 
unlicensed variance and the city can shutter the village. Inhabitation, cohabitation, land 
use, emergency shelter allotments, fire zones and codes, waste removal, physical 
appearance, liability and corporate insurance, site inspections and yearly updated site 
maps, are all means by which external governance ensures that the village is a good 
corporate citizen. The village is not located near the city nor does it look anything like 
this today.  
 The final dimension asks how specific programmes of government seek to 
transform, moderate or identify specific ideas about the self and identity. What attributes 
come to be attached to authoritative or citizen identities?  What duties and obligations are 
produced  for those who govern and those who are governed?   Far from locking an 
individual into a specific identity, governmentality assumes that individuals can occupy 
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many subjective positions relative to these various rights and obligations.  Care of the self 
entails understanding the myriad dimensions of subjectivity that intersect one’s real life.  
 This approach is especially amenable to understanding the homeless.  Whereas 
critical theory and theories of state tend to imply a complicit overpowered person defined 
by their poverty, this Foucauldian approach suggests understanding how multiple facets 
of identity and experience combine to produce what are arguably unique conditions of 
possibility. Sexuality, philosophical knowledge, religion, citizenship, imagination, 
innovation, complacency as examples, meth addiction, pot-addiction, are dimensions of 
subjectivity that vary across persons and fields.  So one might phrase questions, as Dean 
does following Maffesoli (1991, in Dean 2010:44): “How is someone who buys goods at 
a supermarket to be made to identify as a consumer?” Or, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, how might a marginalized, traumatized homeless person made to become a 
consumer of the shelter system, or on the other hand, directed towards fighting for 
housing as an activist citizen?  How does the ethnographic arrangement of homeless 
persons inform their sense of deserving or undeserving freedoms? Once again, Dean asks, 
for example, “How are we all to become good citizens?”(44). 53 The questions villagers 
are asking themselves today, as I stated in chapter one, are exactly, “what does it mean to 
be a Dignity Villager?” Does being a member mean adhering to a dubiously worded 
contract imposed on the villager, or should a villager fight for the sustainable, green and 
safe village, such as the founders did?  These questions are the core of the crisis of 
community the village faces today. This strange identity suggests a confused village 
subjectivity that struggles to understand freedom and domination as two sides of a single 
coin.  
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 In the case of Dignity Village, the combination of available land, activist, church, 
and popular support and a sympathetic regime aligned to create the conditions of its 
possibility.  It currently must reposition itself and rebrand villagers to accommodate a 
new contract that emphasizes its transitional role in a changing governmentality of 
housing. Below is a new amended contract.  The italicized/bolded areas indicate where 
the language has changed to reflect the current attitude of the city towards the Dignity 
Villagers.   Section A, subsection, 3 is especially troublesome for villagers since it 
establishes transition as a requirement of residence, but offers no guarantee of transition.  
This perpetual incapacity for transition is at the root of the problem with liminality in the 
village, and constitutes a certain institutionalization of limbo as the human condition of 
living in the village. We discuss this in the conclusions because the two bolded areas of 
this contract represent a knew ideological shift in the city; a shift that occurred 
concomitantly with the federal incentives for Housing First, and have cast the reality of 
Dignity Village in a different light within the constellation of possibility in Oregon.  Item 
3 in Subsection A, page 278 below is the latest and most significant threat to villagers.  It 
might be that a threat is exactly what they need to get the critical moment started again.  
(Fig. 30. New Contract) 
1. By the end of November 2012, Dignity Village will be required to 
submit a completed, revised site plan that lays out structure, 
pathways, etc. This will be added as Exhibit D to the contract and 
must be approved/initialed by the Dignity Village Board Chair, and 
authorized staff from BDS, Fire, and PHB.  
2. Maintain written guidelines governing the use of the Designated 
Campground, which will be incorporated into an entrance agreement 
and signed by each resident, as appropriate. Contractor will provide a 
current copy of the entrance agreement and written rules to the City, 
together with any amendments or modifications to those rules. 
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3. Post the Designated Campground rules, as well as grievance 
procedure and policy, in a visible location. The written rules shall 
address at least the following: 
a. No resident or guest of the Designated Campground shall threaten 
any person, whether resident, neighbor, guest, invitee or City 
employee, or engage in conduct that subjects any such person to 
alarm, including but not limited to, conduct that involves the use 
of abusive or threatening language or gestures. 
b. No resident or guest shall vandalize, deface or destroy any City 
property, or engage in conduct that degrades the appearance of 
City property, including conduct that would constitute Offensive 
Littering under ORS 164.805. 
c. No resident or guest shall possess any weapon or any similar 
instrument that can be used to inflict injury upon a person or 
damage to property, except to the extent permitted by Oregon law. 
d. When present at the Designated Campground, no resident or guest 
shall engage in any criminal behavior as defined by the State of 
Oregon or the City of Portland.  
e. Residents may not use, possess or share alcoholic beverages, 
illegal drugs, controlled substances or prescription drugs without 
a medical prescription, on or at the Designated Campground or 
within the Sunderland Recycling Facility. Residents may not 
allow guests to use, possess or share alcoholic beverages, illegal 
drugs, controlled substances or prescription drugs without a 
medical prescription at the Designated Campground or within the 
Sunderland Recycling Facility. 
f. Minors shall not be allowed to remain as residents at the 
Designated Campground, but minors may enter as guests for 
periods of not longer than twelve (12) hours and 
i. Minor children must be supervised at all times by a 
designated parent/guardian or caregiver. 
ii. If minor children are staying with parent/guardian, there 
may be no other guests staying within the household’s 
structure when children are present 
iii. Parents/guardians must show proof of guardianship (i.e. 
this does not apply to “street families”) 
iv. Dignity Village will ensure that there is a current 
background check on designated parent/guardian or 
caregiver. 
v. Minor children may not stay with parent/guardian for 
more than 3 nights within a 30 day period (month to 
month) 
vi. Parent/guardian and caregiver must be members in good 
standing for 90 days. 
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vii. Dignity Village may impose additional rules and 
requirements that are not within the scope of the 
Management Agreement with the City of Portland. 
4. All residents shall be given on-going training on fire safety, with 
assistance from the Portland Fire Marshall’s Office. At least twice 
yearly, Contractor shall hold a fire drill in which all residents will 
participate. Upon request, [sic] Subrecipient must display proof of 
twice-yearly fire drills. New residents shall be given a fire safety 
orientation as they arrive.    
5. Contractor shall immediately notify the Bureau of Transportation of 
any unsafe or threatening person or situation at the campground that 
could potentially harm the Sunderland Recycling Facility’s property, 
operation, employees or visitors. In such instances, Contractor shall 
call the Bureau’s Maintenance Dispatch Center at 503-823-1700, or 
such other phone number as the bureau may later designate. 
 
A. For the purposes of Portland City Code 5.36.115, Contractor is designated as a 
“person in charge” for excluding persons from the Designated Campground 
for violations of the written rules. As a designated “person in charge,” 
Contractor may lawfully direct persons to leave the Designated Campground. 
1. Contractor shall be responsible for enforcing and administering its 
written rules established in Section I.A.9a-f, as may be amended from 
time to time. Any failure by the Contractor to routinely and adequately 
enforce and administer the written rules shall constitute a breach of the 
Agreement. 
2. Contractor shall not allow more than 60 residents to occupy the 
Designated Campground at any time. Contractor shall maintain a 
register of all residents, including such information as may be needed 
to perform Contractor’s reporting requirements under Section II.A.1-
10. For purposes of the Agreement, a resident is any person who has 
the intention to remain at the Designated Campground for twenty-four 
hours for sleeping, bathing, cooking, or use of restroom facilities. 
During the limited times when the City has declared a severe winter 
shelter overflow, Contractor may allow 10 additional residents for a 
total of 70 residents at the Designated Campground. 
3. It is expected that Dignity Village residents will remain at the 
Campground for as short a period of time as possible while they seek 
out community services and affordable permanent housing. The City 
holds the discretion to either shorten or lengthen a maximum time 
that residents may remain at the Campground. Contractor must 
establish written rules that residents may not live at the Campground 
for longer than 24 months after the date of November 1 2012. If a 
person became a resident on November 1 2012 they would need to 
find other housing arrangements by October 31 2014. If an 
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individual is in an active housing search and/or active in Village 
leadership, Dignity Village may request an extension and the City 
Contract Manager can make individual exceptions to this. 
 
 Make note of the above bolded clause.  It is the ticking clock, the supreme outing 
of democracy’s attachment to sovereignty, and the impossibility of a generalized sense of 
freedom that does not require the suppression of (some) others.   Finally, Dean’s analytics 
tenders the proposition that conditions of freedom and domination coexist within regimes 
of government.  Further that an analytics of government does not have its goal the ideal 
that all human subjects should be emancipated from governing.  Avoiding this radical 
position is essential because an analytics of government seeks to understand how subjects 
are both dominated and liberated within systems of governing.   
 During 2009-10, the city hired an outside agency to assess the village.  The 2010 
Village Assessment notes that despite the praiseworthy goals expressed in the mission 
statement, even villagers debate the village’s ability to deliver such lofty and idyllic 
promises. The assessment also notes many ways that the city can help the village achieve 
its goals.  To this day, that has not happened. The city in an interview in 2011, stated that 
the village had not reached out for this help - the villagers argued they had reached many 
times but had not been heard. As of this writing, Israel Bayer, publisher of Street Roots 
and activist had said, “No one needs to hear them stuck way out here, on a tarmac”  and 
this speaks to the out of sight out of mind proposition I began with.  So the village must 
find its voice and a way to deliver it.  The assessment was surprisingly in favor of the 
village. The following excerpts are noteworthy (Fig. 31. 2009 PHB Assessment Excerpt):  
“In contrast to traditional Transitional Housing programs, however, residents and 
supporters emphasize that one of the Village’s strengths is that it allows residents the 
flexibility to stabilize on their own timelines and on their own terms. For some people, 
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this can happen in a month, for others it takes much longer. An essay on Dignity 
Village’s website explains, “So now that I have this home, will I stay forever? No. The 
Village is my home until I am able to move on with my life, and soon, I hope. The 
average stay in Dignity Village is 18 months. Many stay for less, and a few stay longer. 
For now, this is the only home we know.” 
 The majority of the residents and stakeholders interviewed for this report 
described the Village as transitional or temporary. But for a small number of residents, 
the very notion of the Village as “transitional housing” is offensive. From their 
perspective, the Village is about having a home and a community. They view Dignity 
Village as an autonomous, semi-permanent “village”, similar to co-housing. As one long-
time resident put it, “For people who have been here for a while, this is home. . . If you 
come here and decide to stay, nobody should be able to tell you to leave. This is not 
transitional housing, and not a campground. It’s a village. This is our home.” 
 These divergent views of the Village’s mission shape the way residents and 
stakeholders evaluate the Village’s outcomes. The differences in their perspectives make 
it difficult to know how to measure the Village’s success. If we are comparing it to 
emergency shelter or the streets, the yardstick is very different than if we are comparing it 
to Transitional Housing programs or co-housing” (PHB 2010:7).  
 
 Since I have been speaking of liminality and transitional from a theoretical point 
of view, in Oregon Law, this is what transitional means ( Fig. 31. in part): 
(38) “Transitional housing accommodations” means accommodations described under 
ORS 446.265. 
 (2) 
Transitional housing accommodations described under subsection (1) of this section 
shall be limited to persons who lack permanent shelter and cannot be placed in 
other low income housing. A municipality may limit the maximum amount of 
time that an individual or a family may use the accommodations. 
(3) 
Campgrounds providing transitional housing accommodations described 
under this section may be operated by private persons or nonprofit 
organizations. The shared facilities of the campgrounds are subject to 
regulation under the recreation park specialty code described under ORS 
446.310 (Definitions for ORS 446.310 to 446.350) to 446.350 (Tourist Facility 
Account). The transitional housing accommodations are not subject to ORS 
chapter 90. 
(4) 
To the extent deemed relevant by the Department of Consumer and Business 
Services, the construction and installation of yurts on campgrounds used for 
providing transitional housing accommodations established under this section is 
subject to the manufactured structures specialty code described in ORS 446.155 
(Sanitation and safety requirements). Transitional housing accommodations not 




 The assessment provides other data as well. Unlike the streets, the village is over 
90% white; like the streets most of the residents  are men, aged 31-50, but there are more 
women and couples.  The village is safer for single women, and couple friendly unlike 
the shelters, and in fact, it is safer, statistically, then all other parts of Portland, because 
villagers constantly monitor each other’s behavior (PHB 2010:8-10, also from my notes 
2011).  The assessment also speaks to the many deficiencies in the village, many of 
which I have addressed; poor location, poor service infrastructure, lack of supports and 
toxicity from the compost facilities to name but a few.  But by its completion, at the end 
of 2009, and into early 2010, the village was delighted at the recommendation for a 
contract extension, and support for the move to a greener permanent location.  When I 
entered the village for the fist time in 2010, then, as it prepared for a city inspection and 
experienced the place alive and vibrant, it  was partly because they understood 
themselves as part of  viable strategy with real potential within the broader strategies to 
end homelessness. There was no real need to fight anymore.  No reason to stay united 
with other homeless communities.  They collectively thought they were going to get a 
long term contract with the provision of a new safer permanent location.  
 Dignity Village had been officially assessed and placed within an imaginary orbit 
of housing strategies. In 2010, when I first went there, no one mentioned activism or 
homeless rights unless I asked them about it.  They were convinced they were a 
community, a village called Dignity, and that they had earned their future place in 
broader community experience of Portland. I say imaginary because despite the contract, 
despite the promissory language in the assessment, Dignity Village is not recognized or 
alluded to in any of the actual EHAC planning strategies or language. EHAC announced 
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its first ten-year plan in 2007, the same year Dignity was officially contracted, but the 
village is not part of the official plan.  This is because, I want to argue, it is not Housing 
First, but a shelter in the imaginary of housing governance, and shelters are not part of 
the long term ideology presented in the rapid rehousing concept of ten-year plans. 
Dignity Village, is legal. It is contractual. It is transitional, emergency housing, even with 
the complicated understandings of what it represents to villagers and which I referred to 
in the above quote.  To governance, as Israel Bayer said on August 12 2013, in a phone 
interview,  
“It is unlikely that the city is ever going to officially recognize the village because they 
can’t explain the village to their critics.  It’s not just out there (by the airport) It is “out 
there,” no one can say what it is or what’s going on in there.” 
 
 While the original EHAC (2007, 2008) documents include images and plans for 
several supportive housing projects in line  with the needs of the aged, the medically or 
psychiatric affected homeless and families, intentional communities are not even referred 
to as possibilities. This lack of recognition does not go unnoticed and contributed to a 
growing anxiety over the possibility of eviction in Dignity Village in 2010 after I had left 
and discussions of the new contract some of which you read, were proposed.   It is also 
very important to note that during that time despite increases in funding for homeless 
projects, the problem has  become worse. 
“Despite the influx of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) dollars, 
Oregon witnessed an increase in the number of people experiencing homelessness, rising 
from 17 122 in 2009 to 22 111 individuals in January 2011. (EHAC 2011) 
 
This means that during  the period in which I did my advance field trip  in 2010 and my 
extended fieldwork in July of 2011,  homelessness was on the rise all over Oregon, and 
Portland, such as any major city in a period of economic decline became a hub for those 
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seeking assistance and solidarity on the streets. On a walk through Portland with a writer 
named Tyler, I commented on how I had not seen so many homeless people on the streets, 
sleeping on benches and in parks, since my days on the streets in Toronto. He had 
travelled from the east to west coast stopping in 15 cities as part of a Masters thesis: a 
blog about the streets in these cities. He explained to me that everywhere, from New 
York to Portland where he had stopped, he had seen alarming numbers of people on the 
streets, living in their cars and overflowing at shelters.  We had met at Dignity Village 
because he had heard in each of the places he visited of this legal camp on the west coast.  
He had remarked after being at the village to check it out, that the people seemed lost, as 
lost as the street poor.  “Worse’” he said, “at least on the streets, people want to get out of 
there.  No one seems to know what they want out here (at the village).”  
 The EHAC plan also notes an increase in the homeless population of over 75% 
between 2002 and 2007 with mental health indicators rising over 120% (EHAC 2008). 
Oregon’s Ten-Year plan has 6 broad goals: 
1. Prevent and divert people from becoming homeless. 
2. Expand supply of affordable housing and supportive services. 
3. Build capacity of persons experiencing homelessness through strategies that 
identify their risks and needs, and help them access appropriate housing and 
supportive services. 
4. Identify and implement system of improvements for coordination at the program 
funding and delivery levels leading of measurable results. 
5. Implement education and public campaign initiatives to remove societal stigma 
about homelessness to build community support and coordinated responses. 
6.    Improve data collection and methodology to better account for homeless 
persons.   
 
 
 Within the plan several action strategies are listed (EHAC 2008). Amongst these 
Action 8 stipulates that SB 200 (Senate Bill)  establishes Housing First and rapid re-
housing as the preferred response to homelessness.   Commensurate with an explicit 
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preference in Obama’s Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-housing Program, current 
(2013) ten-year plans in order to be competitive must present Housing first as a priority 
within their strategies.  Within the context of the plan, goals include, standardized 
measurements of homelessness, equalizing the process for adjudicating claims made 
through various community agencies by people seeking assistance and to effect a psychic 
shift in the mainstream social imaginary about homelessness, to redress the stigma 
attached to being homeless (2008:17).   Understanding these goals, the next chapter asks 
villagers to discuss how they imagine the village. 
 
6.7 Chapter Summary  
 This chapter has shown that the critical action of Dignity housing activists was an 
historically conditioned and successful displacement of power; the critique of housing by 
the activists did make room in the city’s own critique of housing, for the site, Dignity 
Village.  This was achieved by governors imposing a variety of spatial and temporal 
codes for living on the village, which set out the discourse for conduct of conduct in the 
village.  Foucauldians and non-Foucauldians alike can see how this simple view of the 
state of affairs fits nicely into critiques of governmentality. The records and transcripts I 
have shared, however,  indicate a stable set of affairs that does not exist, not even closely. 
Village life is anything but the well-conducted world that governmentality implies. 
Actions there are just too random, too sporadic, sometimes, too few or non-existent in the 
sense that people do not care for themselves, to simply say “Oh it’s governmentality” and 
walk away from the study. The lack of government is not just about drugs, sometimes it 
is about ideas, conflicts over resources or coveted things, sometimes it is about old 
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friendships and loyalties that carry over from the street, but the critical attitudes in the 
village that align people to one another and around which they create critiques of the 
village, rarely transcend what goes on there, as matters of daily living.  Their attitude is 
about what is wrong with the village or their neighbor, and rarely about poverty, housing 
or other homeless people who do without shelter. As alternative to the shelters and the 
streets as the village is, it signed a contract to govern poor people, and is not a site of 
resistance to neoliberal critique of poverty, but an adjunct to it.  
 Activists did punch a hole in the city’s power. And they inserted into its purview, 
a democratically self-governed community, that spoke to the one transcendent ideal I 
could find in the village, and that was a sense of The American Way, which villagers 
understand to mean a mélange of democracy, freedom and liberty, and which John Boy 
and others have discussed in the samples I gave as the right to choose, to roam freely, and 
to be anything they want to be. Clearly this belief is partly delusional, partly fantasy, and 
partly because of how strongly experienced is patriotism amongst the villagers.  The fact 
that they have the right to their own community is evidence to them of this freedom.  
They rarely develop a sophisticated understanding of how the community does a favor 
for city power, while barely meeting villagers’ needs.  In this case, I have argued that the 
activist citizen, as modeled by Isin and Nielsen, existed for a short period, starting with 
the occupations and mobile marches, and ending in the signing of the contract.  This is 
not to say that the activist citizen could not reappear. Most of us who have been advising 
the village have been tying to make that happen. 
 Still the village is a result of critique making room in extant power.  However, 
making room, in this case required a compromise, which as Boltanski has warned us can 
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lead to problems down the road when the nature of the inherent critical contradictions 
become lived and understandable.  In this case, the village is crippled by a fear of 
appearing to be too resistant to the city, which with its sovereign power secured in the 
contract, might shutter the place. This is a very real fear that villagers express. The 
critical contradiction in this sense then, is that the village leaders and membership do not 
fight for their rights, even though democracy demands that they do.  Instead of carrying 
their own plans for fixing the community and moving in the directions of the assessment, 
they sit back and wait for the city to impose its ideas on them. Therefore, they appear to 
be in a subordinate and dominated position, but this is their own doing, or not-doing 
rather.  If nothing else, the fights that R2DTOO and Opportunity Village have presented 
in recent months, and Dignity’s own legacy, give evidence of the power of resistance.  
These other sites are counter-sites, they are acts of resistance, and they are pushing power 
around.  Dignity signed their own fate by letting the city define the limits of self-
determination, and then worse perhaps, accepting the steady decay and perpetual 
liminality of the space as inevitable and immutable. In the next chapter we will explore 
these places and spaces of resistance in more detail. 
 I think this section has shown fairly clearly that the act itself, was a short-lived 
affair, and was as a break with habitus, an act in the sense both Bakhtin and Isin have 
described. That the tactical displacement of power was bi-directional, each critical 
position producing a fairly stable set of affairs in the compromise, however, suggests that 
critical displacement was absorbed or buffered perhaps by the city – the city was resisting 
the growing momentum of the critique.  On the one hand the city told the protestors 
where to go and how to govern, and secured this dominance in the language of the 
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contract and other codes. They enforce these codes through site visits and by entertaining 
a long drawn out series of inspections each time the contract is up for renewal.  And this 
contract looms like the sword of the monarch as a sovereign reminder of who is the boss. 
Villagers, as of the time I wrote this, have been scrambling to find ways to appear 
deserving of yet another contract. On the other hand, there is no reason to say that the 
critique that produces intentional camps is dead. In fact it is perhaps more alive today 
than it was in 2001, in the sense that several camps are officially bidding for contracts 
with cities.   So I will spend most of the following chapter explaining how liminality has 
produced this sense in the village that their part in social critique is dead.  They have 
forgotten, collectively how to act critically because the ties they had to critical leaders 
have been lost for some time. To flesh this out, I will revisit liminality, heterotopias, 
representational space, communitas and Thirdspace, in order to re-open the critical 
possibilities produced by liminal space-worlds. Ambiguity is a threat to established ways 
of doing, by which I mean to say that the conventional world governed by practices, sees 
in their unknown qualities, the potential for what we have discussed as acts, and thereby 
regards these places as dangerous.  Feared by conventional imaginaries, precisely for the 
unknown capacities they possess, this ambiguity threatens power, so it must also possess 
this capacity; how then, can the villagers become empowered?  
  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Endnotes – Chapter Six:  Pages 377- 469. 
 
1  http://www.nlchp.org/program.cfm?prog=4 
Excerpt: “Increasingly, cities across the nation are implementing punitive measures to 
sweep homeless people out of downtown areas.   Laws that make it illegal to do things 
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that people experiencing homelessness must do as a result of their homeless status 
ultimately 'criminalize' homelessness, such as the prohibition of sleeping, sitting, or 
storing personal belongings in public spaces that some states have adopted. 
 
2  For Castoriadis, the social imaginary is pre-logical, a function of the individual’s 
readiness to perceive and need to organize difference, yet is also conditioned by the 
forms of reason employed by a society at a given time and place.  Castoriadis says: 
“This element - which gives a specific orientation to every institutional system, which 
over determines the choice and the connection of symbolic networks, which is the 
creation of each historical period, ….the basis for articulating what does matter and what 
does not, the origin of the surplus of being of the objects of practical, affective and 
intellectual investment…is nothing other than the imaginary of the society or of the 
period considered” (1987:145). 
 
3  Furthermore, he argued that the recognition of diversified spatial meanings, is a 
departure from Cartesian models of space that cannot imagine spatial items without a 
body – in the sense that  “We attribute a generic unity to the extension of the space, so 
that when the body which fills the space has been changed, the extension of the space 
itself is not considered to have been changed but to remain the same; as long as it remains 
of the same size and shape and maintains the same situation among certain external 
bodies by which we specify that space (Pr II 10f). Putting aside the Cartesian “physical” 
model of space opened the door to include other dimensions in which the “occupation” of 
imaginary space by, concepts, ideas and philosophies for example, might be incorporated 
into understanding society as a sort of multidimensional spatialization of diverse 
characteristics of thoughts and culture.  For Lefebvre, the leap from Cartesian bounded 
space had opened up the question of the spatial to broader conceptualization which in 
itself was not  an egregious mistake. He argued that a great deal of attention to claims of 
“mental space” had been made, claims that included notions of ideological spaces, 
literary space and so on, but such epistemological studies suffered from a lack of any 
cohesion from which to draw conclusions about space, and most importantly, they lacked 
key ideas, “not only the idea of ‘man’ but also that of space—the fact that ‘space’ is 
mentioned everywhere not withstanding”(3). 
 
4  See item 8 
 
5  In the last two years, the numbers of veterans on the streets and the numbers of 
families spared street-engagement have declined because of the employment of the 
Housing First Model that uses vacancies in the  conventional rental market and a 
combination of funds from federal, state and local donors to place homeless people in 
housing directly right out of homelessness, and also because of expansion of the shelter 
programs in many cities. (NAEH 2012; US Gov’t. (HUD) 2012)  However, while the 
plan also provides incentives to local governments and non-profits to end chronic 
homelessness or street poverty, the kind of poverty that most of the respondents in my 
research have experienced, the funding just isn’t there as yet to accommodate everyone 
who could use it.  Estimates of how many homeless exist are hard to nail down, but they 
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remain in the range of 300,000 to over 4 million, depending on the sources one examines 
(HUD, NAEH, NCH, et). 
 
6  In Amos 8:4-6: “Hear this, O ye that swallow up the needy, even to make the poor 
of the land to fail, ...falsifying the balances by deceit. That we may buy the poor for 
silver, and the needy for a pair of cause shoes; and sell the refuse of the wheat.”  In Psalm 
140:12, “I know that the LORD will maintain the of the afflicted, and justice for the 
poor.”  In Prov. 19:17,  “He who is gracious to a poor man lends to the LORD, and He 
will repay him for his good deed.  The position is supported by the Encyclopedia of 
Homeless 2004 that offers extensive correlation between verses, laws and policies.  
 
7  Rathbone, Mark. "Vagabond!", History Review; March 2005, Issue 51: 8-13 
Academic Search Premier, EBSCO host (accessed June 25 2010). 
 
8  In addition to branding, “ear boring” was common; a hole one inch in diameter 
was drilled into the gristle of the ear (12).  Of course the vagrant had the choice of 
working in the galleys of the navy or as infantry, or perhaps a stint in an early form of the 
workhouse called the “bridewell” (Snow and Anderson 1993:  12). 
 
 9  Slack 1988 - Poverty and policy in Tudor and Stuart England, London 1988). 
 
10  See Marx, Karl and Engels F. (1970),  Polanyi (1944), Wallerstein (2004),   Dean, 
(1999; 2010) Caton (1990). 
 
11  The cost of providing for the vagrant becomes a calculable measure accounted for 
in terms of the material costs above any spiritual or moral benefit.  Hence parishes 
actively discriminate against vagrants and the poor, making it difficult for them to roost.  
Caton (1990) and Deutsch (1937) cite the common practice amongst parishes of secreting 
the poor to other jurisdictions under “cover of night 
 
12  Oregon and Washington supported major resource economies and had a long 
history of homesteading and claims making.  The topography itself made discrete 
campgrounds possible and it was possible to overlook the shantytown as a form of this 
tradition. ( see History of Oregon, Online). 
 
13  As we will see, these definitions figure prominently in the allocation of resources 
to strategies for dealing with homelessness, even though from a purely conceptual level, 
they are each indicative of a situation requiring sustained and strategic intervention by the 
state, communities and the homeless themselves.  These categories in part describe what 
Leginski (2007) define as the heterogeneous character of contemporary homelessness. 
 
14  Early studies of the homeless by Solenberger (1911) Anderson, (1923) revealed a 
largely male population sometimes of intemperate manner, but very often suffering from 
mental illness of some sort; in some groups almost 2/3 suffered a major health problem 
such as blindness or deafness  (Solenberger 1911; Anderson 1923; Caton 1990:9. 
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15  Hoovervilles, refer in a derogatory sense to President Hoover who was blamed for 
the depression, and who was perceived as less than sympathetic for those most effected 
by his mismanagement of things.  Charles Michelson, Publicity Chief of the Democratic 
National Committee coined the term Hooverville, which was first used in print in 1930 
by the New York Times (Kathy Weiser/Legends of America - online resource, August, 
2010). http://www.legendsofamerica.com/20th-hoovervilles3.html. 
 
16  The Great Depression is understood as the result of irresponsible consumer 
spending, high household debt, falling commodity prices, bank failures, extreme 
unemployment, stock market crash and various other features commensurate with a 
general economic collapse under liberal capitalism. Amongst other things, it helped to 
call into question the liberal market values that were argued had led to monopolistic and 
rapacious business practices. 
 
17  There was little debate over whom was deserving or not; though the displacement 
was massive and unprecedented, it was expected to be short lived, and the millions of 
newly homeless were largely not blamed for their demise by the state, the police or 
media, and especially not in pubic imaginaries. With the dimension of the displacement 
less dramatic in some countries (England for example),  it was still a universal experience 
amongst liberal democracies, and poverty, if not homelessness became a defining caution 
under emerging neoliberal welfare policies. 
 
18  State and municipal camps included. 
 
19  Programs included: minimum wages, encouragement of unions to fight for higher 
wages, and a reduction in farm production to raise farm incomes were seen as economic 
stimulators, while the introduction of social security and make work programs was to 
provide relief on a broad scale to those hardest hit (Best 1991, 1993).  At the same time 
monies were made available as were new financial incentives for new home construction 
and to help homeowners stave off foreclosure.  These measures were successful in 
lowering unemployment by over 2/3 between 1933 – 1937, and the economy had 
rebounded by 1937.  But another deep recession in 1937 proved that even neoliberal 
tinkering was flawed, and this perception of weakness gave liberal conservative critics of 
Roosevelt’s  “socialist” tendencies the power they needed to vote down any extension of 
the New Deal into other areas such as social housing. 
 
20  In the context of the discussion of neoliberalism presented earlier, housing 
policies were critiqued by conservative liberals, for the impact they had on federal 
deficits and spending on economically defective segments of society. 
 
21  While federal US programs such as the New Deal Housing Administration’s  
rezoning laws in favour of single family dwellings can be seen as an ideological 
mechanism of transforming the labor base of the US into manageable and contented 
populations, the result for poor individuals was that it became difficult to establish 
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permanent residences because multi and extended family modes were excluded (Leginski 
2007:5).   Such cooperative housing modes made homeownership feasible for low 
income workers, and even with lower mortgages and long term lending programs in the 
New Deal, most new poor families could not obtain a unit of their own. Revitalization 
was seen as way of creating vibrant and productive cities and increasing the urban 
economy. Such laws as the National Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 created a legacy of 
gentrification in downtown cores where homeless people had congregated. The 1949 and 
the 1954 acts continued to support new single family dwelling construction, but offered 
cities funding to purchase areas deemed to be “slums” under the guide of eminent 
domain, in order to encourage  reinvestment in dilapidated city cores by private 
developers. Though phrased  “urban redevelopment” in the 1949 act, by 1954 it was 
deemed “urban renewal”. 
 
22  In the late 19th century,  Capitalist cities designated the sprawling meadows and 
hillsides on the outskirts of the town to the upper tiers while relegating the poor and 
destitute to the core (Jackson 1985:  intro). While city cores became increasingly worn 
down and slummed out, the new prosperity of the US economy after the war held 
promise for the new vision of the American Household, as the cornerstone of Suburbia.  
 
23  The practice of this intentional slum building started in New York city in 1935; 
developers were encouraged to build large housing projects for the working poor, but 
they did so under condition that for each unit of slum housing, a unit of private dwelling 
would be demolished, creating demand and substandard living conditions as they 
proceeded. "New York City Housing Authority". The City of New York. Retrieved 2011-
11-16. 
 
24  See Davies, Gareth. 1996. From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation 
and Decline of Great Society Liberalism; Katz, Michael B. 1989. The Undeserving Poor: 
From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare. New York: Pantheon Books; Lawrence, 
Kans.: University Press of  Kansas; Quadagno, Jill. 1994) The Color of Welfare: How 
Racism Undermined the War on Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
25  Friedman argued for stronger basic legal (constitutional) protection of economic 
rights. – see -  Friedman, Milton. Inflation: Causes and Consequences. New York: Asia 
Publishing House; Friedman, Milton (1969). Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist. 
Aldine Publishing Company. 
 
26  See Weisbrod, Burton, Ed. The Economics of Poverty: An American Paradox, 
Prentice-Hall 1965. The policies of the War on Poverty, similarly to the housing acts 
previously discussed can be seen as extension of the Roosevelt’s New Deals, and Four 
Freedoms Speech that included freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom of want, 
freedom from fear, the latter two of which were not guaranteed in the US Constitution, 
and became the sources or access points for critics of (Roosevelt’s) alleged socialism 
(Rossi 1989; Best 1993). 
 480 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
27  While overall poverty figures declined to as low as 11% in the mid 1970, by the 
late 1970’s they had resurged to 17% and more currently are conservatively estimated to 
be at close to 16% (HUD 2009; 2010; 2011). 
 
28  In my film, Subtext, homeless respondents recount similar expenses as recently as 
2008. Rossi provides a fairly detailed account of the emergence of shelters as a loosely 
integrated system of municipal and private charitable accommodations for the homeless .  
For the most part, shelters run by private organizations like the Salvation Army were 
superior in most respects to those run by municipalities. Rossi offers that this was in part 
because city shelters did not, could not restrict who entered the premises except in terms 
of going beyond capacity whereas private shelters could restrict who entered on the basis 
of inebriation or bizarre behaviour (36).  It is important to note that at no time in the three 
periods just discussed are shantytowns mentioned as a legitimate form of housing for the 
poor. Tent camps, squats, and other claims are rarely if ever discussed in the literature 
from that period. 
 
29  This is presumably because it has had a large population and a longer history with 
services associated with the poor.  It is noteworthy that the majority of statistical 
information comes from Chicago and New York, where media and scientific observation 
of homelessness has enjoyed a greater appeal because each of these large populations 
required solutions sooner. 
 
30  On Justification 2011:50-55. 
 
31  Various studies, Bahr and Caplow (1968), Solenberger (1911), Anderson, (1923), 
Goodwin (1985, in Caplow, 1990), Caton, (1990) Street Health, (2005-2009), NAEH 
2011)  cite the range of usage amongst the impoverished of alcohol and other substances 
at between 15-35%  although such figures are not only unreliable, it is almost impossible 
to say with any certainty that they differ from conventional populations. In Dignity 
Village, drug and alcohol use was close to 80%, though level of addiction per se was 
impossible to discern.  
 
32  See Levinson, D. (ed) The Encyclopedia of Homelessness volumes One and Two; 
also Salem ebooks, The Eighties in America, section on “Homelessness.” 
 
33  “In 1983, a group of concerned leaders founded the National Citizens Committee 
for Food and Shelter to help meet the emergency needs of a growing population of 
homeless people across the country. By 1987, it was clear that despite the Committee’s 
success, homelessness had taken root for a number of systematic reasons, and a “hot and 
a cot” were not going to end the problem. At that time, the organization became known as 
the National Alliance to End Homelessness.” www.endhomelssness.org. 
 
 481 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  For example, The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 
successfully litigated cases against the District of Columbia and the State of New York. 
See Lampkin v. District of Columbia 27 F.3d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1993);  
 
35  Street counts are a common method of obtaining data  from shelters, missions, 
foodbanks and walk through in areas commonly frequented by homeless persons.  One 
night street counts are extrapolated to suggest tends or composite figures of the total 
persons experiencing literal shelterlessness.  The numbers are dubious and do not reflect 
the total number of persons in jeopardy at a given “point in time”. 
 
36  In 1996 Clinton’s administration introduced the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA).  This act replaced the 1938 (NEW DEAL)  Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children Act, which anchored national welfare strategies for 
close to 60 years. In 1988, AFDC was  replaced with the Job Opportunities and Basic 
Skills Training program ( JOBS).    While AFDC funds to the poor were declining for 
several years, the PRWORA introduced the TANF discussed earlier.   The basic shift in 
this program was  the inclusion of a requirement of TANF agencies to guarantee that 
50% of their clients found employment while receiving assistance. Elements of the 
TANF included workfare provisions; recipients were to pursue or find work in order to 
receive supplements.  While conservatives and Liberals held the measures in high regards 
as means to instill the American work ethic back into welfare recipients, the policy can be 
seen only as a means to associate self-worth with economic functionality.   Furthermore, 
the policy was to instill a sense of purpose for single mothers that non-poor single 
mothers were presumed to enjoy. 
 
37  “Consumers’ perception of the Continuum of Care offers another divergent 
perspective. Consumers experience the Continuum as a series of hurdles—specifically, 
ones that many of them are unable or unwilling to overcome. Consumers who are 
homeless regard housing as an immediate need, yet access to housing is not made 
available unless they first complete treatment. By leveraging housing on participation and 
treatment, continuum program requirements are incompatible with consumers’ priorities 
and restrict the access of consumers who are unable or unwilling to comply with program 
terms.” (Tsemberis, Sam, Founder of Housing First -- 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1448313/) 
 
38  In Subtext  - real stories, version two, (2008). 
 
39  http://www.nlchp.org  and http://www.nclej.org 
 
40  see NCH “ Tent Cities in America: A Pacific Report 2010,  and also 
www.ShareWheel.org. 
 
41  http://vbc.cityrepair.org - “In 1996, neighbors in the Sellwood neighborhood of 
Portland at the intersection of 9th and Sherrett created a tea stand, children's playhouse 
and community library on the corner and renamed it "Share-It Square" Community 
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organizers founded the City Repair Project that same year, seeking to share their vision 
with the community. In January 2000, the Portland City Council passed ordinance 
#172207, an "Intersection Repair" ordinance, allowing neighborhoods to develop public 
gathering places in certain street intersections”. Also see video clip marked Communal 
Tea. 
 
42  www.columbiaecovillage.or 
 
43  “In 1785, the Continental Congress passed the National Land Ordinance, which 
laid a Roman colonial grid over all lands west of the Ohio River. This included all future 
cities and towns. Public spaces and piazzas occur naturally at the intersection of pathways 
when communities are allowed to grow organically. The National Land Ordinance both 
pre-empted the natural development of such places and neglected to provide for them 
within the mandated grid plan. In cities based on the grid plan, it is much easier for 
people to feel isolated and not know their own neighbors. The neighborhood places for 
communication and gathering that develop naturally in non-grid cities must be 
specifically planned for in grid cities. The City Repair Project was established to return 
these important places of communication and participation to our neighborhoods. At City 
Repair, we see that sustainable communities are built when people work together for 
mutual benefit. We create and facilitate prototype gathering spaces that can inspire any 
community to create their own places of gathering. Our projects are all aimed at building 
a more community-oriented and ecologically sustainable society – but we can’t do it in 
your neighborhood if you don’t get involved!” 
 (Quoted from: http://cityrepair.org/about/why-city-repair). 
 
44   I explained these shortly the spaces of liminality, or communitas. Turner states, 
that while his focus a has been on preindustrial, traditional society, that the “collective 
dimensions of communitas and structure, are to be found at all stages and levels of 
culture and society” ( 113).  For modern complex societies, the ‘processual’ nature of 
liminality suggests a real threat to order, and so it is through various spaces, from ritual to 
theatre, that beings [ I would add the streets and intentional community]experience 
alternate possibilities in a communal performance of unlimited possibility (1967:97).  
 
45  Michel de Certeau’s style of writing is as layered and artistic as the discursive 
similes he employs to create an urban social architecture.  So in looking at how real-life 
outcomes arise from relations, one is really addressing a possible infinite plurality of 
possible outcomes based on the individuals connected in the (always social) relation, 
rather than on predictable relations governed by abstract terms.   It is somewhere out of 
the negotiation of the rules and structures of the (urban) landscape, (the source of the 
broken telephone) the strategies he would call it, that people (users) develop tactics, 
often undisclosed means of navigating and claiming the world around them.  
 
46  We have already discussed, Wagner (1993) Bahr and Caplow (1968), Bogue ( 
1968),  Anderson ( 1923), and others all of whom describe the streets and the chronically 
homeless as part of a structurally  diverse culture with examples of meritocratic, 
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charismatic authorities,  competition over turf and resources and hierarchical  systems of 
unconventional affiliations. Equality in the sense used by activists is an ideal that in lived 
experience seems unlikely. 
 
47  For example, the Pathways web site suggests that the cost of a Housing First 
program is about $57.00 per night; shelter - $75.00; jail - $164.00; hospitals and psych 
wards $19 - 1185 per night.  http://www.pathwaystohousing.org/content/our_model.  The 
cost of policing and delivery service to un-housed persons compounds the figures 
immeasurably. 
 
48  Ten Year Plans – “In 2000, the National Alliance to End Homelessness released 
A Plan, Not a Dream: How to End Homelessness in Ten Years - a bold, innovative 
strategy to end homelessness in the United States… By developing - and subsidizing 
when needed - an adequate supply of affordable housing, communities can move people 
off of the streets and reduce homelessness effectively and permanently. Build the 
infrastructure. Ending homelessness can be a first step in addressing the systemic 
problems that lead to crisis poverty, including a shortage of affordable housing, incomes 
that do not pay for basic needs, and a lack of appropriate services for those that need 
them. Addressing all of these issues community by community is a necessary step to 
ending homelessness and poverty. Since the release of this blueprint, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development and the Bush Administration have endorsed the idea of 
planning to end chronic homelessness in ten years, the Obama Administration pledged to 
end veterans homelessness within five years, and the US Interagency Council on 
Homelessness challenged cities to create plans to end homelessness. The momentum has 
built across the country — to date, there are 243 completed plans to end homelessness 
across the country. These plans echo key strategies outlined in the Alliance’s plan and 
represent a critical, collective effort to end homelessness nationwide. The Homelessness 
Research Institute at the National Alliance to End Homelessness recently completed a 
study evaluating the completed plans. The report, A Shifting Focus, evaluates the 
elements and implementation of the plans. The Alliance maintains a database of the 
existing plans and encourages communities developing plans to submit theirs.”(Quoted 
from, NAEH WEBSITE - http://www.endhomelessness.org/pages/ten-year-plan). 
 
49  The number of worse case needs in terms of housing assistance has jumped from 
5.91 million to 7.10 million between 2007-2009, and includes renters in jeopardy of 
losing their housing.   41 percent, or 17.1 million of American poor renters had what are 
called worst case needs, caused by paying more than 50% of income on rent or other 
hardships associated with sickness, low income and high costs.  In this light, new housing 
or building affordable housing is a concern lost in the translation of housing need across 
several categories of homelessness ranging from literally, to in jeopardy of, losing 
housing. ( HUD 2009, Report To Congress :  
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/worstcase_HsgNeeds09.pdf 
 
50  Referring to my earlier summary of neoliberalism, it is hard to imagine modern 
US society in the absence of strong economic convictions; knowledge has been produced 
 484 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
over time about inflation, trade deficit, tariffs, subsidies and budgets and also about the 
“need” for Americans to struggle along side the economy during it s latest reconstruction.  
Homelessness is constructed as a temporary situation that fluctuates with economic 
circumstances, despite its ubiquity in American culture since the country was first settled, 
yet amongst Americans themselves there exist a number of competing truths about 
poverty and how it is produced. Regardless of the debate over poverty, very few 
Americans would argue that a healthy economy is a bad thing for the country or for 
themselves as citizens. 
 
51  There is no way to reduce current practices of government to a principle or point 
of origin.  It is not explaining where a practice comes from that is of interest to this 
research.  What would be the point of identifying the primary point of origin as an end in 
itself? Other than to reiterate a dubious historical point of order, there is little need to do 
so, other than to explain how extant knowledge or rationales articulate from one point to 
another, and are therefore, important in their currency, that is; in how they impinge on the 
problem to which our study is directed.  Hence, as Dean suggest, practices need to be 
understood “as composed of heterogeneous elements having diverse historical 
trajectories, as polymorphous in their internal and external relations, and bearing upon a 
wide range of problems and issues”(40). “The term ‘regime of practices’ refers to these 
historically constituted assemblages, through which we do such things as cure, care, 
relieve poverty, punish, educate, train and counsel” (40).   
 
 For the purposes of this dissertation, I am concerned with how one might 
incorporate an analytics of government into an ethnographic methodology.  As couched 
in the framework given to us by Foucault, but seeking to show how to use it in the real 
world, Dean’s work suggests a way of understanding how the shantytown fits into the 
regimes of practices of government, and further, how this location relative to other 
strategies and subjects, has relevance for the agency of villagers themselves. 
 
52  But in another sense, it includes also the way regimes of government depict 
certain categories of person, as certain problems in terms of their positive or negative, 
contributory or deleterious effects for strategies. 
 
53  The four dimensions are not reducible to one another.  They tend to imbricate in 
various ways that vary over time and in very specific ways.  This is why, and it is very 
important, that generalizations fail to reveal the openings to freedom and autonomy that 
traditional views of authority and governance tend to reject as counter intuitive. 
“Transformations of regimes of practices may take place along each or any one of these 
axes, and transformations along one axis may entail transformation in others” ( 44).  It is 
the transformative process(es) that historically pivotal shifts in governance occur, and 
therefore, it is into these shifting moments that housing activism seeks to insert its 
influence.   These shifts represent the moments when the telos of government might be 
steered towards a shift. 
 For Dean, the telos of the government is the degree to which it believes in the 
probability that people can be changed, that situations can be changed.  It is a Utopian 
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belief in that it counts on the fact that the goals of government are achievable -  one does 
not govern simply to govern, but because one expects that though policy and 
enforcement, changes in the way we do things can be achieved.  Hence, governmentality 
studies need to extract this quality when looking at governance.   
 
 486 
Chapter Seven: Unlimited Liminality in Between-Worlds and Recent Events  
7.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I tie together the many loose ends that unpacking critiques of the 
village produces. I am going to be very faithful to some current events and the actual 
conversations had between villagers and myself in light of these events, to show that the 
liminality of the village is really a reflection of the stalled critique that started it off. Very 
recent events surrounding drug factions are forcing villagers to deal with this limbo, or it 
is very likely they will find the village shuttered, and their lives cast to the streets once 
more. In this chapter I am also going to provide an illustrative passage of what life as a 
village reject looks like to someone who has been targeted by a drug gang and kicked out 
of the village on trumped up charges.  Going backwards in liminality, from one place of 
liminality, to something even less defined, shows just how much the village reflects the 
dominant orders it was supposed to shed. I talk about spatial heterotopias in detail 
because they have in recent years been widely incorporated in literature on festivals, 
political occupations and I have entertained the heterotopic qualities of the village in my 
own work because of the wide range of opinions villagers hold about it. But heterotopic 
qualities are not the only ones they speak of, so I rejoin Soja as a way to enter the current 
conversations we are having about how to “save” the village. I then discuss a series of 
village events and shifts in leadership that centered on the contract we saw in the last 
chapter.  I ask villagers in fairly clear language if this contract was not in fact a sort of 
death-blow.  I ask them how the world of the village might look if they imagined it 
differently.  The contract stirred things up a bit, leading for a short time to an activist 
regime that tried to get things in order, but was soon impeached by factions who felt 
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threatened by this. This latest impeachment was only a few months ago and it set off a 
series of events that, as of today, has the village in the cross-hairs of the housing bureau, 
the police, the Oregonian Newspaper, and a number of critical opposition groups.  The 
issue on the table is the drug problem, something which most reasonable people 
understand comes with long-term homelessness, but in this case, in this icon of self-
governance and critique of neoliberal governance, the village’s drug problem, becomes a 
discursive matter for the intentional camps currently being negotiated elsewhere, and 
provides a clear point of entry for the city’s sovereign power over the village. 
 
7.2 Liminality as Open Space 
        I have already described the condition of the Dignity homeless as perpetual 
liminality, since it places them  “between and betwixt” important values about shelter and 
home, and prevents them from anything but the most limited active roles in society 
outside of the gates. It is a between-world from which villagers must try to find a sense of 
self-worth and dignity from amongst the poverty and broken political opportunities the 
village provides. Unlike Van Gennep and Turner’s use, liminality in Dignity is not 
temporary.  The actual grounded and institutional aspect of the village is very hard to 
understand from within the gates, but is a bit more understandable from the words of 
someone who has been tossed out and back to the streets. And then one might ask, what 
happens to someone who fails in a place such as Dignity Village? What happens to 
someone who gets kicked out of the village? I offer this excerpt to try and link the deeply 
personal and traumatic impact living this way has on people, especially those with mental 
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heath issues, like Jay.  The video is quite moving: http://tinyurl.com/JayintunnelExile. 
(See also DS DISC 2, “Jay in Tunnel”). 
Excerpt from Dignity in Exile 2012:59-64 
 
Jay walked us through a small stand of immature bamboo shootes. A worn path led to the 
culvert that was 100 yards from the main gate of the Air National Guard. Even though it 
rains very hard in Portland and was doing so almost everyday at some point, this culvert 
and the inflow were dusty and dry. Turned out it was an auxiliary culvert, about eight feet 
in diameter. And it never got wet inside except in the winter. Jay had only been there a 
little over a month. We stepped into the culvert, hunched over, and I became itchy. For 
me as an ethnographer, I found it interesting that other than immediately noting the 
relatively spacious quality of the culvert, my most salient reaction was to the spiders and 
how quickly this became a pervasive itch. Hard to control a camera when you were itchy. 
I saw, before anything else, the white puffballs and cobwebs that lined all the visible 
surfaces of the squat. Inside them, small white spiders about an inch in size had colonized 
the walls of the culvert. Jay didn’t even notice them. I kept scratching my scalp.  
 “Do you ever get bit?” I asked.  
 Jay looked at me and laughed. “They don’t bite. It’s them brown recluses [spiders] 
ya gotta watch out for. Those suckers are nasty. They like it damp though. Downtown 
under the bridges, ya get bit. Not here though.” Jay slipped off his shoes and crawled 
onto a sleeping bag laid out on a foam bed. His beddings and belongings all seemed 
pretty clean. I set up the tripod and hooked up my big camera and decided not to do 
anything about the lighting. The sun was blasting in from the west and made the lighting 
on Jay hard to manage. There was a bright halo behind him and every time he moved, it 
influenced my lens and the lighting changed. But I couldn’t escape how overpowering the 
rims of the culvert were, how the bolts and webs seemed almost intentionally placed to 
frame this shot.  
 Jay was a different person when he was sober. That day he was clearheaded and he 
spoke well. A debater. Logical. Angry. “I’m a mouth, I speak out,” he said. “I hate them 
tweakers, and I put it in their face and they don’t like it.” With the village somewhat 
divided across three lines of addiction – tweaking (meth), junk (heroin) and soft stuff 
(liquor and pot) – Jay argued that various alliances seemed to be forming over the 
residents’ dependence on not only certain substances but on the persons who smuggled 
the crap in and sold it. At the time of Jay’s incident, several alleged tweakers were on the 
council and they were tired of his incessant speaking out. He took some pleasure in 
annoying them as often as he could by calling them “Tweaker, tweaker” in public and by 
making sarcastic remarks. Ultimately, he suggested, he pissed them off so much that they 
took his unfortunate fainting spell as an opportunity to rid them of his constant 
haranguing. Whatever the reason, he was here, in a culvert.  
 “Look, it’s simple. I wasn’t drunk. I even went to a doctor who told me that I might 
suffer from micturition syncope, a condition when a man can get up from sleeping and 
take a pee and faint and puke. And the way I read the write-up and the way they 
described it, that’s exactly what happened to me. I wasn’t drinking that night. I did take a 
sleeping aid from my wife that night, because of my past I have trouble sleeping at night 
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and trust me this [he motioned to the culvert] is really hard for me sleeping in here... I 
just got no choice.” 
 “I smoke weed, uh, I been trying to quit because the mental health classes that I go to 
require it. And I been using marijuana to help me sleep at night. It’s worked for me for 30 
years.” He was looking into the camera, directly. He seemed to be pleading with the lens 
or me, or an unseen authority. His voice was broken. I cannot describe how moving it 
was to hear; a metaphor would be rude, I think. I have goose bumps now, watching the 
video clips from which this transcription was derived – I had them then. Quivering, like a 
child, who struggles to understand, “Why?” 
 “And I’m really having a hard time quitting.” Jay covered his mouth, suppressing a 
sob. Catching his breath, he choked it out, “And I could go back to jail for that.” 
 A long pause.  
 And then came the confession. Finally, someone to listen and to tell his story. “Well, 
when I was 12, I was kidnapped, ah, for 11 months. And every heinous crime that could 
possibly happen to a small child happened.” He became calm and the tears dried up 
momentarily. He spoke matter of factly, effortlessly. “I was kept in a closet, and slid 
plates of food, maybe three or four times a week under the door. I was taken out and 
abused.” Jay’s eyes were scanning every inch of the ribbed rounded walls of the culvert. 
Fighting back a new volley of tears. And now his eyes glossed over again. “I am very 
claustrophobic.”  
 A long pause. I heard him swallow.  
 “Uh, stuff I am learning to deal with.” He wasn’t with us, he was back in the closet, 
and later, in his prison cell, and then, perhaps, back in the village in his home with his 
wife. He was nowhere near, but only a meter away. “They didn’t just hurt me by kicking 
me out of the village and keeping me away from my wife. They hurt me because they put 
me back here.”  
 
  
Fig. 33. Jay in his Culvert, July 2011. (N. Dickson). 
 490 
 
 To Jay, his exile marked a failure on the village’s behalf to invigilate rules 
appropriately, because in that space, what people say as witnesses, often as partisan 
witnesses, carries weight.  You don’t need evidence, nor are you granted a proper legal 
defense.  There is a legal system that models itself on trial by jury, but it in no way is as 
regulated or inhabited by due process as “real” courts. Essentially, at the bi-weekly 
membership meetings the council brings up incident reports about bad conduct and the 
villagers vote to support a number of punishments that include exile.  Three types of exile 
occurred when I was there. A “24” expels someone for the day and a night.  A week or 
two week, and up to a month, were also common. The most devastating is a permanent 
“86”.  It is clear that the village, like mainstream groups incorporates the punitive quality 
of space, in this case, housing, as device for conduct.  Jay was 86’d. So one can see how 
this place for all its claims to be democratic is, in judicial matters at least, ill-formed, 
poorly routinized and uses its own irregularly applied system of domination on members 
who are weaker, or who are un-liked for their views. It sits somewhere between proper 
judiciary practice and lawlessness.  Liminal spaces such as the village use ambiguity as a 
device for punishment. And this ambiguity keeps people tied to powerful others rather 
than the rules, because the rules only mean something if enough people say they do – in 
the village.   From this perspective, the village invites a normative discourse about what 
is justice, what is legal, and is it moral or ethical to let gangs govern? As ambiguous as 
the village seemed to me, hearing Jay refer to the culvert as “back here,” reminded me of 
just how relatively better structured and safe the village was, than the other places street 
people had lived. 
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 I could never understand how partisan groups in the village, regardless of how just 
the ruling, could invoke an exile upon one of their members, without investigating 
punishments that didn’t cede them back to homelessness.  Critics of the exile such as 
Samson, had rightly said, “It is mystifying to see homeless people treat other homeless 
people, like they were shelter Gods or cops. It’s outrageous.” The village does what 
conventional society does. It outcasts those who threaten the order of things as 
determined by those powerful enough to make such determinations. Hence liminality is 
not just a state of existence, it is a critique, a threat, a way of thinking.  
 Occupying a transitional phase places the “being” in a void of sorts relative to others, 
in a position to be shunned or mistrusted pending outcomes. From Mary Douglas’ (1966) 
Purity and Pollution, Turner suggests that what is “unclear, is unclean… pollution is a 
reaction to protect cherished principles from contradiction” (in Turner 1967:97). Turner 
remarks that,  “from this standpoint, one would expect to find that transitional beings are 
particularly polluting, since they are neither one thing or another: or may be both; or 
neither here nor there; or maybe even nowhere (in terms of any recognized cultural 
topography), and are at the very least, “betwixt and between” all the recognized fixed 
points in space-time structural classification”(97).    
 Later Turner presages the “dis” or stigmatizing discourse on the transitioning street 
homeless by reminding us that “a structurally negative characteristic of transitional 
beings is that they have nothing, … no status, property, insignia, secular clothing… 
nothing to demarcate them…” (98-99).  If one accepts that Dignity Villagers are liminal 
personae of sorts, then one accepts also that they are living in a community that is betwixt 
the street and conventional housing worlds, and that this entails a sense of rising out of 
 492 
the despair and impurity of the street identity, and into a reclaimed, conventional identity.  
The village uses access to housing as a sort of capital punishment for those who fall out 
of favor.  The city uses the streets too as a sort of implicit threat if the village doesn’t 
comply with the contract. They have told the village, though it is yet to be enforced, that 
they can shut the village down with notice at any time, regardless of the contract, and 
with no promise of an exit plan. This is a powerful sanction, the threat of losing one’s 
place in the village; it mirrors capitalism’s answer for all failures, expulsion to the 
margins. 
 Homelessness, then, places the individual betwixt and between conventional 
spatializations of life events, and also conventional relationships that serve as a rejoinder 
to the properly self-conducted life. The homeless who make claims on public space, or 
who build a new concept of home, the shanty, out of scrap, and thereby begin 
accumulating other material objects, clothing, bikes and such, one could argue, threaten 
the custom and normative, even ritual value of home ownership as the only legitimate 
from and site for private material accumulation (Jackson 1985; Gans 1993; Wagner 1993).  
Liminality then, to refresh, suggests that ideas, attitudes, opinions and identities, arguably 
any conceptualized or empirical phenomenon can be thought of or understood of in terms 
of the liminal space they occupy in a spatial - temporal sense, or on the psychic 
transformation they embody.    
 Bringing this argument to bear on the residents of the shantytown space, 
marginality, on the one hand might speak of promise, of crossing over to a desired and 
structurally consistent role, or on the other, as Myerhoff (1982:117), suggests, possible 
routes to alienation and lack of self-definition. Clearly Jay found his way into the latter, 
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while others in the village, fearing the same end, currently do not do anything to “rock 
the boat.” Dave Samson, suggests that the villager has to understand this sense of limbo 
as the result of buying into the institutional qualities of the village space.  In this sense the 
village is to him a total institution, from Goffman (1961) that separates a stigmatized 
group and fulfills all their necessities, while serving the needs of society at large to 
control problematic segments of the population. He argues that homeless people are 
preconditioned to this way of thinking about themselves because they have for the most 
part, been institutionalized in foster care, jails, welfare and psychiatric service,  for most 
of their lives and certainly as homeless recipients of aid.  Once accepted into the village, 
that frame of mind understands itself as incapable of experiencing the freedoms enjoyed 
outside of the gate, and seeks to fulfill such needs internally.  John Boy says, residing in 
the village fixes the person’s head; Samson suggests that it traps the mind in a sense of 
hopeless inevitability.  
 Dean’s analytics of government is a good model for answering Foucault’s 
question of  “how” governors want to govern, but just because the discourse of 
governance is expressed in manuals and contract language, actual life does not go on 
according to these rules in the village.  Life in Dignity Village is inherently anti-rational 
in the sense that people act and speak in highly irregular and fleeting patterns.  Rules are 
irregularly met, the goals of the mission are hardly achieved, and its transitional capacity 
is virtually non-existent.  “Dave Samson said once, “there is no such thing as truth here, 
we make it up as we go along.”  And this begs me to question the possibility of 
justifications in the sense that Boltanski has used it earlier.  The liminal nature of the 
village, allows for a number of make believe rules and fantasies about what is “just” to 
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become justifications, but these have very little to do with normative-diagnostics, or 
principles of organization and tend to confirm the temporary status of cliques with 
specific agendas inside the village. To sum it up, the village seems to mirror many of the 
liminal experiences and points of conflict that happen in conventional settings as well.  
 The key difference is that the conventional social world, there ideally are leaders 
and practitioners, institutions and organizations to help people experience liminality and 
transit into post-liminal roles (Van Gennep 1908; Turner 1982; Baumhol 2004).  For 
struggling communities and neighborhoods, organizers play an important role in making 
social and economic transformations possible.  At the very least, conventional society is 
supposed to provide the means by which to transit people through various stages of life; 
birth, childhood, adulthood and old age, and all the roles and statuses in between. 
Bourdieu has suggested that habitus guides these liminal experiences, Foucault and 
Boltanski both suggest that discourses and institutions provide continuous linkages 
between ideas, roles and how we choose to conduct ourselves.  But these structures do 
not exist in the village. Ibrahim said that the leadership just does not exist to help new 
villagers find their role or their critical voice.  I think the city knew this would be the case, 
and used it as a way to castrate the village’s critical potential.  City planners said “you 
need help, you need professional help” and when they granted the village its wings they 
knew the weight of democratic self-governance would not let it fly.  Once again, if the 
village acted as a transitional camp, the city and even the village’s public critics would be 
delighted. But it does not.  It is somewhere between the streets and this role as a 
transitional camp, and is therefore, a between-world, for persons whose desired transition  
is to a job and housing, but who rarely achieve these ends.  
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 It is also the case that the village resides outside the conventional imaginary partly 
because of the village’s isolation, but also because it does not present itself in any 
understandable mental categories that are testable or consistently understood. The village  
does not show up en masse anymore in the protests, on the streets helping others, or in 
the press.  The buzz about the village is no longer idyllic, and is very critical, because 
competition for the space to open camps is growing. We will end our discussion of the 
village by recognizing the way Soja’s way of looking at the village, in this case as a space 
to manage liminality, rather than a green democratic utopia, is giving current claims some 
relevance.  This new relevance is not merely experimental, it is based on the 
interpretation of how such places can reasonably contribute to liminal transitions. 
Scholars, activists and cities now want to know what the realistic interpretations of these 
places are. I already mentioned the continuum of debate generated by others about the 
village, but of there is no self-generated debate to inform these others, because there is no 
critical and collective voice.  In this way of thinking, and I think as the documents and 
transitional language suggests, the village and others that are modeled after it, are parts of 
the de facto shelter system, a system designed by city power to manage liminality, but not 
to transcend it. And I don’t think this is because governors don’t want people to take on 
mainstream homes and occupations, but is rather, because the jobs and the reasonably 
priced accommodations do not exist.  These other villages are only now realizing that 
they cannot govern alone; self-governing democratic intentional camps are a fantasy.   
They are coming to embrace a hybridization between external governance and  
membership that reeks of “shelter,” Regardless of the parallels between conventional 
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imaginaries and the world of the village, the bottom line is that the village is a space set 
aside by power for an alternate vision on how to manage liminality.  
 Hopper and Baumohl (2004) argue that “In America in the late twentieth century, 
life-course transitions in general have become more individualized, less bound to 
strategic family decisions, less subject to custom’s scripting. As liminality become[s] 
riskier and more easily derailed, its casualties may find their way into the ranks of the 
officially homeless” (2004:356 [my emphasis]).  This is vitally important; liminality 
applies to us all as we experience our own rites of passage.  University educations no 
longer guarantee jobs. Seniority no longer guarantees one’s pension.  College grads are 
living at home.  Homes are becoming more difficult to keep, and illness or mental 
breakdowns are on the rise across all categories.  We can abridge my use of liminality to 
extend to people who are not homeless.   The village in a very unique way bundles all the 
hope and all the insecurity into a single bounded spatialization. I describe this as a sort of 
idealized community model, which in ways is a between-world, a sort of hybridized 
space that combines Foucault’s (failed) governmentality with a range of ill-formed and 
liminal forms of justification for resolving conflict, that combine to create this 
perpetually liminal space. 
 Earlier I discussed communitas as having limited applicability to the village. By 
now, it should be clear that in the sense that it is populated by homeless people who live 
in a social structure that reflects conventional ideals, but interprets broader legal and 
political processes in its own convenient and irregular ways, the space is both real and 
unreal; real in the Cartesian sense of being bounded by thresholds, unreal in the sense that 
it is largely a place of fantasies about performing conventional ways of living.  Like 
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Turner, Foucault (1984) had ideas about how to understand places that invert, twist, resist 
and reject.  If the village could learn to re-imagine itself for these other qualities; twisting, 
inverting, resisting, would we see the re-emergence of the village activist citizen?  I want 
to re-enter the earlier brief discussion of spatial heterotopias because they have had some 
popularity in recent years as models for spaces of resistance. I want to demonstrate that 
resistance is only one of many possible ways to look at these camps.  
(A sampler of the village space 2011 -http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lN8pe-dCnQQ). 
 
7.3 Counter - Conduct in Heterotopic Community 
  According to Foucault (2007) resistance is way to question how we are governed, 
not to reject government. This question about how to be governed in a certain way can 
result in “counter-conducts” that reflect the choice of actors, groups of actors in the 
pursuit of alternative ways to achieve the same ends, through new leaders, new political 
alliances, new rationales and strategies, vis a vis political, economic and social areas of 
living.  
Yes. Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any 
exercise of power. To make a parenthetical remark, I recall having been invited, in 1966, 
by a group of architects to do a study of space, of something that I called at that time 
"heterotopias, " those singular spaces to be found in some given social spaces whose 
functions are different or even opposite others.  The architects worked on this, and at the 
end of the study someone spoke up--a Sartrean psychologist-who firebombed me, saying 
that space is reactionary and capitalist, but history and becoming are revolutionary. This 
absurd discourse was not at all unusual at the time. Today everyone would be convulsed 
with laughter at such a pronouncement, but not then (Foucault, 1984:252). 
 
 Counter conducts (“contre-conduites” 2004:199) appear in Foucault’s work (also 
2007) as a form of resistance against the way governance is experienced (201). Years 
before that he had discussed spatializations of resistance in various places which exist 
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simply for the purposes of twisting, inverting and playing with alternative forms of self-
conduct and liminal life experience. In 1984, The French journal, 
Architecture/Mouvement/Continuité published a text called “Des Espace Autres,” which 
constituted the basis for a lecture given by Foucault in 1967.1 Heterotopias are presented 
by Foucault as zones of contestations and resistance, yet following Topinka (2010), I 
would argue that in cases, such as the shantytown, they are in fact sites of a reordering of 
extant relations of power that delineate the bounds of freedom and autonomy for actors 
pursuing alternative avenues towards these ends.  They are zones where critique displaces 
power and fills space with its own version of order. In effect, the heterotopia is most 
useful for understanding resistance, not as an outright rejection of power, but as a means 
by which actors try to realign themselves in order to have more of it, even if in a ludic, 
event-based or highly temporary and concentrated spatialization.2  
  There are places too, in every culture, where the other sites of normal living are 
simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. They are outside these other places, 
but are real, they have context in space, the same space, but as places of counter ideas and 
actions - these are heterotopias.  Between the utopia and the heterotopia, there is another 
site, which he calls the mirror.  
 “In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens 
up behind the surface; I am over there, there, where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives 
my own visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such 
is the utopia of the mirror.  But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in 
reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position I occupy” (Foucault 1984:  
5-6).3  
 
 The mirror functions as a heterotopia in the sense that it makes the place from 
which the reflection originates, the place of the viewer, absolutely real and connected to 
all points in space around him yet it is also absolutely unreal since this spatialization of 
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inverted reality must be reflected through a virtual point that exists outside the viewer.  I 
will return to this, since in many ways this is part of the process of perpetual liminality 
that the shantytown embodies - they look at themselves in the critiques of the village that 
appear in media, research, conversations and political pressures from governance, that see 
the village in unique ways that villagers must reconcile with their own self-perceptions.   
It is also partly the place or the space if you will of the pragmatic ethnography of critique; 
the book Dignity in Exile, Mosher’s “Doorways to Dignity and Tent City Tools kit”, my 
videos for the village and this dissertation, create a certain composite mirror, one might 
argue. When I repatriated the book to the village for feedback and to start conversations, I 
was handing them a mirror. When they watch the intake video, they see a mirror of how 
they are to govern. 
 As for heterotopias, there are six principles that define them.4 I will look only to 
the fifth and sixth here. The fifth principle is that “heterotopias presuppose a system of 
opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable” (10). Usually the 
entry into a heterotopic site is not universal or free.  They can be mandatory like prison, 
or they might require a rite of passage, such as membership rituals in a sports club. In 
order to get in, one might have to obtain permission or make gestures of a kind that 
garner such permission; to get into the village you have to sign up, wait for a call, and 
then follow certain rules, exchanging your labor for use of the village commons, put in  a 
certain amount of time proving your value to the group, and then signing a document that 
symbolizes commitment to the group’s core values. The sixth and last trait of 
heterotopias is that they function in relation to all the other space that remains.  Either 
their role is to create an illusory space that exposes all the contents of real space, as 
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illusory in themselves – a place of critique, similarly to the clandestine and 
representational spaces in Lefebvre.  Or they are real spaces, “crafted meticulously as if 
to scorn the messy jumbled actuality of real life.”5  In this sense, the village, and all 
intentional communities, are to some degree heterotopic in the way they must balance 
exterior governing building codes and fire regulations and unite with often counter views 
of social conduct or organization.  
 For Foucault, heterotopias, like Turner’s communitas, are effective at the personal 
level of the actor and at a social-structural level.  As a site with which to play out the 
fantasies of rejection and of unrestrained freedom, to imagine one’s life as more 
empowered, more pagan, more wealthy, less confined or managed, as examples, actors 
can contest and reject in a critical and at the same time, ludic manner, the status quo.6 
Perhaps it is knit picking to suggest that for a scholar who eschewed the idea of grand 
foundations, the six elements of heterotopias seem very foundational, which might also 
explain why he so quickly abandoned these ideas.  However, it is reasonable that like so 
many of his early ideas, later translated, his original intent was not the most valuable of 
the lessons to be learned. Topinka (2010) and St. John (2001) employ the idea of 
alternative cultural heterotopias to event such as Burning Man,  a pagan festival in the 
US desert, and it might be argued the actions of Portland’s urban re-claimers discussed 
earlier could be framed in this light.  Insomuch as heterotopias suggest a destabilization 
of how actors look at fixed perceptions of social reality, they suggest that beginning with 
ideas, knowledge, at least, then, things can change.7  
 In Foucault’s definition, Heterotopias are linked to all other spaces even though 
they are isolated.8  When St. John and Hetherington (1997:41) for example, assert that 
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heterotopias exist “apart from central spaces that are seen to represent social order,” the 
emphasis seems to be on this physical first space that Of Other Places suggests, the 
parkette or the shantytown on the outskirts of town, and not on the second space, that of 
knowledge creation, that imbricates not only with the formation of spaces, but with the 
actions of actors within them. In this sense, the claim that became Dignity Village  
presented alternative ideas about how to use space through collective action,  which 
suggests a certain mental or ideological space, and then secured an actual physical space 
as the spatialization of new knowledge. The parkette is understood as a fun place for 
recreation and relaxation within an arrangement of various other spaces; the skyscrapers, 
the factories, the streets; capital, labour, death, but the village is not so clearly separate.9 
The very effectiveness of heterotopias rests in the fact that they are not utopias.  
As an unreal space, utopias exist as fantasy worlds outside of extant power and systems 
of order.  They cannot challenge order since they are not implicated in it. But 
heterotopias offer alternate versions of order, not anti-order.  They may be counter-
hegemonic, but they are tied to hegemony and it is out of this necessary relational tension 
that the heterotopia first finds its existence rationalized, and then constructs its actions 
that define it as resistance or as a counter-site. Recall that Foucault says, heterotopias 
“function in relation to all other sites that remain” (1967:7).  Topinka astutely points out 
that what such counter sites do is make visible the “formations of received knowledge, 
and thus represents a confrontation with knowledge production that promises new 
information. Yet these formulations will not shed the dominant order” (60).  Foucault had 
said,   
 502 
“To analyze ‘regimes of practices’ mean to analyze programmes of conduct 
which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done and codifying effects 
regarding what is to be known” (1991a [1980]:75). 
 
 Both communitas and heterotopias are interesting ways to understand the spaces 
and places that the Dignity homeless people experience.  As much as they ostensibly 
have incorporated democracy, their performance of it is so flawed that is hardly “as yet to 
come,” but in my mind, it has yet to arrive at all. I have tried to show how the 
shantytown, Dignity Village can be reasonably understood for some of the ways these 
models of space and liminality apply to it, or it to them as it were. However, none of 
these ways of looking at space on their own is adequate for understanding the village or 
the liminality it produces. The village is not temporary, even if people are supposed to be 
there temporarily. It has been there twelve years and does not move. It has few rituals and 
rites of passage, but the experience of these by villagers is not uniform or managed well, 
and they rarely succeed the interstructural role they have when they enter.  That is; they 
rarely actually perform the duties of members, nor do they transcend their homelessness 
by becoming housed in conventional worthy places. Furthermore, and most importantly, 
communitas, and temporary heterotopias do not end with people on the streets or 
regressing backwards into a structurally permanent liminality. In her Masters Thesis, 
Jessica McCaffrey discusses how she followed several Burning Man devotees back into 
their lives in Montreal, had meals at their homes, and more or less experienced them in 
their conventionally lived lives (McCaffrey 2012). Temporary spatializations like 
Burning Man, would cease to be if this conventional life was absent because there would 
be no need for them as sites of counter conduct, nor would their followers likely be able 
to venture there if they were not employed or otherwise resourced.    
 503 
 There is nothing essentially ludic or anti-structural about the village.  As Brad 
Powell said in chapter two it is there to give people structure. It is failing to do that. It is 
not a celebration or a festival though it tries to use these from time to time, to make 
money or to promote itself. The homelessness that sent people to the village was anti-
structural, a threat to order, so the village was arranged in a manner we discussed at 
length in chapter six, as a point, a node, a level, a place, within the structure of housing 
governance, specifically designed to manage liminality, perpetually, not as something 
that emerged as an inversion or challenge to order.  It was from the moment it codified its 
existence in the legal and spatial discourse of the city, a part of the de facto housing 
system.  This recognition opens up the village to a number of ways that it sits in and out 
of that system, which we investigate shortly. 
  
7.4 Spaces More Generally - Everything is Possible 
 
  Recall that Soja (1996) described Thirdspace as a means of uniting Lefebvrian 
and Foucauldian spatial modes into a flexible and progressive way of looking at matters 
of spatial justice, which overcomes the Firstspace-Secondspace myopia. Lefebvre (1974) 
offered a category called representational space; a type of mental category of space that 
includes ideas and creativity, and which constitutes the place of artisans, political plots 
and clandestine activity in neocapitalist cities. Foucault’s heterotopia, is a temporary 
locality-based space of action where members invert, play with, try on and often reorder 
social and political practices that occur in society at large as a from of resistance to 
extreme power that borders on domination (1986a). In Dignity’s case, the villager is 
constantly looking outwards at a world in which they cannot find relevance, and at 
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conventional identities that continue to elude them, but is free to assume various roles 
and statuses in the village or at least that is one of the ways I understand it, as a mirror of 
sorts - a between world, where all such imaginings are possible.  Meaning, as I have 
argued earlier is essentially a pragmatic concern in the sense that one is making sense of 
the world.  This as a type of critique is polyvalent and unstable, and so it changes over 
time and in response to what people think about time spent in space(s). Earlier in chapters 
two and four, the two Brads, and I apologize for using their transcripts and the nominal 
confusion, both discuss what the space is supposed to produce.  Brad Gibson says it is 
supposed to produce activists  but only produces deadbeats who come there for the cheap 
rent. Brad Powell sees it as the chance to change the world, but after a time, a year or so, 
is disillusioned and victim to the village’s drug culture.  Today he is accused of being its 
central drug dealer. Understanding space then, and life in space as a certain way that 
people become oriented towards meaning, cannot be achieved by fitting space into 
narrow containers.  Once again, we need to see diversity.  There are ways,  
Soja has said, “I define Thirdspace as an-Other way of understanding and acting to 
change the spatiality of human life, a distinct mode of critical spatial awareness that is 
appropriate to the new scope and significance being brought about in the rebalanced 
trialectices of spatiality–historicality–sociality” (1996:57). 
 
 Thirdspace is meant to engage, critique and synthesize cultural and spatial 
boundaries into inclusive spatializations of experience. The application of the concept to 
understand spaces means that one can look at the same community, but from differing 
points of interpretation. He called this approach, “thirding” and it is exactly the kind of 
critique that undergirds the diverse positions taken by opposing points of views in the 
debates over Dignity Village’s right to be. 
Soja, (2011:114) said,  
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“I just want to address briefly the notion of "heterotopia", which has become a very 
widely used (and, I think, abused) term in the contemporary literature on space and cities. 
The term is usually taken from Foucault and applied as if it signified a particular material 
site, location, or territory with special qualities. In a manner very similar to this usage of 
heterotopia, I am often asked "does place X or site Y fit your definition of a Thirdspace?" 
There is no direct answer here, for all spaces can be seen as Third spaces or heterotopias 
depending on the scope of one's critical geographical imagination, the perspective one 
has on how far one can reach with a critical spatial perspective. Heterotopias are what 
you open up to view when you look at space heterotopologically, whether you are 
looking at an asylum, a garden, a boat, or Los Angeles.” 
 
 
In clarifying what he means by Thirdspace, Soja says,  
 
 “All three of the spaces I discuss in Thirdspace are perspectives, different ways in which 
observers look at and interpret space. The main historical observation I make is that until 
recently most observers/scholars looked at space in only two broadways, either as 
material forms (things in space) or as imagined representations of material space 
(thoughts about space). What I argue, following Lefebvre and Foucault's lead, is that 
there is another, different perspective that sees space as fully lived, as things in and 
thoughts about space and more. And also, that this Thirdspace perspective gives to space 
the same scope and critical importance that Western social theory and philosophy have 
given to time and history for more than a hundred years. If one does not have this broader 
perspective, the arguments against the privileging of time over space, history over 
geography, are not very convincing” (114). 
  
  Because of the heterotopic, representational, and structural ways that the village 
imbricates with conventional imaginaries and broader strategies of housing governance, 
following Soja (1996) then, understanding the critiques that attach to the village, and 
those produced in the village requires a thirding perspective that gives equal weight to the 
many ways the village can bee seen as a spatial and temporal object.  Having stayed there 
and studied it for some time, I cannot see it in a festive, ludic or temporary liminality.  
This is a space of endemic and enduring liminality. Yet, since people occupy it, and 
power is relational, there is critical capacity and critical potential in the village. I think 
what we are witnessing is the creation of a whole new space devoted to a spatialization of 
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broadly based liminality, similar to what happened after the Civil War and the Great 
Depression with Hobo camps and Shantytowns or Hoovervilles. In those cases, tolerance 
of these communities was short-lived, and as soon as the state could eliminate them, just 
as with Tent City in Toronto, they were ambitiously paved to the ground.  However, 
unlike Tent City, or Dignity Village, those older camps were not understood by the state 
as the harbingers of social critique to the same degree that are current forms.  
 
7.5 The Death Blow? 
 In the months that followed my departure in July 2011 participants and I had dozens 
of conversations about what transitional means, what their rights as a corporation were, 
but the village, as was usual did nothing about getting a lawyer to vet the impending 
contract, or to meet with the city and voice their concerns. The city imposed the new 
version of the contract, which we have seen in chapter 6, by insisting it be signed by a 
certain deadline, or else withdrawn.  Mitch Grubic had become CEO and was a capable 
leader, if not too authoritarian for some people. Rocky, had said he had “that God thing.”  
Under his watch and partly driven by his ego, he tried to start enforcing rules in the 
village.  In his words, “it was impossible to do this because I would have had to kick 
everyone out.” Because the village was so poorly organized, they did very little in the six 
months they had to write a response to the contract. This is by now, the way things are 
done, or perhaps more correctly, not done in the village. Mitch could not do everything.  
His fellow council members were guessing at how to do their jobs.  There is no 
guidebook or instructor’s manual for how to bookkeep, or do the monthly and quarterly 
reports.  There was never a formally organized procedure for teaching these skills, yet 
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government there demands some skills. The founders, many of them, developed the 
system and so the skills they had were built into how they imagined the administrative 
system.  Leaders are supposed to share with members these skills, but once again there is 
no institutionalized structure for helping people transit into roles.  The roles fall onto 
them, without a liminal period where they learn what the role means by skilled leaders 
and practitioners.  Two secretaries and three treasurers were asked to leave the village 
because their incapacity to do their job well had appeared to be malfeasance. In short, 
there was no system for learning what needed to be known to run the camp. 
 Church et al (2008:3) suggest that informal learning is any process by which learning 
occurs outside of formal school or educational settings. I had wanted to think this work 
through in those lines, except that in the village, there was a de facto absence of  
“learning;” there was the need to learn, and people who could help, including Ibrahim, 
me, Wendy and Heather, and a number of local activist supporters, offered and tried to 
force the villagers to “learn,” but there was a clearly absent desire on the part of the 
village as a group to do so. Then there was too the very debilitating effects of having the 
majority of villagers stoned, drunk or high most of the time, and then many of them too, 
suffered learning disabilities and psychiatric issues that contributed to an inability to learn. 
Mitch, Brad Gibson and Ptery were the only ones who ventured out to learn how to lead, 
going to leadership meetings at R2DTOO and other housing activist groups. As a result 
they appeared to have the knowledge to carry the village into a new phase of critical 
engagement and power within the city’s strategic plan.  With a thirty day grace period 
expended, in early December 2012, Mitch in a final act as CEO of the village, signed the 
new contact without fighting for any changes to the transitional language.   
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 With a promise from the city not to move anyone who was there for at least three 
years, the contract was signed. At the end of Mitch’s term as president in December of 
2012, Brad Gibson was elected as CEO, Ptery was elected as treasurer, Scot and Lisa 
were elected as secretary and Outreach officer and Dave Samson was elected as Security 
Officer.  During this transition, several of the older members left the village under 
suspicion of malfeasance and other wrongdoing. The city was dubious about the village’s 
viability under such improprieties.  Under fear of prosecution, they left.  Some went to 
family, most to the streets. In the next six months, a dozen new members came in, several 
of whom had been there before and were anxious to get involved in outreach and activist 
activities.  In the same period as well, Occupy Portland had established itself in the city 
and in 2012 - 2013, while Occupy camps were disappearing elsewhere, in Portland, its 
influence was still salient.  Ibrahim’s R2DTOO was going strong.  While Ibrahim and 50 
other squatters were tactically displacing power downtown, they were incorporating a 
few participants from Dignity Village into their action (Brad and Ptery were most active - 
See DS DISC 2, parts 1 and 2) and villagers were given an active site on which to learn 
about being activists again. Furthermore, the attention that R2DTOO brought to the 
continuous plight of the street poor, shed more light on Dignity Village, an intense 
scrutiny again, that raised questions within the village about what they really wanted 
from housing and how far they were willing to go to get it.   
 And then there was the book, Dignity in Exile.  We have read some excerpts from it 
in this dissertation. I had sent several copies to the village and most villagers had read it.  
Activists and other housing advocates read it, and a new series of conversations began 
between the villagers and me, especially about where to go, how to proceed now that the 
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latest contract had been signed, and villagers had by then thought of themselves as 
residents of an explicitly defined transitional camp.  What would the ideal homeless camp 
look like they wondered?  
 Bogged down by the city’s rewording of the contract, villagers began to ask 
themselves what transitional meant to them as individuals. They were reaching a certain 
anomie to borrow Durkheim’s use, where they knew what they wanted as an endgame 
but had neither the ritual nor the practices in place to get them there.  They understood 
that in the discourse of the contract and the views of governance they were liminal 
personae, expected to move on after a suitable period in the village.  There were several 
strategies available to them.  They could do nothing and get high all the time.  They could 
put their names on waiting lists and hopefully get housing before the contract expired.  
They could organize and start to fight for the health and longevity of the community—
they could do the hard work of fixing what was broken and prove themselves worthy 
once again of the displacement they had earned so long ago, and in so doing infuse the 
critique with their own terms once again.  By all accounts this was a difficult period and 
very clear cleavages formed.  The most dynamic cleavage was between those villagers 
who were willing to “activate” and those who through drug alliances and their status as 
old timers were empowered by the village, and who were either too shortsighted or too 
optimistic to realize the serious conditions this contract placed on their future. They 
argued that the contracts were always there to keep them in line, and this was yet  “just 
another. There would be more.”  
  In the depths of a certain crisis of community, villagers made inquiries to Kwamba, 
and to me about the direction the village might take.  And as this was happening, Eugene 
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and Ashland Oregon were seeking the advice of Dave Samson, Brad Gibson, Ibrahim, 
Ptery and a few other Dignity activists in order to inform these cities’ own plans to build 
intentional homeless camps.   At the request of the leadership at the village and as a way 
to help finalize my own research we agreed to have a series of conversations about 
Dignity Village and what the future might hold. I basically asked them, “What is going 
on there now, and what would you do to fix it?” 
As Shorty, the last remaining original member of the village said:  
 
“You know, this place has been many things. It was a camp, then a shantytown. They 
called us transitional to fit into the language of their laws, but they never enforced it. So, 
people are used to living here. It’s our homes. And even last year, when the contract 
came up for renewal, they suggested taking out the word transitional because, for sure, it 
wasn’t working like, to get folks back into houses. So they was content to keep it as was. 
They even wanted to take ‘transitional’ out. And this is what is really scary to us… you 
know, they have the power. They can tell us what we are and how we are, uh, how we 
should be. Someone somewhere doesn’t like what we are doing here, and maybe they are 
afraid that too many of us, places like this are popping up, or will. But now they are 
gonna tell us that we are nothing more than a shelter. They are turning us into a part of 
their shelter system. Not only are they telling us we have to be transitional, they told us it 
has to be in two years. It’s scary. Scary, you know. Most of us won’t be able to find a 
place, and the few that do will end up in shit holes.” (Shorty left a few weeks ago [June 
2013] to live with a friend, because the drug gangs and emotional violence in the village 
was too much for him). 
 
Most of the immediate replies I received from villagers reiterated what I had been told in 
2011 by Ken, a long-term member. 
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Fig. 34. Ken, 2011. (N. Dickson). 
 
July 2011 - Ken has been at the village for four years. He’s a big unkempt man. He 
walks with a cane. Seven years earlier, he came to Oregon to work with his brother, but 
the job fell through.  He ended up living under the Burnside Bridge and various parks. 
The cops used to come by usually around three in the morning to roust the sleepers. 
There were a lot of them he says. “It was crazy, chaos.”  He came to the village because 
he got tired of being rousted. 
 “So what was the vibe like in the village then?” I asked. 
 “Phew. A lot better than it is now.” 
“How would you describe the vibe now?” 
 He looks down. Shakes his head.  A deep sigh.  “ The politics are outta control.  I 
don’t go to the meetings unless I absolutely have to.” 
 “Do you feel like it’s futile to go to the meetings?” 
Quietly. Reserved.  “Yeah…” 
“What makes it so futile?” I ask. 
 “People constantly at each other’s throats.  Just the politics are getting outta hand.” 
 “Do you think it would be better if more people were involved in the council. If 
the council was bigger than as small as it is?” He looks around to see who’s listening. No 
one was around. 
“ Yeah, but.. the biggest thing I’ve noticed is the drug problem. There’s too many people 
using that stuff in here… it’s a violation of rule 3.’ 
 I interrupt him, “but don’t you drink beer?” 
He looks at me like I should know everyone does. “Sometimes but I can safely say that in 
34 years I have been alive, I have never used drugs.” 
 I look at him away from the lens of my camera.  “But its not a secret that people 
here are doing drugs - people admit it then deny and admit it and  - how do you think it 
translates into a political problem, the drug problem?” 
“Its not so much it’s a political problem as it effects people’s judgment. You know 
everybody’s got their own little cliques around here. Everyone that’s on the council with 
the exception of a couple is in their own little clique.” 
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 I offer, “And the cliques are based on support related to certain resources like drugs or 
something?” 
 “Some of them, yeah.” 
I agree with him that hard drugs are a real problem for the village, “But the bylaw that 
says ‘you can’t have any beer or drugs’ is a little unrealistic, because everyone smokes 
dope or drinks beer here., right?  
“Almost everyone,” he adds. 
He sounds to me like he is trying to convince himself, as if it is important that not 
everyone does drugs. “Not everyone, but close.” 
 “Can you tell me a bit about the IR system?” 
 He cuts me off—with an instructive outstretched hand. 
 “I’ve written one IR since I got here, I don’t like them.” 
“And can you tell me what’s an IR?” 
 It’s an incident report.  People write up IRs on other people for violating rules around the 
village. Pet Rules… ah violating the five basic rules, you know…stuff like that” 
I ask him, “But isn’t the fact that they have IRs a good way to stop people from 
conflicting directly – 
Yeah well a lot of the time those IRs are frivolous – they write ‘em just to be  pain in the 
ass. “ 
I ask, “So they are not really used to mediate conflict, which is what they were for…” 
 “Right.. see what we’re trying to do is set up a committee to investigate the IRs once 
they’re written before they actually go up in front of the council. Because a lot of these 
IRs are like I said, frivolous. They write ‘em just to be MEAN. I’ve had IRs written on 
me because people didn’t like me. A couple of months back I had my house broken into. 
They took almost a thousand dollars worth of my electronics. They took my netbook, my 
PSB, and my Internet modem…. I just called the police and gave them the serial numbers.  
Which means if they try and sell it a pawn shop the serial numbers will be flagged.” 
“How common is that sort of thing around here?” 
 Unfortunately it’s pretty common as of late. 
“It wasn’t that way before,” I said. 
“No, it … you know when I first got here you could walk out of the village all day long 
and leave your door standing wide open and come back and everything would be right 
where it was. But now you know if I leave my house even for a second, I’ll lock it up. “   
“So let me ask you a question. Do you think we should have more Dignity Villages… 
here now this place, should there be more?” 
“Well they could actually set another one up in Portland because the city’s zoned for two  
of these. 
“Well do you think they should? Knowing what you know about this place now, and the 
way it runs and all the crap that’s going on these days, do you think it’s a good idea?” 
“Well I think if they could take 8 to 12 individuals from here that are really committed to 
the village itself and set up another site somewhere, I think it could happen.” 
I agree: “Right,  that way, they could start and invigilate the rules properly, it could 
happen…because it’s kind of hard to go backwards. This place kinda feels like it’s 
imploding.” 
He is nodding his head pensively but agreeably the whole time. 
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“Well its  lot better than when it started…you know they stared out underneath the 
Morrison Bridge (They moved shortly after to the Fremont).” 
“No, that’s not what I mean. I mean it was functioning like a community far better 4 
years ago, 3 years ago 2 years ago… in the last two years it hasn’t really been much of a 
community. And  a lot of people are saying that’s when the meth  started.” 
He is not sure it has anything to do with the drugs.   He is pretty sure the drug use is 
because of a certain hopelessness that people have about the possibility of leaving there 
and finding anything better. 
 “ I think with the economy, the jobs and everything, it’s affecting everyone’s judgment. 
I ask him, “So it’s a question of judgment? People are making poor decisions?”  
“Yeah. But that’s just my opinion, and you know what they say about opinions…”  
 
 I do not want to sound repetitive.  I really do not. If Ken’s words sound familiar, it 
is because they are all too familiar.  Addiction is partly a psychological and somatic 
dependence on substances, but in this case,  is symptomatic of an underlying and 
fundamental disconnect that people have with their surroundings. I talked earlier about 
my own addictions and those of others, and it should be clear that having a beer or 
smoking marijuana on a Sunday afternoon with no responsibilities, for fun, what we call 
recreational use, is not what Ken or the others refer to as the drug problem in the village.  
They are talking primarily of a meth-amphetamine epidemic. When he refers to the 
village being a better place in the past, it was because during that time they had goals - 
they were building a community - literally cooperating and help each other build 
structures and figuring ways to get fed; they were helping other homeless people who 
came to the village or by going into the community and offering help.  They were out in 
the community looking for support, and otherwise “activating” as Brad and others have 
put it.  
 My short visit there in 2010 was the last period that saw any building in the 
community, and any effort to build relations outside of the community.  The former 
observation is because they were building the greenhouse which was the last new 
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structure permitted on the grounds; the latter is because the city was about to extend their 
contract and the villagers had to clean up the place and get outside of the gates to make 
sure they had support from the rest of the housing community.  This lasted for two 
months during June and July 2011. These contract inspections were periods when the 
community had to act critically and it was surprising how much power that generated for 
them.  That temporary contract was offered, a number of new supporters came on board 
and for a short interlude the village was like it was in the old days.  This was the village I 
saw in June of 2010.  
 By January of 2011, feeling safe in yet another temporary contract and under the 
leadership of John Boy’s meth faction, the village was a totally different creature. And it 
had remained in the place Ken talks about, and that you have read about, since then. 
These events that I just mentioned should indicate that drugs are only a superficial 
symptom of what happens when there is no transformative or super-liminal experiences 
in which villagers must partake. As Ibrahim said much earlier, it is necessary to fight for 
freedom and work for liberty. When the village has a contract and supporters are sending 
them food and clothing, what need is there really to surpass limbo?  So I have been 
asking them over the last 24 months, what they intended to do about the stagnation, 
because those with whom I share the most, agreed that the epidemic was about limbo, 
even if what the world saw was drug use. 
 
7.6 What Are the Practical Implications of Thinking About the Village Differently? 
 It comes down to the contract and the right and freedoms that are encoded - and then 
too, to the willingness of the city or the villagers to fight respectively for those they hold 
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dear to them. While Brad was CEO, we talked often because city representatives had 
been inspecting the village and suggesting directly - asking - them to join up on housing 
wait lists.  They had been stressing the transitional definition of how life was supposed to 
be lived there.  I jotted on a note after a phone call with Samson and then Brad,  
Villagers were being asked, perhaps told, to think of the village in alternate terms. The 
group was pretty nervous and everything they say is all about the village, all about the 
contract, all about what to do. I told Brad it was time to think pragmatically and he said, 
“It was a pretty God-pragdammic time, for the village, a real challenge to his emotions.”  
 
 We talked about the contract, and he said,  
 
“ They hold this up to us like a threat, as a way to remind us who’s  ultimately in charge. 
But they wouldn’t dare kick someone else out.  No way. They couldn’t handle the 
repercussions in the press. The village. Now that’s a different matter.  The village has got 
five more years. They want us off of here and moved, or gone in five years.  (the contract 
said 3 at that time, 1.5 now -  he was being optimistic) If we don’t find a place for the 
community, they can say we failed because we as a group had ample notice, and maybe 
we weren’t viable as a community anymore.  But no way they can pick on people like 
they are black sheep and force them out of here. Even if it is in writing.  All that section 
of the contract does is make people walk around in a dirge, so they got no motivation to 
do nuthin. And so now when we try to get them motivated, it’s like zapping a sleeping 
dog with a prod, it just gits up, shuffles over to another corner and goes back to sleep. 
They don’t know or want to believe that they have rights and this contract doesn’t mean 
the end of anything. We have paper, see.  We’re a 501-C3  non-profit and even if they 
wiped us out tomorrow, that paper is in good standing, so the village goes on, just as long 
as there is people willing to fight for it and to support it.  Maybe not here.  Maybe 
somewhere else. ” 
 
  If the state manages to produce the dirge, the first thing critique must do is expose 
this fact, and make villagers aware of their need to resist it. Recall that governments work 
“through practices of freedom and states of domination, forms of subjection and 
subjectification” (Dean 1999:46).  Brad and Ptery, each having spent considerable 
portions of the two years since I had met them with Ibrahim and other community 
activists, through Brad’s office as CEO, were trying to introduce policies and practices 
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that got “people thinking.”  They introduced conversations about rehabilitation, 
psychiatric supports and cleaning up the village, in addition to reiterating the village’s 
commitment to community service as a basic requirement of membership. Brad took 
charge of the computers and other communal devices making sure they were working 
properly and not misused.  Things went missing often, and when sponsors were giving 
the village 52 inch TVs and remote controls, iPads and other objects to share, and these 
things broke from misuse, or disappeared, it was a problem.  It was not like they could 
pay to repair them, and worse was the fact that such mistreatment of donations meant that 
some villagers were abusing privileges at others’ expense.  So Brad started organizing 
tools, machines, electronics and other community property. Organizing, to him, meant 
storing things in his office or at home so they weren’t misused. He spent a lot of time 
working at the R2DTOO campsite, going to local community meetings and even helped 
plan the actions of R2DTOO as a means to keep alive the link between Dignity Village 
and other actions. To their credit, a few of the other faction leaders participated.  They 
didn’t stick it out, appearing at two protests only, but even this was an improvement. 
While Brad was trying to run things like a business, Ptery was spending most of his time 
working in a local wellness center and advocating for various groups, especially 
R2DTOO and City Repair. 
 There had been a transition in membership too. I mentioned that several residents 
were removed. Two died. Three others left to get into city housing spaces. And several 
others left on their own to get out of the “dirge.” Of the 56 who were there when I was, 
23 new members had joined the village by January of 2013.  Of course, because the 
village keeps terrible records, this is hard to verify. I did a head count by video at a 
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membership meeting, and it seems accurate. A problem had been emerging in the village; 
most of these new members were fresh from the streets, and all had addiction or mental 
health issues of one kind or another. Though I was not there to witness it, each week I 
would talk to different villagers who described how new alliances were forming in the 
village again, around drugs and “promises” to be given shacks of their own ahead of the 
line as it were - patronage, village style. While Brad was out trying to “activate,” his 
discussions and invitations to bring outside help into the village, including and this is 
crucial, a joint effort by him, Ptery and a few community activists to get community 
health service to help in a village wide drug intervention, became a widely speculated 
rumor.   
 One can see from the few stories I have told, that Brad was acting in ways that 
broke with the habitus of the village.   What was he doing? He was trying to clean up the 
village, including his own addictions; he was trying to manage the affairs of the village 
by actually taking control over resources and management procedures, he was trying to 
reactivate the village’s promise to be a part of the community.  In a sort of anti-
Bourdieusen break with habitus, he was trying to get villagers to be activists in their own 
affairs and the affairs of the village, because he recognized just how mired in this liminal 
dirge (dirge as habitus?) they had become as a result of long term structural conditions 
that held no promise of emancipation from poverty or homelessness. Most importantly,  
Brad and the other activists, Samson, Ptery, and most of us supporters had suggested 
bringing in outside advisors to help run certain aspects of the village such as bookkeeping, 
and general maintenance, and also to sit on council as a way to rebalance the way 
decisions are made.  These measures were things he talked about with the villagers but as 
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ways of overcoming the dirge.  But most villagers, who were in the dirge, also were in 
denial about it. This structural liminality, the threat of the contract, the drug epidemic, the 
loss of supporters, in short this dirge, once again, was produced by the city’s long-term 
control over the village, the lack of any real supports or “aftercare” plan for villagers, 
except the long-shot of finding housing, and then there was its isolation to the margins 
that gave people a reason not to go downtown and activate. Most importantly, strong 
leadership and legitimate authority had come to mean little in the village, and in its place 
was the perpetual angst between uncooperative factions who seeded council with their 
members.  
 All of these impediments to developing fully participative political subjects were, 
as I have shown, built into the city’s strategy for experimenting with intentional 
community, even if this capacity was merely immanent. To be an active citizen in the 
village, to follow that habitus, if you will, had come to mean locking yourself into the 
limited political roles as citizens in the village, and to perform only minimal sweat equity 
as the measure of good conduct.  If one thinks of the amount of time that takes, to sit in 
on village meetings (4 hours per month), or sweat equity exchanged for rent, (40 hours 
per month) that leaves a great deal of time, to do other things such as picking up garbage, 
or tending the gardens, or generally “picking up the slack.”  
 I wrote in my notes, several times that the village “was like a summer camp for 
troubled teens”, or “they acted like spoiled children.”  Even Ibrahim said in the transcript 
we read, that in the village, they have “silver spoons in they mouths.” If governmentality 
is real, then why were some of the villagers working towards conduct by exercising their 
critical attitude that Foucault had said was part of the care of the self, and therefore part 
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of the conduct towards others, and others were not.  Surely some of this divergence was 
because they were, as Dave said, a heterogeneous group, some new to homelessness or 
the village and thereby infected with intense survival anxieties, and others with longer 
term residency, capable of seeing outside of the fog of the street mentality. Unfortunately, 
even long-term villagers were not looking after themselves very well. The only villagers I 
knew who were overcoming the dirge were those who were actively fighting to wipe it 
out - to open the village up to new possibilities. Dave Samson, Mitch Grubic, Ptery and 
Brad Gibson, all of whom had become key council members.  With the new members in 
2012 and 2013 came a few other members who joined in expressing an alternative path 
for the village. ”New Larry,” as he called himself, “Dog Dave,” and a man named 
“Chuck” were joining with Brad and the others in discussions about how to kill the dirge. 
Dog Dave had been at the village years earlier when it was still under construction. He 
wanted to get that vibe back. Like Samson, he had returned to the village a second time.  
It was with this group that I had my series of conversations about what directions they 
wanted to take the village.  It was essentially a pragmatic exercise – we shared ideas on 
how we understood the village, and how it might work differently.  
January 22, 2013.  Skype Conference.   
(Participants: Brad Gibson, Ptery, Jeff, “Dog Dave”, Dave Samson, Lisa, Scot, and a few 
other unnamed participants). 
 It’s midday. They are talking to me from the commons room at Dignity Village.  ] 
 I mention, “Well you have a had a new election and from my point of view it seems 
to have worked out really well for you. From my point of view its seems to be a really 
great mix of people.” 
 Lisa says, in a humorous tone,  “A motley crew?” But she is participating on camera 
with them, as a part of that team.   That in itself is noteworthy since when I was there, she 
and Scot both had a great deal of distrust for Ptery and Brad’s activism. Now, Brad was 
the CEO and Ptery was treasurer and Lisa was Secretary, and they were working together 
on cleaning up the village’s affairs and image. 
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 Brad says, “The first council meeting went off without a hitch. It was a pleasurable 
meeting. The first one I had here actually. there was more communication, everyone 
worked it out; we were doing our human resources stuff, assigning jobs, making sure 
everyone got in the right place. And it went off without a hitch!” 
Samson pipes up, “We do still have the  torches and pitchforks on the ready  just in case 
things do go.”  
 I expressed my concerns,  
“Okay so I am concerned for a bunch of reasons. One is the contract automatically puts 
limits on your freedom and autonomy so I question the degree to whether you can fulfill 
this idyllic mandate that the founders had 11 years ago... There are two questions; one is 
how realistic is it for you guys to consider yourselves an alternative housing project, 
when the city is trying to impose all these standards on you? The other one;  I, you seem 
to recognize that in order to carry this project forward you need to kind of leave the 
village and take it elsewhere and start fresh and I am wondering what you would do in 
the new project that you would do differently than now? 
 
Brad pipes up - very directly,  “NOT HAVE A CONTRACT WITH THE CITY!” 
 
 They all laugh, and “Dog Dave,” lurking in the background adds, “ On private land 
there is no need for a private contract with the city.” “He was one of the original 
founders,” Ptery adds in the background. I recall Dave’s voice from the tapes Kwamba 
made. He confirms that it was a different place in those early years, a period when 
building community, literally, also meant building community, spiritually, and that was 
the “dead zone” the village had to fight now as he saw it.  He rightly pointed out that 
back then they were expected to fail at certain things because no one had done this kind 
of thing before, but now after so many years, the public and other homeless people had 
watched the place “kind of stagnate.”  The way he described it as a temporary place but 
permanent fixture in the activist mentality rang true.  “It’s impossible to define this place. 
It pisses me off you ask us what it means,” a Villager had once said to me. At some point 
later, off of Skype we had discussed, Brad, me, Jeff and Dave, how the village had to “try 
on a bunch of hats,” that it was a place where people had to try on many hats because 
“homelessness kind of rips that stuff you know about yourself, out of you, and ya gotta 
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put it back in somehow, from the whole world, you know out there, you’re in here, and 
you have to stick that toe in the water and get wet a little to see if you wanna swim.”  I 
suggested that the original plan won’t work there because its gone so far in the other 
direction that you just can’t step back.  
  I have spoken about the goals and desires of planners several times in this 
dissertation.  A closer review of the planning documents reveals that they used terms 
such as, stability, safety and self-governed, which at the time of the planning, city 
councilors had doubted possible in populations of long term homeless people. The 
ethnographic excerpts presented here, tend to support these doubts.   When I reiterated to 
Dog Dave that it would be impossible to create the conditions of stability and harmony 
they had envisioned because the village dynamic was irreversible, he seemed to be 
speaking in different terms, as if the size or location of the place would have implications 
on the factions and lack of communicative action in the village.  While I disagreed with 
him about the focus of his analysis, I agreed with him, Soja, Foucault, Lefebvre, that 
space is not some cold abject lifeless material, but is meaningful in its imbrication with 
time; each of which ascertain value by how life of all kinds is experienced in, through, 
around, because of them. Dave had felt that the village space needed to be bigger, in 
spatial terms, more land, whereas I felt they could expand performative experiences on 
the same space to improve things. 
   “Well it’s partly that, “ he says,  “and it’s partly that there just is no room to grow, to 
develop that vision.” 
 I ask, “And so when you guys talk to the city now is that the image you are 
presenting them to now?” 
 Brad tells me that they are just trying to avoid contacting the city too much right  
then—they just want to get everything in order in the village so the city doesn’t invoke its 
punitive measures and restrictions - so they don’t clamp down hard on the village. The 
new leadership wants to get the village “in line” with the demands of the contract so they 
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know where they will be sleeping for the next couple of years.  “I imagine we will have 
further conversations, at some point down the line pertaining to this, but at present we 
have no plans …” says Brad. 
   
 “And what happened with Eugene and Ashland?”  I ask. During our last 
conversation, just around the time of the book launch in October 2012, they had invited 
me to come live with them when they moved to a proposed camp in Ashland slated for 
2013.  Ptery answered my query by telling me that Ashland had decided to build an 
emergency day shelter program instead of a permanent camp. Eugene was still in the 
market for a new intentional site on which to house homeless people.  The camp would 
be run for the city through intermediate agencies and NPOs. It would be self-managed 
but steered by a joint board. The permits were passed and it was at that time on church 
property while the city, the church and other NPOs tried to implement a management 
plan.   
 “Sounds like a shelter to me.”  I said.  
   
 For the village, as far as this PEOC is concerned, I had wanted the villagers to 
understand that, based on my observation of Portlanders, the city council, the advocates 
and the village, all that was required to get more support was goodwill and a willingness 
to make critique – to show up and state your position, with some regularity.  Goodwill, 
through acts of community well-being and good corporate citizenship, not just direct 
resistance through protest in this case ironically was the key to displacing opposing 
power.  If the city had been unwilling to take the village seriously as a good member of 
the Portland community, then the village had to change that knowledge. 
 I sum it up thus,  “I understand that the city wants to treat you as part of the shelter 
system, but that’s not what you want, that’s what you want to overcome, correct? 
  Absolutely, correct, they all agree. 
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 Brad confirms, “And we don’t get any of the VSG’s, (Village support grants) or any 
of the other monies that other shelters get, we are totally separate from them. And they 
stick us out there on our own, and the want to pin their name on us…and that is not right.” 
 “Right so I thought. “You know I had a chat with Ptery about this before I left. That I 
thought the payoff for people at the village wasn’t just that they were finding a place that 
was safer than living off the streets --  it worked at whole other level.. You know for Lisa 
it was the kind of place she could come and find her voice--  and for you Brad, you know 
you came there, and you been there for three years now and now you have a top 
managerial position and that’s pretty cool, and Ptery found a place where he could bring 
information from the outside to people who needed to know, you found a safe home – so 
it’s the kind of place that works at these personal levels…it doesn’t help if I write my 
book and I write my dissertation and you guys aren’t out there carrying your own 
personal message.  I mean, personally going out and getting to know guys on the street—
and I am not talking about recruiting, I am just talking about doing outreach—you know 
like how the Three Amigos (Christian bible group who brings food on Thursdays) come 
and bring dinner to you guys?  I’m not saying their (religious) motives are cool, but I 
think if Dignity Village was known amongst the community as giving back, that it would 
be easier  for you to ask, and to get zoning. 
 Ptery adds, “There was good will in the beginning. 11 years ago, when the village 
(was still temporary and camped in downtown parks) provided security for the 
warehouses and business in the downtown  area. But that had changed because out there 
on the present site, there is no local community in which to demonstrate good will. That 
whole function was lost… by being out here.” 
“So the village has to find something else to give back,” I add.  “It doesn’t matter if you 
write your own articles and post them, or if one of the papers does it, once a week a 
bunch of you goes out with sacks on your back to give back to some of  the poorest still 
suffering in Portland—and I am going to tell you that if you guys keep doing that for four 
or five months, you’re gonna have more support than you ever dreamed of.  And that’s 
what critical action is all about. You are not doing this to buy a new car. You are doing 
this to get support to provide a new village for more housing for more people.” 
 Brad asserts, “And that’s what I did. Me and Ptery went out and help to start a new 
organization (in Eugene) … and it has,… 
 Ptery interrupts him.. I think he is getting the point at least. He says to Brad. “But 
they don’t have our story on it, they don’t know it’s us ( the village)  doing it.. We are not 
known for doing that—we are not known for that.   We need to correct that.” 
 I suggest that if they want to brand the village they need to brand it as future looking, 
and as gracious, “because out there they want to know that you guys are working hard 
and grateful for the opportunities that you do have…” 
  Dog Dave pipes in.. “its hard to move ahead with a noose around your neck.” 
  I agree with him, but I suggest the contract is the real noose.  He disagrees. He thinks 
the noose is the location. “We can’t move forward with anything we are talking about 
from here.” 
 So I agree with that also, but that is not what stops the action. 
  “So I think part of critical action is acting strategically and having tactics—the 
strategy is to get new lands, and now you have to employ tactics to help get it. So one of 
the tactics is to get out there as Dignity Village, not one or two guys from Dignity Village, 
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representatives of Dignity Village going out and helping the community and helping it on 
your own, a completely unilateral effort.” 
  Dave seems to missing this point. He goes on about how they have found locations 
and are looking at tactics for getting pieces of land, but he is not willing to entertain that 
the village still needs to unite with the critical action of other homeless in Portland. He is 
fixated on the schematic drawings and the design of the green sustainable village 
envisioned back in 2001.  Caught up in that utopian imagery, it is easy to not to see the 
dirty hard work that ensures that the village generates the critique to continuously 
displace power.  
 But Brad understands. So Does Ptery and the few others who remained for the 
duration of this conversation. I can see them nodding their heads and making notes on 
pads and on scraps of cardboard,  over the screen, over Skype. 
 Brad says, “Right, they gotta be more behind the Movement. It’s there.” There is a 
brief pause.  I see a few of the villagers shuffle through the door. Mitch, Lisa and Scot, 
and a new member named Nancy. I could sense they did not like what we were talking 
abut or where this discussion was going. They say they need a break.  “It’s been a long 
and heated discussion”, but I knew them. I wrote about them. We hung out together for 
two months.  Scot especially did not get this “whole activism thing.” 
 
 On May 28, 2013, just 5 months later, Brad’s colleagues on council approached me 
by phone, text, email and Skype to participate as an advisor in the impeachment 
proceedings against its current Chief Executive Officer,  the same, Brad Gibson. With me, 
the video archivists of the village, Kwamba Productions, and a few other supporters of 
the village were asked to “be critical” and to offer advice on not only regarding the 
procedural validity of the impeachment, that is; whether or not the villagers were 
adhering to strict codes embedded in its articles of incorporation as a democratic 
membership run community, but also to gauge whether the accusations had real merit. 
They were grappling with new and old visions of what the village means;  Brad’s 
traditionally rooted activist, “take-charge of the drugs and sloth” fervor (as he put it), and 
the do-little-or-nothing attitude of the drug factions.  For my own part, I reiterated that I 
had a right to share my opinion on the poor image these constant political fights in the 
village were casting outside of the village.  In short, they had wanted those of us who had 
critically experienced life in the village to enter their critique of the leadership as part of 
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their own critique of how the village should be run.  “Is it consistent,” asked one accuser, 
“what do you think the implications will be?” asked another.  “You should know, you 
lived here, you know what people are like, you know what we are supposed to be about, 
do you think we are justified?” They had created fantasies about Brad stealing tools and 
the iPad.  His defense was that he was sick and tired of watching people break things and 
lose tools “because they just get ‘em too easy,” and so  he was storing things of real value 
in the village offices.  There were other accusations, other defenses, all moot. In the 
village, if a faction wants you out, they will get a majority of the village to vote you out.   
It is that simple.  
  In the end, a faction created illegitimate accusations against Brad, managed to get 
a majority of their followers to vote against him, and against all of the experts’ advise 
against this, they impeached him too.  He was the fourth CEO to be removed prematurely 
in the last six years. Not too many democracies could survive that in the real world.  
Mitch Grubic, Lisa Larson, Scot and the new person Nancy, the same group who had 
abandoned our conversation noted above, led the impeachment. They are now the 
leadership of the council. 10 
 
7.7  Summing Up: R2DTOO  and Opportunity Village 
 That was three months ago.  The village drags along in the dirge. In that period, 
Ibrahim’s R2DTOO tent camp has been leading the critical front in Portland.  In 2011, 
they had basically leased a piece of land from a disgruntled landowner and had put up 50 
tents with some common services such as a shower and a kitchen.  It looks like what 
many of the Occupy camps did, though R2DTOO had been there earlier. It has been the 
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subject of city by-law fines and numerous articles, news stories and tours from all over 
the world.  As Ibrahim describes it to me but in my words: it is not a village, or a 
transitional camp. It is not zoned as such, but fights for the right to be an emergency 
shelter and warming station.  People who use the camp are divided into two categories.  
The first group are hard core lifers, mostly men on the streets who are not going 
anywhere - have resolved themselves to the inevitability of their own liminality, and just 
want a shower or a bowl of soup or a place to sleep for the night.  They have a communal 
tent where they can crash, and even on a half-acre of land, are more or less kept separate 
from the rest of the camp. The remainder of the camp is for people who have to check in 
and are given the right to use the services; a sleeping bag in a tent, some meals, shower 
and so on for up to a year, but they are not permitted after that time to keep coming back.  
The idea behind that is that there are many people who are homeless - ON THE 
STREETS - who work, who want to have nothing to do with the drugs or the criminality 
of street poverty, and they need a “Hooverville of they own, ya know ya remember in the 
Depression? Them Hoovervilles. So they can get back to life?” 
 So the camp is part Hooverville and part emergency sleep station. Some of the 
people who run the camp live there and enforce rules about no drug use and other 
carryings on from which Dignity had suffered.  These rules and the method for enforcing 
them, the serious planning and strategies for managing the site, have been explicitly 
measured against the failed and successful measures used at Dignity over the years.  In 
this way, Dignity has contributed to the actual lived experience at the new site, and to the 
ongoing experimentation with how to govern liminal spaces. R2DTOO has zero tolerance 
on violations of the rules. Furthermore, they are a real thorn in the side of BIDs and the 
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city.  R2DTOO has been putting the critical boots to the city and has networked with or 
created the networks for over a dozen activist groups from Washington to California. The 
city, itself, if you recall in chapter one, didn’t know what to make of the group.  Recently, 
the complaints of capital have grown stronger.   While the city has been fining the group 
for what it calls zoning violations, R2DTOO has counter-sued, and a state court judge is 
taking 30 days to render a decision. Everyone connected to this event, and on either side 
of the debate recognizes that this means the judge is considering the constitutional 
grounds of the counter suit very seriously, and BIDS and conservative elements of the 
city are worried.   They are so worried in fact that they offered the group an entire ten 
thousand square foot building for a year, paid for and serviced, as a compromise. The city 
had wanted to enforce its own shelter codes on the use of the building.  Ibrahim rejected 
that.  There were only certain conditions under which he would give up the visibility that 
R2DTOO had, and by that he quite clearly meant, “they all must be smoking some of the 
village drugs, man. We ain’t givin’ up our space and our fight so they can tell us how 
long and how to run ourselves.”  
 So Ibrahim and his board rejected that offer outright.  The next day, they had 
heard that the Judge had required yet more time, to look at the counter claim.  A few 
hours after that, the city invited Ibrahim to look at several parcels of city land, removed 
from the thriving core, but well serviced and reasonably close (within walking distance) 
of missions, soup kitchens and the core, on which to build a larger, and permanent 
emergency sleep station. 
 Note the email below August 12, 2013 @ 6:39 pm: 
Salaam Board,   
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  [sic] I Ibrahim, am sending out this E-mail to inform you-all that an ultimatum was put 
tom us this morning by Commissioner Amanda Fritz. The Space next to the Bud Clark 
Commons was taken off the agenda from us and under the Broadway bridge was 
introduce as the new possible area for Right2Dreamtoo. We have until Noon tomorrow to 
tentative accept this offer. A few of us went to view this site. it has great potential, 
however it takes away from our visibility.  
  I thought on this offer and I have to take my direct Action Right2Survive mentality 
away. THAT is R2DTOO mission statement. Do we want R2DTOO to be publicity 
Action or an Rest Area to help Houseless People get sleep? This is my biggest question.    
  I also remember when Dignity Village was under the bridges. Do we have control 
around the Bridge like we did when were at Dignity. will people sleep down around us 
when we have No more room? will we pull the drugs and other negative that we will 
have to tell them WHAT leave, when we are fighting for people a place to sleep? These 
are some of the things that is going thru my mind.  
Ma Salaam  
Ib 
 
He called me to talk about this decision. 
 
 Ibrahim says there are two levels to social critique.   
“The first is the ideas what you all about. See that’s how people know what you angry 
about. Like us, we are “Right to Survive”, and R2DTOO is our camp.  Like Dignity 
Village is  two things too, it’s the fight that Jack and us made a long time ago, on paper, a 
activist corporation, and then its also the camp, like it is also where they is at and how 
they live. But didn’t forget who we are, we don’t go acting like cuz we got a spot to sleep, 
that we don’t have a message to fight for.  We are looking into taking this spot, because 
we have to be clear.  I got to be clear with myself, like you said to me, we are really about 
two things, helping people, live and sleep and not die on the street, and also we’s about 
carrying this fight.  I was worried that by givin up the spot in downtown we would lose 
that visibility, like they done to Dignity. They try to put it out of sight, out the way - out 
of mind, I guess you would say, but we have to work at the message harder, because we 
are about saving people that’s gonna die on the street of we don’t. See none of is afraid to 
work hard to carry the fight.  This aint been easy here. It’s not meant to be easy. Na aha. 
The village, they gone and forgot that.  It’s like Jack Tafari said, “Once you win your 
rights, you have to keep fighting for you rights.”  They all asleep up there.”(This is from 
a phone conversation on August 19, 2013). 
 
  As of this writing, Ibrahim and his group are waiting for a general Building and 
Development Commission ruling on the site, but the two sides have agreed in principle to 
move his camp there. His dilemma has been the one I began with in this dissertation, 
which is what happens when critique displaces power. In this case, the claim has already 
been successful since it has occupied that central space for two years and, if this new site 
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goes through, it will be an even bigger success in terms of its just goal, which is to save 
homeless people. (Ibrahim and his group now use “houseless,”  instead of homeless). In 
terms of the other level of critique that is in part its ethos, it is in no way inverted, twisted 
or diverted by the city’s plan to move the camp. The activists existed before the present 
camp happened, when there was no space, and the claim was purely mental - or symbolic 
- an attitude after all, to go back to Foucault, but one, which gained momentum, and in 
the same manner that Dignity had done 12 years earlier, managed to pounce on a legal 
loophole and establish itself in the city’s housing debates. It did so in small protests, then 
gathering membership, then finding a loophole and establishing a counter-site, a base by 
which to establish its critique in spatial critiques that undergird the critiques of homeless.  
They put up tents, on space, and stood their ground. So this latest proposal to move 
R2DTOO to new site is a power  push back, but not a rejection of the critique.  It is in the 
end, recognition by the state that this group has power. 
 A week ago, Opportunity Village, in Eugene, passed its final clearance by 
Eugene’s city council.  Recognizing the difficulties of completely member run self-
government, lessons they learned by examining Dignity Village’s failed political 
structure, one of the conditions they imposed on themselves was a hybrid government 
that utilizes external board members to help keep balance in the village’s affairs.   They 
haven’t officially opened yet, so I wait to comment further. These two camps 
demonstrate that critique of homelessness has at least two vectors. One is the immediate 
need to house people or the practical goals.  The other is the empowerment that critical 
action gives to social critique to achieve these just ends in other sites and across societal 
levels of injustice. It seems counter intuitive to imagine it any other way, but that is what 
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has happened at Dignity Village. The hole it poked in power is still large enough for 
other activists to move beyond the limits of that model. 
 I mentioned earlier that this same week, a disgruntled ex-guest of Dignity Village, 
a well know Portland activist, Mary-Jo Pullen-Hughes, went to the city, the Police and 
the media to complain about the drugs.  Most of the villagers wrote it off as a matter of 
little importance because that reputation is not new.  The same day that Ibrahim 
announced his success, which was two days after her threat to “out” the village, the city 
of Portland told the Dignity Villagers that a new inspection was coming up.  The city 
representatives came out to the site and did a walk through at Dignity Village. They 
pointed out 11 items on the new contract that are not being met by the village. These are 
items that have seemed moot, as I mentioned several times; just the sort of stuff that gets 
ignored in the village.  With R2DTOO and Opportunity Village demonstrating a 
willingness to work with their cities, and these new complaints about the village, some 
villagers are pretty sure this inspection was a prelude to something pivotal for the village. 
 Mitch Grubic who was acting as an unofficial deputy Chair since Brad’s 
impeachment, (he emceed, literally emceed the impeachment) emailed these items of 
concern and his replies to me on August 18, 2013: (Bolded print is the city’s position; 
other print is Mitch’s response). 
 [Sic] (8 on the list): The contract states that: "Residents may not use, possess 
or share alcoholic beverages, or illegal drugs, controlled substances or prescription 
drugs without a medical prescription, on or at the Designated Campground or with 
in the Sunderland Recycling facility Residents may not allow guests to use, possess 
or share alcoholic beverages, illegal drugs, controlled substances or prescription 
drugs without a medical prescription at the designated Campground or within the 
Sunderland recycling facility. How is the board maintaining this rule? 
 
If they intend to call us on anything about breach of contract this would be the easiest one. 
The City of Portland puts our feet to the fire on this one.  
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I have had many conversations on this... I have concluded that any effort to help people 
of economic distress has to include addiction counseling. 
 
Not sure there is any solution for Dignity Village as drugs are entrenched here. It would 
take a police action at this point and there would have to be a mass exodus. Pretty drastic 
measure, especially when you consider that we are all close to each other, we are family. 
Perhaps another solution could be mandatory drug testing.... I had plans at one time to 
start testing of council members and board. I still think that’s a good idea. 
 
(9 on the list) I would like to see your written rules that residents may not live at the 
campground for longer than 24 months after the date of December 1st, 2012. What 
processes did you have in place to identify those individuals living at the village on 
December 1st, 2012? Have you begun discussing a process for village leadership to 
determine when or if you would request an extension? (The first extensions 
wouldn't begin for a year, but hopefully you've begun talking about the "how"). 
 
Ah, and here it is. This is and was the most contentious part of the contract (obviously). 
The city of Portland has always been determined to get us to have a higher turnover rate. 
I can say, confidently, that the village would never have made it with limits like this. It is 
so against the idea of intentional community. How can we move on as a community when 
we are all suppose to move on to something new...it doesn't make sense. 
 
My solution on this one is to change it to reflect the fact that we as a corporation want to 
move and need everyone to make that happen. Even without limits we have had a pretty 
good turn over rate. Since I have been here the waiting list has only been at 15 once and 
most times there is about 6 or 7. 
 
What progress has been made toward demonstrating a sustainable board structure, 
such as broadening board membership to include adding former residents, donors 
or community supporters? As we've discussed, this would be very useful in assisting 
the village in long-term sustainability. 
 
No brainer here, City of Portland wants to deal with the same people and build a 
relationship. Pretty clear. 
 
Well, we are not doing well on this. I was taken out after serving a year...I might add I 
have been the first CEO to serve a year in a long while. Brad gets in and the village 
recalls him. Now Lisa Larson is serving a partial term, elections are in December. Not 
sure about this one, I would dislike to see some of these villagers hold control for too 
long. The village has had a real problem with recognizing corruption and then an 
unwillingness to do anything about it. There needs to be some real oversight in order to 
keep someone in place longer than 1 term. 
 
We have made attempts to get an advisory Board with limited success, as with everything 
around here there needs to be more follow-through. 
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Ok Eric here you are, I want to write more but its late and I am tired, perhaps tomorrow if 
its not too late. And feel free to change stuff around and by all means repair my grammar 






 I will speak to this only briefly.  The first item (sanctions against drug and alcohol 
use) is the oldest problem in the village and the least easy to fix. It very likely will be the 
one unfixable problem to afford the city the right to shut down the village altogether if it 
wants to.  After that violation, all the others are moot, since it is a problem that is 
indefensible in both supportive and opposing camps.  With regards to the second item, as 
far as turnover is concerned, what he calls turnover, is not what transitional housing calls 
turnover.  Turning people out to the streets or insecure housing is not what we read in 
chapter six as part of transitional housing.  Transitional means preparing people for and 
finding mainstream housing. And beyond that, those few people who did leave and found 
housing are a small percentage of those who tried. Less than 18%, I am told by the 
villagers, or four out of 19 applications, though I cannot verify this.   The final item is 
telling.  The city is telling the village that the neoliberal critique of housing has room for 
such places, such as it does in Eugene, such as it had when Brad made attempts to extend 
the board to external members.  The village is being told straight-out, what Francisconi 
said in 2001 - “you need professional help.” The city had always known the village 
would need professional help; it would need to open its shill of self-governance to 
governance by other means. Villagers are literally being asked to consider being 
governed another way. Foucault was in part correct when he said resistance has come to 
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mean asking how much do we want to be governed and in what way, not how can we do 
without government? 
 So the village has come to that point where it really must organize itself and act 
united.  Insomuch as the concentrated and concerted activist spatializations of other 
housing critiques are being sanctioned and will save lives, the village needs to recognize 
that there is a body of critique that it helped to create, and which it can rejoin.  It seems 
unlikely that this will happen.  Ibrahim, and a few other local activists are meeting with 
leadership to discuss what the village can do to respond to the city contract and to fix 
itself up.  The next few weeks will be critically important.  There is no way to predict 
what will happen, except that if past trends are good indicators of future events, then 
nothing will happen; the village will continue to fester, and the city will watch as it 
decides if public opinion is for or against the village.  In the end, if the city does send in 
the police and do what they call a “dog search,” for drugs and drug dealers, it is likely 
that the village will experience a shut down and eviction, just like Tent City.  In Toronto, 
because of a high rental vacancy rate, the city found apartments for the evictees.  In 
Portland with a vacancy rate of less than 1% and rising rents, the average number of 
homeless people in street counts is likely to rise from 2000, to 2056, if the village closes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Endnotes - Chapter Seven: Pages 486-533. 
 
1  Heterotopia it should be noted, was not coined by Foucault – its meaning derives 
from medicine and means an organ displaced from its proper place.  But the term has 
been used by Foucault in several of his works and indeed becomes a central theme in his 
studies of knowledge production and order.  Very simply put, his reliance on spatial 
metaphors in The Archeology of Knowledge, Truth and Juridical Forms,  is seen as a 
bridge of sorts between his 1967, “Of Other Spaces” and “The Order of Things” 
(Topinka 2011).  Topinka summarizes the major argument in these texts as one in which 
knowledge is seen as the result of a “clash of forces.”  
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2  Foucault speaks to the preoccupation of that generation of scholars with space.  
Speaking somewhat cynically he asserted that “our experience of the world is less that of 
a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and 
intersects with its own skein” (1).  As such a problem for critical understanding was 
reconciling the temporal experience of life on the one hand, with its structural 
implications, or the way that such relations appear to be connected, “ in short as a sort of 
configuration” (2). 
 
3 	   Today (1967) the site is defined by relations of proximity between points or 
elements...” (4). Modern space he argued was the one in which space identified the 
formation of relations among sites, conceived as individuals as units of a population, 
between organizations, even between non-organic locations, data bases and so on.  Time 
he argued was one of the many distributive operations open to the elements that “spread 
out in space (5)3. 	  
4  First, all cultures  create heterotopias but in various forms.  There are two general 
classes.  Crisis heterotopias occur in primitive cultures where life events such as 
menstruation, or childbearing promote insecurity and doubt and require their isolation to 
places designated as sacred or pure.  The second are what he calls heterotopias of 
deviation, in which “deviant” individuals, or those who fall out of normal participatory 
modes in society, are placed.  Psychiatric hospitals, prisons and rest homes (I would 
argue and shelters) are examples. The second principle is that heterotopias can serve 
different functions at different times in the history of a society.  The third principle is that 
a heterotopia can mimic or reflect the characteristics of several sites in one place, even 
sites that are incompatible in their own right.  A theatrical stage, might reproduce war and 
home on the same “square” of representation; in my work, a shanty camp will reproduce 
poverty and democracy. The fourth principle is that heterotopias are most often linked to 
time; they function at full capacity when men arrive at a break with their traditional time; 
economic implosions or massive social displacements like war perhaps (6).  Cemeteries 
are a clear example of this, where the individual crosses over into a “quasi-eternity in 
which her permanent lot is dissolution and disappearance”(6). While some heterotopias 
are devoted to the passage of time, others are completely temporal; fairs and events and 
festivals as examples. 
 
5  “I am thinking, for example, of the first wave of colonization in the seventeenth 
century, of the Puritan societies that the English had founded in America and that were 
absolutely perfect other places… The village was laid out according to a rigorous plan 
around a rectangular place at the foot of which was the church; on one side, there was the 
school; on the other, the cemetery-, and then, in front of the church, an avenue set out that 
another crossed at fight angles… each family had its little cabin along these two axes and 
thus the sign of Christ was exactly reproduced. Christianity marked the space and 
geography of the American world with its fundamental signs” (7). 
 
6  “Brothels and colonies are two extreme types of heterotopia, and if we think, after 
all, that the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, 
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that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea and 
that the ship is the heterotopia par excellence. In civilizations without boats, dreams dry 
up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates” 
(1984: 7). 
 
7  In The Order of Things, (1970) Foucault speaks of the destabilizing effect of 
these concepts on language and ideas.  “Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because 
they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, 
because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance, 
and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent 
syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to ‘hold 
together’”(Foucault 1994:  xviii…). Yet, spatial heterotopias do a similar thing - they 
tend to destabilize the syntax or logical associations that make dominant symbolic 
imaginaries work through symbols, language and law by presenting alternatives.   
 
8 	   In assuming the logical coordination between spatializations of ideas, knowledge, 
language and living, as both temporally and spatially interconnected, the function of 
heterotopias to link with all other spaces, is measured by this tendency to “problematize 
the order that undergirds knowledge production” (Topinka 2010: 57). In its simplicity the 
position laid out by Foucault fits nicely into arguments that counter-hegemonic space 
exists and that resistance is not dead.  If one brings the idea of heterotopia into his 
broader corpus, Foucault seems to be using the concept of heterotopias a way of 
envisioning the location of actors within systems of knowledge and power.    
 
9  Furthermore, even if we rely on just the physical space to which he referred, even 
Foucault cautions us that heterotopias are dynamic, contextually variant and may change 
functions to meet the needs of a society over time.     
 
10  In a phone call on August 18, 2013, Mitch Grubic admitted to me what we had 
all suspected; the impeachment was because other parties on the village wanted the same 
access to donations and other resources that Brad  now was in charge of. Mitch said it 
was because Brad’s drug use was the problem.  That was half-truth at best.  The council 
that replaced him, Lisa, Scot, Nancy and Mitch, are all invested heavily in the meth 
dealing that goes on the village. 
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Chapter Eight: Summary and Conclusions 
 At the start of this dissertation, I introduced the basic concepts and arguments that 
undergirded this research.  There is an enormous problem with homelessness in the US, 
one that does not hide behind the classifications that various agencies use to define it. 147 
million Americans live dangerously close to the official poverty line, and in a shrinking 
economy and with declining affordable housing, the number that migrates in and out of 
official poverty in Oregon especially is likely to keep edging upwards.  Despite a long 
history of alternative uses of city space by rough sleepers, and community groups 
building ludic and environmentally favorable heterotopias, Portland in particular is a city 
whose policies towards street and chronic homelessness are erratic.  While it was the first 
city to sanction a legal tent camp, Dignity Village, and is currently entertaining a second 
permanent camp, R2DTOO, they have recently amped up sit and stay laws, no camping 
laws, and the mayor has ordered police to arrest and remove homeless squatters from 
public buildings and property in the city.  
 A classic confrontation between capital and the homeless continues to play out in 
a quickly gentrifying city core, as a question of the willingness of city leadership to listen 
to the people on the streets, or to the business districts that are threatened by them.  
Dignity Village was moved as far from the city core as was literally possible. They were 
placed on the last piece of available land, next to the Columbia River, as a compromise 
between conservative critics of the village, and progressive supporters of intentional 
camps.  The link between the conventional urban imaginary and the village, a 
transcendent and widely held criterion was the notion of democratic self-government.  
Other radical forms proposed by the HLF, which literally wanted to be free of legal or 
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city regulated limitations, were rejected by the city, largely because the HLF did not 
present a model for governance that suited critics of alternative spaces. HLF looked for a 
communal, organic political system, and to critics, perhaps rightly so, this suggested the 
randomness of the streets; something the city could not sanction.  So Dignity Village, the 
animal we have been looking at in greater detail here, emerged as a sort of compromise 
between two extremes; capitalist rejection of subaltern use of space at one end of an 
imaginary continuum of debate, and this other commune style of radical egalitarianism. 
The compromise took the form of an agreement between an incorporated non-profit 
501(c)(3) charitable corporation (Dignity Village Inc.) from that moment understood as a 
sanctioned, contracted, and self-governed, membership run democratic community, and 
officially licensed as a transitional emergency camp.  In this context, self-governed has 
turned out to be dubious description of their democracy. All it has meant is that the 
villagers have managed the camp instead of the city, and have done a horrible job of it.  
 Despite ten years of internal debate between villagers and advisors over how to 
interpret the “transitional” requirements of such camps, the village must be understood, 
despite its symbolic value as an alternative form, to be a branch of the housing shelter 
system of Portland.  Historically, each side, city and village, has been in denial about that. 
Still it has managed to squeak by with limited success in actually transitioning people to 
housing.  Less than 18% of residents find secure stable housing when they leave and most 
end up on the streets. Over 80% return to homelessness.   
 The village also has a hard time administering its daily affairs and has a weak, if 
not totally corrupt political structure. A supporter of the villager said to me, “So what 
does that mean, I mean, look at the history of this whole country…?” And so I have in 
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fact done that.  I said that the one transcendent value I could find in the village was this 
sense of the “American Way,” a sense that freedom in poverty even, to stroke De 
Tocqueville’s mantle, was superior to domination in abundance.   Early on in my 
fieldwork at the village, under the shadows of Stars and Stripes flapping in the compost-
dusted wind, I found reason to interrogate what democracy means in this kind of living 
space.   
 So I have shared a pivotal conversation I had with one of the ex-founders of the 
village that looked at the implications of self-run democratic governance in a place where 
people don’t know how to govern. I have shown that democracy sounded like an 
empowering and valid organizing principle but in the village’s case, it has led to powerful 
factions and a complete incapacity to administer village affairs. This tendency confirmed 
Michel’s Law of Oligarchies, but in a small setting, which in turn disrupted Lipset’s 
argument for better participative democracy in small groups. But the poverty of the 
village, the lack of any economic structure or production there, confirmed his argument 
that the potential of democracy is greater where there is strong economy. Derrida’s 
Rogues, was discussed for its wonderful articulation of two important points. First the 
fact that freedom and sovereignty are logically opposed, but absolutely fundamental to 
how democracy works.  I argued that the documents and forms, the contract and the 
language that gives the city the right over life or death of the village, to invoke Foucault,  
were evidence of this sovereignty and the tentative nature of freedom.  I also want to 
suggest, that drugs have the impact they do in the village, not just because of how they 
make people feel,  but because they are a resource that fuels a small economy in the 
village, and this in turn politically empowers some individuals over others. The freedom 
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of the haves, in this twisted case, is far greater than the have-nots.  And so my original 
contention that the village is a replica of the very system that the HLF-Camp Dignity 
activists had wished to indict, that being democratic inequality, stands after this long and 
detailed analysis.  
 This is because of how emancipation was understood and then encoded in 2001.  I 
discussed how the type of emancipation that social critique seeks is important for 
understanding the critical displacements that occur. Emancipation, as means to achieve 
freedom, or perhaps better said, following Isin (2008), Rose (1999) Dean (2010) and 
several others, as a way of  distinguishing active and activist citizens, radical and resistant 
political action, has two vectors: the first seeks to change the system that creates 
inequality and the second seeks to increase a group or an actor’s participation and benefit 
from within it. Dignity Village, in the final analysis, has gone through to another stage, a 
sort of anti-citizen stage, if that is possible.  The act, understood as a rupture with habitus 
and practice was short-lived, and for a few years,  as the community built it, villagers 
were active citizens pursuing this transcendent if not misguided freedom as American 
citizens.  Currently, they are not doing this.  In fact for a few years now, the village has 
all but given up on dreams, and sunk into a den of drug - induced despair.  It had gone 
from being a transitional space designed to moderate and facilitate the movement of 
liminal people traumatized and beaten up by homelessness, and forced into an inter-
structural role, to being one that suspends them there in what I have called perpetual 
liminality, a between-world. 
  I discussed liminality in detail in several places.  I also suggested that critique 
need to be understood for its temporal qualities as it shifts and morphs over time.  I 
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reiterate, that when we talk of critique, we must comprehend the liminal or transitional 
experience of subjects becoming political. In this light, the stagnation of the village right 
now might only mean that critique is stalled, and if this is so, the village might have 
another chance, if the people can become politically motivated.  I made the suggestion 
that the mundane critiques that occur between villagers are in part anticipated by the city 
as an indirect form of creating this liminal space, one which is more easily controlled 
than a thriving activist community.  That means that the city understood how difficult 
mere survival would come to be under the conditions they gave the community, and as 
some of the discussions you read suggested, the city is just sitting back and waiting for 
the village to fail.    
 I have argued that homelessness is a world of liminality and poverty that requires 
people to spend so much time and energy on mundane critique – often of others – or 
directed towards others in the kind of essentially critical capacity granted to actors by 
Boltanski et al, that pragmatic attachments to social critique seem light years away.  
When interpersonal conflicts and scraping together a few dollars to get high or feed 
yourself occupy most of your time, there is little room for activism.  People can be angry 
at the system, they can recognize their poverty for the structural violence it represents, 
but for villagers, isolated on a tarmac with few resources and few, if any social ties 
outside the gate, keeping the activist ferment alive is nearly impossible.  And the irony is 
that activism is what could empower this community with the city and supporters and 
bring meaning to villagers in their personal lives. The transitional capacity of the village 
absolutely depends on this structural union between the marginal world of homelessness 
and the resources and roles of the conventional world. However, the village does not act 
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towards this alignment.  It does not fight, as other members of democracy do, for their 
piece of the pie outside of their community.  The reason I have seen fit to think of this as 
a world, is precisely because that is how the villagers see it.  Earlier John Boy and Shorty 
echoed many of the comments made by villagers that attest to the loss of any experiential 
horizon beyond the gates.  The village fixes the psychological stuff, and at the same time 
it “becomes everything.”  There can be neither social critique nor any fight for 
democracy within the gates alone. Ibrahim’s most recent success, R2DTOO, is a 
collective effort of homeless people, housed advocates and his activist group Right To 
Dream, and they are making changes, saving lives and poking holes in neoliberalism’s 
own critique of housing policy.   Opportunity Village is doing the same, and each of these 
movements is in ways related to the Dignity activists, who started it all in 2001.  So the 
social critique that Dignity activists started is not dead. It has shifted locations.  
 I have been asking throughout this dissertation what is the critical capacity of 
villager under these conditions?  Given that the village is enveloped by the legal and 
encoded rule of the city, what does being critical mean for them?  In the previous 
discussion with Ibrahim, (in chapter seven) we decided that critique has two levels that he 
had to think about when deciding on accepting the city’s offer for a new location: he 
could give up the highly visible and controversial R2DTOO site in downtown, a site that 
provoked critique from all corners of the world, which is to say that it had people 
debating about how to house the homeless in alternative ways, or he could accept the new 
site, help more people stay warm and safe and give up the site that just reeked of critical 
capacity because of its visibility.  In other words, he had to decide what was more 
important, saving people now, tomorrow, and this year, or contributing to the collective 
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social critique on housing. In the end, he came to understand, that the ethical call is to 
save lives, but the moral one is to continue fighting for rights. He too had almost 
forgotten how hard it is to fight for your rights from the margins.   This was and is 
Dignity’s dilemma.  On the one hand it serves a basic and inadequate shelter, so people 
don’t necessarily die – except people do die there and there have been two cases in the 
two years when I was working there when that was because of addiction. On the other 
hand, it must find ways to be engaged in the justification that gave it life, and that was an 
argument for the rights of the homeless. So I have wondered what it means to be critical. 
I have thought of critical attitude at many levels. One was my own eye towards addiction, 
poverty and homelessness. And so I considered a reflexive, critical and pragmatic 
approach as the best way to understand how different critical approaches work together in 
villagers’ deliberations of to produce this lack of action. I suggested that before 
addressing critical approaches, I should explain my orientation towards the subject. 
 I examined how reflexive and critical forms of ethnography unite with 
pragmatism in a PEOC. I theorized fieldwork as an act of investigation, and also as a way 
to be critical in the sense of a social critique, which I defined as a set of attitudes and 
practical orientations towards matters of social justice.  Of course this meant I needed to 
show how ethnography, critical ethnography, reflexive authority and pragmatism could 
be unified in a video supported and participant observational approach. With critical and 
ethnographic elements aligned within a pragmatic vision, I suggested ways that video 
extends ethnographic presence in the four ways that Sanjek suggested, but mostly by 
extending field moments to the authority of all participants, and also by extending 
authority in a temporal sense, allowing for revisitation and re-inscription of meaning by 
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participants.   In this sense, even though I have been looking at how villagers’ pragmatic 
deliberations affect how critical attitudes and capacity happen in the village, I have 
shown without a doubt that this research has been part of the creation of those attitudes, 
even when my “authority” was rejected outright. 
 As part of the autoethnographic and reflexive requirement of PEOC, I gave a fairly 
detailed account of my addictions, homelessness and my stint in rehab.  These 
experiences fuelled the moral call and weight of this research, and gave me first hand 
insights into the village. I argued for the researcher to be thought of as a resource in his 
work, and frankly, this dissertation is full of examples where I have been engaged by the 
Portland housing community for those resources. My documentary studies at Tent City  
and of the housing services introduced to Toronto in the mid 2000’s, led me to ask how 
different types of housing contribute to self-worth and critical attitudes. I looked at issues 
of misrepresentation and how the ethical and moral position I now take are related to the 
failures of others in the past to meet these demands. The streets of Toronto, and then Tent 
City were my first encounters with community organizers and provoked me to think of 
locality-based ethnography as a type of ethnographic community organizing.  In the case 
of the village, it has certainly come to feel this way, especially of late, as the last chapter 
has shown well, I think. 
 Early literature reviewed a tendency to categorize the poor on the groundwork laid 
down by Lewis’ Culture of Poverty premise.  I rejected elements of this, especially his 
idea of psychiatric interventionist policies over economically redistributive ones, on the 
basis that the former are easier to achieve.  They each suggested a certain kind of 
structural violence for which Bourgois, from Bourideu, had rightly criticized Lewis. 
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Bourgois’ recognition that looking at community, and intentional camps as such as signs 
of this noble actioning of needs by the homeless was not in fact a testimony to the 
resilience of people or the realness of freedom, but of our complete abandonment of 
social responsibility under neoliberalism, was an important insight to me.  In this frame, 
the village and intentional camps are better than the streets, but the actions of people 
fighting for camps and signing contracts to self-govern in poverty caters to a certain kind 
of evil after all, and the tendency, one to which I was drawn in the past, to see these 
spaces as positive examples, blinded me to the insidious form of governmentality and 
domination they belied.  Beyond this, the most important part of that early ethnographic 
experience was to try understand the discourses that produce spaces such as this, and 
attitudes toward the poor, and to this end, I interrogated a critical approach to 
understanding the village.  
 It had seemed at first, and in some ways I still hold, that governmentality is a fruitful 
way for understanding the critical capacity of villagers. But there were weaknesses in this 
model, and in fact, amongst all the five major approaches that interest me, so I then went 
on to describe what these were and how one might expect to find expressions of these in 
the village. I addressed Latour’s (2004) critique of critique. I explained PEOC could 
make critique relevant again not by mapping out, but listening to how villagers 
understand their critical assemblages and by sharing the pragmatic deliberations as 
conversations in this work.  These conversations, reproduced as excerpts from my 
monograph, as transcripts from previously un-transcribed video, and from newly 
recorded interactions, express the mediations of actants in critical assemblages and there 
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is pragmatic interaction of an essentially critical and important nature, the structure of 
which is less important to me than its emancipatory outcomes.  
 I gave a cursory introduction to the philosophical roots of critique. These were 
critical dogmatism, transcendental critique and deconstructionism. I suggested very 
simply how homeless camps and people might be framed in these lenses.  I then 
discussed Critical Theory (Frankfurt School), Critical Sociology (Bourdieu), Critical 
Realism (Bhaskar/Archer), Genealogical Critique (Foucault) and Pragmatic Sociology of 
Critique (Boltanski et al), as five basic schools of critical sociological thought. Critical 
approaches were distinguished by where the power to be critical originated.  In Critical 
Theory, Critical Sociology and Critical Realism, actors are asked to form political 
identities on the basis of external, often transcendental notions of truth that are produced 
in entirely exterior and objective structures of reality. In Foucault’s genealogical critique, 
and Pragmatic Sociology of Critique, power is truth, reality is socially constructed so 
objectively impossible, and the basic essence of domination is power. I argued that if we 
look, following Soja, at homelessness or the village as a more than mental and physical 
space with myriad possibilities, all of these critical approaches make some sense.  Being 
overly simple here, let me suggest: Critical Theory can direct us to see how the villagers 
are completely duped into imagining their poverty as freedom:  Critical Sociology directs 
us to look at how the villagers accept limbo as a constituent part of the habitus of their 
poverty, and to therefore not to imagine the various ways they might transcend it: Critical 
Realism understood through Archer’s internal conversation, directs us to look at how 
material and emotional experience contributes to the way actors uniquely make sense of 
real but unobservable structures.   
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 They have weaknesses as well. To be simple once again: Critical theory posits a 
grand social transformation on the basis of such emancipatory information, but this has 
not happened, and even when such societal level transformations against capital have 
been attempted, the results have been generally more repressive models of social 
structure: Critical Sociology really clamps down on actors to free themselves of habitus, 
and sees little value in common mundane critique, the kind of critical attitude that I think 
is very powerful in the village, but for all the wrong reasons; Critical Realism posits a 
real structure but says it is unknowable, fails to articulate how it is that socially 
transformative action might take place, and perhaps most in contradiction to my 
observations,  Archer posits categories of conversational types, whereas I have been 
witness to a variety of internal conversations within the participants I studied which I 
attribute to their liminality.  
 I treated Foucault and Boltanski separately.  Foucault’s governmentality is really my 
central organizing principle, even though he would argue it is not a foundational principle.  
Dean has said there is no single governmentality paradigm. In this sense, governmentality 
is open to range of technologies that regimes of government use to produce self-
governing citizens.  I spoke about the inherent contradiction of freedom and domination 
earlier, but the key reason I entertain governmentality as way of understanding the village, 
is not because of how it works per se, but for how it does not.    
 Using Dean’s (2010) Analytics of Government I showed how the codification of the 
village in contracts, assessments, by-laws, articles of incorporation and other “forms” 
were discursive attempts by power to stem the tactical displacement that the original 
claim represented.  Where pragmatic sociology of critique had showed that governance 
 547 
has the ability to incorporate critique into its management strategies, these forms and 
contracts established the city’s sovereignty over the village, rather than suggesting that 
the critique had been incorporated.  Since the village does not appear in the official 
language of the city, nor do any of the villages appear in the official housing strategies of 
their respective cities, this is not a case where institutions have incorporated technique, 
but is evidence of a displacement still playing out.   
 Now clearly in Dignity Village, it seems that the play is almost dead, and that the 
mantle of critique has been picked up by R2DTOO, Opportunity Village and other camps 
currently fighting for the right to be.  But, because of how rules and codes of conduct 
delineate the acceptable action of villagers, and how codes and laws govern the use of the 
space, I suggest that in the village, we are watching a certain temporal closure to what 
happens when critique displaces power. While the rules and regulations of the 
community suggest a stable and well-organized community, the reality is that its freedom 
has always been crafted by the neoliberal discourse that sees such places as shelters, and 
the recent events I mentioned in chapter six, simply demonstrate that Larsen was correct, 
“ it takes time to see. ”  In this case, the city is now poised to enforce the discourse of 
transitional housing on the village, or end it altogether. 
   As I said, PEOC helps to explain the space opened up by the divergence between 
intended and actual conduct, and the seemingly endless experimentation with critical 
attitudes in liminal spaces. In light of recent events, I see a union of Foucault and 
Boltanski.   In ways, the critical displacement has moved onto other sites that were 
spawned as it were from Dignity’s emergence and legacy.  These new sites ride the 
critical ripple the village made just as they surely are producing their own.  If the city 
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does move in to manage the village outright then this is a good indication of critique 
being incorporated into the managerial strategies of the state, and so the critical 
displacement of power, and the incorporative tendencies of institutions, unite the two 
approaches at least at this very fuzzy level.  I argued that I thought Boltanski’s critique of 
Foucault as too power-centered was silly; the essential matter of domination is power, 
and so regardless of the form, the critique boils down to power.  So I have chosen, and I 
know this is an abstraction that requires more thought, but I have chosen to see this as a 
bridge rather than a schism between these two approaches. I have listed a number of 
faults and strengths of these approaches earlier, and I am not going to reiterate them here. 
However, one area where all these approaches tend to falter is on the problem of liminal 
space and liminality.   
 Bourdieu, because of his cultural approach to habitus and fields, deals with liminality 
in the sense that he understands ritual practice to be the mechanism that facilitates liminal 
transitions. What about cultures or worlds defined by liminality, between-worlds? In 
terms of spaces, or fields of liminality, if one will, none of these approaches is very 
useful.  So I argued as well, that homelessness is under-theorized for its liminal qualities, 
because ambiguity is difficult. Understood as between-worlds, shantytowns and tent 
camps are relatively new to our disciplines, and to these modes of analysis, because the 
shantytown disappeared as a western phenomenon at the end of the 1930s.   Social 
Sciences, all of the social sciences really explode after the Second World War and critical 
reflexive approaches only since the 1980’s so, it is little wonder that western intentional 
camps should be under-theorized.   Most of all, these camps require an entirely new 
lexicon and theoretical framework open to diversity that brings out the qualities they 
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produce, instead of trying to empirically fit such concentrated spatializations of poverty 
into existing Firstspace-Secondspace bicameralisms. 
  So I spoke about space.  I talked about Wright and Castoriadis and ideas about the 
streets, and of Lefebvre and representational spaces, and of Foucault and heterotopias.   
And since the village seems to have qualities of the street, of resistance and counter-
hegemonic idealism, I then talked about “thirding” as a way to look at the village and to 
understand the number of opinions we read in chapter six especially abut what the village 
represents and how to fix it.  I explained very early on that the claim made by activists 
was for space, and so any understanding of the critique or the applicability of critique to 
these places, Tent City, and especially Dignity Village, must imbricate with spatial 
critique.  Looking at the comments made by villagers in the transcripts I presented in 
chapter seven, it seems to me that space is socially constructed, and that the critique of 
Dignity Village by the villagers themselves is a highly contested territory that goes no 
where. The reason for this is the dirge that Brad spoke to.  It’s the human condition 
produced by living in poverty and thinking that such a life is a just situation. It’s the 
presence of the mental or social critique that Ibrahim and I mentioned, but which, in the 
village exists only at the mental, and never in the physical or actual level of experience. 
The dynamic that keeps critical actors stuck in mundane conflicts and justifications is the 
same one that keeps the factions in power; democracy.  Democracy is a liminal 
experience.  It is always as yet to come.  It is as Jack Tafari and Ibrahim said, based on a 
liberty that once obtained must be fought for continuously.    
 With camps increasingly making the news as local responses and experimental 
attempts at helping homeless people, there is room for much more work. In all of these 
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communities, activists, advocates, scholars and journalists and a wary public are 
watching and advising.  The continuum of debate is beginning to be informed and vetted 
by more than just journalists and activists, and the results are not necessarily favorable to 
intentional communities.  There  are two frames that seem important to me going forward.  
The first is to understand these camps as places that save lives.  The second is to 
understand how embracing these unofficial sites might provide more than that temporary 
life saving capacity.  Resourced better and with assisted management, even Dignity 
Village could serve the purpose it had envisioned.   While Opportunity Village, and 
R2DTOO move in a cooperative direction with city management, it is possible that 
official language might include these places in their short-term strategies to end 
homelessness.  In this case, those of us who have spent time agonizing with our friends in 
the camps where we do our work, have every right to inform the process.  
 I am in favour of ambitious housing and supports for the homeless, especially for 
those with long term homelessness.  It is by now understood and accepted that providing 
housing first alleviates the anxiety disorders associated with homelessness, and also that 
with proper professional, educational, medical and psychiatric supports, newly housed 
individuals can learn to manage conventional spaces (Tsemberis 1994; WoodGreen 2005; 
City of Portland 2009, 2010; Weissman 2010; EHAC 2008, 2011; Evans 2012; Brown 
2011; Latimer et al (forthcoming); CMHC 2012; Chez Soi - Voir Les Voix web resource 
2013;). Brown (2011) cites figures in Toronto that say outdoor homelessness dropped by 
over 50% since 2006 when programs such as First Step to Homes and other Housing First 
initiatives received funding. Evans (2012) has shown that Housing First has similarly 
positive results in rural and urban settings in central US states. Even in Portland, where 
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the numbers of street people (outdoor homelessness) remain higher than national levels, 
rapid rehousing of chronically homeless people (usually disabled in mental or physical 
ways), veterans and families, the early targets of Opening Doors, has been reduced 
significantly (PHB 2012; NAEH 2013).  I will not argue against secure, safe and stable 
housing.  I originally argued that poor access and lack of affordability of housing is the 
cause of homelessness.  While Toronto seems to be a doing better job of getting people 
off the streets, Portland still suffers as do many US cities with this growing street 
problem.  As our friend the journalist said in chapter one, it’s not because of the weather 
that the homeless come to Portland.  It is because of a certain permissive attitude within 
the symbolic imaginary that looks at the use of space in a number of ways that the 
traditional bicameral distinction between first and second space does not anticipate.  Still,  
just as he wrote of this permissiveness, he was speaking in the language of intolerance, so 
both attitudes must exist. 
 As recently as August 2013, Portland’s Mayor Hales announced an escalation of 
police evictions of squatters and homeless campers in the downtown area, because they 
had become overcrowded and dangerous to the public. "This Is Not About 
Homelessness… It's About Lawlessness," he said to interviewers (That was the 
headline).1   Homeless people are in some cases, much bolder than they have been in 
the past.  Understanding that their lives are “street” lives, they have no choice but to be in 
public.  The image of the street homeless person is really shaking up the debates about 
housing.  The problem for policy makers and the critique of homelessness is not “does 
housing work?” We know housing works.  The problem is that regardless of current 
funding, history has shown that there is never enough money spent to house everyone 
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who needs it, and also, the numbers of newly homeless people keep rising across the U.S. 
adding to the numbers of chronically unhoused. Even though Portland, Seattle, Ashland 
and others are entering into NPO led intentional community projects, none of these are 
part of the official discourse on homelessness.   
 There is just not enough evidence or experience to articulate what these places 
mean, or how life is experienced there, to rationalize them to a public or a state funding 
system that looks for measures of success and failure to make sense of strategies.  Israel 
Bayer, Street Roots publisher and activist, Commissioner Sten, and others each with 
different political views, agree that intentional homeless communities will never be 
officially recognized as parts of housing strategies, even if they are officially licensed 
communities for the homeless.  Neoliberal governance would not allow that use into its 
own critique of governance because that would be tantamount to admitting a failure to 
govern well. Following Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), I suggest that currently, these 
hybrid shelter forms of the village are a step towards incorporating critique into the 
informal housing strategies of cities.  So they try to create in these spaces, the capacities 
to be rationalized.  If the village would run as the city wanted; if they followed the codes 
and rules - if they transitioned people back to the world in a positive way instead of to 
culverts and vans,  then they might be recognized as legitimate parts of the plan.   
 With the documents in place, governmentality studies would tell us, the failure of 
the village to self-govern, is not inherent to the rules and technologies of governing, but 
to results from the failure of the villagers to govern.   I would suggest that there is a way 
to link these perspectives by arguing that critical displacement leading to a new from of 
power becoming “power,” has reached a point where the spatialization of the critique is 
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being tinkered with, in order for an eventual incorporation into the institutional 
framework surrounding homelessness. But this as David Samson suggested back in 
chapter 5 (pages: 361-367) might mean identifying the needs of the homeless first before 
the needs of governance.  These models might work, if we understood better how they 
might meet real life needs of homeless people, understood as a diverse and heterogeneous 
population. Once again, if we know what to expect from such spaces, instead of defining 
how to be in certain spaces, the success rate might be much higher.  
 I am in favor of helping people get into supported housing. For me it is vital to the 
health of communities. However in a nation that has spent $700 billion annually on 
defense since 2001, and only $2 billion annually in the same time on housing, this is not 
going to happen.2  Even with a current boost to 5.3 billion dollars, there is no immediate 
long-term solution in sight. I want to be clear, that I would very much like to see the 
communal, sustainable and green community that intentional camps often idealize, but 
rarely achieve. I doubt they are feasible in the context of abject poverty and trauma that 
has come to define literal homelessness and Dignity Village. It might be that the camps 
we have talked about are, like democracy, as yet to come. Dignity Village has contributed 
to this emergence, and it is up those of us who are committed to understanding how such 
places work to help keep the critique alive.  A key to understanding the critical capacity 
of Dignity Village and other intentional communities stems from the community studies 
perspective we discussed earlier; this simply that communities are interconnected in 
various ways regardless of where they are located and how they understand themselves. 
Just as relations between people provide for potentially powerful experiences, so too are 
the ties between communities empowering for locality based social critiques. Dignity 
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Village has forgotten the importance of maintaining these ties, and this is something it 
must work on immediately.  
 Last words: Despite the increased tolerance for intentional camps in some cases, it 
is too soon to say that the grass roots critique of housing represented by intentional 
communities that we have discussed here, has been incorporated into official strategies to 
end homelessness.  Until that language appears in Ten-Year Plans, such places will 
always be on the discursive and critical margins of cities.   It is fair to say that social 
critique, understood finally as an organized attitude towards matters of social justice does 
play a role in what we see and can experience when we look at the spaces that homeless 
Oregonians are now colonizing.  Social critique is just very low on the agendas of 
Dignity Villagers, but the village constitutes a point on that continuum of debate 
regardless of what villagers think.  It is also clear that any chance of self-determination 
for these villages is a matter of keeping the critique alive. Liminality does not have to be 
perpetual.  When one considers the diverse range of attitudes, strategies, skills and 
attributes that villagers present when asked to confront a problem, then critical capacity 
merely needs the skilled human facilitators and leaders to render critique meaningful 
again and to empower villagers. It boils down to a question of strong leadership not only 
to keep village affairs in order, but also to guide the village’s collective capacity in action 
directed towards displacing the city and other opposing powers. Power is relational. As 
Ibrahim said, they have to fight to keep their freedom.  Other camps are fighting, 
R2DTOO, Opportunity Village, but it remains to be seen if they can enter operating 
agreements with city governance that transcends the liminality created for Dignity 
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Village.  These camps do not want to become Dignity Villages, put out and forgotten, and 
then subsumed into some wretched branch of an unofficial shelter system. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Endnotes -  Conclusions: Pages 536-555. 
 




2  Take for example, that according to Washington Post the US spent between 600 
and 700 billion a year since 2001 on defense.  
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/07/everything-chuck-
hagel-needs-to-know-about-the-defense-budget-in-charts/) 
 “In 2013-2014, Obama will spend over   5.3 billion, which is the most any regime 
has ever spent on homelessness. It is still less than .007% of that figure.  Note the 
following statement from Obama’s office “Chair and Vice-Chair of the United States 
Interagency Council on Homelessness, we are pleased to announce that President 
Obama's Fiscal Year 2014 Budget demonstrates an unwavering commitment to the goals 
of Opening Doors.  Overall, the President's Budget requests $5.3 billion in homeless 
programs across all federal agencies. 
 Over the last three years, with President Obama's leadership and strong 
partnerships among federal agencies, and with states and local communities, we have 
implemented Opening Doors by helping communities reduce the number of Veterans 
who experience homelessness by 18 percent and the number of Americans who 
experience chronic homelessness by 10 percent. We've  also demonstrated that smart, 
targeted investments can reduce homelessness - even in the wake of a historic 
recession.  This year's Budget strengthens our investment in targeted homelessness 
programs by 21.1 percent over fiscal year 2012 enacted levels and provides our 
communities more of the resources they need to become stronger, healthier, and more 
productive by preventing and ending homelessness. 
 This Administration is dedicated to ensuring that our Nation's Veterans, families, 
children, and all who suffer chronic homelessness have a safe, stable place to call 
home.  We are investing in responsible solutions that not only reduce homelessness, but 
also strengthen our communities by promoting stronger educational outcomes and 
reducing the taxpayer burden of preventable and costly emergency care and institutional 
services. 
 Thank you for your partnership in this important effort.  We hope you will join us 
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